Yes and no. There are metaphysical assumptions that can be made which imply the non-existence of free will. But that's not really the same thing.

There are reasonable arguments that the perception of colors is inconsistent between viewers, and that it is impossible to really "show" in some sort of way that the thing I think of when I think of the color red is really anything like the color you think of when you think of the color red. We just kind of assume that the perception of colors is shared because we can agree on a labeling system. (You and I can both point to a color and agree to call it "red" without there being any correspondence between the color you perceive and the color I perceive.)

Is there really that strong of an analogy between the experience of making decisions to create willed outcomes and observations of chance-driven outcomes?

None of those assumptions in themselves stretch credulity, it's just that the result of their combination is highly counter-intuitive, or so it seems to me.

I don't really see that as relevant. We know that light which you and I will both identify as 'red' occurs only at a certain point on the EM spectrum. That frequency is objectively determinable. Qualia as a general hard problem is reasonably arguable. That this specific wall you see as white reflects light in certain determinable frequencies which I see as what you would call red really isn't.

Closer than 'This wall is white', I'd say.

The fact that a particular combination of assumptions leads to a conclusion which cuts very strongly against the entirety of our experiences is a good reason to consider rejecting the some of those assumptions, not a reason to reject the experiences.

Do you think that this stands as saying something sufficient about the situation?

This is my point. Since truth and falsehood do not apply to subjective experience, most of the counter-arguments in this thread do not apply. Your blind-spot argument for instance, does not apply at all. In order to conclude that we have a blind spot in our eyes, we must have a statistically significant sample of people that also have a blind spot in their eyes. Do you see how many assumptions are made in this process? Why should I choose to reject my subjective experience (of not noticing any blind spot), rather than rejecting a conclusion that is based on assumptions which can not be proven?

The next question concerns 'proof' and 'standard of evidence' one would use to prove such assumptions. The 'standard of evidence' adopted in my argument is very high. I have more evidence to suggest that the colour blue makes me feel one way, and colour red makes me feel another way, than you would have, to suggest that colour blue is one particular frequency and colour red is another.

Also, if I did apply objective truth claims to subjective experiences in my OP, can you please point it out to me, so I can re-phrase the argument and make it more solid?

Well put.

Nice post until the last paragraph. Our decisions are willed, if you'd like. That word may be ambiguous, but it's allowable. But our wills are determined, circumstantially and biologically. Nothing can be willed that is free from the constraints of biology and circumstance. If you can prove the willing of something that meets these two criteria (independent of biology and free from circumstantial pressures), then you've proven free will. This is a definitionally impossible task, since to prove a will independent of neural circuitry would effectively require metaphysical bull****, and to prove a will unmoved by circumstance would effectively require...uh...more metaphysical bull****. The task would be much like trying to "prove" the existence of god, or anything that doesn't exist/relies on metaphysical imaginings

The illusion of control is a manifestation of the fact that our species is conscious. The brain takes in information and then uses it to predict future outcomes and based on these predictions, it selects choices which are more favourable to our survival or the survival of our genes/family's genes. All other species have this too, except we are conscious of this decision-making mechanism. We have consciousness. So when you're choosing which car to buy, you are conscious of all the bits of information that are going into this decision. By being conscious of all this information, you get the illusion of 'choice' or 'free will' if you must.

Accordingly, the evolutionary advantage does not stem directly from 'the illusion of control' but rather from consciousness. And what evolutionary advantage does consciousness offer? You only need to look around your living room.

On a sidenote:
Just ask yourself, who is it that actually selects what your choice is? If you believe in free will, then you believe that there is someone inside your brain that selects what choice it wants and what choice it doesn't, based on various information taken in by the brain. However, this assumes a duality between the brain and 'you'. A duality that is simply not there. Hence there is the 'illusion of control'.

Every item or particle of the physical world has at bottom…an immaterial source and explanation. As Wheeler said: "that which we call reality arises in the last analysis from the posing of yes-no questions (0's and 1's) and the registering of equipment-evoked responses; in short, all things physical are information-theoretic in origin" - which is an immaterial source.

P.S. playing devil's advocate here a little

Nobody said anything about proving that free will exists. I don't think proof (especially within the constraints that you've presented) is necessary for confidence in a proposition.

What are your grounds for confidence in the proposition of free will?

Physics is such a mind****. Don't know nearly enough about it as I wish I did. Although some days I wish I knew nothing of it whatsoever

I also don't necessarily agree with the above, but am not in the mood to truly address it, except to say that immaterial = physical in the sense that energy = physical, even if it's not physical, ie, material. "Immaterial" energy is "material" is my only point here

I need to start with this bit. I'm a compatibilist, therefore none of this applies. I don't believe there is "someone inside my brain" that makes choices. You are conflating libertarian "free will" with "free will" simpliciter: the ability of rational agents to choose a course of action from among various alternatives¹.

I'll grant that consciousness has an evolutionary advantage. But it's not clear how you go from "consciousness has an evolutionary advantage" to "the illusion of free will has an evolutionary advantage". It seems like you are arguing that consciousness is an epiphenomenon that emerges from the evolution of more advanced underlying neural structures. An analogy would be the whistling/roaring sound of steam exiting a steam train funnel: the sound has no relevant function but is an inevitable side-effect of the underlying functional structure. This view actually has a lot in common with mind-body dualism, in that it is unfalsifiable and is a statement of metaphysical faith. What experiment can be done that would determine whether the conscious experience of decision-making plays a causal role? If this is your view, then I think it is misleading to say that consciousness has an evolutionary advantage, as what you must actually be saying is that the underlying brain structures have an evolutionary advantage. You create more questions than you answer here.



Let's try and come up with a analogous model for decision making. Imagine that the brain is like a delivery company. An order comes into the sales department (analogous to the neural networks that receive direct sensory input). The order is then passed to the order pickers who decide what to do with the order and pass it to the department head for approval. The department head can also send the order back to the order pickers, or ask for advice from other departments. If the department head approves, then the order is passed to the delivery drivers (analogous to the motor neurons) to carry out. The order pickers and the department head can be seen as analogous to the Readiness Potential and 'conscious experience of will' from the Libet experiments, or as System 1 and System 2 in Kahnemann's model respectively.

Let's consider some important points about this model. First, the conscious experience (or System 2, if you prefer) is NOT the ultimate origin of the decision. So this is not a libertarian view. Second, this model is compatible with the Libet experiments, while not denying the role of conscious will. This was actually Libet's professional conclusion... it was others who ran off with the idea. Third, it isn't just compatible with the Libet experiments, but perfectly explains the data. On this model, the reason that subjects actions can be predicted with 60-80% accuracy is because the decision is trivial (raising a finger on a whim, looking to the left or right) and therefore the department head rarely feels a need to exercise a veto. It also explains the fact that 20-40% of the time that the order pickers made a decision it was not actually carried out - a real problem for a "department head has no power" hypothesis. The fact that a Readiness Potential is often seen where no act occurs subsequently cannot be easily explained away. This model also makes a falsifable prediction: if we do Libet-style experiments on consequential decisions (instead of mere whims) the accuracy of predictions based on the order pickers will decrease.

Finally, it also makes good evolutionary sense to see the brain working in this way. System 2 decision making is far, far slower than System 1 decision making, but because it is able to send decisions back through other departments (long-term and short-term memory, for example) it can optimise decision-making in novel circumstances. Therefore evolving the sort of large brain required for conscious decision-making has a payoff that compensates for the increased risk of infant-mother mortality. The feedback loops also allow us to, with practise and repetition, use brain plasticity to incorporate System 2 thinking back into the faster, more efficient System 1 neural networks. A good example of this is learning to drive a car. At first we use System 1 and have to focus conscious attention to each manoeuvre, but with time those decision become automated System 1 processes that do not require such attention.

Now, you can argue that none of this is contrary to your model, if your model posits that while the department head is causally efficacious, he is not analogous to the conscious experience of will. Perhaps the conscious will is like a powerless observer in the department head's office, who vicariously believes he is making the decision? Again, this seems like a statement of metaphysical faith, and I'd be interested to hear if you can conceive of an experiment that would falsify it. Furthermore, even if it was true I don't think it would change much. To say that "I" didn't make the decision but "my brain" did is a dualist position. The difference between the experience itself causing the act and the experience modelling the process causing the act seems pretty nitty. They are all "me".

I'm going to be a bit nitty and say that it clearly doesn't cut against 'the entirety of our experiences'. Scepticism about free will is grounded in our observations about causality generally. The libertarian FW hypothesis makes us wholly exceptional in the universe. That's why I think the blind spot analogy is apt.

I'm not sure I understand the question, but as long as 'the situation' refers to the argument you've presented, then yes.

Totally can be proven.

I don't see the relevance.

It's, like, your entire argument, as far as I can see. Even in the paragraph you wrote immediately prior to asking me that.

I meant that the 'assumptions' upon which the scientific method is based, can not be proven, although the conclusions (e.g., blind spot exists) appear reasonable.

The fact that you've said this makes me think you've completely misunderstood my entire post before.
I need a precise example please. The language I was taught to speak in, is not one that evolved under a philosophy where subjective experience > scientific method, hence it can get confusing for everyone. I just hope I can accurately convey the main points to warrant some more discussion.

Maybe you can have a go at re-phrasing your argument, then? Because the scientific method was built using the same perceptive tools that we all use. It's not as though we just found it written down somewhere and started using it sight unseen.

It isn't just through the test that it's proven. Once you understand why we have a blind spot then it becomes unreasonable to suppose that there are people who don't have them.

'Determinism is false because it feels like it's false' - no?

I was under the impression the Libet experiments had largely been rejected / refuted?

Yes and no. They've been repeated many times and the results are pretty consistent - but the interpretation that the experiments show that conscious will is an epiphenomenon is largely* rejected. I recommend Roskies "How Does Neuroscience Affect Our Conception of Volition" for a good overview. It's not really aimed at the layman, but does a good job of summarizing the technical findings.

* Actually I take that back... I don't know how to quantify the level of rejection. But it would be fair to say it's hotly debated in the cognitive science literature.

Just putting this here rather than in PM cos I think others might be interested, but Roskies & Nichols have also had very interesting results when trying to adjudicate between whether folk intuitions are compatibilist (like Nahmias) or incompatibilist (like Nichols earlier experiments):

Cheers for that. I should do more than take Dennett and Flanagans word for it though the Moving Naturalism Forwards conference focused more on the metholodogy of the tests rather than their interpretation and their criticisms seemed reasonable.

I'll take a look at both of them I'm guessing this corresponds to, the question as to whether a person would be responsible for an action predicted 30 years earlier because the morning they woke up they still chose to do the act?

It's interesting that people distinguish between a determined universe in which they live and one they don't because of the way they intuit the choices they have to make and that they accept or intuit a degree of moral responsibility for their own actions.

The same thing that grounds my confidence that I have two hands.

You're using "causality" in a strange way. You seem to be putting a box around what that word means.

If I decide to raise my hand, *I* am the cause of the hand being raised. And this is easily distinguishable from having my hand tied to a machine that raises it for me.

Rocks fall because of this thing we call gravity. Gravity is driving force behind things falling. What's the driving force behind the decisions we make? Surely we are, at least insofar as our experiences indicate. That is, we do not find that for the majority of our decisions that there's "something else" pushing us to make this decision or that decision (at least in a purely deterministic manner as we see with rocks falling). The entirety of our experiences indicate to us that *WE* cause our body parts to move and we can distinguish this motion from when our body parts move involuntarily (including things like reflexes and so forth).

I don't think we need to assume that we are the only ones with this ability. Certainly, it's well within reason for higher order animals to have this. It's also possible for lower level animals to have this.

Let's take an amoeba. What have we observed in amoebas that tells us that they are purely deterministic creatures? If we put an amoeba in a certain situation, will it always behave in EXACTLY the same way every single time? For example, if it moves towards a food source, will its speed and the exact way it reaches out to move towards the food be as predictable as something purely mechanical like a rock falling? I'm doubtful that this is true.

I think there's a lot that's bound up in this view of life as a purely deterministic bio-chemical process (and absolutely nothing more) that creates a system of unwarranted assumptions. Simply put, living things behave in ways that appear to be different from non living things. Since there are things that we can clearly distinguish as "living" and clearly distinguish as "non-living," it makes sense that there could be other things operating for each category.

[Also, even without talking about freedom in other living creatures, there is a real sense in which we *ARE* different from the other creatures on the planet. I think this is prima facie true. You may disagree with this, and it's not really a necessary part of the argumentation.]

"our own senses and experiences are sufficient for understanding the world around and within us"

-no scientists since the 1600s

.

I did say it was a bit nitty, but the point stands tbh. Our experience of just about everything except our own mental processes is bound up in the notion of causality.

Even if all lifeforms generally 'have it' that is simply broadening the exceptional category. It remains exceptional.

In principle, I don't see why not.

I think the bolded is a non-sequitur. I really think you're just putting "It's intuitive" in fancy dress.

There's a real sense in which spiders are different from the other creatures, too. Nothing unique about being unique, as they say.

It's true that life has exceptional qualities that not-life does not have. I'm not sure why this seems strange to you.

You're right that in principle, it could be that way. But it's also true that in our scientific observations, we have no created results like this in even the simplest of living organisms. This is what I mean by an unwarranted jump. The only reason to think that this would happen is if are holding that particular principle as your way of understanding how the universe works.

It's certainly not on the basis of having observed living creatures behaving in a purely mechanistic manner.

Do you not believe that there's an understandable difference between life and non-life in a wide range of cases? As I said: