Have some remnants of my undergrad knowledge.
Truth, beauty, morality, death, etc: these are words in a language and PI is about what language is and how it operates.
Quote:
Wittgenstein’s Beetle – Philosophical Investigations, Sec. 293
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If I say of myself that it is only from my own case that I know what the word “pain” means – must I not say the same of other people too? And how can I generalize the one case so irresponsibly?
Now someone tells me that he knows what pain is only from his own case! –Suppose everyone had a box with something in it: we call it a “beetle”. No one can look into anyone else’s box, and everyone says he knows what a beetle is only by looking at his beetle. –Here it would be quite possible for everyone to have something different in his box. One might even imagine such a thing constantly changing. –But suppose the word “beetle” had a use in these people’s language? –If so it would not be used as the name of a thing. The thing in the box has no place in the language-game at all; not even as a something: for the box might even be empty. –No, one can ‘divide through’ by the thing in the box; it cancels out, whatever it is.
That is to say: if we construe the grammar of the expression of sensation on the model of ‘object and designation’ the object drops out of consideration as irrelevant.
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This is an argument against the interpretation that the meaning (the beetle) of a word (e.g. "truth", or "absolute truth") is something that the individual has any say in. To find out what it means is not to look inside one's head (the box) but rather to look at how it is used in the world around us. The meaning of "truth", or even "absolute truth", is then clearly somewhat complex (think of all the different contexts in which these are used) rather than a boolean yes/no.