Quote:
Originally Posted by tame_deuces
No meaningful definition of free will holds that it is causally deterministic.
As I've brought up many times now
a) 2 out of 3 contemporary philosophers disagree with you, and believe there are meaningful definitions of 'free will' that are compatible with determinism.
b) The majority of ordinary people in empirical studies believe free will and moral responsibility are compatible with determinism.
c) Our legal systems define free will in a way that does not presuppose incompatibilism e.g. when a judge asks "Did you sign this of your own free will" she is not asking "Is determinism true?" but "Were you coerced or not of sound mind" which has nowt to do with determinism.
Given these facts I'm going to need more that just an assertion that you don't think non-theological definitions are meaningful. Do you have an argument for that position?
I've reconstructed a chart from the Neurophilosophy of Free Will, by Henrik Walter where he examines in detail all the arguments and presuppositions around the debate and condenses the issue into three dimensions each with three levels:
Of these, very few interpretations actually have anything to do with determinism at all: A1 and C1. And the legal/judicial use of "free will" only seems to require something like A3, B3 and C2 (requiring only C3 would ignore things like a behaviour-changing brain tumour). A strong libertarian probably must argue for A1, B1, C1, someone like Aaron (I think) argues for A1, B2, C1 and I would argue for A2, B2, C2.
You seem to be insistent on a very narrow concept of free will which is totally divorced from anything except a (admittedly popular) subset of Christian theology, and because of this it is very hard to take you seriously when you weigh in on these issues.
edit: Also, what dereds said
Last edited by zumby; 05-15-2013 at 10:06 AM.