If natural selection favors a creature with a certain biological adaption doesn't it follow that that creatures survival makes certain adaptations necessary? I must be misunderstanding the point you're making in paragraph one.

I shouldn't have said "self authenticating" I meant it humorously in the sense that I borrowed it from William Lane Craig. I simply meant that we all observe ourselves experiencing a predisposition towards a certain type of morality. It could very well be a physiological response biologically wired in to us. Similar to certain fears.

**********

I posted this a while back in the thread Original Position.

nah it was me . wouldn't matter what you said about your position, you'd be speaking a foreign language. i can't think about the subject without concepts like 'wrong' and 'shouldn't do' coming out as obviously the constructs of minds. 'wrong' in itself cannot possibly constitute an objective quality because independent of minds it doesn't describe anything. 'mind independent standard' parses as gobbledygook.

i'm just the opposite. if i start to believe something that makes me feel good or more self-important it's immediately suspect : )

yeah, me too.

What I meant was that I don't pay much attention to developing a consistent position unless the specific topic interests me. I'm happy to call knowledge "true, justified belief". When people point out gettier problems I make some hand wavy comment about the justification needing to be "causally related to the truth" but I don't bother working out what that actually means - I've lost interest by then.

Or, with the disjunct (b) nullified she could resume her belief in (a)

Maybe I’m missing something, but I don’t see how the consequent in (2) follows. (Pretty creative argument, though.)

I don’t think you’ll find any theists willing to cede that gratuitous evils/suffering exists.

The nihilist claims that morality is not real. However, the nihilist can say that if morality was real, then in the actual world gratuitous evil would exist (this is what I mean in (2)). Since the theist is claiming that morality is real, it would then follow from the theist's claim that in the actual world gratuitous evil exists. However, since it also follows from the claim that god exists that gratuitous evil doesn't exist, then the theist's claim that morality is real and that god exists are contradictory.

That's fine. I've not stated that the problem of evil is any more successful on nihilistic than on moral realist grounds. I'm only pointing out that nihilists can present some version of the argument from evil without making any assumptions which contradict their own views. The point is that it certainly seems like gratuitous suffering exists. And since the existence of such suffering doesn't contradict the background beliefs of either nihilistic or moral realist atheists, they have no problem accepting that it does exist. It is only the theist whose backgroung beliefs seem to suggest that it cannot exist. Thus, it is only theists who have a potential problem here.

I don't know any theist who rejects (b). Also, remember I was just proposing what is an obvious and common step. You said reconciling (b) with atheism is equally problematic (presumably you mean equal to the theist answering the POE). I don't believe that, but pointed out she may well just reject (b) - that's what most atheists seem to do.

Saying "she might start believing again" just denies the hypothetical (that she's found the POE persuasive and now abandoned theism).

No. Natural selection provides us with a mechanism for selecting which of two (or more) adaptations will be passed on to later generations, but it doesn't tell us much about which adaptations will show up to be selected from. The latter is mostly a matter of random chance. If you look at the actual history of the evolution, you'll see that some useful adaptations just don't show up in some species, presumably because the mutations that would have led to them just never happened.

Fair enough. It is in my opinion an open question right now whether our moral sensibilities are universal across all people, with some cognitive scientists saying yes and others saying no. Craig's notion of a "self-authenticating belief," whether about God or morality, is one that I reject pretty strongly.

I understand the argument and the conclusion which I take to be ‘if p then x and not x’. What I’m not getting is why gratuitous evil* follows from objective morality.

*A gratuitous evil = An instance of intense suffering which an omnipotent, omniscient being could have prevented without thereby losing some greater good or permitting some evil equally bad or worse.


What I’ve been arguing is that without appealing to objective morality the argument from evil becomes neutered to the point of only serving as a justifier for the atheist's lack of belief in God.

If God exists, then no gratuitous evils occur.
[seemingly] gratuitous evils occur.
Therefore, [seemingly] God doesn’t exist.

Theists generally seem to think that if God exists then morality is objective. For instance, they'll think that torturing small children for your own pleasure is objectively evil. The nihilist is arguing that some of the acts that the theist identifies as objectively evil are gratuitous and so if morality is objective then some acts are objectively gratuitous evil. Honestly, I'm not really sure what's confusing about this.

Here's the argument form.

1) If A, then B.
2) If B, then C.
3) If A, then ~C.
4) Therefore, if A, then C and ~C.

Notice how you can accept (1), (2), and (3) as true without claiming that either A, B, or C are true. This is how the nihilist can use the problem of evil to show that god doesn't exist without claiming that evil exists.

This is a bit frustrating. I gave you two examples of valid versions of the problem of evil from a nihilist perspective. Yet here, instead of addressing those examples, you make up a version of their argument that isn't even valid. I don't think you are being fair.

Notice that the issue here is not whether or not the problem of evil is successful. Rather, it is whether the nihilist can formulate a version of this argument that doesn't assume that evil is real (i.e. with a premise that she thinks is false). Of course, if the theist thinks that one of the premises of the argument is false (such as that gratuitous suffering exists or that if morality is objective then gratuitous evil exists) then the theist can claim that the argument fails. But that doesn't show that the nihilist is being inconsistent in making this argument. If the nihilist is not being inconsistent in making this argument, then even if atheism implies nihilism (which of course I reject), you've failed to show that the argument from evil requires the atheist to assert something that is inconsistent with atheism (i.e. that evil is real).

bunny, if complex math equations can have multiple correct solutions, why do you think complex moral questions necessarily have a unique one?

if mental state (motivation) can be a variable in moral equations potentially leading to different solutions, why can't perspective be?

Agree

Agree.

The nihilist is arguing: (I) some objective evil is gratuitous evil.

Sure, (2) is true if (I) is true.

To me, (I) doesn’t appear obviously true and you haven’t provided an argument establishing that it is true.

I get the argument. What I’ve been saying is I don’t see how the consequent in (2) follows, meaning I don’t see how, other than the nihilist just asserting it, that (2) is true. For example, as a sub-argument:

2.1. If morality is objective in our world, then the torture of small children is an objective evil.
2.2. If the torture of small children is an objective evil, then the torture of small children is a gratuitous evil.

Granting 2.1 as true, why is 2.2 true?

The theist is certainly free to deny that any evils are gratuitous. The point is that (a) such denials will seem to many as convoluted, self-serving, and as good as a reductio, and that (b) it doesn't matter what the atheist's metaethics consists of, since his argument is all conditionals.

This tangent started when you asserted that "the atheist needs to assume ‘objective morality is real’ to make the argument from evil work." You think this is a problem for the atheist because you think that atheism implies that morality is not objective and so the atheist is being inconsistent.

I've presented a couple versions of the argument from evil that do not have as a premise or implication that "objective morality is real." The objection you are now raising to these versions of the problem of evil is not that they imply that morality is objective, but rather some more general problem with the argument (i.e. you think one of the premises is false). Since you are now just raising other objections, should I understand this as you acknowledging that your original objection that "the atheist needs to assume that 'objective morality is real' to make the argument from evil work" is incorrect?

I dont see how equations can have multiple correct solutions. What do you mean?

"X^2 + 4Y - Z/X + 7 = 9" is either true or false (depending what X, Y and Z are) and it makes no difference what you or I think aout it.

I think that, in an exactly analogous way, "It was wrong for Johnny to embezzle from the investment bank to pay for his daughter's heart transplant" is either true or false (depending on a bunch of variables such a motivation, other available options, etcetera) and this truth value is not dependent on us. We can both be wrong about this, just like we can be wrong about maths.

I dont have anything against that, in principle (though I'd offer a qualification, since I dont really know what it would entail). Bearing that hesitance in mind and trying to put it in the terms you use here, my view is not that there are no perspectives, my position is that there is a privileged perspective (the true one).

i'm sure i'm just restating my prior objections in a different way, but in trying to consider your parallel to math i can't help but see moral/immoral as corresponding to a variable to be solved for - not corresponding to the truth value itself. 4^1/2 = x has multiple solutions for x, johnny embezzles (etc) = good/bad might be satisfied by either good or bad.

what exactly makes the true perspective privileged over human perspectives? doesn't that imply there is an advantage of some sort to it?

We do indeed have fundamentally opposed views as to what 'good' and 'evil(bad)' mean. We are definitely talking about different concepts, so there's no way your understanding of morality will ever 'fit' into my scheme.

As I understand your position, it is that a designation of morality (to an event, act, situation, person or whatever) is essentially a matter of choice (not necessarily a free choice, in that we may be predisposed or compelled to accept some view based on culture and/or evolution). As such, there is no fact of the matter as to whether it's right for Johnny to steal to save his child's life, there are many perspectives some of which will declare it moral and some of which will declare it immoral. Operating from this position, there is no way I can persuade you that one of those perspectives is 'more right' than another. My position is that what you are describing is our opinions about morality - not the morality itself.

In my view, there is a real world with real relationships and qualities attaching to various objects and events. Some of those are explicitly physical and some are (in my view) non-physical:

1. "I have a mass of 80 kg" is a statement, true if I actually have the property of having a mass of 80kg in the real world. We may disagree on the answer if we use different scales, but there is an actual, true answer. "Mass" is a spooky concept - there's no understanding as to what it is or why it's there, it's just a brute fact about the world. (It can presumably be reduced to some consequence of fundamental physics, but at its heart - mass 'just is').

2a. "Paris is smaller than New York but bigger than Boston" is a statement about three abstract, composite entities (the cities are just defined by some arbitrary measure of zip code, population or whatever else. The arbitrary nature of the characterisation isnt relevant, it just alters the meaning of the sentence). The statement is either true or false (depending on what measure 'smaller than' is referring to) and it doesnt matter whether you or I agree with that designation - there is a fact of the matter. The fact that the universe operates under approximately euclidean geometrical rules is just a brute fact about the world - reality could have been different so that peculiarities of size might have occured - we just have to deal with what we have we cant explain why geometry and other maths applies to the real world. The effectiveness of maths is a spooky thing we just have to accept.

2b. "7 is a prime number smaller than 11 but bigger than 3" is, in my view, an exactly identical kind of statement. It refers to three objectively existing, abstract entities (defined in various ways) and is true if the purported relationship holds in reality. Most philosophers would reject this view, I think and I dont claim these mathematical entities have any necessary correlation in the real world. I think maths objects exist entirely independently of the physical universe and statements about them can be true or false.

3. "Stealing $100 from Citibank is more moral than stealing $1000 from Neue Regel" is a statement about two actions we might be considering. There are again many issues of definition in unpacking what the statement means, but the moral objectivist is simply claiming that there is some fact of the matter. It means that "moral" is a concept, just as spooky and unexplained as mass is, which attaches to some events. We cant explain why some things are moral and some arent anymore than we can explain why mathematics is so unreasonably effective at explaining the world. Morality 'just is'.

None of that can really be made to fit in with what you think good/evil is referring to. Although we use the same words, we are speaking about fundamentally different concepts. I have offered no reason to suggest I'm right - at this stage it seems to me the best I can do is persuade you that I'm not adopting a nonsensical position. For our purposes, all I would claim is that this spooky 'morality' could exist without being contradictory or vaccuous.
I cant explain why morality exists. Why are some things heavier than others? Does that imply there's some advantage to having a linear scale of mass?

EDIT: In fact, I do have an opinion as to why morality exists in that I think it is necessarily true that some actions are moral and others immoral. However, I am on relatively uncertain ground here and I dont think it's terribly germane to the central point of our disagreement since so far I cant even explain to you what I mean by morality - trying to prove to you that morality necessarily exists when I cant even articulate what it is satisfactorily seems like a Fool's Errand.

1. Atheists claim gratuitous evils exist.
2. If atheists claim they exist, then gratuitous evils exist.
3. Therefore, gratuitous evils exist.
4. If gratuitous evils exist, then God does not exist.
5. Therefore, God does not exist.

There, I’ve created my own valid version of the argument in which the premises do not imply "objective morality is real." Since the premises are evidently and/or obviously true, the argument is sound and the conclusion(s) true. Hence, I’ve disproved my claim that atheist’s can’t make the argument from evil “work” without an appeal to objective morality.

First, the challenge was to present a version of the argument from evil that is consistent with the beliefs of a moral nihilist. Unlike the arguments I presented, the version you present here does not meet that challenge since (3) is inconsistent with moral nihilism. Also, making up a new and ridiculous argument doesn't show that the arguments that I presented are also ridiculous. I think that both of the versions I presented actually do capture the basic force of the argument from evil.

Second, stop avoiding the question. You presented a criticism of the argument from evil claiming that it was inconsistent with the nihilism implicit in rejecting theism. You are now presenting a different criticism of the argument from evil, claiming that a particular premise is false. These are distinct criticisms, and I am only (here) replying to the first. I would rather not discuss the second criticism until the first is laid to rest. So is it?

The challenge is to present an argument that works. I grant that your arguments are valid, but if you can’t assert the truth of the premise either by theist acceptance or consistent with nihilist tenets then IMO the argument doesn’t work, because it’s impotent.


The only thing I can surmise is that you feel the matter implicit in your second premise “(I) some objective evil is gratuitous evil” is somehow self-evident or obvious, but I don’t see it and I don’t see how a nihilist can affirm (I) without an appeal to objective morality. So, I'm not asking you to actually prove (2) is true, but just to show how it could be true without an appeal to objective morality.

<head explodes>

duffe, you do realize that a conditional is automatically true if the antecedent is false, right? So the premise...

2) If morality is objective in our world, then gratuitous evil exists in our world.

...is trivially true given the beliefs of a moral nihilist. You know this, right?

And you also know that the conclusion...

3. Therefore, gratuitous evils exist.

...is false given the beliefs of a moral nihilist. Right?

So in particular, you understand that Original Position's argument is consistent with the beliefs of a nihilist, and yours is inconsistent. Right?!?

The bolded is incorrect. I assume you reject the problem of evil and have assumed that all along. I am not here arguing that the problem of evil is successful in showing that theism is false. Rather, I am only showing that the specific criticism of the problem of evil that you raised is incorrect. Since the specific criticism you raised was a consistency criticism (that the premises of the problem of evil are inconsistent with implied beliefs of atheism), all I have to do to show that your criticism is incorrect is show that the premises of the problem of evil are not inconsistent with the implied beliefs of atheism. Now, I don't think that nihilism is an implication of atheism. But whatever, I've shown that the premises of the problem of evil are not actually inconsistent with nihilism anyway. This defeats your criticism. All your talk about whether these premises are also true is completely irrelevant to whether they are consistent with nihilism. I only have to show that they are consistent, not that they are true.

Do you not understand how a hypothetical claim works? If I say, if it rains, the streets will be wet, I am not claiming that it is true that the streets are wet. In the same way, if I say, if morality is objective, then actions like torturing babies for pleasure are objectively evil, I am not claiming that it is objectively evil to torture babies for pleasure. What is so confusing about this?

In case it is not clear, I am fairly sure that almost all nihilists will agree with the claim that some suffering in the world is pointless. I think that most nihilists will also agree with the claim that if moral claims were true, that it would also be true that this suffering would be wrong, bad, or evil, and since it is pointless suffering, it would also be pointless evil or "gratuitous evil." Where you'll actually get some disagreement is in a premise you haven't objected to, which is that if God exists then objective morality exists.

That’s a secondary judgment that doesn’t factor into the acceptance or rejection of the conditional. In formation, the conditional is true if the truth of consequent ‘necessarily follows’ from the truth of the antecedent. (and yes, I understand that there's no implication that antecedent is actually true.) However, that it 'necessarily follows' is the truthmaker of the conditional and why the proposition is accepted as true or if it doesn’t necessarily follow rejected as false, not that one thinks the antecedent is false. At least to my understanding anyway, hence my repeated requests to show how the consequent does follow (without an appeal to objective morality). However, since Original Position has finally provided a truthmaker in his latest post that might hold, it appears I’ll probably have to renounce or further qualify my original position.

I understand how they work and what they do and do not imply, but what you’re accusing me of objecting to is not what I’m actually objecting to. See my most recent response to Subfallen.

The bolded is similar to what I anticipated but was thinking something like that is an appeal to objective morality. However, since the nihilist basically considers all occurrences as pointless I suppose I need to accept it and modify my original claim, from: "the atheist needs to assume ‘objective morality is real’ to make the argument from evil work."
To: the atheist needs to either affirm objective morality or deny morality altogether to make the argument(s) from evil work. (at least with the arguments I'm familar with.)

So, do you agree that an atheist cannot put forth your latest argument without an appeal to nihilism? That is, while you've shown that an argument from evil can be constructed without an appeal to objective morality, one cannot accept the pivotal premise (2) of said argument unless one's beliefs are consistent with nihilism.

Well, your understanding is wrong. If A is false then the conditional...

If A, then B

...is true. Since a nihilist believes it is false that morality is objective, he also believes the premise...

2) If morality is objective in our world, then X

...is true. For any X.

Now, if you believe morality is objective, you may find Premise 2) to be false for some X. However Original Position was not claiming to present an argument that you would find sound; only an argument consistent with moral nihilism.