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Anyway, I don't think it's really a philosophy of science, so much as a sociology of the scientific community. What's really interesting to me is that it is a pretty well formed rejection of popperian science in the lab - Scientists don't take negative results as a rejection of their model, they keep tweaking the model to try to make it work until the model breaks down
Yeah you'd probably be very interested in reading Lakatos. You can scroll down to "Research Program" to get a tl;dr of his ideas
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Imre_Lakatos
And that should lead you to Feyerabend eventually for the full circle :P
FWIW: I'm currently researching structuralism which pretty much (supercondensed tl;dr) says that theories concist of:
A structural core (immune to falsification), intended use cases, data and approximation. It only gains empirical meaning by using special laws on top of the core and links to other theories (theory-nets). The intended use cases can be changed if some stuff gets falsified.
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I don't think he is arguing that two paradigms are incomparable at all. They are, indeed, explicitly compared regarding their ability to explain the problems being investigated
Iirc he argued something like that different planar models cannot be compared because they use definitions (like "planet") and built upon that. Quick research:
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Commens...hy_of_science)
Btw, I'm still amazed at the different use if "science theory" in Germany vs the english speaking (potentially the rest of the world?) countries. All this stuff, Popper, Lakatos, Kuhn, Feyerabend, Praxeology, Kant, Wittgenstein, Methodenstreit etc. falls under the umbrella of science theory here.
Last edited by clowntable; 10-02-2008 at 06:34 AM.