I've noted this example as an example of being able to distinguish between the appearance of different types of decisions. I never claimed that this would prove in any way that the decision are *in reality* determined or not.

They don't feel like anything but themselves.

I have no idea, but would guess not.

You said that your "confidence [in the proposition of free will] is grounded in the experience of having made a very large number of decisions that have every appearance of being free."

Let's grant that your deciding to release your breath has the appearance of being free. Even so, it would be an obvious mistake to use that as the grounds for confidence in (libertarian) free will if the exact same appearance of releasing your breath also has the appearance of being determined. But that is exactly what is going on here. The appearance of your decision to release your breath is exactly what would be predicted by the determinist--your decision to do so is based on internal motives and desires that are themselves determined.

This is why I said that your example is an example of compatibilist freedom--a freedom that is compatible with determinism. So give me a case where you make a decision that doesn't appear to be determined.*

*So as not to be coy, my own view is that there is no such thing; determinism or non-determinism doesn't really show up in our phenomenology.

I think there's a mix up of ideas based on different conversations.

AIF was moving in the direction of distinguishing between free and unfree decisions, which is a different question than the determined/undetermined question.

The example of holding one's breath is a matter of explaining how one can do things in a willful way (holding your breath) and unwillful way (letting it go). My position there is that the experience of deciding to hold your breath is noticeably different from the experience of deciding to let it go. This goes back to the conversation about causality that I was directing towards the claim "I can cause myself to stand up."

I agree with you that the experiences described here do not differentiate between a compatibilist free will and a libertarian free will. They are only sufficient to point towards the existence of some form of free will.

I don't think there is anything in determinism that states that two different actions with different conditions can't feel very different. On the contrary.

I'm not certain why this perceived difference should therefore be very meaningful to this discussion.