Naturally.

And solipsism applies to thoughts as well. But empiricism is not reliance on observation, it is a conclusion that observations represent messages from an outside reality. Relying on observations is not the same as making metaphysical claims about those observations. That latter is what empiricism does, making empiricism a characterization of observations that depends on thought. This means that empiricism can only be valid if both thoughts and observations are valid.

Solipsists rely on observations just like everyone else, regardless. We do not make claims about where those observations come from. We don't have to do this in order to rely on them.

The planet Endor doesn't exist. Neither does Albus Dumbledore. Are you suggesting I can't talk about them? On the contrary, it's very easy to talk about things that don't exist, we do it all the time (and I'm sure we could have an extended conversation about the character of Achilles, for example). I think it is easy to establish that we can discuss what isn't real. It is for you to establish that we can discuss what is real.

Regardless, empirical assumptions are exactly what must be invoked to invalidate empiricism. So, though I haven't invoked them yet, I do intend to do so, and I see no trouble in this. That's how you refute something - you use its own assumptions to contradict it.

"Solipsism" is another name for ontological skepticism or ontological monism. I said earlier in the thread (and the Wikipedia also describes) that solipsism is a form of skepticism, and in the RGT thread I repeatedly said that the claims I am making are metaphysical (or rather, the specific claim to truth that I do not accept, and that I characterize as unjustified, is the metaphysical claim to truth). I am not of the opinion that ontology and epistemology can be considered separately - to the extent that knowledge is considered a function or attribute of being, the nature of knowledge depends on the nature of being.

I make plenty of assumptions. Those are not solipsists assumptions, they are my own assumptions (madnakian assumptions if you like). But solipsism is defined not based on the claims it makes, but based on the claims it doesn't make.

It is similar to atheism in that sense. Atheism is not the claim that there is no God, it is the absence of the claim that there is a God. This doesn't imply that atheists don't make claims. But atheism, as a "philosophy," is defined by the claims it doesn't make.

To repeat one more time, I am not talking about "philosophical truth," I don't believe in philosophical truth. I am talking about utility. And yes, the state of assuming nothing and thinking nothing may indeed be the state of highest utility. I don't know. But the Buddhists think quite highly of it, and plenty of smart people agree with them.

Of course, there is nothing in solipsism about "observing nothing." On the contrary. To observe something without trying to characterize it or to classify it or to otherwise assign properties to it is no less observation than the alternative. And some (like the Buddhists, again) might say that we observe with the greatest clarity when we observe without assumption and classification.

So you're not claiming that there isn't an absolute reality afterall. Thats good to know.

I was making a joke, becasue solipsism as you present it can not be argued for or argainst. If making assumptions is assumed to be a flaw, and if the lack of full certainty is assumed to mean it has less truth value than assuming nothing, then fine.

I just don't see the point of debate. A pebble would indeed make the same point better.

I get it, solipsism in world praxis is an autistic child; suffered and carrying his past lives into an echoless reality of resurrective salvation.

Wittgenstein's position (as presented by Zeno) that language implies something other than The One of solipsism seems strong. It's hard to imagine the development of language without someone or something with whom to communicate. However I don't think this refutes solipsism (as Jack O' Clubs suggests) anymore than there can be an argument that refutes God.

No, but I am claiming that it is impossible for us to know whether there is an absolute reality, and if there is such a reality, then it is impossible for us to discuss it.

The "point" of the debate? There probably isn't one per se, as the specific external benefits are better achieved in other ways. Though I think I gain personally from the perspective.

Wittgenstein's position on language assumes that an external reality is necessary for public language and a social context. This assumption is nowhere justified.

It's ok to explain a skeptic position, but I think most people have had this "idea" at some point in their life and I have to admit I'm abit confused as to what should be the gain of the perspective.

Even empiricism ("my" perspective if you will) doesn't mean you have to believe there to be an external universe, it merely states that there is no learning without experience. I don't see how you propose to make a valid argument as to why thought is more real than perception, using logic that does not contradict itself.

You can argue that perception is merely illusory thought, but it is certainly no problem to argue the opposite either.

For one thing, it's a good tool for considering what is meaningful and what is not meaningful to consider (ie "what is real, what isn't real"). I also believe it probably takes less energy and upkeep than a realist view (certainly less than the realist views I've adopted). It "feels right." It plays into my spiritual experiences. I could probably go on.

That depends on your definitions of "learning" and "experience." By definition, to the extent that empiricism conflicts with solipsism, it does mean there has to be an external universe. But "empirical realism" is probably a better term to use, as realism is the philosophy to which solipsism stands in greatest opposition.

I'm not sure why you're pre-occupied with thought.

Well, I don't think empiricism needs an external universe. All empiricism needs is experience. From an empirical standpoint it doesn't really matter what you model, merely that you can model. If your statement is that "realism is as unprovable" then I will agree. I don't think I agree that solipsism is more provable however. I still prefer empiricism where you can safely continue your work without worrying about absolutes.

the armless puppeteer

This appears to be an assertion about reality rather than just one's perception of it, extremely arrogant and rather an extreme assertion at that.

A much more reasonable viewpoint. As our own mind is all that we can know, we cannot really justified assertions about anything else such as for example nothing else existing.

Personally I think the assertion that we can take our one’s own mind’s existence as given is too strong. I don’t think we can truly justify ANY assertion about reality.

All that’s left is to pretend our perceptions mirror an external reality in some way and create models based on our perception and treat them as real in some sense. Memory would suggest that this usually appears to generate acceptable practical decisions. I am not sure its possible to do better than that.

You’re in a dream, just go with it, what else can you do?

I'm surprised I can't find any links for this, but Susan Greenfield, I think in The Private Life of the Brain, talks about a modal model of psychological ontology which begins in infancy with the point mode. In the point mode there are no subjective boundaries between the self and the outside world, and nothing happens independant of the individual will. This is essentially what we regress to in the throws of psychosis, and a soft version of it is what we arrive at by philosophical solipsism.

Regardless of the objective validity, which we could debate ad infinitum, I personally find great strength in the solipsistic mind-state. The obvious poker analogy is with Mike Caro's dictum 'you don't need to get even - you are even' (at the start of any new deal). In similar vein, I like to wake up in the morning convinced that I have just been born into this computer game/simulation/whatever it is, replete with a lifetime of memories which are certainly valid, but I don't have to own them, nor is there any reason to assume that I will act a certain way just because my memories tell me I have done in the past. Believe me, one can get very close to freedom this way.

I disagree. The extra lines are just that, extra lines, explaining, limiting, they dont add to the original idea that the mind is all that is. If you take that away, the sceptic's house still stands, just on a different basis. Scepticism does not require solipsism, something you seem to be implying (perhaps Im wrong).
Right, and where then do we stop? This boils down to a type of self-pantheism. What is the difference really between saying that everything is in the mind, but me, im just a small part of that mind, and saying that reality exists and me, im just a small part of that reality. You are thus so broadening and confusing concepts that you lost me.
The knowledge-sceptic position is not the same as the solipsism position. I cant argue with this except to say that it doesnt explain anything and as such is useless.

No, skepticism doesn't require solipsism. But nor does solipsism require the claim that the mind is all there is in an absolute sense.

Well, you just said it yourself, didn't you? I would say that solipsism can be found at the junction of pantheism, skepticism, and idealism. In other words, you could call it a "self-pantheism." From the Wikipedia page:

If you haven't read through that page, I recommend doing so. Virtually all of the issues you raise are addressed there.

It's only an assertion about reality if you assume that the term "exist" is defined based on some relation to reality. But I and many solipsists do not believe it is possible or meaningful to make statements about reality. Because we cannot know or experience "reality," we can't discuss reality, either. It's an empty concept. Thus, I don't define "exist" based on reality. I define "to exist" as "to be within the realm of experience," and when I say "the realm of experience" I mean "the realm of my experience" (as "I" am the only experience I have access to, and I can't discuss the experience of "others"). In other words, to exist is to be (potentially) part of my experience. Thus, to say that my mind is all that exists is to say that everything I experience is in my mind.

This is a much less extreme claim. Remember that solipsism rejects realism, so clearly any solipsist claim cannot be interpreted within a realist context. The common tendency to interpret the claim "my mind is all that exists" within a realist context is a deep fallacy. You must interpret the claim within an idealist context, and within an idealist context the claim is more reasonable.

Again, I would go further and say that we can't even talk about anything outside of our own mind. Thus, if you talk about "something else" existing, the "something else" you refer to is actually within your mind and not "something else" at all.

For example, when I talk about a tree existing, my use of the word "tree" is actually referencing an internal construct within my own mind to which I assign the label "tree." When I talk about a "tree" existing, I can only be talking about the conceptual contents of my own mind existing. Because I have no experience with an "actual" tree, but only with images and sensations and "facts" that I have used to build an internal mental construct, I can't really imagine what it means for an "actual" tree to exist. My perception of a tree existing outside my mind is an illusion, and I can't really imagine anything existing, except within the context of my experiences. When I imagine a tree "existing," what I actually imagine is an image of a tree or a concept of a tree, combined with an image of "reality" or a concept of "reality." But both the image of the tree and the image of reality are really inside my mind; I am constructing a fantasy in my mind, and then imagining that I can put that fantasy "outside" of myself somehow.

This is silly and meaningless. I cannot conceive of an external reality, or push my concepts and fantasies "outside" of myself. I may have a fantasy of myself existing within a fantasy of reality, but both "myself" and "reality" are, in this case, fantasies.

"Reality is merely an illusion, albeit a very persistent one." - Albert Einstein

Again, I don't think we can truly make any assertion about reality, so this doesn't trouble me. Logically we can propose a system, we can define our minds to be parts of that system, and we can propose other objects outside of our minds. But I don't think we can actually imagine this system. When we try to do so, we create an image of our mind, which we insert into the system, and then we create an image of the other objects outside of our mind. But these are both images, and they both exist within our mind. We cannot comprehend "reality" without reference to our experiences.

Thus, when I make a claim, I'm not making a claim about reality. I'm arranging the contents of my mind. How did those contents get there? I don't know. Are those contents "really" there? I'm not sure what that question means. I just arrange the contents, and it seems to work nicely.

I don't think we need to indulge ourselves in treating them as "real" in a realist sense. But as "real" in the sense that our interactions with these models affect our future sensations and emotions and even thoughts. How I act in this model I refer to (when I'm not discussing metaphysics) as "reality" has a serious impact on the future contents of my experience. Thus, I interact with this model on the basis of how it impacts my experiences. This, strangely enough, results in the same behaviors that realism results in.

That is solipsism in a nutshell.

If your mind is all that exists you must by extension be privy to all the knowledge and information present within other "minds" of you construction.

Thus it would take an incredible quack to assert that solipsism is the correct version of reality.

If I'm playing a video game, I must know every line of code?

Seems that way, dont you think?

Well, clearly when you're playing a game with a story, you know how the story ends right from the start.