Quote:
Originally Posted by SprayandPray
Not to mention the national law. Practical things like crime, punishment and property rights.
Roger Sperry said:
"I have never been entirely satisfied with the materialistic or behavioristic thesis that a complete explanation of brain function is possible in purely objective terms with no reference whatever to subjective experience; i.e., that in scientific analysis we can confidently and advantageously disregard the subjective properties of the brain process. I do not mean we should abandon the objective approach or repeat the errors of the earlier introspective era. It is just that I find it difficult to believe that the sensations and other subjective experiences per se serve no function, have no operational value and no place in our working models of the brain."
Sperry compares the activity of the human mind to quantum physics:
In his 1965 paper entitled "Mind, Brain and Humanist Values," Sperry proposed that subjective experience plays a principal role in brain function. He posited that behaviorism and reductionism must both be replaced by a new concept of consciousness, based on the ideas of emergence and downward causation. The concept of emergence, according to Sperry, "occurs whenever the interaction between 2 or more entities, be they subparticles, atoms or molecules, creates a new entity with new laws and properties formerly nonexistent in the universe."
He notes the parallel with quantum physics in which "interactions among subatomic particles result in emergent properties which in no way resemble the particles from which they arose." It is important to emphasize that Sperry did not see this as dualism, which treats the mind as a separate entity outside the brain that is capable of existing independently of it. Nor did he accept the term "psychophysical interaction," suggested by Popper and Eccles in 1977. Sperry pointed out in "Holding Course Amid Shifting Paradigms" (1994) that the erroneous classification of this conception is probably based on an earlier terminology in which "mentalism" was equated with dualism. He describes his reasons for retaining the term mentalism in preference to Bunge's (1977) "emergent materialism" or Natsoulas's (1987) "physical monism," emphasizing that this new form of mentalism must be viewed as a "quite different intermediate position which is monistic, not dualistic."
Quotes above from a bio on Sperry:
http://www.nap.edu/html/biomems/rsperry.html
When you look at split brain research is it any wonder people reason to different conclusions:
http://ibpsychology.wetpaint.com/pag...Brain+Research
Last edited by Splendour; 07-30-2012 at 08:52 AM.