I didn't watch the first 20 minutes so I can't say if he credits him at all, but a lot of his theory is similar to Schopenhauer's - Thing In Itself (the will). Even down to the specifics about how any combination of concious agents is enough to form the system. In Schopenhauer's work however, he relates space-time and everything physical back to the principle of sufficient reason, while Hoffman doesn't seem to touch on this at all.

For others interested in the philosophical roots or parallels to these emerging theories on the mind-body problem I really recommend Schopenhauer's The World as Will and Representation. And Alan Watts - The Book: On the Taboo Against Knowing Who You Are. And Nietzsche; anything where he talks about the Will To Power, especially On The Genealogy Of Morals.

Animals are conscious and do not display free will; its all about instinct.

It is either deterministic or there is some randomness to it. If it is deterministic, then I don't have free will. If it is random, then I don't have free will.

I'd ask you why you wrote that.

Animals, including human animals, aren't all about instinct. They can learn.

I pay no attention whatsoever (other than a general curiosity) to anyone who wrote on topics like these who lacked a modern scientific understanding. They may have been insightful in some way, it wasn't their fault that they didn't have the information that current thinkers do, but they are only - as I say - a curiosity to me.

The reason that I've looked at this topic to the extent that I have is that I thought determinism objectionable. I can accept it if proven but consider it premature at best and dishonest at worst. We are not close to the end of brain science and even further from the end of physics and if sober, respectable, actual scientists say that there might be another explanation I examine it to the extent of my capacity.

Again: I don't claim anything, I'm just looking. What I DO claim is that there's an unwarranted rush to judgment going on w/ this topic. And, while I'm at it, it seems to me that if someone doesn't think they have free will they should have the decency to not offer an opinion. Heh.

To quote durkadurka, this begs the question. The entire premise of libertarian free will is that there is a third alternative, namely free will. Just because such a thing does not fit our concepts for how the physical world works does not mean there is no such thing nor does it mean such a thing would have to be supernatural.

The idea of an action that in the complex flow of causes and effects is a primary cause seemed supernatural to 19th century believers in a deterministic Newtonian clockwork universe. Then quantum physics revealed such actions happen all the time in the collapse of the wave function where no hidden variables are possible to explain why the outcome is what it is. So random actions which amount to primary causes were added to our paradigm of nature. It's possible that sometime in the future we will come to understand as part of nature yet another kind of primary cause that is not random, namely free will.


PairTheBoard

You're ignoring the third - philosophical - option. Which also happens to be the option that you subjectively believe and rely on.

I wrote, what I wrote, because there was a decision in front of me. After contemplation, and with help of my memory, I decided - willed - what it was that was written.

Are you going to ask why there was a decision to make?

It is also possible that we will learn that, in fact, the weather is controlled by a consortium of 13 boll weevils who spend their evenings watching reruns of The Golden Girls. Until such time as there is a reason to believe that is true, it seems silly to consider it at all likely.

Similarly, until such time as we discover that you can somehow act purposefully without regard to who you are and the situation you find yourself in, there is no reason to believe in free will.

Generally, I find that there is very little that isn't "possible."

No one has claimed that you don't make decisions, that processes don't occur, etc.

No one has claimed that you don't have will.

A curious essay is Schopenhauer's essay "Transcendent Speculation on the Apparent Deliberateness in the Fate of the Individual". It's included in "Parerga and Paralipomena".

I find it to be splendid.

Feeding a dog a bone for good deeds is not the same as a human being thinking and planning for the future.

Human beings are not animals; it would be better to discuss the differences between humans and animals than to generalize across natures, somehow planting the idea that all is the same and therefore smudging over the differences.

First difference and the main one is that the human being "stands" with his being perpendicular to the earth parallel to its radius. The spinal column of the animal's is parallel to the surface of the earth.

When the infant stands we speak to the "ego" nature, that to which the animal does not claim on the earth. Man stands, he thinks, and he walks as man and with this moral responsibility begins, the difference of Man.

The animal, though it is immersed within morality, is not morally responsible. The hyena kills its prey, as does the lion but the idea of moral turpitude is not present in the animal kingdom. Easy, breezy,.....

Sometimes in philosophy the demand for a definition of terms is unnecessary, but I think in discussions of free will it is warranted and a reasonable starting point.

Given the philosophical problems with the question of whether or not we have free will, I think it is difficult to even formulate a coherent concept of free will, so I'd be interested in hearing what that concept is supposed to be from anyone who thinks they have a coherent concept of free will.

What, exactly, does it mean to say that someone has free will?

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Volition_(psychology)

Nanos gigantum humeris insidentes.

This is not that helpful, since it doesn't explain what it means for a decision to be the product of free will.

In particular, we can ask whether actions that are the product of free will are caused or uncaused, and if they are caused whether they must be caused by the agent.

As a starting point, I think the traditional concept of free will is something like the following:

I freely chose to perform an action A if and only if I could also have chosen not to perform action A. This requires that I also be the cause of my performing action A.

Here are some basic philosophical positions with respect to the question of whether or not we have free will:

Incompatibilism: One's having free will is incompatible with one's actions having been caused.

Compatibilsim: One's having free will is compatible with one's actions having been caused.

Libertarianism: We have free will and this means that my actions are uncaused, since incompatibilism is true.

Hard Determinism: Incompatibilism is true, and therefore we do not have free will since my actions are causally determined.

Soft determinism: Our actions are causally determined but we have free will nonetheless (which entails compatibilism). Usually the soft determinist argues something like that my actions are free so long as they are caused by my own internal psychological states.

Indeterminism: Our actions are free because they are causally undetermined (i.e., they happen by chance).

Except* that we actually are animals. Also, animals hold other animals morally responsible and some animals are *******s.

Should we take a little from each?

What does that mean?

Like this?:

The philosophical division may be too black and white.

I'd like to say we have SOME free will, but that may not be good enough for the intellectuals.

My point. In your case, I would be still eating the chocolate cake because I desired it beforehand.

If we lived in a world where I couldn't control my hand and it reached towards the cake while I was trying my hardest to stop my hand, but some seemingly outside force exerted its will and made it impossible and chocalte tasted horrible; there would be a problem.

In short, I have the subjective feeling of free will, hence, no problem.

Erm, particle entanglement happens in the known, physical realm.

If we have some free will, then we have free will. It may be possible that our actions are sometimes determined and sometimes free (though that would be an odd fact, and difficult to explain philosophically), but the person who argues against free will is claiming that our actions are never free, and the person who argues in favor of free will is claiming that our actions are at least sometimes free.

So even only one free action during an entire life means that being has "free will"?

Yes, if a person is capable of performing a free action at all then that means they have free will, but it's not clear to me what your concept of free will is such that you think it is possible that a person might perform only one free action during their entire life.