No, there's not more to it. This is strong objective evidence against free will, yes. There is also other strong objective evidence and, although surprising to most people, rather convincing subjective evidence as well.

I'll admit that the entire debate is a bit incoherent. In fact, I'll bet there is nothing in this world you could claim to be real that I couldn't claim is an illusion, and no matter how hard you tried to explain it, in some sense it would be incoherent.

I guess it's just the nature of this particular notion that people can't seem to agree on it for thousands of years. It's still fun to think about though.

The argument is being made here repeatedly that acts of free will amount to causeless events and therefore violate a basic principle of our physical universe. My post argues against that view by pointing out how evidence indicates causeless effects are ubiquitous in our physical universe at a fundamental level.


My post specifically points out that the randomness in quantum effects may not provide the kind of freedom posited by free will. I certainly don't suggest that quantum events are the source of free will. There's also a problem in that it may be impossible to objectively differentiate free will effects - assuming they exist - from random effects, regardless of their origin. And this theoretical hypothetical objective appearance of randomness in acts of free will provides input for an argument that such apparantly random causeless effects are insufficient or irrelevant to what we think free will ought to be. In other words, free will can't be what we think it ought to be because if it were it would appear random to us and therefore could not be what we think it ought to be. I agreee there's an argument there. However there are also counter arguments which I think durka has explained at length in this thread.

Not being any kind of expert, I don't really know what competent philosophers think. What I see posted here by a lot of people are ideas that seem strongly shaped by an outdated clockwork universe view in which high level concepts are routinely discarded when they aren't suggested by or apparently reducible to the workings of all the little gears. In my opinion, that approach is naive.


PairTheBoard

Good. I thought there could be something I was missing. While the Libet experiments (maybe I'll comment on Sam Harris later) are interesting in that they show we make some decisions unconsciously, only realizing them later, why is that a big surprise and how does it interfere with the notion that we can consciously make decisions as well?

So far, all of these Libet type experiments I've read about involve very simple and random choices. Press a button with the right hand or left. In other words, flip a coin. We already know our brain unconsciously controls many of our actions: our breathing, heart rate, etc. But there are also probably thousands of decisions throughout the day we make unconsciously, like which foot to extend first when walking, which direction to look first before crossing the street, etc.

Perhaps when initially learning a process we had to think about these types of decisions, but then we quickly learned to delegate them to our unconscious mind. These decisions were of little consequence, many requiring nothing more than a "mental coinflip." If we had to stop and consciously think about each one our day would be quite mentally exhausting, would it not? So how are the decisions in these experiments any different?

Wouldn't the experiments be more interesting if they attached some kind of goal to the decision? That way, the subject would need to rationally work out which button to push. This would require some conscious thought and an actual conscious decision. I can remember playing Super Mario Bros. 2 as a kid, and between levels there was this slot machine thing where if you got the right sequence you won an extra life. I got really good a timing it so that I could usually hit the right sequence, but it wasn't easy. I'm pretty sure it involved a lot more conscious brain activity than the experiments we have discussed. It would be interesting to see Libet results of that type of decision making process.

That's not the argument though. The (pessimist's) argument is that if an act of free will is a causeless event, then in principle it's not something that a person can be responsible for. It would be rare for a philosopher to deny that it's at least possible that our physical universe has indeterministic properties. Some philosophers may think that the indeterminism cancels out by the time you get to the cognitive layer, but that's not inconsistent with the picture of the universe you describe. Compatibilists usually argue that some kind of macro-determinism is necessary for free will.

Put a smile on my face and link me one post that rises to the level of a counter argument (rather than assertion or invocation of imaginary fallacies). There are indeed some counter arguments out there, but they never deliver.

If you're interested in what philosophers think, here are some good articles on SEP about causal determinism (specific to your concerns), compatibilism & incompatibilism. Competent philosophy is not abundant itt. Consider also that the debate over free will is thousands of years old, and it has always been tethered to a conception of the universe; as the conception changed, the means of providing a physical context for determinism changed also, as well as the means of carving out a special place for free will. I imagine for example that the clockwork picture you describe was dominant in the modern/Enlightenment period but slowly eroded with the science, lagging perhaps by a few decades.

These arguments against free will tend to mirror the arguments for atheism. In discussions on deism or theism, I fully agree we should not believe in the existence of something for which we have no evidence, like gods or fairies. But there is a huge difference between this argument and those.

While as a child I went to church and was told God created everything, it was only my ignorance and misguided trust in adults which lead me to believe it. Not surprisingly, it didn't take long for me to begin questioning, and eventually to discard the notion altogether. But regarding free will, quite the opposite is true. It took no indoctrination whatsoever for me to believe I am responsible for my own actions. And no amount of rational argument so far has done much to sway my belief that I consciously choose to make the decisions which are important to me.

I've heard many atheist, including Richard Dawkins and Laurence Krauss claim that if god revealed himself, if he rearranged the stars to spell out "I am here," they would believe. So if everyone saw god, we wouldn't automatically assume it was an illusion even as incoherent as the notion may seem. But many claim free will (in the sense that we are responsible for our decisions) is simply an illusion. That it must be so because we cannot find a coherent reason how it can exist.

This is an interesting suggestion, which I believe has merit. However, due to the strong experiential sense I have that I control my actions, a sense everyone I know shares, which is so real there is probably nothing in this world more convincing, it seems to me the focus of the argument should not be on proving free will exists, but instead on proving it is an illusion.

maybe stars already spell out 'I am here' , just not in english. The idea of something omnipresent communicating is a bit bizzaree anyway, it would be just talking to itself.

Probably.

Most of us are using exactly the same definition. Occasionally a compatibilist stops by to muddy the waters.

The particular causes are interesting, but don't change the definition.

No. I couldn't hold you ultimately responsible for anything that leads up to you making a decision, so holding you responsible for the decision would be incorrect. If I were a compatibilist I could.

If you knew with certainty that someone committed a crime (for instance, killing someone you cared for) because they are an *******, and that they are an ******* (to simplify things) purely because of an event in their past (again, oversimplification), would you hold them responsible?

There might be a mirror elsewhere, but not in my arguments.

I am making a positive claim that cause and effect are how people work. I am not simply stating that there is no evidence.

I wouldn't call it an illusion. A misinterpretation would be more correct.

What you sense is that you are autonomous. Except for in instances where a gun is at your head, you are free from the outside world forcing your hand. That is completely true.

Your actions involve all of the things we have been discussing (thoughts, wants, etc.). Completely true.

None of this has any bearing on cause and effect at all. Your internal workings either follow cause and effect or they don't.

If they don't, what is there?

Randomness? That is a definite possibility, but doesn't meet the definition of "free" except in statistics.

Uncaused thoughts? That seems to be worse than insanity.

Even the way people describe themselves shows an implicit understanding that cause and effect is the rule. "I had a chicken sandwich because I wanted something a little healthier than normal today and am tired of salads."

I still think it is very similar. Just because you are posing an explanation - a good and rational one - yet one with it's own holes, doesn't change the fact that the lack of what is viewed as a "coherent argument" in support of free will is the main driving force for the determinist's argument against it.

We could look at another similar example. For centuries, many people could not decide on the true nature of space. Most believed it couldn't exist, until Newton "proved" it was real, only to be "disproven" by Leibniz and Mach, only to have the whole notion redefined by Einstein in the form of space-time. Now we understand absolute space and absolute time do not exist, but together they define one another. Perhaps someday free will and even consciousness itself will be redefined in similar fashion.

Call it what you want, but many on your side of the fence refer to the notion of free will as an illusion. And if what you claim is absolutely true, I believe I am under a very strong illusion of something that isn't.

Sure, and I also feel I am often in control of my actions and decisions. I'll even go a few steps further than you and list other instances where I am not in control: when I'm asleep, when I'm distracted, when I'm surprised, when I'm simply not paying attention. None of those states distort my feeling of responsibility when I am focused. Then, I have a strong sense of control over my actions. Don't you?


Your argument is compelling, and many smart people agree with it. There are also many smart people who find it unsatisfactory in describing the full picture. I believe it is missing something. I don't know where to begin, but I'd probably start somewhere along the lines of our ability to focus our mind to solve problems, the process of decision making itself. It's truly a fascinating argument. No wonder it's raged on for so long!

Let me ask you a question. Do you think you fully believe your stance? Do you ever find yourself doubting ... "misinterpreting" your sense of responsibility for your actions, thinking you are actually in control? If so, how often?

I think it is more that it is a direct either-or sort of thing. No big deal.

If you are trying to state that some new idea (or evidence) could come along and change my mind, I could hardly disagree.

You are being a little to harsh on people (both you and I included). An illusion is seeing something that isn't there. A misinterpretation is just a misunderstanding of something that is there.

Of course. No one else is controlling them, so I must be controlling them. I just notice that my wants and thoughts are caused by who I am at that very moment.

I can hardly be blamed for who I am, right?

It is hardly a theory of everything.

There are whole teams of researchers working on the nature of consciousness, decision making, awareness, etc.

They are slowly shrinking the box in which the idea of free will can reside. No worries though! Music theory doesn't reduce the impact of any of the Brandenburg Concertos, right? As a kindness, I offer this pleasant diversion: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=49IOK...eature=related

I'm always waiting for a better explanation of the data. Even more, I find enjoyment in new data. I rarely worry about such things as my ideas are even more fleeting than my life is. As an atheist, I'd be the one who upon meeting a god would say "Heh. Didn't see that coming. How exciting!"

You admit to controlling your own actions, but in the same breath claim you cannot be blamed for who you are. That is a bit incoherent to me. It seems like it should be one or the other, not both.

I think I am to blame(or credit) for who I am. There are obvious things out of my control, and so I don't get too hard on myself, or too high and mighty, but there are parts I am very comfortable taking credit/blame for. To do otherwise would be a cop out, imo.

Thanks for the link... I love Bach! You never really did answer my question though

No. And neither would you if you actually thought about it some more. I'll explain.

If you're not asleep, how are you in any position to say you are in control of whether or not you feel sleepy? If the thought enters your mind that you'd love a nap a lot more than anything else at that moment, you will sleep. Just because it doesn't happen often, you seem to think you're in control.

When you're focused, how are you in any position to say that you chose to be focused? What if your body suddenly stops doing something you were used to it doing automatically and you are suddenly erally disrupted. Let's say you couldn't digest food and became terribly constipated all day long. Clearly this would cause you to not be focused. Did you "choose" to not be focused? No. The constipation example is extreme to make my point clear, but everything is like that to a degree. You never choose anything, it just seems like you can to a greater degree when your basic needs are met. Still, this is an illusion. Your choices are always caused by something you have no control over.

Sitting in silence and paying attention to the stream of consciousness is another way to break the illusion of free will. If you try this, you'll notice that you simply can't control which thoughts arise.

Another way is to name a United States president, or to name a color, or say a number. Why did you choose whichever one you chose in particular? Because it popped into your head, the same way all your thoughts do. If you choose to contemplate between two or more options, the entire process consists of thoughts popping into your head. You control none of them.

This is SMP, so we expect "I believe x" statements to be followed by arguments.