The case for William L. Craig
At least as far as the example presented goes, it's the question of "Why is there something instead of nothing?"
Now this question has no definitive answer, at least as far as I know. So he leads the listeners through a series of observations:
1) (Intuitively) An infinite past is absurd.
2) (Scientifically) The universe has a definite beginning.
3) (Intuitively) If you start with nothing, you end with nothing. (As an aside, the word means a true nothing, not just a vacuum or something that assumes the existence of spacetime).
4) Therefore, it is reasonable that something started the universe.
I have a hard time getting a sense of what the "error" is. You may disagree with the intuitive statements, but that's not really an error in the argument, that's merely a rejection of the premises (since those intuitive statements are indeed premises).
So I guess I don't actually understand your criticism.
Now this question has no definitive answer, at least as far as I know. So he leads the listeners through a series of observations:
1) (Intuitively) An infinite past is absurd.
2) (Scientifically) The universe has a definite beginning.
3) (Intuitively) If you start with nothing, you end with nothing. (As an aside, the word means a true nothing, not just a vacuum or something that assumes the existence of spacetime).
4) Therefore, it is reasonable that something started the universe.
I have a hard time getting a sense of what the "error" is. You may disagree with the intuitive statements, but that's not really an error in the argument, that's merely a rejection of the premises (since those intuitive statements are indeed premises).
So I guess I don't actually understand your criticism.
1. Experts' intuition fails quite often, especially when it's only intuition without empirical data.
2. We keep discovering very weird and counter-intuitive things about the universe all the time, so showing that something seems counter-intuitive now is basically an argument for absolutely nothing.
When I think about the bolded part of your post, I think there is a bit of an equivocation in Craig's argument. Since he (and you) put the question of "why there is something, rather than nothing", this should imply that the universe we are studying (which began with the Big Bang) is ALL there is. But if it is not (neither we nor Craig know this), then the whole argument fails, because even if we assume that science shows that our universe did indeed have a beginning (thus confirming his second premise), it might well be a part of a grander universe which itself does not have a beginning. So, the equivocation I am talking about is: when Craig says "the universe had a beginning" he is talking about OUR universe. But in order for his argument to work, he has to be talking about the grander universe which may or may not exist.
By the Hilbert paradox, do you mean the Hilbert Hotel? I'm not really sure you want to be calling these things mathematical intuition. The terms can be well-defined in the strongest mathematical sense as a one-to-one mapping from the set of natural numbers to the set of natural numbers except 1.
And none of these comments speak to "actual" infinity (which is NOT a well defined mathematical concept, but rather a statement about the "actual" universe). I haven't read the back and forth on this actual infinity business, but I will say that in a strict sense, mathematics says NOTHING about the "actual" universe. Rather, it exists in its own world of models and assumptions.
And none of these comments speak to "actual" infinity (which is NOT a well defined mathematical concept, but rather a statement about the "actual" universe). I haven't read the back and forth on this actual infinity business, but I will say that in a strict sense, mathematics says NOTHING about the "actual" universe. Rather, it exists in its own world of models and assumptions.
It depends on whether the scientific theory is a CENTRAL piece of the argument, or if it's a supporting non-contradictory statement. For example, in the argument that we've been discussing, it is not NECESSARY to invoke scientific theories of the universe in order for the argument to proceed. Fundamentally, it's the intuitive statement that an infinite past is an untenable idea. The fact that science supports instead of rejects this is merely something to strengthen that position.
It *IS* important that the scientific theories are in non-contradiction (for example, scientific theories are in contradiction with a young earth creationism, and this undercuts the credibility of young earth creationism), but it that the universe has a beginning not strictly DEPENDENT upon a scientific result.
It *IS* important that the scientific theories are in non-contradiction (for example, scientific theories are in contradiction with a young earth creationism, and this undercuts the credibility of young earth creationism), but it that the universe has a beginning not strictly DEPENDENT upon a scientific result.
(Although it is more difficult to find contradicting data for the cosmological argument, I think it would be far easier to find such contradicting data for the fine-tuning argument and the argument about Jesus' divinity).
I will have to sit through the debate to see whether I agree that his opponents actually do not invoke the same "fallacies" as Craig.
*For instance, in relation to the second (teleological) argument: "He rejects option B because he claims there is no evidence for it. And then… declares option C the winner by default, even though there is no evidence for it either."
But I will note here that when I listen to their arguments, I will be looking at them with the same level of criticism as you hold Craig. I've already expressed my expectation, but for the sake of practice and argument, it would be interesting to see you summarize his opponents' positions in the same way that you've summarized Craig's, and see whether they do conform to similar patterns of argumentation or if Craig's are objectively different in the way that you suggest.
As I said, you don't have to watch the full debate now, you can start with the opening statement (which usually has the basic contents of the discussion and most of the fallacies, if present, are there) which is no more than 10 minutes.
Well, my only criticism about the intuitive statements is that they rely on some experts' intuition. There are two main problems with that:
1. Experts' intuition fails quite often, especially when it's only intuition without empirical data.
2. We keep discovering very weird and counter-intuitive things about the universe all the time, so showing that something seems counter-intuitive now is basically an argument for absolutely nothing.
1. Experts' intuition fails quite often, especially when it's only intuition without empirical data.
2. We keep discovering very weird and counter-intuitive things about the universe all the time, so showing that something seems counter-intuitive now is basically an argument for absolutely nothing.
When I think about the bolded part of your post, I think there is a bit of an equivocation in Craig's argument. Since he (and you) put the question of "why there is something, rather than nothing", this should imply that the universe we are studying (which began with the Big Bang) is ALL there is.
But if it is not (neither we nor Craig know this), then the whole argument fails, because even if we assume that science shows that our universe did indeed have a beginning (thus confirming his second premise), it might well be a part of a grander universe which itself does not have a beginning. So, the equivocation I am talking about is: when Craig says "the universe had a beginning" he is talking about OUR universe. But in order for his argument to work, he has to be talking about the grander universe which may or may not exist.
Alright, so if science can somehow show that the universe did not have a beginning, would you agree then that the scientific data will contradict the argument?
Why the quotation marks? Even if I agree with you that it's not so bad that Craig's using the argument from authority, how about the other fallacies I listed: argument from personal incredulity, false choice fallacy, equivocation, and other contradictions*
*For instance, in relation to the second (teleological) argument: "He rejects option B because he claims there is no evidence for it. And then… declares option C the winner by default, even though there is no evidence for it either."
*For instance, in relation to the second (teleological) argument: "He rejects option B because he claims there is no evidence for it. And then… declares option C the winner by default, even though there is no evidence for it either."
As far as the example you've presented, it seems that you are equivocating on the word "evidence." The multiverse hypothesis has no evidence for it in an observationally limiting sort of way. There is no way (under our current knowledge of how the universe works) that we could observe ANYTHING about another universe in the multiverse.
However, design inferences are possible as evidentiary claims, even if they are not quantifiable. For example, we can understand the difference between a house and cave in terms of random chance and design, but this inference cannot be quantified (this is one of the big struggles for intelligent design -- design inferences are qualitative, not quantitative). So there is "evidence" of design in a non-trivial way, but it's also a non-scientific way.
As far as the rejection of A, that's another intuitively plausible position. Notice that A is a non-argument: It is because it has to be. So as people who search for a reason for things (sometimes where no reason exists), the rejection of A happens at that intuitive level in the minds of the listeners. It's basically equivalent to the question "Is this house designed or not designed?" It's not necessary (and especially in a debate format) to make an argument in order to reach the conclusion that the house is designed. Maybe the physical laws did build that house and that house is a necessary consequence of the arrangement of the universe and the laws that drive it, but that's does not appear to be plausible.
To contradict (p), you must affirm that some thing (X) that begins to exist does not have a cause. In other words, by claiming 'not everything' you're affirming that out of the set of everything there's a subset X that does not have a cause: if 'not everything which begins to exist has a cause,' then it necessarily follows that 'some thing X that begins to exist does not have a cause.'
Why did you change (q) here? In your first formulation both (p) and (q) start with "whatever begins to exist", but here Q starts with "something does not begin to exist".
Here's how I would phrase it, based on the change I made in (q) above:
1.4 With q: (q→ q') if (q) something does begin to exist, then (q') there may or may not be a cause or reason why something exists.
1.4 With q: (q→ q') if (q) something does begin to exist, then (q') there may or may not be a cause or reason why something exists.
Again, you must affirm that some thing X began to exist without a cause to contradict the first premise. What you're doing here is confusing what that something is with whether or not it has a cause, so your consequent doesn't follow.
1.4 With q: (q→ q') if (q) some thing X does begin to exist, then (q') there is no cause or reason why some thing X exists.
From here we get "There is necessarily a cause or reason why something exists XOR there isn't necessarily a cause or reason why something [X] exists.
Say all your reasoning is correct. Substitute "universe" with "God" in the above logical operations and tell me how you don't reach the same absurdities. People who invoke the cosmological argument reach a point in which they have to assume a changeless, timeless, spaceless, all-powerful being to resolve the alleged absurdity, without realizing that that being itself requires the same amount (if not a lot more) explanation as the universe itself. And notice that positing the existence of God in no way logically follows from the argument, even if we assume that it is true. It is a form of argument from personal incredulity: "I find a contradiction if I assume that the universe always existed, so it must have started to exist at some point. But how can something start to exist without having a cause? I cannot think of anything else other than there being a God who created the universe. Therefore, God exists."
While I obviously understand why an atheist would object to terming that first-cause God, the key issue with the argument is whether or not there is a first or necessary cause, not what we call it. So, whether everything just popped into existence from nothing or existence could not possibly not exist, there's still a lot more explaining to do. Unfortunately, modern philosophy has pretty much abandoned pure metaphysics in lieu of epistemology or at least subjected the former to the latter, and modern physics is more centered around mathematical modeling of reality than reality research. So the 'God question' is really the most active arena of thought if one is interested in why anything exists at all.
I do not understand this at all. Why is it that the claim that there is something imply that the universe we are studying is all that there is? It seems that the claim of the existence of a transcendent God already invokes the claim that there is more than just this physical universe.
Heh.... I've actually raised this type of objection before but for other purposes. It is true that the word universe is not well-defined and that such an equivocation is possible. However, in this case, your claim of equivocation doesn't mean anything. The object in question is *THIS* universe, which required *SOMETHING* to get it started. The "grander universe" (as you put it -- which is now clearly defined to be something different that the "universe") can be understood merely as the realm of God. It's not actually introducing anything new into the argument, because this if just another infinite regression problem ("Who designed the designer?"; "If God created the universe, who created God?"; and that sort of thing).
However, design inferences are possible as evidentiary claims, even if they are not quantifiable. For example, we can understand the difference between a house and cave in terms of random chance and design, but this inference cannot be quantified (this is one of the big struggles for intelligent design -- design inferences are qualitative, not quantitative). So there is "evidence" of design in a non-trivial way, but it's also a non-scientific way.
As far as the rejection of A, that's another intuitively plausible position. Notice that A is a non-argument: It is because it has to be. So as people who search for a reason for things (sometimes where no reason exists), the rejection of A happens at that intuitive level in the minds of the listeners. It's basically equivalent to the question "Is this house designed or not designed?" It's not necessary (and especially in a debate format) to make an argument in order to reach the conclusion that the house is designed. Maybe the physical laws did build that house and that house is a necessary consequence of the arrangement of the universe and the laws that drive it, but that's does not appear to be plausible.
That's okay, but it should be stated: (q) some thing that begins to exist does not have a cause.
To contradict (p), you must affirm that some thing (X) that begins to exist does not have a cause. In other words, by claiming 'not everything' you're affirming that out of the set of everything there's a subset X that does not have a cause: if 'not everything which begins to exist has a cause,' then it necessarily follows that 'some thing X that begins to exist does not have a cause.'
It was a typo, sorry.
But, look how it reads with my above qualification: if some thing (X) does begin to exist, then (q') there may or may not be a cause or reason why some thing (X) exists. You're not affirming anything.
Again, you must affirm that some thing X began to exist without a cause to contradict the first premise. What you're doing here is confusing what that something is with whether or not it has a cause, so your consequent doesn't follow.
1.4 With q: (q→ q') if (q) some thing X does begin to exist, then (q') there is no cause or reason why some thing X exists.
Unless you retreat into skepticism, you'll still need to affirm that some thing (X) begins to exist without a cause.
To contradict (p), you must affirm that some thing (X) that begins to exist does not have a cause. In other words, by claiming 'not everything' you're affirming that out of the set of everything there's a subset X that does not have a cause: if 'not everything which begins to exist has a cause,' then it necessarily follows that 'some thing X that begins to exist does not have a cause.'
It was a typo, sorry.
But, look how it reads with my above qualification: if some thing (X) does begin to exist, then (q') there may or may not be a cause or reason why some thing (X) exists. You're not affirming anything.
Again, you must affirm that some thing X began to exist without a cause to contradict the first premise. What you're doing here is confusing what that something is with whether or not it has a cause, so your consequent doesn't follow.
1.4 With q: (q→ q') if (q) some thing X does begin to exist, then (q') there is no cause or reason why some thing X exists.
Unless you retreat into skepticism, you'll still need to affirm that some thing (X) begins to exist without a cause.
I'm more into Thomism, so I can't say for certain in regard to Craig, but traditionally theologians end this argument with something like, "… and this we call God." That's a key point a lot of atheists miss. Theologians are not positing God as the necessary cause; they're saying that which we call a necessary cause, we call God. "Therefore it is necessary to admit a first efficient cause, to which everyone gives the name of God." - Aquinas
While I obviously understand why an atheist would object to terming that first-cause God
, the key issue with the argument is whether or not there is a first or necessary cause, not what we call it. So, whether everything just popped into existence from nothing or existence could not possibly not exist, there's still a lot more explaining to do.
Well, we seem to agree here. Introducing God or another naturalistic universe doesn't solve the problem. My point was that the scientific consensus for the universe having a beginning (i.e. not being infinitely old) hold only for THIS universe. We don't know if the grand (naturalistic) universe is not actually infinitely old. What I was saying is that in order for the Kalam argument to work, Craig has to show how the grand universe has also a beginning. If he doesn't, even if we accept that our universe has a beginning, it could then be just another naturalistic effect of a previous naturalistic cause. Nothing necessitates a transcended God yet.
I still fail to see the evidence for ID. The arguments proponents for ID have been giving are either "if something looks designed, it must be designed" or the more sophisticated versions about things like the human immune system, the bacterial flagellum, etc. which are said to be "too complex" to have evolved, or that some physical constants which appear to be fine-tuned for life to exist, in which case they are invoking backward probability estimation (you would know it's a pretty meaningless operation). So, there is no real evidence for design, only arguments from ignorance. Given all that, Craig cannot declare option C the winner after hastily dismissing A and B.
However, in the same sense that there is no clear standard of the acceptance of design, there is also no clear standard for the REJECTION of design. That is, the non-design inference suffers from the same problem as the design inference. So the question boils down to some statement like the following: The cause must be sufficient for the effect.
And this is where both sides spin their wheels in terms of getting traction to somehow "prove" their position. It's very similar to the question of free will and determinism. Neither side has an empirical argument that can be made. Nobody can "prove" in any real sense that X is more likely than Y when it comes to these types of statements. That's just reality.
So while you say "I fail to see the evidence" you should take a long hard look as to what it might take for you to "see evidence" for it -- what would it take to convince you? (And don't take the easy route of saying something like 'if the scientific community accepts it...' because that simply says that you're unwilling to think for yourself.) It might be that you don't believe that such evidence is even possible. That's perfectly acceptable. (For example, I don't think I will ever accept hard determinism because the experience of freely willed choices will override any argument that is presented to me.)
But if you are in that position, then you must recognize that you've established an impossible standard for the other side, and that attempts to argue are not intellectually fair because you've established yourself to have a no-lose situation. So if you want to argue against that position, you need to challenge the opposition on *THEIR* terms and not yours.
(By the way, this is how I feel about your position regarding arguments about the existence of God. You've already established that you think such arguments must reach some higher standard than what you are willing to accept for scientific positions, but you also seem to hold the idea that scientific positions are the MOST convincing positions to hold, and therefore no theist will ever be able to make a successful argument. I don't think there's anything wrong with holding to such a position, but it also means that your arguments are intellectually disingenuous unless you are willing to argue on the theists' terms.)
This is why ontological arguments are not ultimately convincing. It's merely a definition game. But it is worth noting that if you accept the premise that an infinite regression of causes is intuitively absurd, it *does* lead you to the notion of a first cause ("God"). But if you find the idea of an infinite regress of causes to be intellectually sustainable, there's no reason given for you to trade that belief. Again, the foundation is the position of intuitive plausibility.
I find that most people who hold this type of position to be straddling intellectual fences. I've never met anyone who is willing to say that a car or plane or something else like that fails to have what can be called "the appearance of design." Even Dawkins admits the existence of such an concept. So even if there is no precise definition of "design" it is something that we are intellectually able to distinguish or determine. This does NOT imply that anything with the "appearance of design" is ultimately designed.
However, in the same sense that there is no clear standard of the acceptance of design, there is also no clear standard for the REJECTION of design. That is, the non-design inference suffers from the same problem as the design inference. So the question boils down to some statement like the following: The cause must be sufficient for the effect.
And this is where both sides spin their wheels in terms of getting traction to somehow "prove" their position. It's very similar to the question of free will and determinism. Neither side has an empirical argument that can be made. Nobody can "prove" in any real sense that X is more likely than Y when it comes to these types of statements. That's just reality.
So while you say "I fail to see the evidence" you should take a long hard look as to what it might take for you to "see evidence" for it -- what would it take to convince you? (And don't take the easy route of saying something like 'if the scientific community accepts it...' because that simply says that you're unwilling to think for yourself.) It might be that you don't believe that such evidence is even possible. That's perfectly acceptable. (For example, I don't think I will ever accept hard determinism because the experience of freely willed choices will override any argument that is presented to me.)
But if you are in that position, then you must recognize that you've established an impossible standard for the other side, and that attempts to argue are not intellectually fair because you've established yourself to have a no-lose situation. So if you want to argue against that position, you need to challenge the opposition on *THEIR* terms and not yours.
(By the way, this is how I feel about your position regarding arguments about the existence of God. You've already established that you think such arguments must reach some higher standard than what you are willing to accept for scientific positions, but you also seem to hold the idea that scientific positions are the MOST convincing positions to hold, and therefore no theist will ever be able to make a successful argument. I don't think there's anything wrong with holding to such a position, but it also means that your arguments are intellectually disingenuous unless you are willing to argue on the theists' terms.)
I find that most people who hold this type of position to be straddling intellectual fences. I've never met anyone who is willing to say that a car or plane or something else like that fails to have what can be called "the appearance of design." Even Dawkins admits the existence of such an concept. So even if there is no precise definition of "design" it is something that we are intellectually able to distinguish or determine. This does NOT imply that anything with the "appearance of design" is ultimately designed.
However, in the same sense that there is no clear standard of the acceptance of design, there is also no clear standard for the REJECTION of design. That is, the non-design inference suffers from the same problem as the design inference. So the question boils down to some statement like the following: The cause must be sufficient for the effect.
And this is where both sides spin their wheels in terms of getting traction to somehow "prove" their position. It's very similar to the question of free will and determinism. Neither side has an empirical argument that can be made. Nobody can "prove" in any real sense that X is more likely than Y when it comes to these types of statements. That's just reality.
So while you say "I fail to see the evidence" you should take a long hard look as to what it might take for you to "see evidence" for it -- what would it take to convince you? (And don't take the easy route of saying something like 'if the scientific community accepts it...' because that simply says that you're unwilling to think for yourself.) It might be that you don't believe that such evidence is even possible. That's perfectly acceptable. (For example, I don't think I will ever accept hard determinism because the experience of freely willed choices will override any argument that is presented to me.)
But if you are in that position, then you must recognize that you've established an impossible standard for the other side, and that attempts to argue are not intellectually fair because you've established yourself to have a no-lose situation. So if you want to argue against that position, you need to challenge the opposition on *THEIR* terms and not yours.
(By the way, this is how I feel about your position regarding arguments about the existence of God. You've already established that you think such arguments must reach some higher standard than what you are willing to accept for scientific positions, but you also seem to hold the idea that scientific positions are the MOST convincing positions to hold, and therefore no theist will ever be able to make a successful argument. I don't think there's anything wrong with holding to such a position, but it also means that your arguments are intellectually disingenuous unless you are willing to argue on the theists' terms.)
You said that even Dawkins admits to "appearance of design". This admission is almost universal, excepting All In Flynn and maybe 2 or 3 other people in the history of the world.
This is by definition evidence of design. Which is why some people fight against the idea even of appearance. Because to admit the appearance exists is to admit evidence for design exists. At the very least it forms the basis for an argument that the design inference is plausible and not irrational.
To me, world and human don't appear designed. I would expect them to be much different (simpler) if they were designed.
This is by definition evidence of design. Which is why some people fight against the idea even of appearance.
And you have no clue why some people fight against the idea of appearance. Of course, *some* are almost surely doing it for the reason you mentioned, since there are millions of us, but I don't think you meant it in this way. I think you rather meant to imply that significant number of mentioned people fight for this reason, not just any percentage >0.
This is why ontological arguments are not ultimately convincing. It's merely a definition game. But it is worth noting that if you accept the premise that an infinite regression of causes is intuitively absurd, it *does* lead you to the notion of a first cause ("God"). But if you find the idea of an infinite regress of causes to be intellectually sustainable, there's no reason given for you to trade that belief. Again, the foundation is the position of intuitive plausibility.
I find that most people who hold this type of position to be straddling intellectual fences. I've never met anyone who is willing to say that a car or plane or something else like that fails to have what can be called "the appearance of design." Even Dawkins admits the existence of such an concept. So even if there is no precise definition of "design" it is something that we are intellectually able to distinguish or determine. This does NOT imply that anything with the "appearance of design" is ultimately designed.
However, in the same sense that there is no clear standard of the acceptance of design, there is also no clear standard for the REJECTION of design. That is, the non-design inference suffers from the same problem as the design inference. So the question boils down to some statement like the following: The cause must be sufficient for the effect.
And this is where both sides spin their wheels in terms of getting traction to somehow "prove" their position. It's very similar to the question of free will and determinism. Neither side has an empirical argument that can be made. Nobody can "prove" in any real sense that X is more likely than Y when it comes to these types of statements. That's just reality.
So while you say "I fail to see the evidence" you should take a long hard look as to what it might take for you to "see evidence" for it -- what would it take to convince you? (And don't take the easy route of saying something like 'if the scientific community accepts it...' because that simply says that you're unwilling to think for yourself.)
I cannot quite imagine how the positive evidence for ID would look like, but I'm guessing we would know if we find it. One thing that comes to my mind is falsifying evolution (e.g., finding fossils of animals or plants from a time in which they were not supposed to have evolved yet). But this is too vague, I am not sure I have the necessary background to elaborate on that at this moment. But in any case, even if such standards didn't exist yet, that does not justify ID proponents presenting false evidence, right?
It might be that you don't believe that such evidence is even possible. That's perfectly acceptable. (For example, I don't think I will ever accept hard determinism because the experience of freely willed choices will override any argument that is presented to me.)
(By the way, this is how I feel about your position regarding arguments about the existence of God. You've already established that you think such arguments must reach some higher standard than what you are willing to accept for scientific positions, but you also seem to hold the idea that scientific positions are the MOST convincing positions to hold, and therefore no theist will ever be able to make a successful argument. I don't think there's anything wrong with holding to such a position, but it also means that your arguments are intellectually disingenuous unless you are willing to argue on the theists' terms.)
I haven't read all the exchanges you two have had but would like to point out something re this post.
You said that even Dawkins admits to "appearance of design". This admission is almost universal, excepting All In Flynn and maybe 2 or 3 other people in the history of the world.
This is by definition evidence of design. Which is why some people fight against the idea even of appearance. Because to admit the appearance exists is to admit evidence for design exists. At the very least it forms the basis for an argument that the design inference is plausible and not irrational.
You said that even Dawkins admits to "appearance of design". This admission is almost universal, excepting All In Flynn and maybe 2 or 3 other people in the history of the world.
This is by definition evidence of design. Which is why some people fight against the idea even of appearance. Because to admit the appearance exists is to admit evidence for design exists. At the very least it forms the basis for an argument that the design inference is plausible and not irrational.
Has Craig or anyone else come up with a philosophical treatment of causality that allows us to meaningfully ask "What caused spacetime?"
I haven't read all the exchanges you two have had but would like to point out something re this post.
You said that even Dawkins admits to "appearance of design". This admission is almost universal, excepting All In Flynn and maybe 2 or 3 other people in the history of the world.
You said that even Dawkins admits to "appearance of design". This admission is almost universal, excepting All In Flynn and maybe 2 or 3 other people in the history of the world.
See my response to Aaron. If something looks designed, it is designed (as long as you use the very broad definition of the world). But if you say "if something looks designed, then it is intelligently designed", you are making a leap of faith. In no way does your conclusion follow from the observation.
But it's not evidence. I don't know how you could claim such a thing. Some rocks (shaped by water over hundreds of thousands of years) look like humans, animals, etc. That is, they appear designed, as if sculptor made them. In reality they are NOT designed, however. Do you see where the link between "appear" and "is" breaks?
Many things that appear to be designed at first glance appear to be udesigned on further investigation. The shape of a mountain or bubble or nautilus shell to give three obvious examples. But to discover this you have to know MATH. That is why it is so ridiculous to pay attention to anyone's opinion on either side of this issue if they don't know math.
If it's allowed to spread beyond that, to something more like "The universe possesses a quality or set of qualities which create in the mind of a disinterested observer the impression of being the product of intent, such that an identical observer in a universe lacking those qualities would necessarily conclude otherwise, or would consistently fail to conclude likewise," that's where the problem comes in.
Your consistent failure - and you've had well over a year, if my position really is unique, which I very much doubt - to identify any such qualities, and to describe a universe lacking those qualities, means that I can cheerfully accept your claim of a universal 'appearance of design', since clearly you must mean it in the first sense.
This is by definition evidence of design.
I agree with one small remark. As I responded to duffe, if there is a first cause, and it's simply a matter of labeling it "God", then there is no disagreement. But if the claim is that the existence of a first cause implies that this first cause has to be personal, then I would disagree because it is not something that follows from the argument.
Well, even natural selection in a way "designs" things. So, I would also agree that a lot of things look designed and they are designed, but in a self-organizing way, without external force guiding it. What most people are objecting to is intelligent, purposeful design.
A bit off topic, but there is empirical evidence that speaks against the existence of free will.
Come on dude, you must know by now that I would never say a thing like that. If I've been criticizing Craig for making these types of arguments from authority, it would make me look pretty foolish if I did the same thing
I cannot quite imagine how the positive evidence for ID would look like, but I'm guessing we would know if we find it. One thing that comes to my mind is falsifying evolution (e.g., finding fossils of animals or plants from a time in which they were not supposed to have evolved yet). But this is too vague, I am not sure I have the necessary background to elaborate on that at this moment. But in any case, even if such standards didn't exist yet, that does not justify ID proponents presenting false evidence, right?
This new classification of "false evidence" means what, exactly? Falsified information?
Again, if you are interested, I could send you some of the papers I have that undermine those experiences.
I think the problem here's that you and me don't view science the same way. I don't regard science as a separate institution which has its methods, but religion is another institution and has other methods. I regard science as the natural extension of philosophy: simply a tool for reaching all kinds of truths about the world by logically valid conclusions. It just so happens that for a lot of things we cannot make logically valid conclusions without the scientific method. I am holding the position that everything should in principle be explorable scientifically. And I would argue that even religious people are doing the same thing, the only difference is that they are doing it internally (and it's subjective), whereas science is trying to move the subjective evidence to the realm of the objective evidence.
But it is worth noting that if you accept the premise that an infinite regression of causes is intuitively absurd, it *does* lead you to the notion of a first cause ("God"). But if you find the idea of an infinite regress of causes to be intellectually sustainable, there's no reason given for you to trade that belief. Again, the foundation is the position of intuitive plausibility.
And here's what Craig has to say:
The being which created the universe must be… personal. Why? Because this cause must be beyond space and time and cannot be physical or material. There are only two kinds of things that fit that description: abstract objects (e.g., numbers) or else an intelligent mind.
Your use of quotes around the word "design" is highlighting that you're shifting the definition of design around a bit. The addition of "purposeful" (for example) does not help your position because it's extending the concept even further. We would be able to recognize the design of an arrowhead (insofar as it does not appear to be merely the result of naturalistic processes), but we would potentially not be able to distinguish its purpose. And the determination of the purpose is something that goes beyond the "appearance of design" (it speaks to something like the "appearance of purpose").
This is a philosophical flaw in your interpretation of the data. Free will vs. determinism is an empirically underdetermined problem. Go find the thread in SMP if you're interested.
I don't know what was being discussed in that thread, but regardless of what it was, I can tell you that there IS evidence against the existence of free will. That is not to say that this proves that hard determinism is true, but then again science doesn't attempt to prove things with 100% certainty anyway.
Given that I've *ALREADY* accused you of doing this, I don't think you realize what you're saying.
It's worth noting that the falsification of evolution *STILL* would not qualify as positive evidence for ID, unless you're taking a really strange view of the nature of "positive evidence."
By the way, it's not my job to find evidence for a theory which I am not proposing, nor to determine what the evidence would look like. It is not my fault that a group of people are positing an unfalsifiable "scientific theory" for which it is impossible to find any positive evidence, other than perhaps the intelligence which designed the universe to appear to us and to explicitly say "Yes, it is true, I designed it."
This new classification of "false evidence" means what, exactly? Falsified information?
Except that they don't. I can almost guess which papers you would link. Is it the one where they do brain scans to predict the "choices" that people make, and that the "experience of choice" happens after the indicating factors? Yeah, I've seen that one, and unless I'm mistaken the authors explicitly indicated that this does not show that free will doesn't exist.
Well, this would be precisely what I mean by establishing an impossible standard. It would be useful for you to think more carefully about your epistemological standard. In particular, the underlined sentence does not appear to be a statement that can be explored scientifically.
And since you bring up the underlined sentence as something unexplorable by science, you do make a difference between studying something (looking for evidence for it) and proving/disproving it, right?
Many things that appear to be designed at first glance appear to be udesigned on further investigation. The shape of a mountain or bubble or nautilus shell to give three obvious examples. But to discover this you have to know MATH. That is why it is so ridiculous to pay attention to anyone's opinion on either side of this issue if they don't know math.
I should point out, as you've made this mistake before and I didn't correct it, that appearance here doesn't just mean "how it looks", but includes concepts such as function and apparent purpose. If things in the cell operate like machines then their appearance of design isn't primarily referring to how they look but the fact that they are LIKE machines we design, in function and purpose.
My last post was a response to what you said here:
You were talking about the cosmological argument, not the ontological argument (which you just mentioned in the beginning of your post).
And here's what Craig has to say:
So, unfortunately, he does talk about a personal God.
You were talking about the cosmological argument, not the ontological argument (which you just mentioned in the beginning of your post).
And here's what Craig has to say:
The being which created the universe must be… personal. Why? Because this cause must be beyond space and time and cannot be physical or material. There are only two kinds of things that fit that description: abstract objects (e.g., numbers) or else an intelligent mind.
The meaning behind the term is what's important. So, I was saying that there is a lack of evidence for purposeful design in nature.
I don't know how that thread was named and it's going to take me a long time to find it. You can give me a link if you feel like it.
There's not a lot of value directly related to our topic here, except to say that you've got a lot of arguing ahead of you if you want to make the claim that determinism can be shown empirically.
I don't know what was being discussed in that thread, but regardless of what it was, I can tell you that there IS evidence against the existence of free will. That is not to say that this proves that hard determinism is true, but then again science doesn't attempt to prove things with 100% certainty anyway.
That's why I said I don't know how the positive evidence would look like. The falsification of evolution would at least open the door for something like ID.
By the way, it's not my job to find evidence for a theory which I am not proposing, nor to determine what the evidence would look like. It is not my fault that a group of people are positing an unfalsifiable "scientific theory" for which it is impossible to find any positive evidence, other than perhaps the intelligence which designed the universe to appear to us and to explicitly say "Yes, it is true, I designed it."
By the way, it's not my job to find evidence for a theory which I am not proposing, nor to determine what the evidence would look like. It is not my fault that a group of people are positing an unfalsifiable "scientific theory" for which it is impossible to find any positive evidence, other than perhaps the intelligence which designed the universe to appear to us and to explicitly say "Yes, it is true, I designed it."
This is what happens with conspiracy theories -- they've arranged their understanding of the situation in such a way that no amount of evidence can convince them.
Unreal evidence. Pseudo-evidence. Something which is called evidence, but is not. I don't know how else to name it.
I don't know which ones you've heard about exactly. From your description, I can guess that you're probably talking about the Libet studies. Libet does say that his experiments don't necessarily rule out free will (although he admits that they rule out at least half of what people call free will; and his claim is unjustified anyway). But no, I am talking about more recent studies which are far more interesting.
That is why I said "in principle". In practice, there are currently things we can't explore scientifically. I just don't declare those things "impossible to study" just because we can't study them now.
And since you bring up the underlined sentence as something unexplorable by science, you do make a difference between studying something (looking for evidence for it) and proving/disproving it, right?
If you know what those 3 things are then you already know they are not designed (as to their shape) and so appearance isn't evidence. For instance, we don't think a cloud that looks like a camel is designed to look like a camel because we know other facts that inform us as to what it really is. But complexity and structure are evidence of intelligent design. Why else would Dawkins need to write a book explaining why the appearance doesn't PROVE design?
I should point out, as you've made this mistake before and I didn't correct it, that appearance here doesn't just mean "how it looks", but includes concepts such as function and apparent purpose. If things in the cell operate like machines then their appearance of design isn't primarily referring to how they look but the fact that they are LIKE machines we design, in function and purpose.
[url]http://forumserver.twoplustwo.com/47/science-math-philosophy/durkadurka-you-only-believe-free-will-because-lc-789993/[/url
There's not a lot of value directly related to our topic here, except to say that you've got a lot of arguing ahead of you if you want to make the claim that determinism can be shown empirically.
There's not a lot of value directly related to our topic here, except to say that you've got a lot of arguing ahead of you if you want to make the claim that determinism can be shown empirically.
You still need to clarify your sense of the word "evidence." The idea of 100% certainty is a red herring.
Here is where your concept of "evidence" is most blatantly confused. It's not your job to "find" evidence, but if you cannot even admit that you don't even have a concept of evidence that would qualify, then you have arranged an impossible standard for the other side. Since you have no standard, you can *ALWAYS* say "that's not evidence" or "that's not enough evidence' or any of a number of other objections. It's not good enough for you to say "I'll know it when I see it." It's intellectually disingenuous.
This is what happens with conspiracy theories -- they've arranged their understanding of the situation in such a way that no amount of evidence can convince them.
This is what happens with conspiracy theories -- they've arranged their understanding of the situation in such a way that no amount of evidence can convince them.
This is not helpful, but does highlight how poorly you understand the concept of "evidence."
Since you seem to believe that a philosophical problem can be approached empirically, it does not surprise me that you think what you think.
I think your weaknesses in philosophy are showing.
The basic idea is that there is no empirical measurement or series of measurements that can either prove or deny the existence of free will. It's just as nonsensical as trying to disprove the existence of non-physical entities by measuring things.
An observation which is compatible with one theory and incompatible with the rival theory.
But again, it's not my fault that they are presenting a view for which no evidence can be presented!
What if I asked you to tell me what kind of evidence would qualify for the falsification of the existence of Santa Clause? If you can't tell me what the evidence would look like, should I accuse you of intellectual dishonesty?
It's just that this isn't evidence in any conventional scientific sense. And this is where your understanding of evidence reveals an extremely narrow epistemology that is INCAPABLE of addressing many questions.
And that is just your assertion. Since you're accusing me of not knowing what evidence is (?) can you tell me what your definition is?
Of course I think a philosophical problem can be approached empirically. Why shouldn't it? Most contemporary philosopher think that philosophical problems should be ultimately resolved with science. People who want some of the issues to stay in philosophy are just afraid that their view is going to be falsified and want to remain in the comforting realm of abstract reasoning in which nothing can be shown to be false.
Level 1) LOL @ Appeal to authority, especially after making such a big deal about it
Level 2) LOL @ Ad hominem, because you can't even find a way to produce a positive argument for your position
Level 3) LOL @ "Most contemporary philosophers think that philosophical problems should be ultimately resolved with science" because it's FALSE. Where did you get this belief? And how can you assert such a strong consensus when the views of philosophers vary so dramatically on such a wide range of topics? It feels like you're talking our of your rear end here.
I don't understand how you can dismiss what those studies have found without having any idea for what they're about?
Come on, man. You can't play the "you're weak in philosophy, you don't know what evidence is" type of card forever. It's not fair. Either elaborate on your remarks, or just don't make them. I don't know what you think you're accomplishing by declaring me ignorant in different fields.
You don't have a coherent system of understanding for this conversation. You're making it up as you go, and it's very obvious that you're doing this. There's evidence in previous posts that you don't do very well talking philosophically, which only adds to my skepticism that you're actually able to have a meaningful conversation at this level.
What do you hope to gain in the conversation by drawing a line between "prove/disprove" and "looking for evidence"? Are you going to bring up 100% certainty again, as if that's a meaningful distinction (especially coming from someone who is trying to use science as the epistemological standard)? I see nothing more than a smoke screen of words that don't carry useful content.
Okay, here I would give the answer that most agnostic atheists give. I cannot affirm that something begins to exist without a cause, I am just saying that we don't have the necessary knowledge of the universe to conclude that it is impossible for something to exist without a cause. (Although, if God exists, he doesn't have a cause either, but see below).
So, what you're essentially saying here is: "for things we know they are not designed, the appearance doesn't matter. But for things which appear to be designed but we don't know whether they are designed or not, we will assume they are designed". I can't think of a better demonstration of an argument from ignorance.
Oh no, please, anything but the bacterial flagellum! This "argument" has been crushed, smashed... and completely destroyed. Does it ever occur to you to read more than one of the sides on an issue?
Oh no, please, anything but the bacterial flagellum! This "argument" has been crushed, smashed... and completely destroyed. Does it ever occur to you to read more than one of the sides on an issue?
Feedback is used for internal purposes. LEARN MORE