Quote:
Originally Posted by smrk2
How can the descriptive claim of noncognitivism ever be true then if a majority of philosophers are cognitivists?
The cognitivists aren't agreed on the nature of the properties which moral statements describe, if indeed they do. It's not a straight choice between cognitivism and non cognitivism given that there are various natural and non natural cognitive theories. These distinctions are often the response to legitimate non cognitive challenges. Error theory is a cognitivist non realist moral theory that I suspect you'd also find less than you want.
It seems to me the challenge for congnitivism is to identify these properties. One of the challenges from non cognitivism is that cognitive realism is ontologically expensive it requires there to be something moral statements describe.
Another is explaining how beliefs, generally considered to be inert, motivate action. A belief only prompts action if accompanied with a corresponding desire. The non cognitivist in claiming that a moral statement is one of desire gets to explain moral motivation in a way that a cognitivist doesn't.
The strongest challenge to non cognitivism seems that it requires the same statement to mean different things if it is asserted. Consider
P1 Murder is wrong.
P2 If murder is wrong Dave was wrong to kill his wife.
C Dave was wrong to kill his wife.
The non cognitivist has to hold that "murder is wrong" in P1 and P2 are different. In P1 it is asserted and so non cognitive, in P2 it is not asserted due to the presence of the conditional if and so it is cognitive. This means that for moral language modus ponens isn't valid and the challenge for non cognitivism is to demonstrate how moral language is different to any other.
I think it also has to answer how we intuit moral descriptions and how we generally consider that we can make moral progress.
Quote:
Originally Posted by smrk2
What is it that you think (playing a noncognitivist) that most people think morality is such that the descriptive claim of noncognitivism is true? For example, it is plausible to be a 'descriptive moral relativist' because it seems rather evident that people/cultures often have different moral standards, but it does not seem evident that most people think or act as if moral statements are not truth apt.
Simon Blackburn has an interesting take on this, he considers moral statements truth apt on a minimal standard of truth aptness. Essentially if we all consider a statement truth apt it is, even when that statement is a desire generally not considered to be.
His is a quasi-realist but in essentially defending non cognitivism he's ceded the significant definition of truth aptness. It's interesting stuff and it seems churlish to note that it's a shame OrP never got round to that longer post given his contribution itt.