I counted, and there are only 5...

And I can account for them as being lazy shorthand for things that Durka should have already studied.

For one, random events tend to obey stochastic laws; merely indeterminate events need not. There's also a 'random but caused' class which is separate from 'indeterminate and not caused' or, at least, not completely caused (incline without necessitate).

Alright, although I don't think this is a metaphysical distinction, let's say that a random event is an indeterminate event that obeys a stochastic law. What's a non-random indeterminate event; an indeterminate event that does not obey a stochastic law? That's relevant how for libertarian free will?

Libertarian free will isn't determined or describable by any stochastic law. It's indeterminate but not random. It's not caused but can be influenced by causes (incline w/o necessitating). How is this not clearly relevant?

Is the free agent's action caused on any level? I mean caused, as opposed to influenced.

I believe you are in a box in which you need to argue your case to escape. How is it indeterminate, but not random?

The agent is in an essential sense a causa sui. The agent is what causes but isn't completely caused (nor random). This is the level that there is indeterminacy but not randomness.

Of course sometimes 'people' do things and they're completely determined, but the Libertarian only needs that it's possible for the agent to do something not determined and not merely random.

We can forget the cases in which an action is caused. We all agree that at least some actions are caused, right.

We are only concerned with potentially uncaused agents/actions, right?

This requires an uncaused force. Either it magically arises from within the actor, or it magically arises from the choice itself.

Explain the magic. Make it something more than random. Make it not just magic.

I don't need to explain it. I'm not trying to prove that Libertarianism is true; that can't be done. Explain to me how gravity works.

...

I'll wait.

I don't object to the incline w/o necessitating part if that's your kayaker example again, but I don't get what you gain by saying it's not describable by any stochastic law. The problem with randomness being the mechanism of choice is not that choices would then obey stochastic laws, the problem is that no choice is then sufficiently determined by a reason (or no reason is sufficiently determined by another reason). If two choices (eat the cake, don't eat the cake) can follow an agent's deliberations, then nothing about the agent's deliberations is sufficient to explain the choice; this problem is not alleviated by saying it's a non-random process.

Except that they made the choice wilfully. You're looking for something that isn't there.

Why did the agent just do that? Because they wanted to.

Why did they want to? <---category mistake This is a different kind of question than the previous one. The agent terminates the 'causal' story here (unless you want to discuss the 'incline without necessitating' influences).

I don't understand that response. Why did the agent just do that? Because he was being agent-ish? Is that the non-causal Ginet line?

Well, the agent is causal. To ask 'why' the agent did something free is asking the wrong sort of question. At a point there will be a shoulder shrug and something like "well, they were being a free agent."

Because of magical gravity-ness of course.

You are admitting that you have less than this?

I have a formula that describes gravity:

Fg = G (m1*m2)/(d^2)

Name your formula. Feel free to write a book to describe freedom from prior or present outside cause.

Describe freedom without randomness.

Read Schoppenhauer. Willfull does not equal free-willfull.

(ignore senilia, he did kind of lose a grip)

Actually, I think that 'willful' qua free-willful is the only meaningful sense. I consider Frankfurt's secondary preferences to be an incoherent concept.