Originally Posted by amplify
Take your time, I'm not going anywhere and I'd rather have a thorough discussion than a quick one.
My starting point would be - that we do not actually experience the ontology of 'other' matter but merely we signify aspects of our own experience of that object.
Which means that given that we do not actually encounter the ontology of other things other than through our own being - we cannot actually provide a hierachy of ontology over anything which is what your statements would imply.
e.g. We encounter an hourglass.
We have language that signifies that the hourglass is an instrument for measuring time.
We do not experience what it is to be that hourglass. Nor can we describe the 'essence' of or the being of that object other than through the language that we use to signify parts of that hourglass. Be it the sand, glass, structure of parts - reducible constiuents of any given part.
Nor is it enough for us to say - we experience the being of matter writ large of that hourglass. For what about the matterness of matter do we mean to experience.
Which is not to put into cartesian 'doubt' the existence of the hourglass or matter but to say that the ontological construct is left short of descriptive power beyond the signification process of language.
That is in part - some of my comments on your assertions.