Disclaimer: I haven't actually watched the debate, just read zumby's post so I may be way off on a couple of things
So for the kca to hold we need to believe that:
1. the universe had a beginning i.e it isn't eternal
2.That beginning had a cause
And because this is generally an argument for the existence of god and it would be pretty ridiculous to assume this without examination i'll add
3. That cause was God
even though I know that's not strictly what Craig was arguing in this debate.
From there it still seems you have a lot of work to do to even get to an interventionist god who intended/cares about humanity let alone one that resembles the god of any of our religions.
What the debate had to say about
:
1.: a bunch of technical stuff i wont pretend to understand but Craig says that both the gbv model and Carrolls model support the view that the universe had a beginning and that there have been no good eternal models. Carroll basically says that Craig doesn't understand the topic well enough, he gives an example of an eternal model that could work, says that Craig's wrong about Carrolls model and shows a picture of one of the authors of the bgy model saying that he thinks the universe may be eternal. Craig repeats his points that Carroll has rebutted and doesn't address any of Carrolls rebuttals directly.
Analysis: From this it seems difficult to conclude anything other than that it's still an open question but. the universe may well be eternal.
2.: Craig claims that
Quote:
[1] if the universe began to exist, either the universe had a transcendent cause or it popped into being uncaused. [2] He then adds that if this is the price of non-theism, the non-theist are welcome to it. [3] it is a "metaphysical first principle" that being cannot come from non-being. It is inconceivable. Second, if universes can pop out of nothing, why can't bicycles and Beethoven? Finally, all the empirical evidence we have supports the metaphysical principle.
Analysis:[1] is fine, [2] This is silly. obviously not wanting to believe x is a terrible reason for not believing x. [3] We have 0 information about how things outwith the universe might work. We can't apply laws we have learned about the universe to anything not in the universe in much the same way as we know know we can't apply laws about the macro world to the quantum world.
100 years ago it would have seemed just as reasonable to say something similar about things being in two places at the same time.. I conclude that both options in [1] are possible.
3.: We presumably get to 3 via the fine tuning argument which, interestingly, both say is possible and even likely, though unlikely to have been done with intelligent life as the end goal.
Quote:
On the generous constants issue, Craig says that the fine-tuning argument does not imply that intelligent life is the purpose of the universe.
Quote:
Carrol turns to Craig's 'gotcha' moment where he quoted Carroll saying the entropy of the early universe is fine-tuned. Carroll points out that his argument was not that the universe has no fine-tuning, it is that it is not fine-tuned for life.
However Carrol also says:
Quote:
2. God doesn't need to fine-tune anything. On naturalism life is purely physical, so supervenience on particualr physical constants make sense, but on theism life is not purely physical and such supervenience is not neccessary for life (and indeed is, in other arguments, widely claimed by theists to be false!).
3. Apparent fine-tuning may turn out to be false. There are examples of this: we used to think that expansion rate of universe had probability of 1 in 10^60. But using general relativity there is a rigourous derivation which gives the probability as 100%. So other apparent fine-tuning may also turn out to be resting on incorrect mathematical models.
4. Multiverse models solve the apparent problem. These universes are predicted by models that were made to solve other problems not to do with fine-tuning. These models also make definite cosmological predictions about features of the universe e.g ratio of dark matter. Theistic fine-tuning solutions do not even attempt to make such definite cosmological predictions because theism is not well defined. Carroll wraps up this point by claiming that Boltzmann brains are not a universal problem for cosmological models but are a useful way of identifying bad models.
5. Theism fails as an explanation for fine-tuning. Theism should predict that constants fall right in the 'sweet spot' for all values, whereas naturalism + weak anthropic principle predicts that some values may excessively generous. The latter is what we observe.
Analysis: Both participants say it is possible that the universe has been fine tuned (perhaps as, or even more, likely than that it has not been fine tuned). If it has been fine tuned any arguments about premises 1 and 2 of the kalam would seem to be redundant. Something, in some sense, “intended” to create the universe. That this is such a viable possibility is extremely interesting in and of itself and is not a conclusion I expected to reach when I opened this thread however if you wish to impute on this creator any of the other characteristics we normally associate with god such as omniscience, omnipotence, some kind of consciousness/patterns of thought analogous to our own etc. then I think you still have a long way to go.
N.B. I'm still not totally sure about the line of thought “The universe was fine tuned therefore something intended to fine tune it” or even what it means to say “it was fine tuned” in this context but i'm having trouble thinking about it head on if that makes any sense.