The case for William L. Craig
Think about the "confirmation" that would be received. Let's take a very specific example: "The sun in the morning is a sign that God still loves us." You tell this to a kid every morning, and he gets confirmation because the sun does indeed rise. He sees it. The sun is clearly rising every morning. The association of that concept ("God still loves us") with the empirical experience of the sun rising is NO DIFFERENT than the association of the concept "car" and the empirical experience of seeing it on the street driving towards you.
I'm well aware that there are people who avoid me. That's fine.
But you continue to engage in the discussion, so I continue to converse with you.
In the theist-poker thread, it was the idea that your theological views were the only appropriate theological views, and that no other views are actually Christian. Original Position spent a lot of time trying to explain that one to you.
I ended the discussion with you there because your posts had started to have very little content; most of it was again about my logic and it was just too annoying to continue.
In the child-abuse thread, it wasn't until you finally abandoned your "Is there anything other than religion that's massive child abuse? I think not." and took the more sane position of "some religious teaching which are traditionally thought to not be harmful are harmful." that the conversation died down.
Here, you've brought up an impossible standard, but you don't seem to see it. On the one hand, you've brought up a scientific empiricism as the best standard (and perhaps the only way) of knowing. But then you've also said that theists must argue in such a way that does not invoke science, since science is subject to change. So there's no logical possibility in your mind about the existence of God.
Until the 19th century they were using the silly argument from design for the existence of life, claiming that such complexities are impossible to exist naturally, therefore God did it. When it was shown that life can actually come about in a self-organizing manner, some of them (the more intelligent ones) stopped using the silly argument and years later when the infamous physical constants' "fine-tuning" was discovered, they started clinging to it and they still do. If a naturalistic explanation of that fine-tuning is discovered (not that the argument isn't completely destroyed even today, but still) the equivalents of Craig in the future will pretend that God's existence was never dependent on the teleological argument in the first place.
Do you see what the problem is? That is why I asked on several occasions whether if those scientific views change, Craig should admit that his arguments were actually false. And if he doesn't, this means that those arguments were actually unfalsifiable.
By the way, if the theory of evolution were not developed today, and the origin of the different species were still a scientific mystery, do you think Craig wouldn't be using this as yet another great argument for the existence of God? I think you can safely bet your ass that this is exactly what he would be doing.
And I've been showing you how you're continuing in that pattern regarding your views of "evidence." Although it's possible for someone to present a piece of information for you and for you to consent "this *IS* evidence of intelligent design" it is far more likely the case that NOTHING will ever satisfy your undefined standard of "evidence" and therefore it will never be possible for you to be convinced of intelligent design if it were real.
I would also say that it's a reflection of the same intellectual biases you have when listening to these debates
I you cannot see the contradiction in this sentence, I don't know what to do.
So when we accept the premise that gravity is approximately constant over small changes of altitude, and conclude (via mathematics) that this would cause projectiles to take parabolic paths, is the fact that we have now learned that projectiles will take parabolic paths something "new" about the universe that we did not know before?
In the late 19th century it was thought that the brain was a continuous structure and not composed of discrete units (this was known as the reticular theory). This was so, because the only microscope available at the time was the optical microscope whose resolving power was not good enough to see the tiny synaptic connections between neurons and it all appeared like a single, unbroken tissue. With the invention of the electron microscope, however, the small gaps in the tissue could now be observed and that gave rise to the neural doctrine (that the brain actually consisted of individual neural cells).
So, the electron microscope was used as a tool without which that knowledge about the brain would not have been learned. But the nature of the microscope itself cannot teach us anything about the world which we don't already know (since we invented it; no need for reverse engineering even).
In the same way, we invent certain mathematical tools to help us learn new things about the universe. But the tools themselves (which we invented!) do not teach us anything we don't already know.
Since Craig isn't here to defend himself all we really have to go on, in regard to his position with this argument, is what he's written. Perusing his sight I found the following:
http://www.leaderu.com/offices/billc...ppy.html#text1
I. Introduction
In his helpful book God, Reason, and Theistic Proofs, Stephen T. Davis explores at some length what criteria must be fulfilled by a theistic argument in order for it to count as a successful piece of natural theology. Of course, the argument must be formally and informally valid; moreover, Davis opines, its premisses must be known to be more plausible than their denials. When assessed by this standard, it seems to me that the kalam cosmological argument qualifies as a successful piece of natural theology, for it is obviously valid, and we may at least know that its premisses are more plausible than their denials, even if we do not know them to be necessarily true, or simply true, or even plausible.
I. Introduction
In his helpful book God, Reason, and Theistic Proofs, Stephen T. Davis explores at some length what criteria must be fulfilled by a theistic argument in order for it to count as a successful piece of natural theology. Of course, the argument must be formally and informally valid; moreover, Davis opines, its premisses must be known to be more plausible than their denials. When assessed by this standard, it seems to me that the kalam cosmological argument qualifies as a successful piece of natural theology, for it is obviously valid, and we may at least know that its premisses are more plausible than their denials, even if we do not know them to be necessarily true, or simply true, or even plausible.
Can you see the problem here?
And many other possibilities...
Can you see the problem here?
Just because Original Position tried explaining something to me, doesn't necessarily mean it is true. As far as I remember, that discussion ended with a post by me, Original Position had disappeared from the forums for about a week and then forgot to reply to my last post. He hasn't convinced me that my position was wrong.
lawdude attempted to defend the same position as I did but gave up quickly because he saw it was pointless
I ended the discussion with you there because your posts had started to have very little content; most of it was again about my logic and it was just too annoying to continue.
You are hugely misrepresenting my position again. I didn't say that theists should not invoke science.
This is what must be considered when appealing to an authority. Is the authority actually authoritative? You can challenge the authority, but if the appeal to authority is valid, the challenge will presumably be subsequently met by the authority. It's not just presented as the end-all of the discussion, but presumably the one arguing against the authority will not be able to mount a successful challenge against the authority.
Do you see what the problem is? That is why I asked on several occasions whether if those scientific views change, Craig should admit that his arguments were actually false. And if he doesn't, this means that those arguments were actually unfalsifiable.
The argument cannot be "true" or "false." It can be sound/unsound or valid/invalid. Presumably, you're talking about soundness here (true premises and valid). He would agree that his argument is not sound, but the argument would remain valid.
Your second use of false (in unfalsifiable) is related to a broader scientific concept. Arguments are not subject to falsifiability (just as arguments are not subject to being false). Propositions are things that could be falsified. And presumably, you're talking here about a scientific standard of falsifiability, which will likely lead us all the way back to your understanding of philosophy as an empirical subject.
By the way, if the theory of evolution were not developed today, and the origin of the different species were still a scientific mystery, do you think Craig wouldn't be using this as yet another great argument for the existence of God? I think you can safely bet your ass that this is exactly what he would be doing.
I already explained that if they present a piece of evidence which is compatible with ID but incompatible with evolution, that would qualify for good evidence supporting ID.
What contradiction are you talking about FFS? I am not defining anything in the sense that I am not making up my own definitions. I am using a definition which was made by philosophers and evaluating according to it.
We have learned something new about the world. The bolded part is crucial, however. Math is obviously useful, so it DOES help us in learning truths about the world. But mathematical knowledge by itself does not teach us anything new.
You reject mathematics as a science (as defined by empirical observation). Fine. You're a mathematical Platonist.
You want to include philosophy as a science, and you believe philosophy is ultimately decided empirically.
Putting these two side-by-side is bizarre. Do you really see no intersection between mathematics and philosophy (in particular, the role and centrality of logic)?
Edit: I really believe that you've redefined "philosophy" in your own head to mean something else.
Maybe it was only one God but once he created the universe, he stopped existing, or went on to creating another universe and doesn't care about ours at all?
I don't know the problem you're talking about, unless you think I said that whether something can exist without a cause cannot be answered empirically? It's hard to understand the problem that you apparently saw in those two quotes without clarifying what you mean.
I think most acknowledge going into this particular argument that the theist can't prove empirically that God exists, nor can the atheist prove empirically that God does not. Nonetheless, we can set the bar with the 'God does exist' or 'God does not exist' disjunction and see who makes the more plausible case. Not that you must accept less than empirically grounded arguments for your personal worldview, but honestly, I'm not sure why you think that position belongs in this debate. It seems to me like you're denying Craig's position in the argument (that the theist version is more plausible than the alternative) to begin with and taking that as a refutation of his argument rather than a negation of his position.
I. Introduction
In his helpful book God, Reason, and Theistic Proofs, Stephen T. Davis explores at some length what criteria must be fulfilled by a theistic argument in order for it to count as a successful piece of natural theology. Of course, the argument must be formally and informally valid; moreover, Davis opines, its premisses must be known to be more plausible than their denials. When assessed by this standard, it seems to me that the kalam cosmological argument qualifies as a successful piece of natural theology, for it is obviously valid, and we may at least know that its premisses are more plausible than their denials, even if we do not know them to be necessarily true, or simply true, or even plausible.
In his helpful book God, Reason, and Theistic Proofs, Stephen T. Davis explores at some length what criteria must be fulfilled by a theistic argument in order for it to count as a successful piece of natural theology. Of course, the argument must be formally and informally valid; moreover, Davis opines, its premisses must be known to be more plausible than their denials. When assessed by this standard, it seems to me that the kalam cosmological argument qualifies as a successful piece of natural theology, for it is obviously valid, and we may at least know that its premisses are more plausible than their denials, even if we do not know them to be necessarily true, or simply true, or even plausible.
Unless one's a pan-theist
Yeah but there just a myth.
I'm not all that familiar with Craig, so I really don't know how he'd respond, but loosely and briefly from a Thomistic perspective: if there were a multiplicity of uncaused causes, one uncaused cause would not be distinguishable from another uncaused cause. So, logically, we cannot have more than one 'distinguishable' uncaused cause, however, we cannot logically show that there are more than one 'indistinguishable' uncaused causes.
Most of Craig's popular work deals with the abbreviated form of the KCA. He doesn't usually go further because he runs into so many brick walls on the simplified version, such as people who argue that it's plausible that something can come from nothing or that the universe didn't begin to exist.
4.1 Argument that the cause of the universe is a personal Creator:Any more details on 4.12?
4.11The universe was brought into being either by a mechanically operating set of necessary and sufficient conditions or by a personal, free agent.
4.12 The universe could not have been brought into being by a mechanically operating set of necessary and sufficient conditions.
4.13 Therefore, the universe was brought into being by a personal, free agent.
I assumed as much, but this was all I ran across on his site:
4.1 Argument that the cause of the universe is a personal Creator:Any more details on 4.12?
4.11The universe was brought into being either by a mechanically operating set of necessary and sufficient conditions or by a personal, free agent.
4.12 The universe could not have been brought into being by a mechanically operating set of necessary and sufficient conditions.
4.13 Therefore, the universe was brought into being by a personal, free agent.
Craig first started acquiring fame for his book on the KCA, which I think he recently updated. I haven't read it but I imagine it goes into quite a bit more detail than you find in his popular presentations.
Edit: Here's some stuff from Reasonable Faith, p. 153:
On impersonal cause-
The cause is in some sense eternal and yet the effect which it produced is not eternal but began to exist a finite time ago. How can this be? If the necessary and sufficient conditions for the production of the effect are eternal, then why isn't the effect eternal?
If the temperature were(sic) eternally below zero degrees Centigrade, then any water around would be eternally frozen.
I've heard him speak on it in his defender's series. Because the universe isn't eternal it requires a personal agent for a cause. The reason is an impersonal cause, if eternal, would produce an eternal effect. As an illustration he cites examples like ice, which is always frozen if its cause, freezing temperature, is also eternal. For there to exist a cause without the effect, and then the effect, requires free will, which requires personal agency.
Craig first started acquiring fame for his book on the KCA, which I think he recently updated. I haven't read it but I imagine it goes into quite a bit more detail than you find in his popular presentations.
Craig first started acquiring fame for his book on the KCA, which I think he recently updated. I haven't read it but I imagine it goes into quite a bit more detail than you find in his popular presentations.
A. If there is no necessary being and past time is infinite, then there was a time that no contingent being existed.
B. If it is possible that no contingent being exists, then in any infinite stretch of time there will be time when no contingent being exists.
I'll give it a read. I've somewhat dismissed the cosmological arguments because they don't seem all that conclusive, one way or the other, and I generally consider them to be 'ways to God' rather than proofs in the proper sense of the word. But I have a couple related conditionals Plantinga posed that I've been wanting to explore:
A. If there is no necessary being and past time is infinite, then there was a time that no contingent being existed.
B. If it is possible that no contingent being exists, then in any infinite stretch of time there will be time when no contingent being exists.
A. If there is no necessary being and past time is infinite, then there was a time that no contingent being existed.
B. If it is possible that no contingent being exists, then in any infinite stretch of time there will be time when no contingent being exists.
There's an interesting side question here about whether or not time can exist if there are no contingent beings. I have a book by Craig on time and though I don't recall him addressing that specific question, he seems to connect the existence of time with contingent existence - for instance, God is timeless without creation, but is omnitemporal with creation, but time itself is created and therefore contingent. If all contingent beings ceased to exist wouldn't time also?
This is the third attempt to respond to this post. The first two attempts were made from another computer whose browser gave a weird error every time I clicked on "Submit reply" and I hadn't saved the message. Hope this time it works! Lol.
I don't 'believe' this as strongly as you think. I am always open to new information to change my views. If you (or whoever is proposing this) can show how the rising sun is actually confirming the existence of God, I might rethink my position. Tell me why it's not arbitrary and I will listen. FWIW, I can explain why the information coming from the other modalities is not arbitrary with respect to the car's existence.
And there is no necessary connection between you and Original Position claiming I'm wrong and me being wrong.
Again... I am changing my position only in your head. What I was explaining in the quotes you cited here was that you can't make an argument for the existence of God reliant on a consensus for the truth of a scientific theory, or at least if you do, you should acknowledge that the argument is meaningless the moment that consensus disappears. I never claimed that you should not use science to prove the existence of God. In fact, all along I've been claiming that all philosophical (and theological) questions should be addressed empirically. But Craig doesn't do that. He instead finds weird confirmation of his faith in some scientists' views about the universe. What theists should do instead is look for direct evidence for the existence of God (what they're doing instead is "findind" questionable and highly vulnerable second-hand "evidence").
Yes, I know what a sound and a valid argument means, thank you. We can probably argue a lot on the validity of informal fallacies, but whatever. As I pointed out earlier, Craig likes to make formal fallacies as well.
Would he really agree that the argument is no longer sound, as you're claiming? Do you honestly believe that? Which do you think is more likely: him acknowledging that his arguments are absolutely meaningless or being the intellectual slut that he is, completely changing his arguments and fitting them to the new theories?
Oh, come oooon! Be honest and tell me if what I said there is not true! People like Craig love exploiting gaps in the scientific knowledge to "prove" the existence of their God. The same way he talks about the rigged physical constants today (the improbability of them coming about naturally), he would be talking about the improbability of the species living today originating as a result of a natural process. The same way Darwin's theory was a cold shower for the creationists, we are now waiting for the next Darwin to explain the apparent fine-tuning of the constants (not that that argument isn't already completely destroyed).
Alright, let's summarize. We have a very powerful theory (of evolution) explaining life, but person X decides to challenge it by saying he has a better theory (ID) for explaining life. People ask him to support his theory with evidence but the person is unable to - his so-called evidence is absolute trash. Now you come and tell me to say what evidence I would accept as good? This question is flawed because if it was known what the evidence should be, the theory would have already been supported. And that is not how science works! Nobody defending a theory comes and says "well, if you can't tell me what evidence you think would support my theory, then you're being unfair to me *sniff*". Proponents of theories find their own evidence and other people later evaluate that evidence objectively. I wish there were some philosophers of science here to explain this to you, because apparently my explanations aren't good enough.
Let's consider an example from the opposite point of view. Nobody knew of the existence of the hereditary units (genes) in the beginning of the 19th century. People were still living under the reign of creationists. Let's say somebody came and proposed a theory that life actually didn't pop into existence but evolved gradually over billions of years. People would (rightly) expect him to support his claim with something other than his faith or intuition. But let's say he can't. And let's say he decides to defend himself by asking "what evidence would convince you that my theory is true?", to which the creationists simply shrug and are unable to give an answer. Why? Because, as I said a few sentences ago, the genes, which are essential in supporting the theory of evolution, have not been discovered yet and people don't have any concept of heredity. But later when the genes were discovered, it became clear what evidence is needed to support evolution. And that is exactly what people have been doing ever since. There are now mountains of evidence in support of evolution.
ID proponents should do the same thing. If they can't find evidence supporting their theory now, instead of whining about people setting up impossible standards for them, try to find real evidence supporting their theory - one from which the truth of their view follows logically. Those are the same standards as the standards for every other theory that is being proposed and defended today.
I never said philosophy is science. I said that philosophy has more in common with science than with math, in that the questions philosophy is interested in also interest science. Are there questions which interest only philosophy but not science? Possibly (it would still be nice if you gave an example of such a question). But those questions* which do not fall into that category, should ultimately be addressed by science, even if philosophical thinking can be helpful in guiding the scientific research.
*The question of free will is one such example. Over the past 20-30 years psychology and neuroscience have contributed to the discussion more than hundreds and probably even thousands of years of philosophical debate.
Let's stop you right there. Why do you believe this? The place you're starting from is presuming certain pieces of information. Especially with respect to your views, nothing has anything to do with God, which is your freedom to dismiss this example without contemplating what the example is designed to represent.
There is no necessary connection between you being convinced that you're wrong and you being wrong.
Oh?
Since science is not infallible in principle, nor can it be exempted from criticism, at what level can theists invoke science in their arguments? This is you changing your position... again.
Since science is not infallible in principle, nor can it be exempted from criticism, at what level can theists invoke science in their arguments? This is you changing your position... again.
The argument cannot be "true" or "false." It can be sound/unsound or valid/invalid. Presumably, you're talking about soundness here (true premises and valid). He would agree that his argument is not sound, but the argument would remain valid.
Would he really agree that the argument is no longer sound, as you're claiming? Do you honestly believe that? Which do you think is more likely: him acknowledging that his arguments are absolutely meaningless or being the intellectual slut that he is, completely changing his arguments and fitting them to the new theories?
Do you ever get tired of playing the mind-reading game? I know I get tired of reading it.
This is not good enough. You're still saying at a fundamental level, "I'll know it when I see it." There's nothing inherent to ID and evolution here that allows anyone to discern any information about what you're saying. Basically, you're just repeating your definition. What things would constitute evidence compatible with ID but incompatible with evolution? Can't think of any? That probably means that nothing will satisfy you.
Let's consider an example from the opposite point of view. Nobody knew of the existence of the hereditary units (genes) in the beginning of the 19th century. People were still living under the reign of creationists. Let's say somebody came and proposed a theory that life actually didn't pop into existence but evolved gradually over billions of years. People would (rightly) expect him to support his claim with something other than his faith or intuition. But let's say he can't. And let's say he decides to defend himself by asking "what evidence would convince you that my theory is true?", to which the creationists simply shrug and are unable to give an answer. Why? Because, as I said a few sentences ago, the genes, which are essential in supporting the theory of evolution, have not been discovered yet and people don't have any concept of heredity. But later when the genes were discovered, it became clear what evidence is needed to support evolution. And that is exactly what people have been doing ever since. There are now mountains of evidence in support of evolution.
ID proponents should do the same thing. If they can't find evidence supporting their theory now, instead of whining about people setting up impossible standards for them, try to find real evidence supporting their theory - one from which the truth of their view follows logically. Those are the same standards as the standards for every other theory that is being proposed and defended today.
You want to include philosophy as a science, and you believe philosophy is ultimately decided empirically.
Putting these two side-by-side is bizarre. Do you really see no intersection between mathematics and philosophy (in particular, the role and centrality of logic)?
Edit: I really believe that you've redefined "philosophy" in your own head to mean something else.
Putting these two side-by-side is bizarre. Do you really see no intersection between mathematics and philosophy (in particular, the role and centrality of logic)?
Edit: I really believe that you've redefined "philosophy" in your own head to mean something else.
*The question of free will is one such example. Over the past 20-30 years psychology and neuroscience have contributed to the discussion more than hundreds and probably even thousands of years of philosophical debate.
I'm not all that familiar with Craig, so I really don't know how he'd respond, but loosely and briefly from a Thomistic perspective: if there were a multiplicity of uncaused causes, one uncaused cause would not be distinguishable from another uncaused cause. So, logically, we cannot have more than one 'distinguishable' uncaused cause, however, we cannot logically show that there are more than one 'indistinguishable' uncaused causes.
In Thomistic metaphysics God's essence is esse (God is being, the act of being/existence itself). So if God stopped being so would everything else.
But you believe it strongly enough that you've dismissed the entire analogy out of hand.
This is the exact same shifty standard as you're doing with ID/evolution. You'll know it when you see it. That's just not good enough. It shows that you can't even wrap your head around the hypothetical to even address the underlying issue. And yes, this is a hypothetical. I don't actually believe that the sun rising in the morning is a "sign from God that he still loves us." So asking me to pull out this demonstration in reality is completely missing the point.
<SIGH> Do you not realize that a "consensus for the truth of a scientific theory" is THE SAME THING as "science" according to your definitions? And that an appeal to science IS an appeal to authority? So when you say:
You *ARE* rejecting science as a part of the argument! It's that simple.
I reject the word "meaningless" and replace it "unsound." Nobody is rejecting that the argument would no longer be successful at showing the conclusion. But you seem to take this to mean something about veracity of the conclusion. You've shown an example yourself of an invalid argument with a true conclusion.
Again, you are DECLARING certain classes of information to be "out of bounds" for the conversation, thereby creating a logical IMPOSSIBILITY for the theists. This is essentially what you're saying: "I will only believe in the existence of a non-physical being if you can catch it in a net."
You are clearly saying that he is arguing in bad faith. That's already bad news and a demonstration of intellectual bias.
But also, this is a new level of absurdity, especially because THIS IS EXACTLY WHAT HAPPENS IN INTELLECTUAL DEBATES! New information turns into new arguments. That you would even propose this as a problem is beyond asinine.
Summary fail. It's like you don't even know what a hypothetical is.
---
Wow. This is mind-bafflingly convoluted. It reminds me of you talking about how theists have to jump through all sorts of hoops to maintain their irrational beliefs.
You have made the following statements:
and
So now when you say:
The answer is NO! Quit making this crap up as you go. You don't have a grounded position, and you're just spewing whatever nonsense is at the top of your head. It makes for an impossible discussion.
If you (or whoever is proposing this) can show how the rising sun is actually confirming the existence of God, I might rethink my position. Tell me why it's not arbitrary and I will listen.
Again... I am changing my position only in your head. What I was explaining in the quotes you cited here was that you can't make an argument for the existence of God reliant on a consensus for the truth of a scientific theory
Since in order for *those* arguments for the existence of God to really work (as I explained before), the authority must be indeed infallible in principle and exempted from criticism.
...or at least if you do, you should acknowledge that the argument is meaningless the moment that consensus disappears.
I never claimed that you should not use science to prove the existence of God. In fact, all along I've been claiming that all philosophical (and theological) questions should be addressed empirically. But Craig doesn't do that. He instead finds weird confirmation of his faith in some scientists' views about the universe. What theists should do instead is look for direct evidence for the existence of God (what they're doing instead is "findind" questionable and highly vulnerable second-hand "evidence").
Would he really agree that the argument is no longer sound, as you're claiming? Do you honestly believe that? Which do you think is more likely: him acknowledging that his arguments are absolutely meaningless or being the intellectual slut that he is, completely changing his arguments and fitting them to the new theories?
But also, this is a new level of absurdity, especially because THIS IS EXACTLY WHAT HAPPENS IN INTELLECTUAL DEBATES! New information turns into new arguments. That you would even propose this as a problem is beyond asinine.
Alright, let's summarize.
---
Are there questions which interest only philosophy but not science? Possibly (it would still be nice if you gave an example of such a question). But those questions* which do not fall into that category, should ultimately be addressed by science, even if philosophical thinking can be helpful in guiding the scientific research.
You have made the following statements:
Are there questions which interest only philosophy but not science?
This is the exact same shifty standard as you're doing with ID/evolution. You'll know it when you see it. That's just not good enough. It shows that you can't even wrap your head around the hypothetical to even address the underlying issue. And yes, this is a hypothetical. I don't actually believe that the sun rising in the morning is a "sign from God that he still loves us." So asking me to pull out this demonstration in reality is completely missing the point.
<SIGH> Do you not realize that a "consensus for the truth of a scientific theory" is THE SAME THING as "science" according to your definitions? And that an appeal to science IS an appeal to authority? So when you say:
You *ARE* rejecting science as a part of the argument! It's that simple.
You *ARE* rejecting science as a part of the argument! It's that simple.
I reject the word "meaningless" and replace it "unsound." Nobody is rejecting that the argument would no longer be successful at showing the conclusion. But you seem to take this to mean something about veracity of the conclusion. You've shown an example yourself of an invalid argument with a true conclusion.
Again, you are DECLARING certain classes of information to be "out of bounds" for the conversation, thereby creating a logical IMPOSSIBILITY for the theists. This is essentially what you're saying: "I will only believe in the existence of a non-physical being if you can catch it in a net."
You are clearly saying that he is arguing in bad faith. That's already bad news and a demonstration of intellectual bias.
But also, this is a new level of absurdity, especially because THIS IS EXACTLY WHAT HAPPENS IN INTELLECTUAL DEBATES! New information turns into new arguments. That you would even propose this as a problem is beyond asinine.
But also, this is a new level of absurdity, especially because THIS IS EXACTLY WHAT HAPPENS IN INTELLECTUAL DEBATES! New information turns into new arguments. That you would even propose this as a problem is beyond asinine.
EDIT: If "THIS IS" indeed "EXACTLY WHAT HAPPENS IN INTELLECTUAL DEBATES", aren't your accusations that I am changing my position ridiculous? Not that I really am, and not that this is how intellectual debates really work, but again it's ironic how you accuse me of one thing and then state that this same thing is what should be happening in intellectual debates.
I can't wait for your wise explanation why Craig changing his position is perfectly acceptable but I am being intellectually dishonest and incoherent.
Summary fail. It's like you don't even know what a hypothetical is.
la6ki: 0
Wow. This is mind-bafflingly convoluted. It reminds me of you talking about how theists have to jump through all sorts of hoops to maintain their irrational beliefs.
You have made the following statements:
and
So now when you say:
The answer is NO! Quit making this crap up as you go. You don't have a grounded position, and you're just spewing whatever nonsense is at the top of your head. It makes for an impossible discussion.
You have made the following statements:
and
So now when you say:
The answer is NO! Quit making this crap up as you go. You don't have a grounded position, and you're just spewing whatever nonsense is at the top of your head. It makes for an impossible discussion.
I'm not saying you *SHOULD*! I'm saying that you've defined an IMPOSSIBLE STANDARD. Are you even reading the words that I'm typing?
Edit: You're arguing as one who is so entrenched in his view of the world, that he's mistaking the edge of his rut at the horizon.
<sigh>
I simply do not understand how you think you can hold your strict empiricism together with your Platonic view of math, and how you can believe that
and
and that there are infinitely many primes, and still be logically consistent. You're swimming in the vast oceans on utter nonsense.
Edit: You're arguing as one who is so entrenched in his view of the world, that he's mistaking the edge of his rut at the horizon.
I'm sorry if it's too difficult for you to understand. Just to clarify: if there are philosophical questions which aren't addressable by science, then those questions will never find anything that ever remotely resembles an answer.
I simply do not understand how you think you can hold your strict empiricism together with your Platonic view of math, and how you can believe that
I am holding the position that everything should in principle be explorable scientifically.
What I would claim, however, is that empirical observation is the best method we have for answering ANY KINDS OF questions. So, if some things cannot be answered empirically (which seems to be your claim) then those things cannot be answered at all.
But also, this is a new level of absurdity, especially because THIS IS EXACTLY WHAT HAPPENS IN INTELLECTUAL DEBATES! New information turns into new arguments.
There's a difference between changing your argument and changing your position. But since you don't seem to know the difference between arguments (which are valid/invalid, sound/unsound) and propositions (which true/false), it does not surprise me that you would make this error.
Edit: It also doesn't help your case that you insist that you're not when you are. But I don't think anything will ever convince you of that since I've quoted contradictory statements side by side and you still don't seem to get it.
Edit^2: There's also a different between being changing the argument due to logical errors and changing arguments due to evidentiary discovery. The first case is something that would NEVER have worked, but the latter is a contingent position.
<sigh>
I simply do not understand how you think you can hold your strict empiricism together with your Platonic view of math, and how you can believe that
and
and that there are infinitely many primes, and still be logically consistent. You're swimming in the vast oceans on utter nonsense.
I simply do not understand how you think you can hold your strict empiricism together with your Platonic view of math, and how you can believe that
and
and that there are infinitely many primes, and still be logically consistent. You're swimming in the vast oceans on utter nonsense.
Of course you decide to include imaginary entities in my "everything" just to appear as if you have found yet another contradiction. That's fine, if it makes you feel proud.
The problem is that when I say "everything" and we are having a discussion about the real universe, I am talking about things in the universe, like planets, stars, gods, gravity, lions, human brains, animal brains, etc. I am not talking about abstract objects which are imaginary, like numbers.
When you say:
I am holding the position that everything should in principle be explorable scientifically.
I am holding the position that everything that is empirical should in principle be explorable scientifically.
What I would claim, however, is that empirical observation is the best method we have for answering ANY KINDS OF questions. So, if some things cannot be answered empirically (which seems to be your claim) then those things cannot be answered at all.
What I would claim, however, is that empirical observation is the best method we have for answering ANY KINDS OF EMPIRICAL questions. So, if some things cannot be answered empirically (which seems to be your claim) then those things cannot be EMPIRICALLY answered at all.
Yes, with one exception. You are probably going to declare God non-empirical. But my claim is that (and not only mine) anything which has an effect on the empirical universe, should be studies empirically, and in fact the best way to study it is the empirical method. You can probably say that your God doesn't have an effect on the empirical world, I guess. But not only would that be contradicting your theology, you would also have declared your god to be as imaginary as numbers.
Questions:
1) Is this claim an empirical one?
2) Given the claim, can it be studied empirically? Note very carefully that this is not the same as whether is it possible to have captured the necessary empirical information that I clapped my hands (in the past), but whether it is possible to empirically verify that the hand-clapping happened (given the present condition).
We can go further:
Claim: Yesterday, I intended to buy toothpaste.
Questions:
1) Is this claim an empirical one? (If so, then you are claiming that "intent" is empirical, not an abstract concept.)
2) Given the claim, can it be studied empirically? (Again, pay attention to the tense. I'm asking whether you can empirically study yesterday's intent today.)
Claim: Yesterday, I clapped my hands.
Questions:
1) Is this claim an empirical one?
2) Given the claim, can it be studied empirically? Note very carefully that this is not the same as whether is it possible to have captured the necessary empirical information that I clapped my hands (in the past), but whether it is possible to empirically verify that the hand-clapping happened (given the present condition).
We can go further:
Claim: Yesterday, I intended to buy toothpaste.
Questions:
1) Is this claim an empirical one? (If so, then you are claiming that "intent" is empirical, not an abstract concept.)
2) Given the claim, can it be studied empirically? (Again, pay attention to the tense. I'm asking whether you can empirically study yesterday's intent today.)
Questions:
1) Is this claim an empirical one?
2) Given the claim, can it be studied empirically? Note very carefully that this is not the same as whether is it possible to have captured the necessary empirical information that I clapped my hands (in the past), but whether it is possible to empirically verify that the hand-clapping happened (given the present condition).
We can go further:
Claim: Yesterday, I intended to buy toothpaste.
Questions:
1) Is this claim an empirical one? (If so, then you are claiming that "intent" is empirical, not an abstract concept.)
2) Given the claim, can it be studied empirically? (Again, pay attention to the tense. I'm asking whether you can empirically study yesterday's intent today.)
Given that, in both examples you are essentially asking if something that happened in the past can be studies empirically. The answer is obviously "yes", but with the clarification that not everything that can be in principle studied empirically, can be studied empirically in practice.
What do I mean by that? It's all about the methods we have to study the things which happened in the past. We might have good enough methods to trace what happened yesterday from the empirical information that is out there, caused by your actions. But we also might not have good enough methods to do that. For example, before the method of radiometric dating was discovered, we couldn't estimate the age of a fossil (or there could have been another method that was used before radiometric dating, but whatever, you get the point). Even though the age of a fossil was something that could be in principle studied empirically, people couldn't study it just because they lacked the proper methods.
In your case, if we have the method to trace what you did yesterday, or what the specific pattern of activation over your neurons was yesterday, we can definitely study both examples empirically.
- For every time interval during which contingent beings have existed, there was a preceding time interval during which contingent beings existed.
- In any infinite stretch of time, every possibility is realized; a possibility that does not get itself realized in an infinite stretch of time is not worthy of the name [possibility].
- Every [contingent] being can fail to exist -- hypothesis.
- If every [contingent] being can fail to exist, then it is possible that nothing exists -- necessary truth.
- Hence it is possible that nothing exists.
- There was a time a when nothing existed.
- If there is no necessary being, then in any infinite stretch of time there is a time at which no contingent beings exist; that is,
- Contingent beings have existed for an infinite stretch of time only if there is a necessary being.
What I'm wondering about is if (3) is false, and a contingent being cannot fail to exist, then a contingent being is not a contingent being. The other issue is that I can imagine the universe dying out, where no contingent things exist, so if it can die, then isn't it necessarily born? In other words: if something X can go out of existence, then something X came into existence.
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