The point that I'm about to present stems from a famous rhetorical question, posed by Socrates in Plato's Republic, known as the Euthyphro dilemma. It goes like this:

"Is the pious loved by the gods because it is pious, or is it pious because it is loved by the gods?"


While reflecting on that timeless question started my train of thought, I'm after something slightly different here. Let's suppose for the sake of argument that God doesn't exist, and that morality as we know it has been constructed and influenced solely by human invention and evolution over the ages. There are clearly many reasons why an accepted system of morality helps us flourish as a species. From an evolutionary standpoint, it goes a long way to preventing us from murdering one another -- and especially our children -- which could potentially be very bad for our gene pool as a whole. Human morality is largely influenced by our capacity for empathic connection that gives us incentive to live harmoniously in groups. Living in groups is conducive to the formation of economic innovation and organization that permits market interaction, and allows a rationalized pursuit of comparative advantage to yield greater economic returns. In sum, human societies flourish on the basis of social and economic interaction, and moral systems based on empathy facilitate those interactions and make them sustainable.

So assuming that morality was not divinely delivered to us, and that moral teachings found in holy scriptures are the product of human construction over the course of history, we are left to confront the conclusion that our moral codes exist for no reason other than because they are convenient to our existence as a species.

That means, however, that (as far as I can tell) there are some problematic implications. Consider the following thought experiment:


You wake up on a deserted island next to a stranger. You know nothing about this person other than that they are not your friend or your loved one. The two of you are the only ones on this island, and nobody else will ever come to this island. Nobody knows you are here, and you will never be rescued or returned to civilization. There are no laws on this island, criminal or otherwise. This island is, for all intents and purposes, a moral vacuum. There is no food on this island, except, of course, for each other. However, the stranger will never hurt or kill you, even if it means that they will starve. You will starve if you don't kill and eat the stranger.

Is it intrinsically wrong to kill the stranger in order to save yourself? Even if there is an abundance of food on the island, is it wrong to kill them? Let's suppose that a person lacking the empathic capacity (aka a psychopath) finds himself in this situation. What reason does he have not to kill the stranger? And if he has no reason not to, what good argument could there be for why he shouldn't murder the stranger?


This thought experiment seems to demonstrate, imo, that if we control for the social and evolutionary benefits of a moral code that prohibits murder, for instance, there ceases to be a good reason to prevent one person from murdering another if they should want to for whatever reason. Obviously our empathic instincts would prevent the vast majority of us from committing murder even in the absence of legal retribution or some threat of revenge. But that's not the same thing as murder being intrinsically immoral.

Discuss

So what? You have basically said "if things are not intrinsically immoral, then things are not intrinsically moral". Okay, let's accept that murder isn't intrinsically immoral, and that we can't convince psychopaths through force of logic that it is. What, exactly, is the problem?

That what we give enormous value to - morality - is undeserving of that value. Much like the Church was valued too highly at one point in time.

For example, I'll choose the selfish/hedonistic choice if it gives me a more interesting life experience.

Why shouldn't I?

why would morality not being intrinsic or natural affect how much value it has

If I value new life experiences highly, and I'm more likely to have a new and interesting life experience by cheating on a partner for example, then I would be morally justified in doing so, as I would be against doing so.

To add to this, let's imagine that my emotional well-being is like a fortress and that I don't value jealousy at all: so if my partner wants to cheat, I would encourage it. In this instance, there would be no double-standard, or lies involved, yet society's overvaluation of the moral value of - one partner at a time - would cringe at the notion.

I often feel that society clings too strongly to outdated moral values, hence my perception that they overvalue morality in general.

Don't get me wrong I think we often consider some property morally relevant when it isn't and I agree that society is often too slow in realising this but I don't think it affects the value derived from actually morally relevant properties success.

Well for one thing, I can imagine a situation where human life ceases to have intrinsic value if it doesn't provide a benefit to their social group. For instance, apart from our empathic instincts, what reason do we have to keep the mentally and physically disabled alive? Disabled people often don't contribute to society in any utilitarian way, and indeed often drain resources. The reason we devote time and resources to their well-being is because we belief that as human beings their lives have intrinsic value, and our human empathy for each other means that we want to prevent/limit their suffering. But as far as I can tell, the logical conclusion to all this means that murdering a severely handicapped person has no downside, apart from the emotional suffering it causes others due to empathy.

You touch on a lot and any response I give will be inadequate but I would like to clarify what exactly you mean by intrinsic and why are extrinsic attributions of value worth less?

How to answer the question regarding killing a severely handicapped individual depends on a number of factors, firstly for a utilitarian what account of the good you subscribe to and in what manner can this good be satisfied by committing this act. Does the severely handicapped person suffer less? Is the utilitarian concerned with average or total utility, both face serious challenges. Does the utilitarian subscribe to a rule utilitarianism that prefers rules that we don't commit non-voluntary euthanasia? Some may argue that post birth abortions of disabled children are morally acceptable while others may hold that it is of greater concern that we build the type of society that cares for its most vulnerable. In any case these arguments do not rest on whether the value we ascribe to a human life is intrinsic or not.

And we don't always value life above the wishes of the individual, in a number of countries it is acceptable to assist someone to end their life, we do not value the persons life over their decision to end it.

Well i dont see anything immoral about abandoning lifetime monogamy (deceiving those closest to you and engaging in codified relationships like marriage based on those deceptions is a different story). It seems to be a good deal about a response to economic realities in highly gendered past societies than a function of human desires. That is, while we clearly pair bond regularly, even in the existence of a dont cheat social taboo we have sex outside of these bonds pretty regularly and end these bonds for new ones regularly, and one can imagine that without this social taboo sexual encounters outaide of lifetime monogamy would be even more frequent.

But anyways...im still not seeing the problem. We can debate the value of a particular moral claim. But i dont see "isnt a fundamental property of the universe" as some massive problem. Okay, thinking of morality as, say, socialky codified behavioural norms isnt as glamours as the ten commandments, but is it problematic?

Sure, if a society accepted that maximizing economic output was the only measure of the good, then killing off disabled people would be valued by such a society. However, our human tendencies to value human life, to appreciate charity and fairness and the like has meant that in our present societies at least - where resources are relatively plentiful compared to past times - we are more than happy to spend extraordinary amount of resources raising and educating and healing severally handicapped people.

I suppose that's indeed the best way to frame the question, and I haven't considered it that way before. I would define "intrinsic" as having inalienable value that is not merely a means to an end but an end in itself (much like Kant's second formulation of the Categorical Imperative). Extrinsic attributions of value, on the other hand, I would say are derived from their instrumental use in the pursuit of some goal or end.

I guess I find this all problematic (in the sense that it makes me uncomfortable. It still conforms perfectly to a cynical view of life and reality, our place in the universe, etc.) because it would seem to instrumentalize human life, which is directly counter to the Categorical Imperative.

Is empathy intrinsic?

Fair.
Fair point too.

It's not particularly problematic I guess. It's simply all the grey areas that make it problematic in reality, although it may not be so in theory.

It's difficult to live by theory as well, and although I don't value jealousy - based on theory - there are other aspects in my life where in theory - I do not value - but in reality I struggle to change.

I'm also worried of the implications of becoming someone whose values and behavior are very closely aligned. Although theory suggests its a good thing.

If there is no God, then there is only one possible ultimate outcome for the species and the entire universe: death. Hot death by cosmic contraction or cold death by continued expansion of the universe... either way, we and the universe end in annihilation.

So, who the heck cares about the alleged short-term benefit of the social group or temporarily continuing the species?

Hedonism it is.

Still cant figure out how things being finite means doom for morals, time to rape and pillage.


Also the mandatory.... You should hope if there is a God its not judging you by the desires of your heart and instead by your actions that are held in check by him exiting.

I think a lot of social / cultural values are often treated as moral issues when they are not. Certain behaviours are considered immoral, when they are counter to the social / cultural norms. Monogamy is a good example, it's commonly held to be immoral to break in modern Western cultures but there are other cultures where it is not practiced or expected. If, as in your example, all the behaviour is out in the open and nothing happens in secret or against any of the participants wishes, no-one has been hurt, hence no immoral behaviour happened. But society frowns on it and labels it (incorrectly imo) as immoral.

Empathy is part of human behaviour, I don't think you can justify morality to a person that lacks empathy, they wouldn't understand it.

If you have empathy, you know what it feels like to be wronged, you actually feel those emotions / sensations via mirror neurons, and you would not want the same immoral act done to you. If this is all true, and you act against empathy anyway, this is immoral behaviour. I'd say that a lot of the time this happens, the perpetrator compartmentalises themselves from the person they have wronged, or they hold a prejjudice against that person (or group) such that they do not think they are deserving of equal treatment. If they can be persuaded to recognise that person is a real person affected by their actions (in the former), or is their equal and deserving of empathy (in the latter), you should see a change in their attitude. Showing remorse is a key part of the judicial process when someone harms another person, and I think for the most part it genuinely happens.

I think only in cases of sociopathic tendencies, or deeply rooted prejudice, would you see a complete lack of empathy, sociopaths not having it and bigots unable to apply it.

In summary, the fact that I feel terrible when I see someone else get hurt is as much a fact about me as my eyes are green. When you say that people cling to moral values, I don't think there is much choice in the matter. Just as you cannot control your beliefs, they develop over time, so you cannot control the fact that seeing others in distress is also distressful to you, and helping others makes you feel good.

We are probably making moral progress (seeing others as equals) in the same way that we are making intellectual progress, there will always be some that are ahead of the curve, and others that are well behind.

Now I'm starting to ramble...

archimedes11:

As someone who, like you, used to struggle with this issue more than I do now but who has settled a lot as I've gotten older and quieted the part of my brain that would keep me up at night thinking about this -- the same part that fueled many an enthusiastic debate in college and grad school -- I appreciate what you're asking / thinking about.

Let me also out myself as an atheist (well, maybe a 99% atheist) who, mostly as a mostly unthinking & adolescent, has flirted with religion, and who also sees the problem of not being able find a transcental backing to moral beliefs -- to our beliefs, to people from completely different cultures, and all those who hold very different and conflicting beliefs about what is "right" or "just." Indeed, the fact that there can be so much variety in the world of our complicated species in what people claim to know, and that ultimately none of it is provable, and that (except for fundamentalists who I truly believe are in the minority) there will never be a book or any concrete/incarnate example from the divine telling us how things really are, is ... problematic. To say the least.

I'm not really addressing your thought experiment here (though I do find it interesting); I only wanted to offer how I've settled this in my head, as much as that's possible anyway. Essentially it's secular humanism. It's something, I think, you were hinting at in your OP in that we've necessarily constructed societies that more or less allow for a great number of us to flourish, or at the very least survive, and have used as it's basis moral codes that keep us (again, more or less, with varying degrees of success and usually with many contradictions and flaws) from killing one another and to keep us procreating. But for me, like you I'm guessing, morality and ethics are two distinct things that many people conflate; the former is vague and often without reason, and is doled out arbitrarily at times, and overall quite problematic.

I guess I've just let go a lot of my difficulty in trying to justify what is moral and how why we ought to act "morally." It's a piffle. Much like the Cartesian question of how do we know for sure that we exist. Much like many of the debates that try to answers questions that we clearly will never understand. I let, for the most part, folks who want to engage in these arguments have their arguments on their own.

But for me this doesn't mean I can't engage the issues of ethics. I can't justify whatever my personal, highly subjective code of ethics are in a transcendental truth, but that's ok. What I try to do now is live in a way that gives me as much pleasure as I can have while at the same time doing as little harm as possible to others. What I do "know" (as much as it's possible to know anything) is that suffering is real. The pain we can inflict on others is real. I don't want to suffer, and it's safe to say most people don't, so I try not give out something that both I don't want personally, and/or something that would be harmful to the people around me, and by extension to others in the global community as a whole. It's an arbitrary line, and it's sometimes difficult to balance to two. But it's what's allowed me to get through my youth and my 20's & early 30's and to become the very imperfect -- yet mostly at peace -- person that I am today. I try to have compassion for others, even if I can't justify in an objective morality; it's in part selfish because it means I'm at odds with fewer people in the world, and also because it makes for a more civil society. And I'm not interested in living apart from society. And thankfully I'm not stranded on that island you described.

There are two authors/thinkers who impacted me a lot that I figured I'd throw out there. One is someone you might have heard of who's had a lot of critical and popular success recently: Richard Dawkins. He wrote The Selfish Gene and the God Delusion, among others. The second is Richard Rorty and his book Contingency, Irony, and Solidarity. It's a bit more academic but somewhat short, albeit dense. Very very broadly, he argues that while we can't prove an objective truth that is contingent in something transcendent, and while we can be ironic about it (that is, we can acknowledge that it's impossible and hold conflicting beliefs that at odds with public "truths"), we can also find solidarity among each and live compassionately (essentially try to be less cruel to one another) without needing to ground that in abstract notions of justice and morality.

Well, that's my two cents. It was nice finding this post and thinking about this for little while today. I probably won't respond again, but I'm glad to have engaged here.

Now back to poker. Cheers.

The answer is easy:
Someone who eats, will die too.
Humanity/Morality is about: I rather die as a human than acting like/as an animal.
Philosophy wrongly assumes: Cogito ergo sum is what makes the difference between humans and animals.
This is wrong!
What makes the difference is: Humans can overcome the beast in themselves. Animals cannot.
Reason: Thinking subordinated to instincts is not thinking, it is instinct, no matter how complex.
How this? When a dog is subordinated to me and kills someone because of my order than I am the killer not the dog. At least regarding the killing act, me and the dog are the same.

So to correct the title: Morality is not subjective. Every time we do harm someone in anyway because of food, sex, power (defending/expanding territory) we act like an animal thus we act immoral.

"Is the pious loved by the gods because it is pious, or is it pious because it is loved by the gods?"
The answer is: What is loved by the gods, we call it pious.

Since humans are animals and cant not be it must be that not doing harm for food sex and power is also acting like an animals.

Then it is not cheating. Cheating implies an expectation of adhering to certain rules. These are not present in this scenario.

I have a feeling I shouldn't engage in this but just a quick thought....

But this argument is still predicated on: 1) the assumption that there's a meaningful distinction between human-animals (for we are, whether you like it or not, sentient being made of bones and muscle, etc., just as non human animals are) and I guess what you're suggesting are beast-animals, which btw also are also self-aware, sentient beings who also happen to be less intelligent than we are, or at least in the way we quantify intelligence. It also assumes 2) that there is a inherent, self-evident hierarchy between these two categories of human vs. the "beasts" we can somehow "overcome."

I'm pointing this out because even if these are correction assumptions, it doesn't speak to the issue posed by the OP. And regardless, the reasoning here is circular; I think you're basically saying we are moral because we are not animals, and that is what makes us moral. Or another way of putting it is, we know our moral system to be true because we know it to be true (because we are not animals).

But again, this doesn't get us out of the circularity of your position and doesn't really get us to the question of how we ground morality in something that isn't subjective, how we prove it's value despite our bias, or how do know what we think to be right or wrong as transcendentally, absolutely right or wrong outside of our very human perspective.

Also, just to frame what's underlying our conversation here, let's keep this in mind because I think there's a conflation of these two notions.

Morals are the principles on which one’s judgments of right and wrong are based. Ethics are principles of right conduct.

So the two nouns are related and sometimes interchangeable, but mostly they are not. The main difference is that morals are more abstract and often personal or religion-based or based on the notion of there being inherent "Truth" (with a capital T) out there, overarching our subjective points of view. Ethics, however, are more practical, conceived as shared principles promoting fairness in social, cultural, and economic interactions, among other things.

I'd be interested in what the OP thinks about all of this. You there, archimedes11?

Every time when we act and our intention is not the same as the intention of animals, we are acting humanly or at least not acting like animals.
How this is circular only god knows and you.
This is actually also the story of Jesus going into desert: I rather die than living like an animal.
Just like Buddha, Elijah, Moses, Mohammed....

But this distinction you keep making doesn't get at how our view/belief about what is moral is, in fact, truly and absolutely THE correction perspective on morality. You're saying we know what is moral because we are human and somehow that makes us correct.

I'm not saying there is no difference between a member of the human species and, say, a house cat. But this difference doesn't explain how we can really know whether our belief in is right or wrong is more than subjective. Ok, we're human beings -- a category you (and many of us) think is important. That's fine. But does that necessarily make our opinions about morality correct?

I guess the question is how much can we really "know" about something like this, and how can we ever claim to have a perspective that is beyond/outside of the lens we looking through. It's safe to say we are always bound by our subjectivity, so trying to tackle questions of absolute truth (and thus, by extension, morality) is tricky -- or as the OP said, problematic at the very least.