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Originally Posted by Mightyboosh
Seems that you're using the logic of the ontological argument here. As I said already, I'm not actually convinced by the ontological argument, but more pertinently to my point, in the universe that I think must be the necessary result of the properties awarded to god, there are no moral choices either. Morality may exist in that there are things that are right and that are wrong, but we have no choice about what we do. And yes, the implications of that are not lost on me.
I don't see anything of the ontological argument in my response. Please explain.
Your OP was about how to resolve an apparent conflict between free will and a God that is perfect and maximally powerful and knowledgeable. You think there is a conflict because you think a perfect god
must create a world without moral choices. Why? There are moral theories that view free will as the basis of morality, so why doesn't it instead follow from this view of god that a perfect god
must create a universe that has free-willed beings in it in order for it to have any moral value (surely a requirement of a perfect universe) and so anything that follows from this claim must also be true (including that some things happen that are not what this perfect god intended)? Or that this god doesn't know everything that happens in the future?
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God can't not know how everything will be, he knows everything in the moment of creation because he created it. Plus I'm not even sure if Determinism applies here in the sense of everything we do being determined by "previously existing causes" because it's only us that experiences things in such a linear fashion. God doesn't experience time.
You are assuming this when you need to argue for it. Perfect foreknowledge of the future might not be an implication of an omnimax god if (a) an omnimax god would prefer to create a universe with free-willed beings and (b) a universe with free-willed beings cannot be perfectly foreknown.
The dogma that god doesn't experience time is not a requirement of Christian theology nor universally accepted by Christians.
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I did address the idea of foreknowledge though, I pointed out that it's "not even an issue or a conflict to be resolved because how could he not know what he decided would be".
This isn't "addressing" it, it is you just asserting your thesis in the face of objections to this specific point. I and others have told you exactly how an omnimax god might not know what he will decide to do - if the future is not yet set because it is at least partially the result of freely chosen decisions that have yet to be made. God can't know what is impossible to know, even an omnimax god.