Wiki: morality "A key issue is the meaning of the terms "moral" or "immoral". Moral realism would hold that there are true moral statements which report objective moral facts, whereas moral anti-realism would hold that morality is derived from any one of the norms prevalent in society (cultural relativism); the edicts of a god (divine command theory); is merely an expression of the speakers' sentiments (emotivism); an implied imperative (universal prescriptivism); or falsely presupposes that there are objective moral facts (error theory)."

After seeing the debate (Craig vs Antony) posted in the adams modified command theory thread, I wondered a bit on the basis of morality for theists.

On 'objective' morality, there are traditionally two ways of looking from a theistic point of view, best held out as the Euthyphro dilemma. Wiki here. "Is an action morally good because God commands it, or does God command it because it is morally good?"

In the debate, Craig held a third option(@02:50), claiming it is a false dilemma. "The good is neither something arbitrarily invented by God, nor something to which God is subserviant. Rather, the good just is the nature of God himself and expresses itself toward us in the form of his divine commands. This provides a logically coherent basis for objective moral values, duties and moral accountability."

Id like to split the discussion in three pieces. The first on this idea and others like it:
Does Craig indeed have a third alternative here? Why is it different than the divine command theory?
Are there other interpretations by theists on the basis of morality?

The second on what this means for the Christian believer.
For the Christian, is not the divine command theory a given due to the events in the bible? Are there not plenty of instances (in the bible) where God "changes his mind" regarding certain acts, endorsing or retracting their "moral" worth?

Then the last issue.
Believing the divine command theory (which is theistic, not revealed), how do we obtain God's commands?
I suspect most Abrahamic religious followers will point to their holy book here and go with revealed command. On this a question: how does one seperate revealed divine command from misguided words or downright misinformation?
How does one unify the answer to this with a belief in the struggle between the Devil and God? Or, believing revealed divine command, how do you sort between two competing 'revealing beings'?

i dont see how thats a third option...that would just take the latter answer of the dilemna...god commands it because its morally good. (and that moral good is a nature of god.)

edit: and god would indeed be subserviant to it, if it was his nature. if its his nature to be good...then its inescapable for him to be good. hence, he is 100% subserviant to good.

That might fly in the Middle Ages, but not today. Why do people think Craig is so brilliant when he makes these arguments that are so full of epistemic holes? Where's the beef, Craig?

I think for most people, it's hard to think straight when an educated, eloquent speaking guy tells them stuff that already agrees with their intuitive sense of the world. They are either unaware or refuse to accept that it is precisely when a claim is most agreeable that one should be most skeptically alert.

What is it in that sentence that you take issue with?

Self-describing quotation?

Obviously claims which are more agreeable tend to be correct more often than claims which are less agreeable.

In a certain sense, absolutely. That's why when I find a claim to be very agreeable I remind myself to be extra careful. The more I want something to be true the more vigilant I must be in making sure I'm believing in something for the right reasons.

Well it really depends on what you mean by "agreeable". If you mean agreeable to human intuition, then I think history will show you pretty much the exact opposite of what you're saying.

As DA said, it's just a semantic rewording of the proposition "God commands things because they are good," or "things are good because God commands them." It makes no difference to say "well, God is inherently good, so things he commands must be good." Why? If God is inherently good, that means he CANNOT act in such a way that is non-good. So ultimately, goodness trumps God-ness, or otherwise "good" becomes a meaningless term (since it is merely what you are compelled to do via command). It misses the entire point of the Euthyphro Dilemma, and it still never answers the million-dollar question: how do you know?

Why?
Why does it become a meaningless term if you are compelled to do it?

How can goodness trump Godness? If God is good, meaning that it is just a part of God, then what you are saying is essentially "Godness trumps Godness", which obviously doesn't make any sense.

Goodness is not something that God chooses, as if he could choose nongoodness, but something that God is. and goodness does not exist apart from God.

The problem with the question is that it is inherently flawed as it treats goodness as a separate entity, as if it could exist on it's own. But it cannot. God's will and good are interchangeable.

A short example:
1. acts that are performed now and are (im)moral may be performed later and not be (im)moral.
2. acts that are performed now are (im)moral and may be performed later and will still be (im)moral.

1 is divine command theory, 2 is not. The third option does not change anything in the example and adheres to option 1. Do you agree?

From the OP:
"For the Christian, is not the divine command theory a given due to the events in the bible?"

Id like to put this on the table again, as im curious wether this is true, or learn that there are other options for the Christian (and the other abrahamic religions).