There are three logically possible views the atheist might hold if she accepts (4). She can accept (~a and b), (~a and ~b), or (a and b). We probably agree that (~a and b) is unlikely to be true, so we are left with two options. That is, if the atheist accepts (4), she must believe either morality is objective and gratuitous evils exist, or morality is not objective and gratuitous evils do not exist. I don't see any reason to think that merely affirming (4) requires you to accept either one of these options.

This is wrong. The default interpretation of "or" says that a disjunctive statement is still true if both disjuncts are true. Thus, if an atheist asserts that either god doesn't exist or gratuitous evils don't exist, and that god doesn't exist, she is not logically committed to asserting that gratuitous evils do exist.

Edit: More explicitly, the move from (a ⊃ b) to (~a ∨ b) is only valid if you accept the "inclusive or."

I’m pretty sure if the conditional is true then the disjunctive and at least one of the copulative propositions is true. Meaning if you deny all the derivatives then the conditional is necessarily false. Consider:

If I am alive, then I am the President.
a. Either I am not alive or I am the President.
b. I am not alive and I am not the President.
c. I am alive and I am the President.

Obviously, I can’t accept any of the derivatives. So if every logical derivative of the conditional is false then the conditional cannot be true. Then compared to a conditional where we can accept all the logical derivatives, where the conditional is necessarily true:

If the window is not open, then the window is shut.
a. Either the window is open or the window is shut.
b. The window is open and the window is not shut.
c. The window is not open and the window is shut.

Then comparing the atheist’s proposition (4) and the theist’s (6) along with a couple relative comparisons (with what the adherents of the conditionals are denying and what you seem to be denying of (4) in red):

4. If (a) morality is objective, then (b) gratuitous evils exist.
4.a. (either ~a or b) either morality is not objective or gratuitous evils exist.
4.b. (~a and ~b) morality is not objective and gratuitous evils do not exist.
4.c. (a and b) morality is objective and gratuitous evils exist.

If evolution is true, then the earth is more than 6,000 years old.
a. Either evolution is not true or the earth is more than 6,000 years old.
b. Evolution is not true and the earth is not more than 6,000 years old.
c. Evolution is true and the earth is more than 6,000 years old.


6. If (a) God exists, then (b) gratuitous evils don't exist.
6.a. (either ~a or b) either God does not exist or gratuitous evils don’t exist.
6.b. (~a and ~b) God does not exist and gratuitous evils exist.
6.c. (a and b) God exists and gratuitous evils don’t exist.

If YEC is true, then the earth is 6,000 years old.
a. Either YEC is not true or the earth is 6,000 years old.
b. YEC is not true and the earth is not 6,000 years old.
c. YEC is true and the earth is 6,000 years old.

Maybe I wasn't clear. When I said, "I don't see any reason to think that merely affirming (4) requires you to accept either one of these options," I didn't mean that you didn't have to accept one of them, rather, I meant that which one you accept is not an implication of the statement. So, as I said, if you think that (4) is true, you can consistently affirm either that morality is objective and gratuitous evil exists or that morality is not objective and gratuitous evil doesn't exist. Which of these two options you pick is up to you. Using your examples, I am not denying 4a,b, or c. Does that resolve your confusion? I'll admit that I am still unable to identify either an argument or a conclusion in your last three posts.

Also, your examples are marred by you ignoring the case when both disjuncts are true. For instance, you should include as a possible assignment of truth-values:

6.d. (~a and b) God does not exist and gratuitous evils don’t exist.

However, I think the conversation is threatening to go off-track into another duffe against modern logic tangent, so unless you have some important point here that I am missing, I think you should respond to the most recent and complete version of the argument in #108. The question is not whether that argument is sound, but whether it can be put forward by a nihilist (or moral realist) in "good faith," or, if it can't, why this is a problem.

I think you are confused by the fact that a conditional can be translated into a disjunction and a disjunction cannot be true if both disjuncts are false. What you are forgetting is that the disjunct that corresponds to the antecedent of the conditional is its negation.

In other words,

a->b, so
~a or b, so
~(~~a^~b) = ~(a^~b)

Notice that if ~a^~b, the conditional is still true.

The nihilist does affirm one of the disjuncts. The disjunct that he affirms is ~a, i.e. objective morality does not exist.

Considering the logical language being employed requires one to accept “if I’m alive then I’m dead” means “I’m dead,” and to say “I’m alive or I’m dead” doesn’t mean “one member is necessarily true and the other is necessarily false,” I think I’ll pass.

1. If there is not God, then there is gratuitous evil.
2. If there is gratuitous evil, then there is objective morality. (~a and ~b)
3. If there is not God, then there is not objective morality.
4. Therefore, if there is not God, then there is and is not objective morality.

If we believe that conditional, what other interpretation is possible?

Exclusive 'or'?

So basically, your last word is: "These crazy philosophers, logicians, and mathematicians who use formal logic. There's just no reasoning with them!"

What does this have to do with my argument in #108? Here it is again:

1. God exists. (by assertion--this is the premise we are interested in)
2. If God exists, then morality is objective. (this is usually understood as being true by definition)
3. Therefore, morality is objective. (from (1) and (2) by MP)
4. If morality is objective, then gratuitous evils exist. (by assertion--this is supposed to be an empirical claim)
5. Therefore, gratuitous evils exist. (from (3) and (4) by MP)
6. If God exists, then gratuitous evils don't exist. (assertion--usually understood as an implication of God's nature).
7. Therefore, gratuitous evils don't exist. (from (1) and (6) by MP)
8. Therefore, gratuitous evils exist and gratuitous evils don't exist. (from (5) and (7) by conjunction)

Do you think that a nihilist or moral realist cannot use this argument to show that god doesn't exist without violating some rule about arguing in good faith? I know that you think that (4) is false, but that isn't the issue right now.

? don't follow. i was just pointing out the obvious, that science has a pretty good track record of eventually providing perfectly working physical explanations for phenomena no matter how intuitively transcendent they previously seemed. suggesting human behavior has an intrinsic 'right/wrong' aspect that falls outside that pattern seems like human-centric wishful thinking to me - like trying to shove sentient life up onto a pedestal we have no evidence to suggest it deserves in the universe in the same way theists try.

i was just saying beauty and morality seem connected to me conceptually. at least i don't think the human emotional response to what we perceive as a right or wrong moral decision is all that far away from our response to something beautiful or ugly. we frequently describe immoral actions as ugly etc.

are you just making this distinction intuitively, or do you think there's a logical basis why morality transcends desireability and beauty doesn't? i don't see why one wouldn't be able to make the same arguments you have to the same effect for beauty - that it's an objective metaphysical binary property representing a privilaged frame of reference that we may or may not have evolved incorrect opinions about.

Obviously nihilists reject (1).

duffe,

You are making this way more confusing than it needs to be.
You agree that the contentious point in OP's argument is 4: if objective morality exists, then gratuitous evils exist. Right? Well, your argument that this premise fails for the nihilist because the nihilist rejects both the antecedent and the consequent does not make any sense.

Consider the following simple conditional:

If it is raining, then the ground is wet.

Do you think that this conditional is false or that I am asserting it in "bad faith" just because I happen to believe that it is not raining and the ground is not wet?

I hope not. So why do you think this case is different from OP's 4?

And of accepting, for now, the mysteries it can't explain. (like the reason for inertia, hundreds of years after realizing that things which are moving will continue to move unless acted upon by an external force. There's no why for that (yet) - its a mystery).
My views on objective morality are not at all humanocentric, far from it in fact. I think it is entirely plausible that every single human being ever may deem an immoral act moral.
I haven't really thought about it before. They seem different to me, however aesthetics doesn't interest me very much.
I haven't really got a position yet. My inclination is that beauty is inherently subjective, but as Original Position pointed out, given my ontological promiscuousness, this might indeed be an inconsistent view.

Do you also think it is plausible that every single human being ever may deem a moral act immoral? If not, why not?

One problem with your position as I understand it is that it allows for hypothetical scenarios where all or most of my moral beliefs are completely false, which is just an incoherent scenario for me. E.g. it is inconceivable to me that sadistic cruelty may "turn out" to be morally permissible independent of what my intuitions and affective states indicate about it. If superintelligent aliens told me that their superior moral faculties indicate that sadistic cruelty is in fact morally permissible, I wouldn't entertain the possibility that they're right even for a moment.

given what we know about the subatomic world, intuitively it would be much more mysterious if objects in motion slowed for no apparent reason. and in any case obviously it is fully expected that there is a physical basis for inertia. unless you think objects in motion might be being pushed by angels or something.

are you not appealing to metaphysical morality of the gaps? not that i think our understanding of evolution leaves much of a gap.

yeah and even though god cares what humans do in principal they all could do the wrong thing.

point was you are proposing that it's a property of a mindless universe to differentiate between murder and a tree falling on someone's head. there has to be a pedestal in use there somewhere. you are proposing that our actions "matter" in some way that transcends ourselves after all.

i think so. it seems to me any differentiation would have to come as matter of degree or criticality, which would invalidate your premise.

i was trying to make a similar point. if a mind independent standard existed completely separate from our opinions and from any possible practical/utilitarian application, of what possible relevance would it be to us? if it is of no relevance to us in what sense would it describe morality?

Yes.
I don't see the problem. If aliens turn up and tell me 2+2=5, I won't believe them either. My view is at least one of them or us are wrong, not that we merely disagree.

Are you assuming morality must be useful or "relevant to us" in some specific sense in order to exist?

I was giving sadistic cruelty as an example of a behavior that nearly everyone will agree is morally wrong. Since you think it is plausible that nearly everyone can be mistaken in cases like this, I don't see why you would automatically disbelieve the aliens.

if inertia didn't exist, no doubt the subatomic particles would behave differently too. There's no "why" for the Heisenberg uncertainty principle - things are just like that.
No, I'm saying there's no shame in admitting a mystery. Science does it all the time. I'm not saying that because there's no scientific answer, there must be a spooky one.
I'm proposing there are differences between a deliberate act of an intelligent being and an unguided event - one being that one is a moral issue.
It may be binary. I reject any necessary subjective component of morality - I'm not claiming there are no inherently subjective concepts. (after all, I think moral subjectivism could be correct. Clearly that implies inherently subjective concepts are possible.

This isn't the kind of thing I think we may all be mistaken about. I think it is self evidently immoral.

I don't think aliens will get 2+2 wrong either, though they may erroneously think maths can be complete and consistent.

It's easy to come to the conclusion that morality is objective when you predominantly experience predispositions toward empathy/morality/cooperation. I don't think you'd have the same views on morality if you were a sociopath or a psychopath who has far lower levels of serotonin and oxytocin in their blood and brain, and who's moral orientations are underdeveloped or misaligned with cooperative evolutionary strategy.

i'm saying a behavioral code with no relevance to us doesn't qualify as a moral code.

I defined moral code above as a set of statements about the morality of various actions. What do you think a moral code is?

Can you give an example or two that you would find satisfactory? It will be hard to believe that your moral realism is not anthropocentric if you turn out to think that all the important moral truths are self-evident to human beings.

I think an explanation of how you think we come to know moral truths would go a long way toward clarifying your position.

Saving an innocent child over an old mass murderer. I think that is the kind of thing we may all agree on incorrectly.

(obviously, I have no specific example of something I think we're actually wrong about.

indeed. I don't mind doing this in some spinoff thread, perhaps. Here though, I'm solely interested in persuading Neue Regel that objective morality might mean something. Not that it's likely to be true or even knowable to us.