You don't know either of the bolded. Knowing I did it does not give you how I did it, as in the mechanism. It also does not give you why I did it, apart from the what you can infer from function.

As to what I think, I am trying to explain that via analogy.

In that case you're not an explanation. I was assuming I had that as well. If I see a computer and someone says "Jibninjas did that" with no other information, then nothing is explained.

I misunderstood the explanation you were putting forward.
Try without the questions. What is it about "Jibninjas did it" that makes it an explanation for a computer?

Okay, good. So we're agreed that in saying that God is the best explanation for the universe we are not talking about how God made the universe. Rather, we are saying that God is the best explanation for the purpose of the universe. Here, I think you have a strong case. Any account of meaning or purpose for the universe available to the atheist seems pretty farfetched.

However, this seems to miss the atheist viewpoint. Generally speaking, atheists will not claim that naturalism or humanism provide a better explanation than theism for the purpose of the universe. Rather, they'll claim that there is no purpose to the universe. Now, obviously they cannot prove that. But it is a natural result of their worldview.

Furthermore, while the lack of an account of purpose was a serious defect in the atheistic worldview in pre-modern times, when it was assumed that scientific explanation required describing the teleology of natural objects as well as their mechanical and material nature, modern science has rejected teleological explanation as essential to understanding nature. So, at least from a scientific viewpoint, this question doesn't seem like one that scientifically-minded atheists need concern themselves with.

I find this a bit obscure, so let me see if I got it right. You are saying that in order to explain how the universe is rationally comprehensible we must postulate an intelligence that created it? I have a different view on this. First, I don't assume that the universe is rationally comprehensible. Rather, this seems to me a hypothesis that is so far consistent with the lawlike behavior of the physical objects of our experience (although this can end up being more limited than we originally supposed, a la quantum mechanics). Now, you seem to think that in order for this to make sense we must be able to have a complete explanation for this law-like behavior, i.e. we must be able to say what the reason or purpose is for the universe to have this behavior.

But here, once again, it seems we are where we started. If there is no reason or purpose for the universe to be this way, then that's that. It is not a logical requirement of orderly (rationally comprehensible) universes that they have a purpose. It might just be the case that some universes are like that, and some are not. More to the point, we just don't know at this point. So while we can speculate about this question, I don't see any way we can come up with evidence for an answer using the modern tools of either science or philosophy.

I wanted to make a couple comments on this. I basically agree with this claim. However, instead of saying "atheist," I'll just say "scientist." I think the reason why is that the dominant fact of modern intellectual life is the triumph of scientific reasoning. This has ended up dominating our thinking in all sorts of areas, including epistemology, such that we now view science as the paragon of knowledge, and all other forms of knowledge-seeking as lesser objects. However, the scientific method has definite limitations, and one of them is in addressing questions about how we should live our lives. One way of putting this, is like you say above, the scientist will always end up responding to the question of the purpose of the universe, or of life, "well we just don't know enough yet."

We can respond in a couple ways. One is to claim that if we use other means of gaining knowledge, such as philosophy or theology, we can end up knowing enough to answer this question. I think this project is certainly worthwhile, but it is difficult for it to be taken seriously given the dominance of scientific modes of thinking.

The other is to accept the view that there is no purpose that is provided to us by knowledge disciplines, but that this purpose must be something that we make or accept for ourselves. This was the view of the existentialists, who claimed that philosophical or theological project of finding the purpose of life through an examination of the nature of human beings or the universe is doomed to failure. Now, from that starting point, many existentialist philosophers went on to construct ways of living as atheists (e.g. Sartre, Camus) or as Christians (e.g. Kierkegaard, Marcel). Anyway, I wanted to develop this story to point out that atheism should not be viewed as a necessary result of the acknowledgement that the picture of the universe given to us by modern science is of a universe without purpose or meaning.

I missed this on the first time through. It's kind of an aside but I don't consider existence to be a property of an object. I think it's a linguistic coincidence that "X glows" and "X exists" have the same form. My preferred understanding of existence is that it's a property of the universe of discourse. "X exists" is true if the universe contains the object X.

If it's a property of the object, how do you determine whether an object has it or not?

This seems more obscurantist than helpful to me. I don't see how it makes sense to say that the "real" nature of logic is as an expression of God's character. It's true, I suppose, that God's actions are consistent with logic. But so are my actions. Yet I wouldn't say that logic is "really" just an expression of my nature. It seems to me like exactly the same points apply to both morality and maths as well.

More philosophically, all these disciplines involve the study of abstract objects or principles. The ontological nature of these abstract objects or principles is a notoriously difficult question. However, it is of no help to say that they are aspects of the nature of God. That only makes them more mysterious, as now their essential nature is also somehow connected to a specific being as well (which makes their universal nature even more mysterious).
If you have an infinite series of contingent causes stretching backwards through eternity, then you have no uncaused contingent objects or actions. If you think this is wrong, if you think that at some point there was no universe, then obviously you think that contingent objects can pop into existence uncaused (as God created the causal laws and so cannot initially be constrained by them). Hence, it must be possible for this to happen, hence it can happen without God.

I'm sure I'm not the only poster that appreciates the efforts of OP, NR, bunny and jib to sort through this topic. thanks.

For a theist like Aquinas, God is not a being; God is Being/beingness itself. In a gender neutral sense, we can think of God as "isness," and from here reason that God or "isness" underlies all causal relations along with logic or rationality where truth (that which is) is a precondition and modal properties where something is possible.

Granted the atheist is not required to accept the theist's definition of terms or their arguments, but I think it's proper that if they want to engage theism, they should at least be willing to grapple with the theists arguments rather than just dismiss them a priori or set up their own straw man definition of God to knock down. So, as far as Christian Theology goes, nothing is possible without God because nothing is actual, potential or possible without being.

A couple of points. First, there is nothing wrong with a priori demonstrations of the falsity of Christian claims. I think you mean some other term here.

Second, I don't think I've been using a straw man definition of God--in fact, most of my effort in this thread has been to present Christian claims in as accurate and fair a light as I can, with actually very little criticism. At least according to my understanding of Christian theology, nothing that I said in the passage you quoted is inconsistent with the Christian view of God. It does disagree with some conclusions that some theologians have thought followed from their understanding of God, but that will always be true. But perhaps I'm wrong. So please show me specifically where I misrepresented the Christian conception of God.

My man to the rescue again:


http://www.reasonablefaith.org/site/...rticle&id=6923

That's what I was trying to spit out but he does it so much better.

Yes, thanks for pointing that out. The why is certainly what the theist is concerned about. They've already gotten past the fact (belief) that God is the original cause/source, so they're focused on the details.

My comments were directed at the atheist position, not you. I apologize if it came out wrong. I was addressing the particular point of defining God as a being (ens) instead of the conception of God as Being (esse ipsum subsistens), as per Aquinas and through biblical interpretation (I Am that I Am). If we accept the former definition (God as a being), then God becomes contingent upon existence. That has a very different substantive meaning than defining God as Being, which is to say, defining God as Existence. God, Being, Existence, "Isness," are all synonymous terms, because they are the esse of God and God is one, according to the way Christian theology defines its terms.

The issue is whether God provides a foundation for logic. It seems to me that you are saying, the basic principles of logic are descriptions of the essential character of God's mind. Now, it might be that these logical principles are essential to just mind's like God's. But no, that's not your view either. You (or at least Craig) also believe that the basic principles of logic also describe how human minds work. In other words, we can draw a general principle that these logical principles are descriptions of the possibilities of thought.

Now, since Craig disagrees with Descartes that God creates the metaphorical possible worlds as well as the actual world (i.e. that God creates logic), that means that these possibilities do not depend for their existence on God. Thus, while it is true that the basic principles of logic describe part of the essential character of God's mind, this is only as an instance of the fact that they describe part of all minds. Thus, logic does not depend for its validity on whether or not a God exists, as regardless of the existence of God, it would still counterfactually describe how God would have to think.

So the computer has no explanation for its' existence and function? If you saw a computer and someone told you that I built it you would have an explanation for why it exists and also for how it is capable of functioning the way that it does.

How it works and why it was built is inconsequential to these questions.

I think that when it comes to the universe we get into difficult ground as there is so much uncertainty in the reality of the universe.

I still disagree that 'how' always refers to the mechanism.

First, I think that if the bolded is true, it is most certainly a mistake. Maybe in function science must assume naturalism, but that definitely does not mean that naturalism follows from science, which is the claim of many atheists.

Second, some of the issues raised here is why I attempted to get away from the universe discussion, but I apparently did not make myself as clear as I had thought.

I did not make my self clear here. When I spoke of the universe being "comprehensible", it was not a statement about the universe, but a statement about us. That we have the ability to comprehend the universe.


I think that you are right that 'scientist' is a better label here. But as I said above, this is really only due to a necessity of function rather than a reflection of truth. Science assumes its' own conclusion when it comes to teleology. But it seems to me to be fool hearty to believe that because science does not give us a non-materialist explanation for anything, that there must not exist a non-materialist explanation as this is by design. It is a self fulfilling prophecy.

Focussing on this as your attempt to explain what you think an explanation is via an analogy. Can I take it from this that you think an explanation of X entails answering the questions:

"What does X exist?"
"How is X capable of functioning the way that it does?"

That if those questions are answered - X is explained? If so, are there other questions which are also answered by an explanation? If only one of them is answered is that sufficient to consider X explained?

Jibninjas? Is this right:


Focussing on this as your attempt to explain what you think an explanation is via an analogy. Can I take it from this that you think an explanation of X entails answering the questions:

"Why does X exist?"
"How is X capable of functioning the way that it does?"

That if those questions are answered - X is explained? If so, are there other questions which are also answered by an explanation? If only one of them is answered is that sufficient to consider X explained?

Yes, I think that there are many questions that need to be answer as part of an explanation, but I would say that the two listed here are the most crucial for most events/phenomenon etc. How something does work, as in mechanism, is also important but not nearly as much.

I would probably go as far as to say that if these two questions are not answer then we have not explained the event/phenomenon/entity etc. But if you could come up with a good reason why that statement is more false than true I would retract.

Thought isn't an abstract object either, existing apart from God. You are artificially separating what is essential in God's nature and making it an object - this is actually one of the distinctive's of atheistic thought, which places something(logic, justice, love, etc.) above God and to which God is subject thus effectively denying He is God in the first place.

I don't see that the existence of a possible world creates logic if that possible world is only possible because God exists. As far as describing all minds, if God doesn't create, His is the only mind and as stated, logic is part of His essential nature - nothing you say refutes that. Logic doesn't describe How God would have to think, it just is what He is, not separable and superior to Him.

How does "God" go at providing an answer to "How is consciousness capable of functioning the way that it does?"

As a subsidiary question - do you think the concept of a 'partial explanation' makes sense. In that, if we answered "Where does the diversity of life come from?" with 'DNA + evolution' that this is still some kind of an explanation, even though 'Where does DNA come from?' or maybe even 'How does evolution work?' remain unanswered. Alternatively, do you think we haven't yet explained the phenomenon in question, we're just making headway towards the ultimate explanation of God?

This is a bit tricky, so let me try to clarify the issue. You claim that I am "artificially separating what is essential to God's nature and making it an object." By this I take it that you mean that I am identifying "logical" as a property of some arguments or thoughts, and thus saying that insofar as God is logical, it is because some of God's thoughts have the property, "logical." However, you want to claim that the property, "logical," should be identified with "God's thoughts" (since they are essential to God's nature). In that case, to say that God's thoughts are logical is just to say that God's thoughts are God's thoughts.

Now, my point was this. If you believe the above, then you are left with a philosophical puzzle. If your claim is correct, that "logical" should be identified with God's nature, then how is it possible for beings other than God to think logical thoughts? In other words, it seems like humans also have thoughts with the property, "logical." However, since humans are not God, and since you claimed that the property "logical" names "thoughts of God," this seems contradictory (since these are thoughts of humans, not thoughts of God).

Now, this makes more sense if we think that "logical" names an abstract property (a universal) that can apply to different particular thoughts, whether human or divine. Notice, however, that in pointing this out I am not thereby assuming any particular ontological status for these abstract properties. And I think it is here that you are making your mistake.

There is a debate about the ontological status of abstract properties. Very broadly speaking, the two poles are between Platonists who think that they exist independently of their particular instantiations and nominalists who believe that they do not. For the Platonically inclined, a question you must answer is in what sense these universals exist. One answer, associated with Augustine, is that these universals exist in the mind of God. It is something like this view that I take you to be describing.

However, this does not mean that the the content of the universals is the mind of God. For example, the abstract property "red" names a particular color, even though on your view its ontological status is as a idea in the mind of God. In the same way, "logical" names a particular feature of arguments, even if its ontological status is as an idea in the mind of God. Thus, insofar as it names that feature, we can ask still ask whether or not it is a characteristic feature of God's thoughts (just as we can ask whether or not God's thoughts have the property of "redness" even if we believe that "redness" itself is an idea in the mind of God).

Again, this confuses the question of the ontology of logic and the nature or content of logic. So, according to Descartes, before God created the universe, God created logic. In other words, God could have created a different logical system for the universe. However, given that God did create the logical system that she did, that is the logical system that governs our universe. You can think of this as like a divine command theory of logic--there is no inherent reason why God should create this logical system, but given that she did, this is the logical system of the universe.

Now, the relation of this logical system to God is a bit mysterious. Was the act of creating it a way for God to limit her powers? Maybe so--Descartes is not very clear on this issue, although he seems to think that God cannot do what is logically impossible after the creation of a logical system.

Craig is describing a different view of logic. His claim is that logic was not created by God, but is rather a result of certain immutable features of God's nature. As such, logic is (ontologically) simply a description of the essential nature of how God thinks.

But here's the problem with this view. God can do anything that is logically possible. It is logically possible to think illogical thoughts. We know this because humans do it all the time. Thus, God can think illogical thoughts. Therefore, it is not a logical necessity that God only think logical thoughts. But if that were the case, then logic cannot be identified as the essential nature of God's thoughts (as it is possible for God to have thoughts without that feature, which would imply that it is possible that God's thoughts are not God's thought, i.e. a contradiction).

Anyway, these are some of my objections to the specific view you outline. But you still haven't actually shown what problem in the foundation of logic the God hypothesis is meant to solve. In other words, you have claimed that atheists are inconsistent in accepting logic. Why?

This jumped out at me so I'm going to comment on it and it perhaps goes to the main issue as well.

God can think ABOUT illogical thoughts, He can know what illogical thoughts humans have, but He can't HAVE an illogical thought. Stated another way, He can't think that an illogical thought is logical or that it is true. He can't think that A=NonA or that He COULD make a round square.

The reason we can be logical is because we are created in God's image - we have the gift of reason, but it is finite and fallible, therefore we can be wrong, irrational, etc.

Really? Can you give me an example when we use "how" to refer to purpose?

Like you, I believe that science is compatible with a number of worldviews, including worldviews that accept the existence of the supernatural, such as Christianity. However, I also think that science has placed certain kinds of supernatural worldviews under strain--especially those that posit a more active supernatural world. For instance, I think science has convincingly shown that sickness and disease is primarily the result of natural causes, whereas it used to be ascribed to supernatural causes. This is why it is much less common than it it used to be for educated people to believe that sickness or disease is a punishment from God.

As for the bolded statement that you disagree with ("modern science has rejected teleological explanation as essential to understanding nature"), the challenge for you is to then develop some epistemological access to teleological explanation. After all, science has been very successful in giving us giving us epistemological warrant for accepting claims about the mechanical nature of the universe. How are you going to be successful in giving us warrant for accepting claiming about the purpose of the universe?

Now, I know that you want to get away from talking about the universe to talking about the comprehensibility of the universe, but I think you are giving away too much then. If your claim is not that the we have any reason to think that the universe has a purpose, but rather that human psychology is such that we can only comprehend the universe if it has a purpose, then your argument doesn't tell us that we should accept the claim that the universe has a purpose. It is very possible, likely even, that the universe is in certain ways incomprehensible. Also, your claim about human psychology would seem dubious.

I don't think that "science" assumes what you describe. Many scientists believe that there is a God who created the universe. Rather, the point is an epistemological one. We are justified in accepting the conclusions of scientists about how the universe works. We are not justified in accepting the conclusions of theologians and philosophers or scientists about the purpose, or non-material causes of the universe.

I know that theologians make the claim you describe. My point is that they are wrong to do so. I'll put it into argument form so you can criticize it more explicitly.

1) God can have any thought that it is possible to have.
2) It is possible to have an illogical thought.
3) Therefore, God can have an illogical thought.
4) An illogical thought is a thought that God can't have.
5) Therefore, God can have a thought that God can't have.

(1) follows from the omnipotence of God. (2) is an empirical result. (3) follows from (1) and (2). (4) follows from your identification of logic with the essential nature of God's thought. (5) follows from (3) and (4).