OMFG SIR MADNAK THE GREAT POSTED

'Epistemic determinism' and/or 'epistemological determinism'. I'm confused by these terms, and my googling has failed to clear up my confusion. Wondering if someone more philosophically literate than I am might explain what these refer to?

I don't know if it's the main thing (if there is a main thing), but the first google result for 'epistemic determinism' was in the context of divine foreknowledge; there 'epistemic determinism' is the view that God's foreknowledge of the future makes human free will impossible. Another usage I found was in the context of Laplace's demon; there 'epistemological determinism' is the view that it is possible to know or work out what will happen in the future (or what happened in the past) if you know the causal laws and the state of the world at some point in time.

Hmmm. Epistemic determinism seems fine. I'm wondering what about epistemological determinism distinguishes it from regular determinism, though, or if it's just a consequence that happens to be named.

I also wonder if the meaning I speculatively invented is an actual thing: an argument against free will based on our having no volition in what we regard as true. Which seems like it might lead to no volition in decision-making. You kind of have to say that every decision arises from holding some claim to be true, which is where I'm not sure it works.

Just to say, I'm not sure how many philosophers would actually use 'epistemic determinism' to refer to that argument (the google result I looked at was a forum post, not from a journal). The usual term(s) for God posing a problem for human free will is theological fatalism or theological determinism.

'Epistemological determinism' was defined in a journal article I looked at concerning the computability power of Laplace's demon, but I'm guessing that this is not universal usage either. But the difference between 'epistemological determinism' and regular determinism in that article is just that regular determinism can be true while it could still be impossible to figure out the future/past based on the facts of today and the causal laws; it could be too complicated or impossible in principle.

I don't think it's an actual thing as is, perhaps you can develop it into one (or maybe more development will show that it's equivalent to something else). At first pass, I think freewillers can accept that what we regard as true may determine our range of options but deny that what we regard as true determines our decisions.

Thanks.

The argument would be that the selection of any one option is always the outcome of regarding 'This option is the best' as true. I wouldn't really know how to go about making it more rigorous. It doesn't exactly look revolutionary, I'm just curious if there is some tendency making that case, even a discredited one.

Found this on IEP, so I was off a bit.

So you may have epistemic determinism without God e.g. if it's true that Mary knows Steve will do x, then Steve is determined to do x.

Given that, here's a better account of what theological fatalism is:

Are you aiming at compatibilists or libertarians (or both, if so how)?

I guess at libertarians (I at least think I understand their position). If every decision finds sufficient cause in a thing that is 'known' and if there is no volition in 'knowing', then there's no volition in decision-making.

I just had to say that this is really annoying. Like, obviously if I know you're going to do x, then you're going to do x. But this is a point about our concept of knowledge and not about some capacity that you may or may not have. This bit about being "powerless to prevent x" is just so wtf - my knowledge is the dependent variable here, not your behavior. I think language like this is why people get confused on this topic.

I think you mean to say 'belief' instead of 'knowledge', since most of the time when people decide to do something because they think it's best option they're wrong. But either way, I think it's easy for libertarians to deny both parts of your antecedent and say that the will is implicated in belief and also that beliefs underdetermine decisions. What about people who hold beliefs because those beliefs are comfortable and unpleasant to challenge? Isn't the will implicated there? And what about impulsive decisions?

Don't see it as hugely important, but sure, maybe.

People holding beliefs because they're comfortable doesn't imply free will in and of itself. You'd need to be clearer about what you mean by 'impulsive decisions' (ie, avoid defining them solely as 'decisions not made by virtue of regarding a proposition as true').

The theological version of this is kind of interesting though, what would theists sooner give up if they can't make them compatible: God's omniscience or the only seemingly sensible answer (free will) to the problem of evil?

bump for reference to current thread.

PTB

I was going to chastise you for this thread bump - then I realized; You had no choice.

You are a magnificent moderator for making such a wise decision.


PairTheBoard