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Originally Posted by Ramana
The brain is a complex organ, what about it is specifically a self? I'll try to skip some steps now. I imagine that you'll say that the self depends specifically on the functioning of a bunch of brain processes, to which I will respond that these are just brain processes and don't translate into an experience of self until that subjective experience of self actually occurs. And so it is within subjective experience that we will have to look for the self.
You seem to be assuming that who I am should be identified with my subjective experience of who I am. I don't. While I think those experiences are a component of who I am, I also think that the objective physical correlates of those experiences is also part of who I am.
However, I don't see how this is relevant to the claim that the self doesn't exist. Whether you identify the self with a physical body and mind, or with only psychological factors, it still seems like I exist.
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That's a legitimate use, but it doesn't necessitate the existence of an actual independent self and is merely a convenient way of differentiating between objects.
Independent of what? I am not arguing for the claim that there is a self independent of my body or experiences. I don't believe in mental substances. Here's the problem. If you reject the idea that the self can be exhaustively defined by your subjective experiences, then Gorodeckyj's claim that the self doesn't exist because it isn't part of our phenomenological experience of our mind fails.
It seems to me that, contrary to what Gorodeckyj said, what is really going on here is a rejection of an immaterial soul. I agree with that critique--I just don't think that is the only account of the self on offer.
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Further, it's not how the vast majority of people use "I". Most people believe and feel to be a real, separate entity and have a complex narrative going on centered around that belief. Gorodeckyj isn't addressing the self as prounoun, but rather the intimate subjective experience of self and the insufficiently reflected intimate intuition about what that self is.
Well, I think most people's believes here are wrong as well. However, I don't think they are wrong to believe that the self exists, rather I think they are wrong to believe that the self should be identified with an immaterial substance.
Basically, it seems to me that Gorodeckyj is telling us to look within and see if we experience the self--understood as an immaterial soul. When we do this, we find no experience of a soul--all we have are thoughts, feelings, desires, pains, memories, etc. So, on this account of the self, and presupposing some basic empiricism, we should reject the existence of the self.
However, if you understand the self as I do, as a collection of thoughts, feelings, desires, memories, etc., grounded in a physical body, when we "look within" we find that the self
does exist. I experience my body, I think/feel my thoughts and feelings.
Moreover, even if you reject my view and think that the self should be identified solely with our subjective experiences, I still don't think we have adequate reason on this basis to claim that the self doesn't exist. Sure, now its existence over time doesn't consist in its being the same
substance over time. But there are non-substantial accounts of the self that must then also be dealt with (such as Locke's
relational account of the self).
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The liberation that he is talking about is the seeing that the subjective "feeling to be a self" is simply the seeing of a pattern layered over experience and that the intuition is false in that it is merely a thought the content of which has no actual entity to which it is pointing. What then remains is "just thoughts, just feelings, just memories, just choices, just experience of self pattern, just confusion etc", but no self-entity responsible for any of these.
I think the goal here is to promote a feeling of happiness and peace by helping people to accept what they cannot control. I don't have a problem with that goal. I just disagree with his claim that we discover by looking within us that we don't exist. Furthermore, since I don't think that the effectiveness of meditation in achieving this goal depends on accepting this claim about the self, I don't yet see a good reason to accept it.