Not quite. The WORD "good" has an (generally) agreed-upon meaning, just like all usable words. That's what language does. It provides a bridge between what's going on in my brain and what's going on in yours. If we share a general conception of what a word like "good" means, we can communicate.

But that doesn't mean that the CONCEPT of "good" is necessarily relativistic. For all I know Aquinas was right and there are God-given absolute standards of natural law that are the basis of morality. If that is right, then some people may simply be wrong, as a matter of morality, as to how they define or apply the concept of what is "good".

What I am saying is that language can't resolve that debate, because that isn't language's purpose.

Well, I agree with you here, but I am also not sure I buy that all theists believe in a God who is inherently good as you do.

Right. Which is why things like this:

were ignored.

I don't think you get off the hook that easily.

Let's go back to Hitler for a second. (I know you love my Hitler examples. )

If my hypothetical neo-Nazi says that Hitler by definition is good, that definitely ends our conversation in terms of me trying to convince him that the Holocaust was evil.

But it doesn't mean that I am going to think he isn't ducking the question. In other words, it may be a coherent philosophical position, but when accompanied by a refusal to defend the actual acts of the man, it's still a dodge.

So you can, coherently, and with philosophical grounding, say "I believe that the actions of God in the Hebrew Bible were definitionally good". And we understand that is your position. But if you, based on that, refuse to examine at all the issue of whether it is moral to sack a city and kill its inhabitants, you are still dodging.

It happens that a position that you take that has philosophical grounding also is MIGHTY convenient for avoiding tough questions about God's actions.

This is where I point out that you're playing your own label game. Is all killing immoral? I think you have a tough argument to make if you're going to argue that perspective. Is it always immoral to attack and destroy a city? Again, I think you've got a tough argument to make.

So it's not enough to slap a label on it and ask me to defend against that label. You must first show that the label you're using is justified and can be consistently applied.

I agree that the questions are tough. In fact, they're impossible if I adopt your terms of the conversation. This is exactly like proving the existence of the supernatural on the basis of naturalistic methodology. If I'm restricted to your understanding, I am likely only going to be able to reach your conclusion.

But that conclusion is based on certain other presumptions which are inconsistent with the presumptions that I actually hold. So it doesn't really do much of anything. In the end, what is rational is a function of what is assumed.

Aaron, I don't think they are impossible.

Suppose that I ask you "what was God's justification for tormenting Job?". I suspect you would have some sort of answer for that. Most Christians would.

And then I ask you "would you have tormented Job if you were in God's place?". I suspect you could even answer that.

But then if I ask "was God's tormenting of Job a moral action?", you would not want to answer that because God is inherently good.

As I said, it is a philosophically justifiable position, but it is ALSO a refusal to answer a difficult and uncomfortable question. There's no reason it can't be both.

I can give a response, but the response may not be in the same terms that you use. For example, I might say something like "God was testing Job." Okay, but now I have to explain that a test is not an immoral activity and that the consequences of such a test, even if it were death, is still not immoral.

So all I do is chase down a long line of definitions that don't go anywhere.

This is a question that simply doesn't make sense for me to answer. I'm not God. Since I'm not God, I don't know what God knows, and I can't give a straight answer.

I would want to answer that question, but using the terms that I use to describe God, and not your outside definition of goodness. Using outside terms of goodness, I may or may not be able to reach the conclusion that God's actions were moral. It all depends on what definition is presented for me to use.

You are welcome to label it as a refusal to answer a difficult question. After all, it's just a label like any other label (ie, 'good').

Well I hate to be a bore, but it really just stipulates that you've undertaken your assessment and come to the inescapable conclusion that you were/are being addressed by god.

This is interesting though. Presumably, when evaluating the morality of HUMAN actions, you don't ask "What Would Jesus Do?", right? Or at the very least, even if you DO ask that, you also make such evaluations based on secular criteria as well. Am I wrong?

For instance, if I asked you to evaluate the morality of the military actions of the United States against Libya, you'd be able to give me an opinion on that based on whatever secular moral criteria you use, correct?

So why can you not give an opinion on an action of God using those same secular moral criteria?

I'm not saying that you can't. You can even given an assessment under the "Hitler is good" criteria. I'm just saying that the conclusion may not be consistent with what I actually believe because I'm starting from assumptions that I don't actually hold.

Given certain assumptions, there are some conclusions that are not possible in a logically consistent system of thought.

So where such a conclusion is stipulated, the relevant assumption is suspended. For like the ninth time of explaining.

And for the ninth time, this does not provide a sufficient framework to respond to the question at hand, which is why the answer is "I don't know" and this is the most straight-forward answer that can be given.

You don't know whether it is morally correct to obey the will of god?

*sigh* Welcome to the world of dancing goalposts.

Post #229: Obey? Yes/No.

Post #236: Answer: I don't know whether I would obey.

Post #240: Obey? Yes/No.

Post #243: Answer: I don't know. I probably should obey, but I don't know if I would.

Post #244: The point is that you should obey. (Shift #1)

Post #246: That wasn't the question.

Post #249: Who cares what the point is! Should you obey?

Post #251: I just answered that. And this is not the original question.

Post #270: I don't care that I changed the question. Answer the new question: Should you obey?

Post #284: I *ALREADY* answered.

Post #286: LOL - You didn't answer the question.

Post #288: I keep pointing to post where I answered the question. I don't understand.

Post #289: Well, answer the Euthyphro's dilemma already! (Change #2)

Post #293: You've misquoted me. As far as Euthyphro goes, there's no problem with it if you understand the theistic terms. But if you change the theology, I can't give you a good answer.

Post #297: I don't care what you think. Just tell me what you think! Is Euthyphro a problem?

Post #299: I *ALREADY* answered.

Post #301: ???

New thread: Post #163: Are you saying you don't know about the relationship between God and morality? (Change #3)

*sigh*

You do indeed appear to be the gatekeeper of that realm.

Not my post; not my problem.

(shrug) It's a weak formulation of the question. Sue me.

That's not a 'goalpost shift', it's a clarification. But let's suppose - I gather you have difficulties with this sort of thing, but do try - that my sole aim had been to find out if you would obey. That that was all I was concerned with. Then, when you reply that you don't know, I move to asking whether you agree you should obey. Is there some unwritten rule of discourse that I'm violating by doing that? Did I use up all my questions and then get greedy by asking more?

"Should you obey?"

"It is possible that I would conclude that I should obey."

That's not an answer.

And indeed, you didn't.

You linked to the SEP entry on Euthyphro, not me. I don't know why you linked to it, except as some fig leaf for your naked intellectual cowardice. All I've said about the dilemma in this discussion is that it's not a problem for Christians and, on condition of your not accepting that, invited you to explain why.

I've asked you that because if Euthyphro is a problem for Christians, then my question gets into difficulties. I don't think Euthyphro is a problem for Christians, and you haven't so much as hinted that you do. So I still have NO IDEA why you ever brought it up and are blathering about it even now.

The only theology I'm aware of changing is [fill in the blank] that leads you to believe god would never command you to do X where X is something you currently think is immoral. Feel free to explain why that's so world-shaking; I wasn't aware Pope Aaron was speaking ex cathedra ITT.

Not even worth responding to.

Except you didn't. You merely hinted that an answer might exist.

Either you understand that I am assuming Yahweh is the moral arbiter of the universe, and that your understanding of Yahweh is of necessity imperfect, and that it is therefore the case that your Yahweh-derived morality is subject to error induced by that imperfection, in which case direct instruction from Yahweh contradicting your imperfect moral intuitions should lead you to reject those intuitions, or you don't. I can only chew it for you so much, Aaron - you have to swallow at some point.

You call that a change in the same post that you quote this
... which clearly shows that it is not a change, simply a condensation of the question your pontificating had diffused.

But that's all just for the record. I don't hold out any hope of getting an answer.

Your post above, with it numerous mischaracterisations and accusations of argument in bad faith manages at once to mangle the course of the entire exchange while capturing your attitude to it in a nutshell. You've hedged and quibbled and picked nits, ignored or tried to rewrite key terms of the question, ignored entire posts and generally done your level best to avoid responding to a question whose answer is obvious.

I've done the best I can to accommodate any misgivings you might have. I've said more than once that I'm not trying to undermine your faith or cast Christians in a bad light. I haven't bothered you about the posts of mine you've ignored, and I've even bent over backwards trying to sugar the medicine with examples less glaring than murder, but you can't even admit that you should steal an apple if your god commands you to? Spare me the whinging about goalposts; you are the one defecting from the standards of legitimate discourse here, not I.

I will accept that your actual intent was to change the question upon receipt of my first response. Claiming that "the point is that..." was confusing, as it seemed to me that "the point" is related to the question you *just* asked, not the question you were *going* to ask. In other words, "the point" had not even been made in the conversation, but you were already declaring it in advance of the conversation.

*Shrug* decision-making in ill-defined contexts leads to vague answers. I answered the question to the best of my ability: "If I were somehow in that situation [I don't know how I would end up there except by some nebulous process that is foreign to me], I think it's reasonable to say that I might conclude that I *should* obey [based on a process that I don't know what it is, ending up with the conclusion that I should obey is a reasonable possibility]."

If you don't like it, that's too bad. That's the most honest answer I can give.

For example, it's possible that I decide that the situation is logically inconsistent to the point that I give up my theism. In this case, I conclude that I shouldn't obey God because God is not real. On the other hand, maybe I'll end up as you and be a suicide bomber:

If you insist that I'm being stubborn or dishonest, that's fine. But I've answered the question.

There was a specific thing that I quoted, and that thing that I quoted was *NOT* in the same line of conversation as this conversation. Maybe you got so excited by things that you failed to see the context.

http://forumserver.twoplustwo.com/sh...&postcount=279

Edit: Specifically, you can click back in the conversation several posts and find that it you and duffe talking for quite a while. It covers over 40 total posts.

And in fact, the thing in BOLD that I quoted is indeed a very minor permutation of the dilemma. (Trade "justice" for "goodness" and you're there.)

Gee... I don't know. Maybe it's not knowing PRECISELY the things that need to be abandoned in order for me to acknowledge the premise. That would be *TOO* obvious, right? To think that it's a simple matter to completely subvert your understanding of the world and still come out on the other side with something meaningful to say?

I can conclude that it is moral to obey God, but reject the existence of God, thereby concluding that I should not obey God. Is it really so complicated?

This is true. You've gotten the most honest answer I can give. I'm sorry that the world of ideas is bigger than the box that you're looking in.

If we take as a definition that the things that God commands are good, then of course the things that God commands are good. But this isn't the argument that you were making!

This is *NOT* the resolution to the dilemma! And the questions you asked don't actually make your point! It simply shows that you have a fundamental misunderstanding of the terms of the argument.

The trouble is you're essentially saying "Maybe I would and maybe I wouldn't (conclude that I should obey)." The reason that's unsatisfactory to me is that it implies you might conclude it was immoral to obey a command from god. I don't see how you can even entertain that notion.
Let me get this straight. You think it's plausible that you, presented with a compelling reason which prompts you to genuinely believe you have received an instruction from god, would conclude from that that god does not exist. That is your position?

Yeah, I have absolutely no problem with it, man. If I was presented with a compelling reason which prompted me to genuinely believe I was receiving an instruction from god, I would at the least conclude that the morally correct thing to do was to obey (it's possible I'd chicken out). I can generate endless examples - if I went crazy and thought every day was Thursday, would I think any given day was Sunday? No. I would think it was Thursday. So on.

Sure:
You are, as ever, welcome to explain why you disagree, if in fact you disagree.

So... you can't answer the question because you're not sure which aspects of your theology would be altered by such a command?

No idea what the bolded part is trying to say.
Not complicated, just contrary to the terms of the hypothetical. Again.
If you're going to be a dick, so am I.
Given that and your Fisher-Price rendition of consequentialist reasoning, I laugh in the face of your supposed philosophical sophistication.

...

Come ahead - school me.

If this were true, people would have a hard time choosing a religion and most of them would end up sticking with the religion they were born into.

Hmmm...on second thought, maybe you're right.

First, I want to point out the inconsistency of your position throughout the conversation. You change between moral, good, should, would, and maybe one or two other words to describe your position. This is already problematic in terms of trying to understand your position and characterize it properly.

Second, you've made two distinct types of statements:

1) "Whatever it says is good, is good."

2) "whatever is good is good because god says it is good."

I agree with the first and disagree with the second. The first is an observation: As a result of God having said it is good, we can rightly conclude that it is good. The second is a declaration of causation: As a result of God having said it is good, it has become good. My interpretation of the latter is consistent with your attempts to posit actions which one would presumably deem to be a bad action (stealing apples).

It is true that everything that God commands is good. But this does not mean that God can command anything at all and have it be good. To do that would require Him to go against his own nature, which is a logical contradiction, and outside the realm of God (whose nature is morally constant and logically coherent). Therefore, if "stealing an apple" (in some sort of context -- maybe stealing the apple from a homeless, hungry kid) turns out to be evil, he cannot declare good to make it good.

For more reading

Are you saying that God's commands have boundaries? Your OP states:

You admit that God's intentions can make no sense. So how do you even know what His own nature or realm is? You're essentially saying God's intentions can make no sense, but only within a certain nature/realm that is logically coherent. Is this correct?

Yes, he is bounded by himself. He cannot exceed that which he is without being something different than what he is.

What I know about God has no bearing on what God is.

Yes. God cannot go against His own nature.

The connection between "makes sense" (as an observational assessment of activities for which we do not have complete knowledge) and "logically coherent" is non-existent.

Are you saying that it is impossible for God to commit an action that is immoral?

Does this mean that God does not have a free will to commit a sin?

Correct.

In the exact same way that we don't have free will to become God.

(You need to clarify your concept of "free will" if you want to go further.)

More circular reasoning from Aaron.

Why can't God decide to be different than what She currently is?

Why can't She decide "this complete benevolence is boring. Satan's right. I want to see how the other half lives."?

It can't be that She doesn't have the power to do this. She's all-powerful. And it can't be that She doesn't have an independently operating mind that could decide to do this. She's got the greatest and most infinite and most brilliant mind there is.

The only argument that Aaron would have, it seems to me, is that she wouldn't WANT to do that. And that's not only pure assumption; it goes against the Christian argument that we humans can't know the mind of God.

From commanding the universe into existence to testing Abraham's obedience, what exactly can He not do?

If His intentions can make no sense to us as humans, then how can we know God's nature fully? So much so that some claim to know what goes against God's nature and the realm in which God operates?


Edit: I took out my response to above quote because it didn't make sense ;-)