It could be the source. I just know i dont have an objective answer on which baby to save.

I agree with your conclusion. It could very well be that because of the indifference between the two babies that the question of which one to save isn't a moral question, and that all of the "moral action" is in the question of WHETHER to save.

So moral objectivity (it is right to save one) can exist while having unanswered questions (which one should I save?). It also addresses lestat's view that there can only be one right action in an objective morality.

Yeah i can see what your saying now.

Right. Another way of putting this is that morality doesn't necessarily determine what actions you should take. Let's say it is your day off and you are deciding whether to go to the beach or the museum. One or the other of these might be the right choice depending on what you are trying to accomplish. However, that doesn't mean that if you make the "wrong" choice you are doing something immoral.

For Kantians, morality puts constraints on what kinds of actions we can use to achieve our goals, but it doesn't tell what goals to accept (this isn't quite accurate).

Why cannot I be a relativist who argues that whether an action is better to society is a valid reason for judging the morality of said action. The only difference is that I do not claim there is an objective proof that this is the case.

As an analogy, I could call apples bananas and bananas apples based on my own personal definitions. There is no objective reason why I am wrong, but there are a number of good reasons how it could be argued that I should instead take the majority position.

Before y'all drag me on the moral objectivest train there is still one problem i cant see getting by.

Im dont think all moral questions have universal answers, just some.

Like is drinking alcohol objectively morally right or wrong? For an alcoholic with kids and family i would say its morally wrong for them to drink. But for non alcoholic i think its morally fine. Even morally good if you add in the health benefits.

Aggregate utility of what, or whom? See, this is where it gets sketchy. We tend to think of things in selfish terms as humans. Aggregate utility for humanity is just as arbitrary as aggregate utility for everyone in your neighborhood or aggregate utility for chimpanzees. Who determines which aggregate utility we are using for this objective morality? If nobody, what is responsible for it or how do we gain access to it?

And what if human existence is a detriment to the universe? Clearly, launching a nuclear holocaust and ending all of humanity would be the moral thing to do for aggregate universal utility.

I believe torturing small children for pleasure is wrong.
I believe that any reasonable code of morality concludes that torturing small children for pleasure is wrong.
I think it is extremely unlikely (although maybe not impossible) that you could conceive of a situation in which someone could torture small children for pleasure and for it not to be wrong.
If someone argued that they believed torturing small children for pleasure was morally right, I would argue against this on benefit to society grounds (but would not conclude that this was an objective standard).
I do not believe that there is any way to prove that torturing small children is wrong to a mathematical degree of certainty.

I understand if you disagree with my thinking of the above statements, but do not understand that you believe this position is logically incoherent.

In thinking it over, I think the crux of the problem is that I believe my own morality broadly derives from "good of society" arguments but I do not believe this constitutes an objective basis for morality or the only possible reasonable basis for morality.

Just one thought: If you believe killing babies is objectively wrong (or any moral preposition), please can you prove this from clearly defined axioms.

If someone holds a moral position different from mine, I believe he is wrong, but do not believe I can prove this mathematically. This does not prevent me from attempting to impose my moral position on them as appropriate (eg stopping them killing babies)

The only difference for an objectivist in the above situation is that he would "know" rather than "believe" the baby murderer was wrong. My struggle is how you could "know" something about morality given that this is a fuzzy concept.

If you believe that the fact that an action is better for society makes that action right or wrong, then you believe that there are true moral claims. Thus, you believe that morality is objective. If you want to call this "relativism," fine, but that doesn't change what you believe. Also, note that our ability to give an objective proof that a moral claim is true is irrelevant to the issue.

The more technical, philosophical meaning (from SEP) of "moral relativism," is that the moral relativist believes that moral claims "contain an essential indexical element." Indexicals are words like "I" or "there." The sentence, "I am 40 years old," can be either true or false depending on who is saying it. This is because the "I" relativizes the statement to the speaker.

Moral relativists claim that all moral claims are indexical in this manner. Thus, if I say, "Todd shouldn't steal in situation x," this statement might be true, but if you say, "Todd shouldn't steal in situation x," this statement might be false. For the relativist, what makes this statement true when I say it and false when you say it doesn't have anything to do with either the nature of stealing in situation x, but is the result of some difference between me and you (note that moral claims don't have to be indexed to persons, but can also be indexed to cultures).

The person who claims that moral relativism is false is claiming that the truth of some moral claims are not indexical in this way. For example, the truth-value of "You shouldn't steal in situation x," would not depend on any essential indexical element (e.g. on differences between the speakers), but on objective features about stealing in situation x (such as the effects of such an action), or necessary features of how we reason about such actions.

For example, let's take a claim like, "The gravitational pull of the moon is the cause of the ocean's tides." This is a true, non-relative statement. The truth or falsity of this statement doesn't depend on the speaker's beliefs, or the cultural traditions of society. On the other hand, the truth or falsity of a statement like, "Brocolli tastes good," is clearly relative to the speaker. If we add a practical claim like, "you should eat what tastes good," then this statement will only motivate us if it is (relatively) true.

The relativists in this thread have claimed that moral claims are relative to the speaker. That is, they've claimed that the truth or falsity of moral claims depend on the subjective state of the speaker. These are subjective states about some action or state of affairs external to the person (my dislike or disapproval of murder).

Now, I'm not denying that the relativist cannot have such subjective states. My claim is that such subjective states do not give a reason for other people to not murder. However, since moral claims are supposed to be practical, that is, they are supposed to give people reasons for actions, this understanding of moral claims ends up making morality pointless. Another way of putting it is that if we relativize the truth of moral claims to the individual, then whether or not a moral claim is true or false wouldn't have any implication for how other people should act. To me, this is a form of moral skepticism, as it trivializes moral statements into irrelevance.

Aggregate utility of all sentient beings. This includes chimpanzees. Incidentally, this is why utilitarians like Peter Singer have advocated so strongly for stopping cruelty to animals. Nobody determines which aggregate utility we are using. Aggregate utility is a fact about the world. I'm not sure what you mean by asking who is responsible for it, or how we gain access to it.
Well, if your hypothetical claim that the aggregate utility of the world would be higher if we launched a nuclear holocaust is true, then (on this theory), we should launch a nuclear holocaust.

You are confusing epistemic claims with claims about truth. So, once again, "truth" is not the same thing as "justification." If I say that p is true, I am not claiming to know that p is true. The moral realist (or the person who believes that morality is objectively true or false) doesn't have to claim to know that x is morally wrong.

I agree with all of these statements (except for your contradictory claim about the benefit to society) and do not regard them as inconsistent with a belief that morality is objectively true or false.