I have two responses. On the one hand, I think you're right. Our views on the objectivity or relativity or subjectivity of morality will not dramatically affect what we think is actually the correct or incorrect thing to do. On the other hand, I think this is a central issue in any rational system of morality and so must be addressed. But let me be more specific.

Moral philosophy is typically divided into two main subject areas--what is called normative ethics and meta-ethics. The domain of normative ethics includes questions about whether particular actions actually are moral or immoral (such as abortion or eating meat or homosexuality, etc). Peter Singer, who is probably the most well-known living moral philosopher, is primarily famous for his work addressing normative moral questions. For instance, in a famous 1972 essay, "Famine, Affluence, and Morality," he developed a very strong argument for the claim that it is immoral for wealthy people to not give away most of their money to charity.

On the other hand, meta-ethics is not primarily concerned with determining the specific morality of actions, or in developing true basic moral principles. Instead, it is concerned with understanding the nature of moral claims and principles. For example, some people think that moral language doesn't have any literal meaning, but instead is an expression of negative or positive emotions, like saying "Ouch," when you hit your thumb. An acceptance or rejection of this view doesn't, on its own, tell you what things you should find immoral (i.e. have negative or positive emotions towards). Thus, this is not properly an issue of normative ethics, but a topic in meta-ethics.

Moral objectivity is also typically a meta-ethical question. That is, whatever your views on it, it will usually not affect your actual moral beliefs. So in that sense it will seem to not matter much. However, in my view, you will be unable to avoid this question if you are trying to develop a theory of morality. And in philosophy it is this theoretical aspect that is most important.

What I mean is that both philosophy and science are disciplines about knowledge, not technology. That is, their purpose is to better understand the world, not to just develop new technology to affect the world. Obviously, the development of new technology has a symbiotic relationship with science and philosophy. New technology can raise new problems and give us the tools to solve old ones, and new ideas in science and philosophy can give us the means to develop new technologies (I'm using the term broadly, so that it doesn't just refer to machines, but also to things like democratic voting systems). But fundamentally, both science and philosophy are attempts to understand. That is, they are disciplines oriented towards thinking about the world in the right way. Thus, regardless of its effect on our actions (e.g. our changing our views on what is actually moral), we are interested in the question of the objectivity of morality simply as an important element of correctly understanding the world.

I think all moral questions have answers - including 'should we punish someone?' so the correct punishment objectively exists too.

Ultimately, the same charge could be levelled at mathematical claims - there's a chance people will disagree about mathematical claims (they frequently do, even when some consider a theorem proved), there's a chance we'll all make an incorrect judgement (there was a field of geometry which lasted for several years before someone proved its axioms were inconsistent). Nonetheless, there's an answer to maths questions which is correct and that's separate from the issue of what people believe.

As Original Position points out above, morality's objective or subjective nature doesnt have much to do with how we should act in a given situation.

The difference being...? You believe consequences should be imposed for certain moral choices but not culinary choices and because most people agree with you, that's what happens?

That sounds like 'might makes right' to me (which is a reasonable response, but doesnt seem popular amongst subjectivists).

In reality, if there's an objective morality, "everyone's objective morality" is the same thing*. It's not about what we believe, it's about the nature of the world. (You can believe God exists, even if he doesnt. You can believe murder is justified, even if it isnt. The fact people disagree about God's existence doesnt imply he doesnt or does. Neither does the fact that people disagree about moral positions doesnt imply one is right or wrong.)

* You're correct that everyone has to argue for their opinion about what the true objective morality is - functionally objective morality and subjective morality are (imo) indistinguishable. The question of morality's nature is not central to deciding how to act.

So what would you say the objective punishment for adultery should be and could you show me how you came to that conclusion objectively and not subjectively. You can use any moral question and punishment you want as an example if you dont have the objective moral truths on adultery.
Might (voting for the things you think are right and wrong) makes right is the best we got even for the people who claim objective morality sense they cant prove they are right. All they can do is say they have the objective moral truth for a given moral question and impose that unsupported objective view based on their opinion.
I agree with all this. It still doesn't change that no one has ever proven even one objective moral truth and vary few have the same objective moralitys. So the best i can tell is all objective truths are subjective until that proof.


I dont know much about this stuff so im more than likely wrong but i still dont see how objective morality isn't subjective. Take someone who says suffering should be the bases of all moral questions. How did they come to that conclusion? Through their subjective opinion is the best i can tell. We've gone through this all before though so.. meh.. if skalf wants to continue the convo ill stop interrupting.

I don't know, but I think there's an answer.
Perfectly consistent, but unusual in my experience. Most subjectivists I've discussed it with insist they are not advocating might-makes-right.

EDIT: I'll also spell out - I consider the bolded part incorrect. Even if they believe in objective morality, it doesnt follow that their own moral positions are objectively correct (even if they believe them to be). Such a thing is a subjective opinion.
I personally don't think they're provable in the same way mathematical axioms aren't provable. Nonetheless:
"Inflicting unnecessary harm on innocents is immoral'. is a true statement and I don't know anyone who disagrees - the fact they disagree about what entities belong in the classes 'innocent' or 'unnecessary' isn't relevant.
Again, I think it's important to understand that in claiming morality is objective I'm not claiming any special status for my moral opinions (which are subjective). All I'm claiming is that I'm right or wrong (In fact, I'll even concede I'm probably wrong about most such judgements). Objective morality is a metaphysical question, not a question about what actions constitute right or wrong.

You are pointing out people disagree, which is completely consistent with the existence of objective morality - people disagree about lots of things which can be definitively answered even if we can't at the moment. As an analogous example, consider the question of whether alien life exists anywhere in the andromeda galaxy (considered alongside the question of whether it is right to steal to feed your child):

Someone thinks yes, someone thinks no, most don't think it's clearcut given what is available to us. None of these differing positions lend any support to the idea that there's no answer. That it's 'just' opinion.

Well there could be. But without proof its just subjective opinion objective truths and punishments exist.

Ok this is my main point. You asked "How do you justify punishing someone for making a different subjective judgement from you?"

If objective morality is only subjective opinion without proof than how do you justify punishing someone based on it? You cant show me your justification any more than someone who believes in subjective morality.


I dont even disagree with this and i do think, think being the key word, its objectively true. But i cant justify my beliefs in any real provable way so its just my subjective opinion that this is true and i use that opinion to force others to accept it through voting and might makes right.
Ok
Im not saying because there are different opinions on objective morality it doesn't exist. Im saying that because everyone has different opinions it appears everyone has more of a subjective objective morality. Which means in the end without proof they cant justify their truths anymore than anyone else.

I'm hesitant to move forward in case you think I'm establishing (or attempting to prove) my moral claims. Bearing in mind that I'm not doing that with regard to any specific moral claim and further that I agree an objectivist has no more weight behind having their moral views accepted than a subjectivist, I think you're setting the bar of justification unreasonably high (and higher than you do with other things - you believe gravity will work tomorrow, try and prove that. You can't, and yet the belief persists, and quite reasonably in my view).

I think one can produce moral statements we all take to be true (see my example of harming innocents above). Further I think that we can logically deduce other true moral statements from those primitive axioms - we must be able to if I am right that there exist some true moral statements. Sure you can say "Aha, but can you prove it without a shadow of a doubt?" and this is just the problem of skepticism - something I think people shy away from too much. The answer is no I can't, I also can't prove I'm not the only person in the universe, two points define a line, or any number of primitive concepts - I nonetheless hold them to be true, as does everyone else and I am justified in doing so.

I confess to being confused by what a subjective objective morality is. Such a thing is meaningless in the way I am using the words so I am worried we are using the same words for different things.

I believe I have a subjective moral code (loosely - the set of all moral statements with an assignation of true/false according to the value I would assign to them). I believe there is an objective moral code also (the set of all moral statements with an assignation of true/false according to the actual truth values). Some people claim their subjective moral code is identifiable with the objective one. Other people propose a different assignation of values, yet also make the claim theirs is a mirror of reality. I think it is strange terminology to refer to their two subjective moralities as 'subjective objective moralities' - they are just both expressing subjective opinions about what that objective code is and both proposing two subjective codes as claimed descriptions of it (at least one of which is wrong). To me, it wouldnt make sense if I said this day feels warmer than yesterday and you said it felt cooler to therefore conclude that each was a "subjective objective measure of temperature" - there is an objective measure and we are making conflicting (subjective) claims about it.

EDIT: Ultimately I'm hoping Original Position will chime in. Moral philosophy was a real blind spot in my philosophical education (which was patchwork at best anyhow) and unfortunately I am not well versed in the jargon or differing schools of thought. Whenever I try and put forward a position on morality, it rarely ends well. :/

Sorry, been super busy. Mostly what you say sounds fine to me. Batair seems to be confused about what "objective" morality means. It is of course true that my belief that p is true (where p is a moral claim) is subjective. This is because all beliefs are subjective. This includes my beliefs that force equals mass times acceleration and that Hitler killed himself.

When we talk about an objective versus subjective moral claim, what distinguishes between the two is a difference in the truth conditions of the two claims. The truth or falsity of an objective moral claim ultimately relies on factors external to my subjective states (in the same way that the truth conditions for my belief that Hitler killed himself ultimately rely on factors external to my subjective states). The truth or falsity of a subjective moral claim ultimately relies on factors internal to my subjective states.

So if you want to know if a normative moral claim is objective or subjective, ask yourself, what would make this claim true? If it is true because you believe it is true (or if you believe it is false, then it is false), then it is subjective. Alternately, if it is true (or false) because of some fact about the world, such as its expected effect on other people's happiness, then it is objective.

Note: this is complicated slightly by moral non-cognitivism. Basically, since many people who believe that morality is subjective claim that moral claims have no truth-value, this test will not work. However, since everyone who believes that morality is objective claims that moral statements do have a truth-value, we can easily distinguish these views.

No worries - let's face it, you don't owe me anything and we're lucky you take the time to post here.
How does a moral-noncognitivist describe a moral claim? That it's an expression of some psychological state, a simple statement of preference or somesuch?

I know this is petty but I need to point out.... I've read through several threads today, have been really impressed by the back and forth. Its been thoughtful and intelligent. It seems both sides have been pretty respectful and mostly writing thoughtful responses. It actually struck me as odd. That I have been able to read so long without reading something completely nonsensical that sidetracks every conversation. And I realized what's different. That a key regular member is missing. And the difference is night and day.

But thats kind of what i want. I want you to show me one objective moral truth and justify it not using subjective means. It seems fair if you demand justification form subjectivest that you provide the same.

I dont think im setting the bar to high. I think there are some moral truths i just wouldn't claim to be able to justify it them in any kind of meaningful way so i call them my subject moral truths.

See im not asking for that amount of proof. Im just asking for any proof. The bar can be as low as you want it. You can prove to me gravity is objectively real and its not subjective by asking me to jump off a roof. Im just asking for something along those lines.

It means your objective morals come form your subjective opinion. So it looks like objective morality is subjective.
Alright idk. The more i hear people talk about object moral truths the more i think objective morality is just subjective morality in a guise. Course its probably my fault for not fully understanding the terms.

No i get all this. Its kind of my only point.

If anything im confused by your, bunnys and others ideas of subjective morality. But like i said my confusion is more then likely my fault. When people talk about this stuff my brain fogs over and i really cant make heads or tails of what people are trying to say.

One thing I'd say is that I wasn't demanded justification in the same sense (I used the word sloppily) - I was curious as to how they make sense of it to themselves. Given they believe morals are subjective, it seems they implicitly hold the view they are unjustifiable in the sense I mean (where justifiable means sufficient to persuade a rational skeptic). My query is what difference they see between morals and flavors such that one should be punished for choices in one sphere but not the other. "One's about morals, one flavors" doesnt seem like much of a reason - it's just restating that there is a difference.

However, to answer your question - if you don't want proof and just want a persuasive argument along the lines of 'jump off a roof', I would suggest my previous example works fine. Everyone agrees that it is wrong to cause needless suffering to an innocent. You can see that it's true - same as you can see that any two points define a line. Given the fact nobody disagrees, what is the point is asking "Aha, but how can you be sure?" - I claim it is self-evidently true and is usable as a moral axiom to derive further objectively verifiable moral truths.

If you say I'm using subjective means here to justify that moral truth, you are perhaps saying that everything is subjective since we can't know anything without 'filtering it' first. I think this is a broader claim than morality (I think it's wrong, but again I reject skepticism as being both irrefutable and unhelpful). Do you think there is anything which can be said to be objective? Which passes your test of being justifiable without "using subjective means"?

I'm still confused since my claim is they (moral truths) exist independently of mind - so they can't come from my opinion, given they existed before anyone was intelligent. You still seem to be identifying my opinion that "killing abortion-performing doctors is wrong" with an objective moral.

I think there are two sets of statements which both contain this statement. One is my subjective morality, one is the objective morality - it doesnt make sense to talk about "my" objective morals, since the qualifier is redundant. The objective morality is unique, as far as it can be said to 'belong' to anyone yours, mine, Original Position's, everyone's is the same (whether we agree about it's properties or not).

Original Position, if you get a chance, I would like your thoughts on:

I cant really answer this as i just dont know enough about subjective morality. But the reason i imagine is because what others truths are about food tastes doesn't affect them. Peoples moral truths do so they have to care about one and not the other.

Me jumping off a roof and seeing that i will fall isn't an argument, its proof. Its the reality of what happens when i jump off a roof. If you ask me to touch one of my ears and than the other i will see i have two ears. I dont have anything i can show myself like that when it come to morals.

You say because no one disagrees this should be enough to prove an objective moral truth. I dont see it that way. Everyone could agree and the objective moral truth could be the opposite. Kind of like how just about everyone in my country and most of the world thinks being nude in public is morally wrong (even most of the atheists i know) but i dont know if thats the correct moral answer. In fact i think its the opposite. I mean if we go by the everyone agrees thing... well that hasn't worked out to well with morals in the past so it has to be wrong today in some cases too i would think.

No im not in the everything is subjective camp. Some things i know (at least enough for myself) are objectively true like jumping off a roof and falling. I just cant find anything similar with morals. The best i can do is guess and hope my guesses are right (if there is a right because i dont know that either).

Ive tried to explain this a bunch of times (not just in this thread or on 2p2) and i dont know how i can clear it up. But ill try one last time.

Say there is an objective moral truth for every moral question. Without being able to know what those truths are (to my level of acceptable knowing) i cant know what any objective moral truths are. I can think i know but i dont know for sure. So my moral truths are subjective and i have no objective truths. And i think everyone's in the same boat pretty much.


Im sure im just massacring the terminology in this discussion though and in truth i would rather read what someone who believes in subjective morality and knows what they are taking about debate this with you and OP. So im going to step aside because i really have said just about all i can.

No worries, I feel quite similarly to be frank. I will say though that in this quote I find nothing to confuse me. Here you are clearly separating objective morals from subjective morals and I'm pretty sure I understand your position. (Would a reasonable paraphrase be "Even if objective morals exist, the only morality we have access to is subjective so such an objective morality is inaccessible, unverifiable and unknowable. All people have knowledge of are their subjective speculations about what it entails." ?)

My confusion comes from labelling something a "subjective objective morality" this seems as sensible as an odd even number to me.

You don't know you'll fall if you jump of the roof tomorrow - all you're going on is your subjective memory and induction based on what happened in the past. Maybe you've misinterpreted the data, there's a chance isn't there?

Isn't your judgement that you have two ears based on a subjective test? How can you be sure you aren't hallucinating? How do you know there isn't a third ear you've forgotten about in the last second? You can't actually be 100% certain.

In my view, you're justified in believing in gravity tomorrow. You're justified in believing you have two ears. Nonetheless, both of those beliefs are only possible given your subjective understanding of the world - I don't think that matters, but if you say it does for morality, I don't see why you say it doesnt matter with physical questions.

I don't think I said it was proof - if I did I retract that. My point is that you can't prove it but that proof isn't required in order for a belief to be justified.

My argument is that it is self-evident - we can all consider the meaning of the statement and we all agree that it is true. It doesnt conflict with any of our other well-founded beliefs. It's been deemed true for a long time by people in lots of cultures and with all kinds of differing psychologies. I maintain this is enough to accept it as true. If you reject this, do you also think "Any two points define a line" should only be accepted as a subjective judgement and not objectively true (making theorems of geometry a set of subjective beliefs)?

Or force every one to drink milk knowing part of the population is allergic to it.

We instead should fund research for atheists to move to another planet free from religion and let all those believers pray for their god to help them when the sun will turn into a red giant in 5.5 billion years.

Pretty much. Although i wouldn't go as far as saying they are unknowable i would just say i and i think other humans dont know them. That we cant know them is something idk.
Well yeah that was kind of my point. Someone who claims an objective moral truth on an issue based on their subjective opinion seems non sensible to me.
No i know.
No its not. Its like a fact man. Well as much as a fact can be.
Like i said im not a big believer in everything is subjective. I understand you can put my brain in a jar and have me not falling and take away my ears but thats all kind of meaningless to my reality.

As far as why i hold morality to the same standers of other things i would say i know. Well i hold all things i would say i know to the same standers pretty much. In order for me to say i know an objective morality exists i would have to know it to the same level as the other things i know, like falling of a roof. And i dont have that level of knowledge with morality. In fact its not even close.


Like i said i dont think everyone agreeing makes an objective moral truth. People have been in agreement about moral truths before and thought they were self evident and have been grossly wrong.


We're pretty much going round and round though so...I really would rather see someone who knows what the hell their talking about argue with you guys.

television

There are many different varieties of non-cognitivism, but probably the most important versions are emotivism and prescriptivism. Emotivism, which is version championed by Ayer (although the most sophisticated version is probably that of Charles Stevenson), is the view that moral claims are expressions of our emotions or attitudes. A moral term such as "right" or "good" expresses a positive (what philosophers call a "pro") attitude towards the object of the utterance. Using a moral term such a "wrong" or "vicious" or "bad" expresses a negative attitude towards the object of the utterance.

On this account, since moral claims are expressions of emotion or attitude, they do not have a truth-value. That is, according to the emotivist, "Lying is wrong" does not mean "I have a negative attitude towards lying." If it did, then "lying is wrong" would have a truth-value (i.e. do I actually have a negative attitude towards lying). Rather, it is a speech act, a way of showing my emotions or attitudes, rather than describing my emotions (although, according to some emotivists, there is a descriptive element as well).

The other main version of non-cognitivism is prescriptivism. This view, whose most well-known proponent was R. M. Hare, says that moral claims are more like commands. Saying "Lying is wrong" is equivalent to saying, "Don't lie!" Again, there is no truth value associated with these statements (commands don't have truth-value).

If you are interested in more, here is the SEP article on the topic.

I think there are two different issues here that you are confusing. Some people are moral skeptics. This means that they believe that we cannot or do not know any moral claims. Some people are moral nihilists. This means that they believe that there are no true moral claims. Bunny and I, by saying that we accept objective morality, are claiming that we are not moral nihilists, that we believe that there are true moral claims. The reason why I argue that moral relativism is false is that, in my view, it collapses into nihilism.

Now, how we come to know specific moral claims, if we do, is a separate question. Answering that question is a matter of epistemology--figuring out how the belief in specific moral claims or principles are justified.

This distinction is very similar to a similar issue with regards to scientific claims. Do scientific claims refer to facts about an external world or only to our way of perceiving the world? This question is obviously different from skeptical questions about whether we are justified in believing any scientific claims because of problems with induction or Cartesian skepticism.

Well, your view basically seems to be this: many humans have basic goals of survival, avoidance of suffering, and happiness. However, the world is such that we cannot (reliably) achieve these goals on our own. Thus, we have a reason to cooperate in certain ways with others to achieve these goals. "Morality" is basically just the rules about how best to cooperate with other people to achieve these goals. So, for instance, torture is immoral because it detracts from our ability to avoid suffering (which is one of our goals).

This is a perfectly fine way to go. It describes the basic pattern of justification of utilitarian, contract, and Aristotelian views of morality--all of which can be viewed as objective.

However, there are some assumptions you will have to make if you view this as an objective morality. You begin by acknowledging that if someone doesn't have the goals you describe then the following doesn't apply. Does that mean that for that person his actions are not actually immoral? So, let's say that you don't care about avoidance of suffering. Does that mean it is okay for that person to do things that lead to more suffering? If so, it seems like you are describing a relativistic, not objective, morality.

To avoid this problem, you will have to make some assumptions. You might say that as a matter of fact, everyone actually does have those goals. This preserves your subjective starting point (that morality comes from desires that we actually have). Alternatively, you can give up this subjectivist claim and say that if someone doesn't have these goals, they should, because they will have a better life if they do. Here you might appeal to objective facts about human nature that influence the goodness of our own lives. Anyway, I can go on, but that is probably good enough for a start...