1. Is god a rubber chicken?
2. How do you know?

1) I don’t believe so.
2) I don’t know. I believe the people who claim to know.

1: No
2: Anselm told me: If god were a rubber chicken, I could conceive of a god who'd be rubber c*ck. Eh, that came out wrong.

parody religion

Ah but just because you can imagine a rubber c*ck doesn't mean that one can exist outside of your imagination.

In any case, even if you imagine the greatest rubber c*ck that it's possible to acheive, the real measure of that c*ck achievement would be it's intrinsic value, and the skill level of it's creator because the more handicapped the creator, the more impressive the c*ck. The greatest handicap we can imagine is to not exist so although you cna imagine a god who can make a rubber c*ck, I can imagine a greater achievement, that of making a rubber c*ck without actually existing. Therefore god doesn't exist.

(With apologies to Dougl Gasking)

It would be ace if god was a rubber chicken. Maybe Gary Larson was onto something.

Someone really got lost in his imagination here...

Well, I was trying to make a philosophy joke and had to get a bit creative.

No, this isn't a parody religion. Parody religion would be saying god was a rubber chicken.

And we don't joke with something as serious as rubber chickens.

How have these people obtained their expertise?

I was referring to founding prophets and mystics. So I’d say they obtained their expertise from their encounter with God. (Maybe it’s just a terminology issue, but I define a knower as one who has experienced God’s existence, and a believer as one who basically believes the testimony of a knower.) So I don’t really know God is not a rubber chicken. I believe he is not, because I believe those who claim to know of his existence first-hand.

Presumably you don't believe everything you are told. What is with what these mystics tell you that make it believable?

1. no
2. I do not experience God in a way that seems plausible to describe as a rubber chicken.

I don’t have a set of hard rules. There are probably a bunch of factors and some heuristics involved. Like how one finds a witness's testimony credible and believable in a trial.

Would you say the credibility of said testimonies (those that are comparable to the testimonies of aforementioned mystics) is unrelated to their content?

Of course, St. Paul seems to suggest the idea that would can be known of God is apparent to us through nature itself.


These are some bold claims.

I can imagine a good argument that God's eternal power (or his existence) is manifest. But how His "Godhead" might be apparent, truly, I do not have a revelation of this, unless, of course, he counts human beings and their natural revelation concerning God to be evidence. But don't quote me on that.

That’s kind of a chicken and egg issue. Rather than assigning credibility to the testimonies, it’s probably more near to say I find the testifiers credible do to their character and motives. But there are a lot of moving parts here, so I can’t say that what is being said doesn’t factor in at all.

You are downplaying it well, but it seems evident that the content of the message of these witnesses plays a part... so if we remove the assessment of the witness, what do you use to assess the testimony?

I weigh the content against everything I know and believe to be true or false.

Niiiice!

Well, I think I would prefer it if differentiating key concepts in my worldview from polymere toys is somewhat simple and can be explained with a bit more oomph than "credible testimonies".

Now, the purpose of the thread isn't to use absurdity to insult religion (like someone might have thought when they used the term "parody religion"), but absurdity in examples often make for a very clear canvas.

I think the concept "god" is almost exclusively argued apologetically, even in the cases where it is explicitly claimed this is not the case. In other words "god" is very often argued from "why it could exist" rather than "how one should come to think god exists".

Explaining why god is different from a rubber chicken is easy; If we assume the classic biblical God, rubber chickens don't hand down stone tablets to tribal leaders.

Explaining how we should come to think God is different from a rubber chicken is trickier. Not that it is in any way or form difficult, but it is certainly more uncomfortable... as it means revealing the actual epistemological reasoning behind accepting a theistic belief.

Well, I think I would prefer criticisms that didn't seem to conflate "hermeneutical circularity" with "vicious circulariy".

I think you must go into more detail here, so this swine can be certain these are actual pearls.

So if you want to flesh out exactly it is what you think is wrong and why, I'll be happy to respond. Right now I'm not even certain you have properly read and understood the thread.

Well, it's heartening to see you continuing with this approach despite the dubious success you had with it. But regardless:

You: Is god a rubber chicken? How do you know?
duffe: No, because people I trust tell me so.
You: How do they know?
duffee: Because god told them.
You: What makes you believe their testimony?
duffee: Various factors and heuristics, similar to assessing credibility in court, for example.
You: But their credibility isn't unrelated to the the content of their testimony, is it?
duffee: Hello chicken-and-egg. I find their testimony credible; obv. in part because of its content. But there's a lot of interrelating parts here.
You: Yeah, you cover it well, but just admit that the content plays a role. So let's focus on that. What figures in assessing that?
duffee: I weight the content against what I know and believe.
You: Well, I think I would prefer it if key concepts in my worldview can be explained with a bit more oomph than "credible testimonies".

Duffee argues, in a very condensed form: I know X because Y testifies towards it. I believe Y because I trust him. I trust him, because I find his testimony credible. I find it credible because it comes from someone I accept as a credible source (and meshes with what else I belive). I trust the source because of its testimony. Etc. This is circular.

Now you say:

This reasoning has been revealed as to appear circular. You find this unconvincing, evidenced by using phrases such as: "You are downplaying it well" (which implies you believe he is downplaying something or at the very least has reason to) or "Well, I think I would prefer ... and can be explained with a bit more oomph..." (implying that a different - presumably non-circular - reasoning would be better and had more "oomph"). Hence, you claim, that for god is argued in the form of "why could it exist" (which would cover the circularity) rather than "why would I come to think he does" (which reveals it).

The two simplest ways in which you could come to hold these views is if you either assume all circular reasonings to be equally vicious or you are aware of differences of viciosity (is that a word?), yet believe duffees account is of the bad sort. As a belief in the second would at least require some kind of supporting argument, it appears the first is the case. That lead to my post.

To respond to the first sentence: Asking for clarification is not an "approach", I can't imagine many people not finding your post that spurred said request both short and obtuse.

Other than that, I don't really see the connection you are making. Testimonies are of course valid proofs. I can't recall having said anything about accepting testimonies somehow being "circular".

Ok.