The Just World Fallacy and the Problem of Evil
What you're hoping to get, however, is the converse: People hypothesizing (or even being biased towards assuming) that bad/unfair consequences are indicative of morally bad deeds prior. And it's telling that you seem to be unsure yourself how prevalent such a sentiment is.
If you take that to the extreme, you'd have that someone entertaining the j-w-h could waltz into a hospital and tell anyone in the ICU that they really should have been more moral people earlier. I suspect, even among hardened evangelicals, you'll find few with a strong enough stomach for such a stunt.
In any case, whether or not someone would 'waltz' into a hospital and act as you describe, or fleetingly wonder what circumstances would mean that it isn't likely to happen to them, are entirely different things. Nice straw man though.
Tawdry tactics Fret, come on.... If I argued like this you would justifiably rip me a new one.
You're getting hung up on the notion of "trying to find reasons why it won't happen to us." This is not the j-w-h, however, and the first part of this (trying to find reasons why it happened) is entirely rational. We are a curious breed - if **** happens, we want to know why.
What you need to show, first, is that we do it "such that we comfort ourselves" into knowing that it won't happen to us. It doesn't seem you have people here convinced that this is the most prevalent (or even somewhat relevant) factor of why we ask "Why did it happen to him." Then you'd have to find a way to get the directionality-issue out of the way: "if a then b" does not allow the conclusion "b, hence a". Only after you've clarified those two, you'll be in a position to specify more clearly, how it - third - relates to theodicy and religious rationalizations of the problem of evil.
In addition, something not being a fact has little to do with being wrong either.
But besides terminology: If I act kindly towards others, in general I get acted kindly back. That seems to be pretty hard to disproove (and if you're honest to yourself, you'll agree that this is true in your daily life just as it is in mine). If you label the first part (acting kindly towards others) as altruistic behavior, Iterative Prisoners Dilemma gives you a non-trivial explanation why this is not automatically a bad strategy. So, in the social sphere, the assumption that good deeds pay off is certainly not a bias that is simply "wrong". An unquestioned transfer of that dynamic to the world at large (diseases, accidents, w/e) would result in errors of judgement, sure. But still - it's an error not because of an incorrect premise but a faulty transfer of dynamics of one sphere to another.
While I agree that this is not what the thread is about, you're making it too easy for yourself if you just read the label on the box, see "bias", and simply conclude that "something in here is objectively wrong".
Not really that telling, I'm simply being reasonably uncertain. It's not really fair to then use that uncertainty to undermine my position. If I were unreasonably certain, as in the past, you'd use that too. Be charitable here.
I suspect that the JWH is at play in a religious context (how could it not be, theists are human too aren't they?),
In any case, whether or not someone would 'waltz' into a hospital and act as you describe, or fleetingly wonder what circumstances would mean that it isn't likely to happen to them, are entirely different things. Nice straw man though.
You're getting hung up on the notion of "trying to find reasons why it won't happen to us." This is not the j-w-h, however, and the first part of this (trying to find reasons why it happened) is entirely rational. We are a curious breed - if **** happens, we want to know why.
The just-world hypothesis (or just-world fallacy) is the cognitive bias that human actions eventually yield morally fair and fitting consequences, so that, ultimately, noble actions are duly rewarded and evil actions are duly punished. In other words, the just-world hypothesis is the tendency to attribute consequences to, or expect consequences as the result of, an unspecified power that restores moral balance; the fallacy is that this implies (often unintentionally) the existence of such a power in terms of some cosmic force of justice, desert, stability, or order in the universe.
Hence:
Either we agree to accept the bias exists, to avoid the regress, and we have the conversation, or we don't and it's over.
What you need to show, first, is that we do it "such that we comfort ourselves" into knowing that it won't happen to us. It doesn't seem you have people here convinced that this is the most prevalent (or even somewhat relevant) factor of why we ask "Why did it happen to him." Then you'd have to find a way to get the directionality-issue out of the way: "if a then b" does not allow the conclusion "b, hence a". Only after you've clarified those two, you'll be in a position to specify more clearly, how it - third - relates to theodicy and religious rationalizations of the problem of evil
As for how to show that - well, assuming that we've established that the part about "to assure ourselve that it won't happen to us" is indeed not what the JWH is about but simply your interpretation as to its existence and utilization by us, one way to suggest this link would be to point to human traits that suggest that we constantly habour significant worries about troublesome future events. Perhaps risk aversion would point towards this conclusion, as well as some other cognitive biases such as the Framing effect. Not sure how far you'd get with this, but it'd be a try.
For my 2) above (directionality), you would simply have to suggest/present evidence that at least a significant portion of mankind is indeed capable of going from "If A then B" to "B, hence A". On its surface, it doesn't seem unlikely that one can show that.
After that, you can posit an explanation on how that relates to religious folks in particular.
Ugh. Just to clear up terminology: Something being a cognitive bias doesn't automatically mean it's "wrong". The Negativity bias, for example, is probably very key to evolutionary success as there is a very distinct and disastrous lower bound for negative experience that we best not reach. Also from a psychological PoV it isn't necessarily wrong: if bad experiences impact my (psychologically) more than good experiences, it's entirely rational to give more attention to negative experiences (in order to avoid them).
In addition, something not being a fact has little to do with being wrong either.
In addition, something not being a fact has little to do with being wrong either.
1) I'm 'pretty sure' it's wrong that people have somehow deserved or earned something bad happening to them and because of that it's not likely to happen to me. I don't believe in a higher power, or force or karma and I fully accept that some things are just random and it could happen to me.
2) It's a cognitive bias and as such may not apply to everyone in every situation. It's not written in stone to me, it doesn't explain everything, just something to consider as an explanation for some situations.
And yes, I associated the word 'fact' with 'right', I shouldn't have done that. Lazy thinking again.
In this part I wasn't undermining it but simply drawing attention to the fact that you seem to be unsure of its prevalence once it's spelled out in detail. Given that most itt don't seem to hold the views of the spelled-out version (multiple posters have assured you that a dying person doesn't immediately evoke thoughs of "where did he go wrong?" but simply compassion and sorrow), and you yourself don't seem to be convinced of it either, this seemed to be a releveant point.
Separately though, whilst multiple posters may have assured me that they don't do it, they still might. We engage in many behaviours that it surprises us to find out about. Most cognitive biases are unthinking and unrecognised whilst they are going on. I'm sure that there are other biases that they would deny they engage in whilst in fact engaging in them on a regular basis. It's not easily provable nor relevant to the OP so I didn't pursue that.
Just as an aside on argumentation: Here you're assuming that all humans are equally susceptible to the JWH - which is perhaps likely, but not simply evident (I would assume that Aspergers, for example, are not). Also, it's at least conceivable, that some theological argument negates the JWH, such that it would NOT affect theists at all. Concluding from theists humanness to their susceptibility to this or that particular bias is not valid.
I think it is valid:
P1) Some humans are susceptible to JWH (If you don't agree, we go no further)
P2) Theists are human
C) Some theists may be engaging the JWH
Since the conclusion can't be true while either of the premises are false, it's a valid argument.
You do see that there is nothing in there about rationalizing something to assure myself that it won't happen to me? The JWH - as a hypothesis - is claiming a specific relationship between causes and consequences; that it is done to assuage our worries about looming doom or some such is your interpretation.
SOURCE The idea that people need to believe one will get what one deserves so strongly that they will rationalize an inexplicable injustice by naming things the victim might have done to deserve it. Also known as blaming the victim, the just-world fallacy, and the just-world effect.
SOURCE The just-world phenomenon is a term referring to people's tendency to believe that the world is just and that people get what they deserve. Because people want to believe that the world is fair, they will look for ways to explain or rationalize away injustice - often by blaming the victim.
Those with this belief tend to think that when bad things happen to people, it is because these individuals are bad people or have done something to deserve their misfortune. Conversely, this belief also leads people to think that when good things happen to people it is because those individuals are good and deserving of their happy fortune
Those with this belief tend to think that when bad things happen to people, it is because these individuals are bad people or have done something to deserve their misfortune. Conversely, this belief also leads people to think that when good things happen to people it is because those individuals are good and deserving of their happy fortune
SOURCE
The need to see victims as the recipients of their just deserts can be explained by what psychologists call the Just World Hypothesis. According to the hypothesis, people have a strong desire or need to believe that the world is an orderly, predictable, and just place, where people get what they deserve. Such a belief plays an important function in our lives since in order to plan our lives or achieve our goals we need to assume that our actions will have predictable consequences.
The need to see victims as the recipients of their just deserts can be explained by what psychologists call the Just World Hypothesis. According to the hypothesis, people have a strong desire or need to believe that the world is an orderly, predictable, and just place, where people get what they deserve. Such a belief plays an important function in our lives since in order to plan our lives or achieve our goals we need to assume that our actions will have predictable consequences.
Ok, given your three additional definitions, where in them (and the original one from wiki) do you find: "What I'm describing is a cognitive bias with a very definite context, it's not 'trying to find reasons why it happened', it's trying to find reasons why it won't happen to us." I don't see that at all.
Ok, given your three additional definitions, where in them (and the original one from wiki) do you find: "What I'm describing is a cognitive bias with a very definite context, it's not 'trying to find reasons why it happened', it's trying to find reasons why it won't happen to us." I don't see that at all.
Example: Because it’s far too frightening for many to accept that bad things can happen to good people, and therefore that they themselves have no control over whether bad things might happen to them someday, they will instead search for ways to differentiate themselves from victims of ill fortune. For example, outsiders might deride people whose houses were destroyed by a tornado, blaming them for choosing to live in a disaster-prone area or for not building a stronger house.
Ok, its I sure been beat to death but can one actually state that there is a "just world fallacy" but more like a "just world hypothesis" ? It can then be proven or disproven( so to speak) but in the first case its a statement of fact which cannot be disproved as it does not allow movement from its statement of falsehood.
Is this more apropos in the "best of all possible worlds" augured by Leibniz and denied by Voltaire and Russell and of course, others on stream, yea or nay ?
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Best_of...ossible_worlds
If you do click on the Wikipedia article please note the statements of Aquinas concerning much of what is debated through many threads.
Voltaire mocked the above in his play, "Candide", which actually i had seen and brought to mind what the debate is about. I don't care for Voltaire and actually find him unhumorous,here, and while tweaking the Papal nose.
Is this more apropos in the "best of all possible worlds" augured by Leibniz and denied by Voltaire and Russell and of course, others on stream, yea or nay ?
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Best_of...ossible_worlds
If you do click on the Wikipedia article please note the statements of Aquinas concerning much of what is debated through many threads.
Voltaire mocked the above in his play, "Candide", which actually i had seen and brought to mind what the debate is about. I don't care for Voltaire and actually find him unhumorous,here, and while tweaking the Papal nose.
Right. Conveniently quoting one, and shortest, source. Had you made the effort to look just one step further you'd have found in the next link, that (a) they differentiate between explaining what the JWH is, and how to explain/interpret it and (b) that there are, indeed multiple competing interpretations/explanations:
... which might have alerted you to the fact that in your quote:
only the bolded is actually an example, while the underlined is again an explanation.
Had that alerted you enough to bothered looking in depth at the third source you cited, you'd have found that explanations of the phenomenon in it make no reference at all to your suggestion that the phenomenon is not to be explained as the attempt to simply find reasons for other peoples misfortune but rather specifically to find reason why their misfortune wont befall us.
Rather, they suggest:
In that article, the initial research is also mentioned - again without your suggested explanation:
It concludes with a word of caution:
Had you now turned to wikipedia, you'd have found:
In short, you take the least comprehensive source you can find and take it as pars pro toto for the entire phenomenon. Then you go on for 100 posts insisting that this is what the bias is about. srsly...
Question: What Is the Just-World Phenomenon?
Answer:
The just-world phenomenon
is a term referring to people's tendency to believe that the world is just and that people get what they deserve. Because people want to believe that the world is fair, they will look for ways to explain or rationalize away injustice - often by blaming the victim.
Those with this belief tend to think that when bad things happen to people, it is because these individuals are bad people or have done something to deserve their misfortune. Conversely, this belief also leads people to think that when good things happen to people it is because those individuals are good and deserving of their happy fortune.
[...]
Explanations for the Just-World Phenomenon
There are a few different explanations that have been proposed to explain the just-world phenomenon. First is the idea that people have a need to believe in their own invulnerability. For example, people don't like to think about themselves being the victims of a violent crime. So when they hear about an even such as an assault or a rape, they will blame the event on the behavior of the victim. By doing this, people can go on believing that they will never be the victim of such a crime because they will simply avoid these behaviors.
Another possible explanation for the just-world phenomenon is that people want to reduce the anxiety that is caused by injustices. Believing that the individual is completely responsible for their misfortune, people are able to go on believing that the world is fair and just.
Answer:
The just-world phenomenon
is a term referring to people's tendency to believe that the world is just and that people get what they deserve. Because people want to believe that the world is fair, they will look for ways to explain or rationalize away injustice - often by blaming the victim.
Those with this belief tend to think that when bad things happen to people, it is because these individuals are bad people or have done something to deserve their misfortune. Conversely, this belief also leads people to think that when good things happen to people it is because those individuals are good and deserving of their happy fortune.
[...]
Explanations for the Just-World Phenomenon
There are a few different explanations that have been proposed to explain the just-world phenomenon. First is the idea that people have a need to believe in their own invulnerability. For example, people don't like to think about themselves being the victims of a violent crime. So when they hear about an even such as an assault or a rape, they will blame the event on the behavior of the victim. By doing this, people can go on believing that they will never be the victim of such a crime because they will simply avoid these behaviors.
Another possible explanation for the just-world phenomenon is that people want to reduce the anxiety that is caused by injustices. Believing that the individual is completely responsible for their misfortune, people are able to go on believing that the world is fair and just.
Example: Because it’s far too frightening for many to accept that bad things can happen to good people, and therefore that they themselves have no control over whether bad things might happen to them someday, they will instead search for ways to differentiate themselves from victims of ill fortune. For example, outsiders might deride people whose houses were destroyed by a tornado, blaming them for choosing to live in a disaster-prone area or for not building a stronger house.
Had that alerted you enough to bothered looking in depth at the third source you cited, you'd have found that explanations of the phenomenon in it make no reference at all to your suggestion that the phenomenon is not to be explained as the attempt to simply find reasons for other peoples misfortune but rather specifically to find reason why their misfortune wont befall us.
Rather, they suggest:
People have a strong desire or need to believe that the world is an orderly, predictable, and just place, where people get what they deserve. [...] Such a belief plays an important function in our lives since in order to plan our lives or achieve our goals we need to assume that our actions will have predictable consequences. Moreover, when we encounter evidence suggesting that the world is not just, we quickly act to restore justice by helping the victim or we persuade ourselves that no injustice has occurred.
Lerner concluded that "the sight of an innocent person suffering without possibility of reward or compensation motivated people to devalue the attractiveness of the victim in order to bring about a more appropriate fit between her fate and her character."
Neither science nor psychology has satisfactorily answered the question of why the need to view the world as just exerts such a powerful influence on human behavior and the human psyche. But the research suggests that humans have a need to bring their beliefs about what is right into conformity with the objective reality they encounter--and that they will work to achieve consistency either by modifying their beliefs or attempting to modify that reality.
To explain the findings of these studies, Lerner theorized the prevalence of the belief in a just world. A just world is one in which actions and conditions have predictable, appropriate consequences. These actions and conditions are typically individuals' behaviors or attributes. The specific conditions that correspond to certain consequences are socially determined by the norms and ideologies of a society. Lerner presents the belief in a just world as functional: it maintains the idea that one can impact the world in a predictable way. Belief in a just world functions as a sort of "contract" with the world regarding the consequences of behavior. This allows people to plan for the future and engage in effective, goal-driven behavior. Lerner summarized his findings and his theoretical work in his 1980 monograph The Belief in a Just World: A Fundamental Delusion.[5]
Lerner hypothesized that the belief in a just world is crucially important for people to maintain for their own well-being. However, people are confronted daily with evidence that the world is not just: people suffer without apparent cause. Lerner explained that people use strategies to eliminate threats to their belief in a just world. These strategies can be rational or irrational. Rational strategies include accepting the reality of injustice, trying to prevent injustice or provide restitution, and accepting one's own limitations. Non-rational strategies include denial or withdrawal, and reinterpretation of the event.[citation needed]
There are a few modes of reinterpretation that could make an event fit the belief in a just world. One can reinterpret the outcome, the cause, and/or the character of the victim. In the case of observing the injustice of the suffering of innocent others, one major way to rearrange the cognition of an event is to interpret the victim of suffering as deserving of that suffering.[1] Specifically, observers can blame victims for their suffering on the basis of their behaviors and/or their characteristics. This would result in observers both derogating victims and blaming victims for their own suffering.[6] Much psychological research on the belief in a just world has focused on these negative social phenomena of victim blaming and victim derogation in different contexts.[2]
An additional effect of this thinking is that individuals experience less personal vulnerability because they do not believe they have done anything to deserve or cause negative outcomes.[2] This is related to the self-serving bias observed by social psychologists.[8]
Many researchers have interpreted just world beliefs as an example of causal attribution. In victim blaming, the causes of victimization are attributed to an individual rather than a situation. Thus, the consequences of belief in a just world may be related to or explained in terms of particular patterns of causal attribution.[9]
Lerner hypothesized that the belief in a just world is crucially important for people to maintain for their own well-being. However, people are confronted daily with evidence that the world is not just: people suffer without apparent cause. Lerner explained that people use strategies to eliminate threats to their belief in a just world. These strategies can be rational or irrational. Rational strategies include accepting the reality of injustice, trying to prevent injustice or provide restitution, and accepting one's own limitations. Non-rational strategies include denial or withdrawal, and reinterpretation of the event.[citation needed]
There are a few modes of reinterpretation that could make an event fit the belief in a just world. One can reinterpret the outcome, the cause, and/or the character of the victim. In the case of observing the injustice of the suffering of innocent others, one major way to rearrange the cognition of an event is to interpret the victim of suffering as deserving of that suffering.[1] Specifically, observers can blame victims for their suffering on the basis of their behaviors and/or their characteristics. This would result in observers both derogating victims and blaming victims for their own suffering.[6] Much psychological research on the belief in a just world has focused on these negative social phenomena of victim blaming and victim derogation in different contexts.[2]
An additional effect of this thinking is that individuals experience less personal vulnerability because they do not believe they have done anything to deserve or cause negative outcomes.[2] This is related to the self-serving bias observed by social psychologists.[8]
Many researchers have interpreted just world beliefs as an example of causal attribution. In victim blaming, the causes of victimization are attributed to an individual rather than a situation. Thus, the consequences of belief in a just world may be related to or explained in terms of particular patterns of causal attribution.[9]
Phew!! For awhile there I thought that wall of text was aimed at me.
Everything you quoted seems to support how I'm interpreting the JWH, I'm really at a loss as to why you don't see it.
How do these excerpts from the quotes you listed NOT mean that the result of the bias is that people reassure themselves? That's what the bias does and that's all that I need to take from it to ask the OP question.
people have a need to believe in their own invulnerability.
or
people want to reduce the anxiety that is caused by injustices.
or
Because it’s far too frightening for many to accept that bad things can happen to good people, and therefore that they themselves have no control over whether bad things might happen to them someday
or
Such a belief plays an important function in our lives since in order to plan our lives or achieve our goals
or
people want to reduce the anxiety that is caused by injustices.
or
Because it’s far too frightening for many to accept that bad things can happen to good people, and therefore that they themselves have no control over whether bad things might happen to them someday
or
Such a belief plays an important function in our lives since in order to plan our lives or achieve our goals
No, not assuming that 'all' humans are equally susceptible to it, just that it's common enough to have been identified, tested for, and named.
I think it is valid:
P1) Some humans are susceptible to JWH (If you don't agree, we go no further)
P2) Theists are human
C) Some theists may be engaging the JWH
Since the conclusion can't be true while either of the premises are false, it's a valid argument.
I think it is valid:
P1) Some humans are susceptible to JWH (If you don't agree, we go no further)
P2) Theists are human
C) Some theists may be engaging the JWH
Since the conclusion can't be true while either of the premises are false, it's a valid argument.
Oddly enough, most Christians believe that Christ did nothing bad at all, yet he was mocked, scourged and crucified.
Christ Himself spoke about accidental tragedies, saying that a bunch of people who were killed in a tower that collapsed did not sin any more than those outside the tower that lived.
Christ Himself spoke about accidental tragedies, saying that a bunch of people who were killed in a tower that collapsed did not sin any more than those outside the tower that lived.
What I'm describing is a cognitive bias with a very definite context, it's not 'trying to find reasons why it happened', it's trying to find reasons why it won't happen to us. There's no getting hung up, just a discussion about a specific behaviour in a limited context.
people have a need to believe in their own invulnerability.
or
people want to reduce the anxiety that is caused by injustices.<--This can happen for all sorts of reasons, obv., only ONE of which is a to strenghten their belief in their own invulnerability.
or
Because it’s far too frightening for many to accept that bad things can happen to good people, and therefore that they themselves have no control over whether bad things might happen to them someday
or
People have a strong desire or need to believe that the world is an orderly, predictable, and just place, where people get what they deserve.
or
in order to plan our lives or achieve our goals we need to assume that our actions will have predictable consequences
or
Lerner presents the belief in a just world as functional: it maintains the idea that one can impact the world in a predictable way. Belief in a just world functions as a sort of "contract" with the world regarding the consequences of behavior. This allows people to plan for the future and engage in effective, goal-driven behavior..
or
people want to reduce the anxiety that is caused by injustices.<--This can happen for all sorts of reasons, obv., only ONE of which is a to strenghten their belief in their own invulnerability.
or
Because it’s far too frightening for many to accept that bad things can happen to good people, and therefore that they themselves have no control over whether bad things might happen to them someday
or
People have a strong desire or need to believe that the world is an orderly, predictable, and just place, where people get what they deserve.
or
in order to plan our lives or achieve our goals we need to assume that our actions will have predictable consequences
or
Lerner presents the belief in a just world as functional: it maintains the idea that one can impact the world in a predictable way. Belief in a just world functions as a sort of "contract" with the world regarding the consequences of behavior. This allows people to plan for the future and engage in effective, goal-driven behavior..
There is the difference between THE explanation and A explanation. In particular since you stated that the JWH is a congitive bias for a SPECIFIC context and goal:
Your rendering is not supported by the bolded explanations:
Thus, you claimed the JHW is a bias intended to achieve ONE specific result. The Interwebz disagrees.
Your rendering is not supported by the bolded explanations:
Thus, you claimed the JHW is a bias intended to achieve ONE specific result. The Interwebz disagrees.
I'm looking at a cognitive bias in a specific context, that of religion. I'm not saying "that the JWH is a cognitive bias for a SPECIFIC context and goal:"
That's the reason that I haven't been looking at the reverse side of this bias, that people often assume that good things happen to good people, it's not relevant ITT.
And I got the explanation the wrong way around.
Then I'm pretty much at a loss how you can think this can result in anything but a trainwreck:
You take a cognitive bias that can kick in in a multitude of different contexts (observing a person electroshocked vs. 43yr old dying of cancer vs. earthquake vs. Madoff getting arrested for a ponzi scheme) and is being explained in a number of different ways, and reduce your discussion of it to ONE context and ONE explanation (while not being too clear about it). You don't argue for the validity of that reduction. Furthermore, you simply claim that some specific contexts aren't relevant for your intended topic, again without argument.
Thus, without justifying any of these steps, you chip and chop both the bias, context and explanation to a size you find appropiate and then ask how it relates to religion.
That won't work. Take a bias, understand how it works, gather all proposed explanations, try to find common themes and patterns. Given that comprehensive undestanding of the underlying cognitive mechanisms of the bias, take the context you're interested in (religion) and again find common themes and patterns - this time of contexts and situations in which the bias might be at work. Then try to find correlations and observable differences to non-believers and then hypothesize about the perhaps religious reasons for these differences.
You take a cognitive bias that can kick in in a multitude of different contexts (observing a person electroshocked vs. 43yr old dying of cancer vs. earthquake vs. Madoff getting arrested for a ponzi scheme) and is being explained in a number of different ways, and reduce your discussion of it to ONE context and ONE explanation (while not being too clear about it). You don't argue for the validity of that reduction. Furthermore, you simply claim that some specific contexts aren't relevant for your intended topic, again without argument.
Thus, without justifying any of these steps, you chip and chop both the bias, context and explanation to a size you find appropiate and then ask how it relates to religion.
That won't work. Take a bias, understand how it works, gather all proposed explanations, try to find common themes and patterns. Given that comprehensive undestanding of the underlying cognitive mechanisms of the bias, take the context you're interested in (religion) and again find common themes and patterns - this time of contexts and situations in which the bias might be at work. Then try to find correlations and observable differences to non-believers and then hypothesize about the perhaps religious reasons for these differences.
You take a cognitive bias that can kick in in a multitude of different contexts (observing a person electroshocked vs. 43yr old dying of cancer vs. earthquake vs. Madoff getting arrested for a ponzi scheme) and is being explained in a number of different ways, and reduce your discussion of it to ONE context and ONE explanation (while not being too clear about it). You don't argue for the validity of that reduction. Furthermore, you simply claim that some specific contexts aren't relevant for your intended topic, again without argument.
I think I do
You know if anything, I expected more problem with the use of the Problem of evil since it's such a broad ranging and contentious subject.
The religious reason why the JWH might be playing a part in sidestepping the problem of evil is that religious people believe in god.
Take a bias, understand how it works, gather all proposed explanations, try to find common themes and patterns. Given that comprehensive undestanding of the underlying cognitive mechanisms of the bias, take the context you're interested in (religion) and again find common themes and patterns - this time of contexts and situations in which the bias might be at work. Then try to find correlations and observable differences to non-believers and then hypothesize about the perhaps religious reasons for these differences.
Cognitive biases are fascinating, but given that the literature is still reasonably young I think it's worth approaching it cautiously. For me, the most compelling cognitive biases are those that are 1) very common 2) cause demonstrably false judgements and 3) are directly tied to underlying cognitive structures. The archetypal example, imo, is Base Rate Neglect. E.g:
1% of women at age forty who participate in routine screening have breast cancer. 80% of women with breast cancer will get positive mammographies. 9.6% of women without breast cancer will also get positive mammographies. A woman in this age group had a positive mammography in a routine screening. What is the probability that she actually has breast cancer?
Spoiler:
No peeking before estimating!
Spoiler:
The correct answer is 7.8%, obtained as follows: Out of 10,000 women, 100 have breast cancer; 80 of those 100 have positive mammographies. From the same 10,000 women, 9,900 will not have breast cancer and of those 9,900 women, 950 will also get positive mammographies. This makes the total number of women with positive mammographies 950+80 or 1,030. Of those 1,030 women with positive mammographies, 80 will have cancer. Expressed as a proportion, this is 80/1,030 or 0.07767 or 7.8%[...] the vast majority of doctors in these studies seem to have thought that if around 80% of women with breast cancer have positive mammographies, then the probability of a women with a positive mammography having breast cancer must be around 80%
[source]
To my mind, the Just World Hypothesis is qualitatively different from something like Base Rate Neglect. Firstly, the JWH is not (setting aside methodological naturalism) demonstrably false. It is possible, however unlikely, that theism is true. One way to rescue the argument would be to show that the JWH really is a neurological issue. However, it is not clear to me that the JWH reflects any underlying cognitive mechanism rather than being a common but culturally-influenced belief. If this is the case then the OP is on very shaky ground because if the JWH reflects a culturally-transmitted belief rather than a systematic failure of cognition then the OP essentially begs the question. We know that the vast majority of people are theists, and we know that the vast majority of theists believe in a just god. Therefore the existence of the JWH is plausibly just an inevitable (even rational) consequence of theism.
Originally Posted by MightyBoosh
The obvious observable difference is that an atheist doesn't believe in god and therefore can never be allowing JWH to help them sidestep the problem of evil because they don't think that there is one.
it's funny in that while belief in a just God may provide some cover for the PoE, it's also the cause of the PoE
That's some gentle comedy
To my mind, the Just World Hypothesis is qualitatively different from something like Base Rate Neglect. Firstly, the JWH is not (setting aside methodological naturalism) demonstrably false. It is possible, however unlikely, that theism is true. One way to rescue the argument would be to show that the JWH really is a neurological issue. However, it is not clear to me that the JWH reflects any underlying cognitive mechanism rather than being a common but culturally-influenced belief. If this is the case then the OP is on very shaky ground because if the JWH reflects a culturally-transmitted belief rather than a systematic failure of cognition then the OP essentially begs the question. We know that the vast majority of people are theists, and we know that the vast majority of theists believe in a just god. Therefore the existence of the JWH is plausibly just an inevitable (even rational) consequence of theism.
I'm not qualified to argue whether or not JWH is Neurological or culturally transmitted. Does it matter though? Whether neurologial or learned, it may still be a factor in how some Theists reassure themselves when a conflict arises between their belief in a loving, just god, and bad things happening to people.
I'd say that if atheists don't exhibit the JWH then it is not really a cognitive bias. But you could remove reference to the JWH and still have an interesting thread imo. It seems perfectly plausible that belief in a just god could provide some cover for the PoE, regardless of whether or not it is a true cognitive bias.
Are you familiar with Dawkins 'moth' argument?
I'm not qualified to argue whether or not JWH is Neurological or culturally transmitted. Does it matter though? Whether neurologial or learned, it may still be a factor in how some Theists reassure themselves when a conflict arises between their belief in a loving, just god, and bad things happening to people.
I didn't mean that Atheists don't exhibit the JWH at all. Fret asked for "observable differences to non-believers", and Atheists not sidestepping the problem of evil because the JWH is in play is an obvious one since they don't believe there's a Problem of Evil. Atheists are no less likely to be susceptible to the bias though.
1) Some mammals may live on land.
2) Whales are mammals.
3) Therefore, some whales may live on land.
Notice here that both premises are true, but the conclusion is false. However, if the first premise said that all mammals live on land, it would be valid.
That is a very general claim and your OP is about the relationship between a specific cognitive bias and specific theistic beliefs. My argument addresses the specifics and explicitly draws distinctions between different cognitive biases. You can't just hand-wave away the criticism by moving to a much broader argument.
It's not, I was responding to your comment. It's a completely different subject to the OP and I'm well aware of that.
It matters because of the structure of your OP. As I noted, you can still have an interesting discussion about the relationship between belief in a just god and the PoE but, if you want to demonstrate that belief in a just god is false due to cognitive bias, the order of causation matters.
I can't provide anything, I was basing it on the fact that humans are susceptible to cognitive biases, atheists are human and I have no reason to believe that they are any different in that respect from any other subgrouping. I'd could be completely wrong. I'd rather retract it than try to defend it in any depth so please don't shred this.
Bear in mind that I was correcting your misconception that 'I'd say that if atheists don't exhibit the JWH then it is not really a cognitive bias.' when that's not what I'd said. I said that atheists can't be sidestepping the PoE because of the JWH cognitive bias, because they don't believe in god so there is no PoE for them, in response to Fret asking me for a difference between believers and non-believers.
This is one of those misunderstandings that takes on a life of it's own.
In order for your argument to be valid the first premise must be a universal statement. For example, your argument is of the same form as this argument:
1) Some mammals may live on land.
2) Whales are mammals.
3) Therefore, some whales may live on land.
Notice here that both premises are true, but the conclusion is false. However, if the first premise said that all mammals live on land, it would be valid.
1) Some mammals may live on land.
2) Whales are mammals.
3) Therefore, some whales may live on land.
Notice here that both premises are true, but the conclusion is false. However, if the first premise said that all mammals live on land, it would be valid.
Since I can't say that ALL humans are susceptible to the JWH, how about this:
P1) Theists are human
P2) Humans are susceptible to cognitive bias
P3) JWH is a cognitive bias
C) Theists may be susceptible to the JWH.
So now I'm wondering how the JWH might manifest itself in a religious context and it occurred to me that for some theists it might provide an rationale for why an all powerful and loving god allows bad things to happen to people. It might even explain why god does bad things to people. Simply put, they must have done something to deserve it. Now they have reassurance and a motivation to avoid deserving it themselves.
Perhaps it has even deeper roots and the idea of Sin, that there's an invisible force that will punish you for being committing sin, is a byproduct of our tendency to rationalise bad things in the way that the JWH suggests that we're doing.
I get that this is very generalised and full of holes but it's just a thought at this point. I thought that I'd throw it out there to see what people would make of it.
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