(PoE) Problem of Evil:
If God exists, then evil is not real.
God exists.
Therefore, evil is not real.

(AfE) Argument from Evil:
If God exists, then evil is not real.
Evil is real.
Therefore, God doesn’t exist.

Evil is a problem for theists because they’re charged with reconciling the existence of an all-good, almighty creator with the appearance of evil. It’s like if someone whose character you have a complete and an unquestioning faith in is accused of some atrocity… somehow, someway the evidence or what it implies must be wrong or is being misinterpreted.

So whereas the PoE is ontological, in that it is arguing from the nature of God to the nature of the cosmos, the AfE is cosmological in that it is arguing from the nature of the cosmos to the non-existence of a benevolent creator. But the AfE is really just an atheistic argument, since theists are going to challenge whatever particular material premise, or the framing of the argument, needed to make it sound.

I'm not 'talking about disease outside of the context of health', though. Clearly, complaining about cancer-stricken four-year-olds implies a judgement that it would be better if four-year-olds didn't get cancer. It's not as though I'm bereft of suggestions - healthy four-year-olds are clearly what I have in mind as a preferable alternative.

It's just that it straight-up doesn't matter if evil is only the absence of good. You just end up rephrasing the issue to be the Problem of Good's Absence (or Scarcity if you like). It doesn't address the meat of the issue at all.

If arbitrary logic statements is somehow a problem for gods existence, then bananas are as big a problem as evil.

Two ways of answering this. Some psychologists have argued that one of the primary functions of the belief in gods like those worshipped in the Abrahamic tradition is that it encourages pro-social behavior on the part of believers. They think that god is watching them and rewarding or punishing them as they deserve--even when no one else in society will know if they've done wrong. On this account, the problem of evil is an attack on the claim that god is rewarding or punishing people as they deserve and so challenges one of the primary functions of this belief.

From a more philosophical angle, the problem of evil is significant, not because you'll necessarily be able to prove that god doesn't exist, but because the defenses proffered by theists will often force them into unpalatable claims (such as that we live in the best of all possible worlds).

It’s not just a rephrasing.

S1. a child did contract a terminal illness.
S2. a child did not contract a terminal illness.

We all agree that S2 is a preferable state-of-affairs to S1, and further, we all agree that the world would be a better place if S2 obtains rather than S1. So we have an imaginable state-of-affairs (S2) that is deemed better than or preferable to an actual state-of-affairs (S1). The issue with that line of thinking is there will always be an imaginable state-of-affairs we can deem better than or more preferable to whatever actual state-of-affairs we encounter, at least in respect to temporal existence. For example, even if my fate were to live a disease free life and die peacefully in my sleep on my hundredth birthday, I’d still prefer to live another hundred years or go on living forever. And even if I could live forever, I’d find it more preferable if everyone else could do so as well. And even if that were the case, I’d find it still more preferable if we could bring an infinite number of people into existence that could do so as well. And not just live, but enjoy an infinitely better and better quality of living. Etc.

Hence, the atheistic argument reduces to: anything short of an infinitely good state-of-affairs is contrary to an almighty, benevolent creator. And since such a state-of-affairs is contrary to temporal existence, the atheist isn’t really arguing against God; he’s condemning existence itself, or at least the mode of existence we find ourselves in. So while theists may employ privatio boni as a theodicy, what they’re defending isn’t so much God, but the inherent sanctity of existence and life against an atheistic argument designed to rid existence and life of inherent goodness and value. In other words, the atheist isn't really arguing against the goodness of God, nor is the theist really defending the goodness of God; what’s being argued over is the inherent nature of existence, i.e., whether it is inherently good or not.

Well, yes it is and even if it weren't, the rest of your post goes nowhere in establishing that.

This is drivel, no offence.

It’s not definitional; it’s a paradigm. You need to actually get into it to see it.

"Metaphysics is the finding of bad reasons for what we believe upon instinct..." -Appearance and Reality, F.H. Bradley

I have no doubt that the gist of what Bradley is getting at is true. Our pre-verbal intuitive sense or deep feelings about the nature of existence is the fountainhead from which we articulate our beliefs and metaphysics. That is, the theist’s deep feelings about the nature of reality is what drives his theodicy and apologetics, just as the atheist’s intuitive sense of the world is the force behind his asserting the argument from evil.

Well, pro-social comes with the territory. We can't survive and come to age without a lot of prosocial behavior. A human baby has no viable means of survival of its own. I would think religion is a more a result of being a social species, more than anything else. That said, social phenomena can ofcourse change our culture and perception.

Well, most mainstream religions do not hold that we live in a perfect world where God does everything for us. Rather (rather briefly stated) most mainstream religions hold that we live in an imperfect world where we are granted a chance to prove ourselves. And even if we disregard those, PoE-contenders would still have to show that evil could not exist in the best of all possible worlds. So essentially you end up having two parties dispute what neither could know. Not exactly a very deep discussion, if you ask me.

I think the issue is tied to omnipotence more so than "good/evil". The Abrahamic God has had an "evolution" from not omnipotent/omniscient (for example the biblical God did not know what went on in the initial paradise), to omnipotent/omniscient being in popular belief. Thus the holy work does not fit the current God that people actually believe in.

Which is very problematic, if you ask me.

It's useful for understanding duffee if you remember that he's a neo-platonist. Thus, he thinks that in order for us to correctly ascribe a property to an object or action there must be some actually existing Form or Idea that underlies that property. This is why he wants to define evil as "not-good," otherwise evil would actually exist as an Idea in the mind of God and thus as something created by God.

The frustrating part is that duffee thinks this is what the problem of evil is primarily about and so comes up with ridiculous claims about the implications of this argument for the beliefs of atheists. Of course though, since most atheists aren't platonists (neo or otherwise), he is incorrect about this.

This is not to say that evil doesn't present a problem of some sort for duffee's particular theology. However, the implication is not towards atheism, but rather towards manicheaniam. This is why Augustine in particular was so concerned to show that evil wasn't a real property.

What I would like to see from duffee on this is more than just an analogy (and an acknowledgement that there are other formulations of the problem of evil where his whole response is irrelevant, but whatever). Analogies generally mean whatever you want them to mean. For instance, I can use a parallel argument to claim that "goodness" is just the absence of evil. What is there to prefer in his formulation?

God did create evil. eg Isaiah 45

I can't begin to understand Duffee's position. Perhaps he could describe how Not Good applies in some commonly accepted act of human "evil" - genocide, the Holocaust etc?

The underlying issue here is that atheists assume all theists hold basically the same conception of God. That’s not the case. The way classical theists, like Thomists, conceive of God isn’t the same as modern theists like Protestants. The latter have a very personalist view of God, in that he is thought of as something like a disembodied person, or ‘a’ being. So with that conception an atheist can question whether or not God is good, in the sense of asking if an entity is acting in a maximally good way. For Thomists, however, God isn’t ‘a’ being but Being itself, and God isn’t good but the Good itself. So suggesting to a classical theist that “God might not be good” is like suggesting that Plato’s ‘Form of the Good’ might not be good. In other words, for classical theists ‘good’ isn’t something God does; good is what God is. Now of course atheists can question whether or not God exists, in the same way they can question the existence of Plato’s Forms, but what they can’t question is if he’s morally deficient. For classical theists, if God exists, then necessarily he’s good and it’s impossible that he might not be.

Additionally, modern theism doesn’t hold God to be ‘simple’ in the same metaphysical sense that say Thomists do. For the latter, to say that God is Being and God is Good is to say that Being is Good. In other words, for classical theists Being and Good are convertible. So something that exists is good by sheer virtue of its existence.

Where privatio boni fits in to all this is that since whatever is Being itself is also Goodness itself, whatever is purely Being is purely Good. That’s what Thomists mean when they say that God’s essence is his isness and convertibly his goodness. In contrast, manifest beings, such as ourselves, have an essence distinct from but not separate from our isness. So by our nature we can’t be good in the same univocal sense that God is, but more in an analogous manner. And since we’re good by the sheer fact that we exist, what opens up is how good we are, which is derived by how well we fulfill our essence. For example, we have the essential capacity to love one another as brothers and sisters, to not judge others too harshly, and to turn the other cheek when affronted. If we do so then we’ve fulfilled our essence; if we don’t then our essence is suffering a privation. That’s why classical theism defines ‘sin’ as ‘missing one’s mark’. In other words, sin is not something we do; it’s what we don’t do, i.e., a failure in fulfilling our essence. That’s why Jesus cursed the figless fig tree.

Anyway, privatio boni flows naturally out of the metaphysics of classical theism, and hence, isn’t some ad hoc attempt to vindicate God. If God exists: God is good necessarily, existence is good necessarily, life is good necessarily, and we’re as good as we choose to be. So for classical theists, it’s all good, metaphysically, and hence, there’s no place to either insert the existence of evil or question whether or not God is good.

A few points: first, Duffee, we've gone over this before. No atheist thinks that the conclusion of the problem of evil is that God exists but is not good. Rather, they think that, if successful, it shows that an all-good God doesn't exist. In your terminology, that there is no Being. Again, it is supposed to be an empirical claim that evil exists and if that is inconsistent with your metaphysics - then so much the worse for your metaphysics.

Second, it is nice to see an acknowledgement here that there is a different concept of God for which the problem of evil might be an issue. If you think your own view avoids some of these difficulties, fine, but you shouldn't talk as if atheists writing on this topic are wasting their time just because they aren't directing their arguments towards your concept of God (your claim that atheists assume theists hold the same concept of God is obvious prejudice on your part-they in fact often emphasize the differences ).

Third, you are aware that Plato's Third Man argument, which challenges whether or not we can coherently say of the Form of the good that it is good, is regarded by many as an insuperable difficulty for his view, right?

Finally, I am still seeing nothing but assertion for your view here. I see no necessary connection between existence and goodness, or really morality in general. Thus, it seems to me very plausible that on a platonic metaphysic there is a real evil.

I don’t think it’s a stretch to assume that classical theists believe their conception of God is correct and that modern theist’s conception of God is a misconception. So it’s more that I think atheists are wasting their time engaging a strawman of sorts.
You’re reading in too much Platonism. I’m not suggesting that classical theists conceive of God as a Platonic Form; they don't as far as I'm aware. I was basically saying it makes about as much sense to say one as the other.
I was just presenting a synopsis:

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Transcendentals
The transcendentals are the properties of being. In typical accounts being is said to be One, Good and True (unum, bonum, verum). Additional properties such as Thing, Beautiful and Being (ens) are often posited as transcendentals but remain more disputed.

http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/tr...tals-medieval/
Medieval theories of the transcendentals present an explication of the concept of ‘being’ (ens) in terms of the so-called ‘most common notions’ (communissima), such as ‘one’ (unum), ‘true’ (verum), and ‘good’ (bonum), and explain the inner relations and order between these concepts. In contrast to early modern accounts of the transcendental, these medieval theories regard the transcendental notions as properties of being and deal with the transcendentals within a conception of metaphysics as a ‘real science’ (scientia realis). The introduction of the doctrine of the transcendentals fundamentally transformed the medieval conception of metaphysics: it became the ‘common science’, the ‘transcendental science’, and ‘first philosophy’ in a new sense. Medieval theories of the transcendentals vary with regard to issues like the number and order of transcendental concepts and the systems of conceptual differentiation; the conceptual unity that is granted to them (analogy vs. univocity), and the way the transcendentals relate to the divine.

You don't see the irony of this statement?

So....any takers?

AiF and well named have already gone once, so it really should be someone else. How did your election turn out fretelöo?

Kin selection does a pretty good job of explaining why babies are cared for by their parents. Norenzayan argues that some of the features of modern religion (which are the ones for which the problem of evil is a dilemma), such as a belief in a omniscient god that punishes evildoers (i.e. free-riders), can help explain how the cooperation between strangers that is a feature of modern society became possible. So yeah, pro-social does come with the territory, but not indiscriminately.

Yes, most mainstream religions don't hold that we live in the best of all possible worlds--the claim is that it follows from the description of God that they should. Or something like that. Anyway, I'm not that interested in discussing the significance of the argument. If you don't think it is very important, fine, I'm not that bothered.

How is this a strawman? As you yourself acknowledged, this is a common view among Protestants. Just because you don't hold it doesn't make it a strawman.

You said this:

I was pointing out that in fact a serious charge, brought up by Plato himself, to Plato's theory is the suggestion that his "Form of the Good" might not be good. So this isn't really a useful analogy for your point.

Yeah, that is what the KJV says, but modern versions aren't so clear:
e.g. NRSV

7 I form light and create darkness,
I make weal and create woe;
I the Lord do all these things.

NIV

I form the light and create darkness,
I bring prosperity and create disaster;
I, the Lord, do all these things.

NASB

The One forming light and creating darkness,
Causing [a]well-being and creating calamity;
I am the Lord who does all these.

I would want freteloo's expertise here to really know what is going on.

I also would like an answer to this question. I think this view, that general terms like bad, evil, ugly, sick, etc. don't have any meaning themselves except as negative contrast terms is unintuitive. Why shouldn't there be a Form of Ugliness?

The Bad Guys won. However, the Despicable Guys missed the 5% mark, meaning they won't be represented in the next Bundestag. So a mix of meh and omgpopcorn. As they say over here: Nothing is more gratifying than Schadenfreude.

I'll take that as my face-saving reason for bowing out. I've thought about it for a bit in the last days and I couldn't even find an argument for "my side" to get started.

The specific term used in Isa 45,7 is רָע, which is an adjective and usually simply means bad, but can imply anything from ill-temperedness, over inferiority to actual evil qualities (it's not generally used as an abstractum, though). Occurs some 500+ times in the OT. Here, it is structured as a merism, with Shalom as the first element. The two verbs used do imply active authorship in the sense of "making", "creating" etc.

Shalom is a term denoting a much more comprehensive state of wholeness, completeness, prosperity (both in a spiritual and material sense) than the frequent translation with "peace" suggests. So, given the merism, we'd have to decide what the appropriate opposite of shalom is. I guess one could argue that evil is a good candidate; otoh, "forlornness", woe, calamity etc. attempt to better bring out the opposite of a more comprehensive notion of shalom. I personally like best the rendering weal/woe.

That said, it is certainly a common OT theme that God is, ultimately, the "author" of bad things/luck etc. (Lam 3,38; Am 3,6; Dtn 32,39; Job). The one thing that doesn't work is to interpret Isa "platonic" and take it as a statement that God created the abstract idea/property/entity of Evil. Generally, the OT doesn't think in abstract categories like that.

Would like to see a proper debate on any topic. More interested of the debate rather than topic.

1. Let Mods choose a short list of topics like above. (No complaining about it, Could be most stupid statement ever and you know you're bound to loose but will try your best if you have to defend it)
Or people on the forum can suggest topics and shortlist will be created(no debating which is the best subject just vote). Person suggesting certain topic can't be listed on that debate.


2. People can choose and list their name on certain topics or more than one.
3. You may have to argue against or for the statement. (coin flip)
4. Mods select pairs randomly
5 Done. See who did well

It’s the way you’re presenting the whole issue.
You’re not saying that “if successful, it shows that [some conception of] an all-good God doesn’t exist.” The implication you’re presenting is that the PoE is applicable to all theists who believe in an all-good God, and if successful, knocks down the entire species. That’s a strawman.

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Problem_of_evil
In the philosophy of religion, the problem of evil is the question of how to reconcile the existence of evil with that of a deity who is omnipotent, omniscient, and omnibenevolent (see theism).[1][2] An argument from evil attempts to show that the co-existence of evil and such a deity is unlikely or impossible, and attempts to show the contrary have been traditionally known as theodicies.

The PoE applies to those theists who (a) believe in a personalist conception of God, whereby he can be judged as a sort of disembodied moral agent, and (b) believe in the existence of evil. The atheist’s objective when employing the PoE is to show an internal inconsistency, incompatibility or irreconcilability in holding those two beliefs. So for classical theists who don’t believe both, the PoE doesn’t apply.

I had heard that the word translated as 'evil' in Isaiah was the same word used for "the tree of knowledge of good and evil" - is that so?

Ya. It is also the same word that is used to characterize the quality of water in 2Kings 2,19, for example.