A couple hundred years out...
*I am now done channeling my inner chezlaw.
It's more like you stating definitively that 2+2=4, and then citing me in a footnote. You would be doing more than saying "According to Bruce". You would be agreeing with me in your role as the compiler of knowledge. What if 100 other encyclopedias referenced that same sentence? Irrelevant?
At any rate, apparently the pdf for Baker's Encyclopedia is available:
Baker's Encyclopedia of Christian Apologetics M section page 20 in the pdf (not page 446, as this pdf is only the Mm section).
This is its entry on metaphysics:
Metaphysics. Metaphysics (lit. “beyond the physical) is the study of being or reality. It is used interchangeably with ontology (Gk. ontos, “being,” and logos , “word about”).
Metaphysics is the discipline in philosophy which answers such questions as: What is real? (see REALISM); Is reality one or many? ( see ONE AND MANY, PROBLEM OF); Is reality material or immaterial? ( see MATERIALISM ); Is it natural ( see NATURALISM ) or supernatural? ( see MIRACLES, ARGUMENTS AGAINST). Another important metaphysical problem has to whether being is univocal or analogical ( see ANALOGY, PRINCIPLE OF ).
In the Aristotelian-Thomistic tradition, metaphysics is defined as the study of being insofar as it is being. Physics is the study of being insofar as it is physical. Mathematics is the study of being insofar as it is quantifiable.
Metaphysics is the discipline in philosophy which answers such questions as: What is real? (see REALISM); Is reality one or many? ( see ONE AND MANY, PROBLEM OF); Is reality material or immaterial? ( see MATERIALISM ); Is it natural ( see NATURALISM ) or supernatural? ( see MIRACLES, ARGUMENTS AGAINST). Another important metaphysical problem has to whether being is univocal or analogical ( see ANALOGY, PRINCIPLE OF ).
In the Aristotelian-Thomistic tradition, metaphysics is defined as the study of being insofar as it is being. Physics is the study of being insofar as it is physical. Mathematics is the study of being insofar as it is quantifiable.
We know many things that exist. In any discourse we are usually only addressing a subset of them. It's useful to be able to refer to this whole subset at once. If something is known to be true of everything, then it's certainly true for the elements of any subset of everything. So everything is a useful concept.
I didn't say it's the extent of what there is. I said it's the extent of what I know. There may or may not be something outside my senses, but even if there is, I can never know it. I can only know what my senses tell me. Before I drank scotch, I had visual perceptions of scotch, auditory perceptions of voices speaking of scotch, etc. But the point wasn't whether things ONLY exist in my mind. It was that they definitely exist in my mind (and maybe only there AFAIK).
At any rate, apparently the pdf for Baker's Encyclopedia is available:
Baker's Encyclopedia of Christian Apologetics M section page 20 in the pdf (not page 446, as this pdf is only the Mm section).
This is its entry on metaphysics:
As I tried to explain earlier, you don't just stop reading after the first sentence. The first sentence is "Metaphysics (lit. “beyond the physical) is the study of being or reality." If you stop there, you can speciously claim that metaphysics is the study of frogs, since frogs are part of reality, and metaphysics is the study of reality. However, if you read on, the entry clearly defines which topics metaphysicians study, and these topics have nothing to do with frogs. Can we move on now?
Baker's Encyclopedia of Christian Apologetics M section page 20 in the pdf (not page 446, as this pdf is only the Mm section).
This is its entry on metaphysics:
As I tried to explain earlier, you don't just stop reading after the first sentence. The first sentence is "Metaphysics (lit. “beyond the physical) is the study of being or reality." If you stop there, you can speciously claim that metaphysics is the study of frogs, since frogs are part of reality, and metaphysics is the study of reality. However, if you read on, the entry clearly defines which topics metaphysicians study, and these topics have nothing to do with frogs. Can we move on now?
Everything is a useful quantifier, I already said this. I didn't say 'everything' was useless, I said it was masquerading as a word.
Who invented scotch? Who codified the laws of property ownership? Your senses can't tell you, does that mean you can't accept the sensible explanation that they were created by other people in the past, or are we brain in vat/simulation hypothesis territory here?
We have lots of words that describe undefined concepts: universe, infinity, god, sky, bottomless, etc. They are undefined on purpose, sort of the point. Sometimes they are useful, other times they are not. I wish you guys would agree to disagree on the semantics and get back to what is important and useful. I think this is where smrk is going with the definition of metaphysics. Agree on a useful definition and move on, so both your big brains can get back on track with this somewhat interesting topic, pretty please and I will be forever grateful (don't ask me to define that!).
Antisemantic bastard.
lol, okay, then agree on the semantics... Btw, I ask this assuming you've been trolling smrk. He's obviously trying to agree on a working definition useful to discuss this topic, and you couldn't care less.
Especially considering all the post-graduate level information it contains, and contributions by experts in each field. Then there is an extensive Talk section where experts and non-experts alike nitpick every little thing. Not one of them made a single peep about the definition I cited which was the opening sentence of the article.
There's nothing in what you quoted that contradicts anything I've said. In fact it supports my statement that metaphysics concerns itself with things beyond the physical, so a metaphysical change does not have to be a physical change as you so egregiously stated. The question of the nature of being of the house is certainly a metaphysical question. We can move on whenever you like.
Now knowing that, read the SEP article (where you should go for philosophy to begin with) on the origin and 'definition' of metaphysics. I'll bold and underline some stuff just cuz I feel like it.
The word ‘metaphysics’ is notoriously hard to define. Twentieth-century coinages like ‘meta-language’ and ‘metaphilosophy’ encourage the impression that metaphysics is a study that somehow “goes beyond” physics, a study devoted to matters that transcend the mundane concerns of Newton and Einstein and Heisenberg. This impression is mistaken. The word ‘metaphysics’ is derived from a collective title of the fourteen books by Aristotle that we currently think of as making up “Aristotle's Metaphysics.” Aristotle himself did not know the word. (He had four names for the branch of philosophy that is the subject-matter of Metaphysics: ‘first philosophy’, ‘first science’, ‘wisdom’, and ‘theology’.) At least one hundred years after Aristotle's death, an editor of his works (in all probability, Andronicus of Rhodes) entitled those fourteen books “Ta meta ta phusika”—“the after the physicals” or “the ones after the physical ones”—, the “physical ones” being the books contained in what we now call Aristotle's Physics. The title was probably meant to warn students of Aristotle's philosophy that they should attempt Metaphysics only after they had mastered “the physical ones,” the books about nature or the natural world—that is to say, about change, for change is the defining feature of the natural world.
This is the probable meaning of the title because Metaphysics is about things that do not change. In one place, Aristotle identifies the subject-matter of first philosophy as “being as such,” and, in another, as “first causes.” It is a nice—and vexed—question what the connection between these two definitions is. Perhaps this is the answer: The unchanging first causes have nothing but being in common with the mutable things they cause—like us and the objects of our experience, they are, and there the resemblance ceases. (For a detailed and informative recent guide to Aristotle's Metaphysics, see Politis (2004).)
The Greek plural noun-phrase ‘ta meta ta phusika’ became in Medieval Latin the singular noun ‘metaphysica’—much as the Greek plural ‘ta biblia’ (‘the books’) became the Latin singular ‘biblia’ (‘the bible’). The word was used both as a title for Aristotle's book (now thought of as a single entity) and as the name of the “science” that was its subject-matter. The word for ‘metaphysics’ in every modern European language (‘la métaphysique’, ‘die Metaphysik’, ‘la metafisica’…) is an adaptation of the Latin word to the orthographic and phonetic requirements of that language. This is true even of the non-Indo-European languages (like Finnish and Hungarian) that are spoken in Europe. Works written in some non-European languages, however, use words constructed from native materials both to translate the European word ‘metaphysics’ and to refer to writings in their own philosophical traditions whose subject-matter is similar to the subject-matter of Western metaphysics. For example, the Chinese phrase that is the customary translation of ‘metaphysics’ is an allusion to a statement in the I Ching: “that which is above matter is the Tao”; the phrase can be literally translated as ‘[that which is above matter]-ology’, the final word of the phrase being a “discipline marker” that performs much the same function as the English suffix ‘-ology’. The word that is the usual Arabic translation of ‘metaphysics’ means ‘the science of divine things’. Unlike the Chinese phrase and the Arabic word, however, the European words derived from ‘metaphysica’ carry no internal indications of their meaning. (The word has, as we have seen, an etymology, but as is so often the case, etymology is no guide to meaning.) It is uncontroversial that these words all mean exactly what ‘metaphysics’ means in English—or, less parochially, that all the European words derived from ‘metaphysica’ mean exactly the same thing. But what is it that they all mean?
Can the origin of the word help us to answer this question? Can we say that the word ‘metaphysics’ is a name for that “science” (that episteme, that scientia, that study, that discipline) whose subject-matter is the subject-matter of Aristotle's Metaphysics? If we do say this, we shall be committed to some thesis in the neighborhood of the following theses: “The subject-matter of metaphysics is ‘being as such’”; “The subject-matter of metaphysics is the first causes of things”; “The subject-matter of metaphysics is that which does not change.” Any of these three theses might have been regarded as a defensible statement of the subject-matter of what was currently called “metaphysics” till the seventeenth century, when, rather suddenly, many topics and problems that Aristotle and the Medievals would have classified as belonging to physics (the relation of mind and body, for example, or the freedom of the will, or personal identity across time) began to be “reassigned” to metaphysics. One might almost say that in the seventeenth century “metaphysics” began to be a catch-all category, a repository of philosophical problems that could not be otherwise classified: “not epistemology, not logic, not ethics … ”. (It was at about that time that the word “ontology” was invented—to be a name for the science of being as such, an office that the word ‘metaphysics’ could no longer fill.) The academic rationalists of the post-Leibnizian school were aware that the word ‘metaphysics’ had come to be used in a more inclusive sense than it had once been. Christian Wolff attempted to justify this more inclusive sense of the word by this device: while the subject-matter of metaphysics is being, being can be investigated either in general or in relation to objects in particular categories. He distinguished between “general metaphysics,” (or ontology) the study of being as such, and the various branches of “special metaphysics,” which study the being of objects of various special sorts, such as souls and material bodies. (He does not assign “first causes” to general metaphysics, however: the study of first causes belongs to natural theology, a branch of special metaphysics.) It is doubtful whether this maneuver is anything more than a verbal ploy. In what sense, for example, is the practitioner of rational psychology (the branch of special metaphysics devoted to the soul) engaged in a study of “being”? Has a soul a different sort of being from that of other objects?—so that in studying the soul one learns not only about its nature (that is, its properties: rationality, immateriality, immortality, its capacity or lack thereof to affect the body …), but about its “mode of being,” and hence learns something about being? It is certainly not true that all, or even very many, rational psychologists said anything, qua rational psychologists, that could plausibly be construed as a contribution to our understanding of being.
Perhaps this development, this wider application of the word ‘metaphysics’, was due to the fact that the word ‘physics’ was coming to be a name for a new, quantitative science, the science that bears that name today, and was becoming increasingly inapplicable to the investigation of many traditional philosophical problems about changing things (and of some newly discovered problems about changing things). Whatever the reason for the change may have been, it would be flying in the face of current usage (and indeed of the usage of the last three or four hundred years) to stipulate that the subject-matter of metaphysics was to be the subject-matter of Aristotle's Metaphysics (or that it was to be “that which is above matter” or “divine things”). It would, moreover, fly in the face of the fact that, in the current sense of the word, there are and have been paradigmatic metaphysicians who deny that there are first causes—this denial is certainly a metaphysical thesis in the current sense—, others who insist that everything changes (Heraclitus and any modern philosopher who is both a materialist and a nominalist), and others still (Parmenides and Zeno) who deny that there is a special class of objects that do not change.
This is the probable meaning of the title because Metaphysics is about things that do not change. In one place, Aristotle identifies the subject-matter of first philosophy as “being as such,” and, in another, as “first causes.” It is a nice—and vexed—question what the connection between these two definitions is. Perhaps this is the answer: The unchanging first causes have nothing but being in common with the mutable things they cause—like us and the objects of our experience, they are, and there the resemblance ceases. (For a detailed and informative recent guide to Aristotle's Metaphysics, see Politis (2004).)
The Greek plural noun-phrase ‘ta meta ta phusika’ became in Medieval Latin the singular noun ‘metaphysica’—much as the Greek plural ‘ta biblia’ (‘the books’) became the Latin singular ‘biblia’ (‘the bible’). The word was used both as a title for Aristotle's book (now thought of as a single entity) and as the name of the “science” that was its subject-matter. The word for ‘metaphysics’ in every modern European language (‘la métaphysique’, ‘die Metaphysik’, ‘la metafisica’…) is an adaptation of the Latin word to the orthographic and phonetic requirements of that language. This is true even of the non-Indo-European languages (like Finnish and Hungarian) that are spoken in Europe. Works written in some non-European languages, however, use words constructed from native materials both to translate the European word ‘metaphysics’ and to refer to writings in their own philosophical traditions whose subject-matter is similar to the subject-matter of Western metaphysics. For example, the Chinese phrase that is the customary translation of ‘metaphysics’ is an allusion to a statement in the I Ching: “that which is above matter is the Tao”; the phrase can be literally translated as ‘[that which is above matter]-ology’, the final word of the phrase being a “discipline marker” that performs much the same function as the English suffix ‘-ology’. The word that is the usual Arabic translation of ‘metaphysics’ means ‘the science of divine things’. Unlike the Chinese phrase and the Arabic word, however, the European words derived from ‘metaphysica’ carry no internal indications of their meaning. (The word has, as we have seen, an etymology, but as is so often the case, etymology is no guide to meaning.) It is uncontroversial that these words all mean exactly what ‘metaphysics’ means in English—or, less parochially, that all the European words derived from ‘metaphysica’ mean exactly the same thing. But what is it that they all mean?
Can the origin of the word help us to answer this question? Can we say that the word ‘metaphysics’ is a name for that “science” (that episteme, that scientia, that study, that discipline) whose subject-matter is the subject-matter of Aristotle's Metaphysics? If we do say this, we shall be committed to some thesis in the neighborhood of the following theses: “The subject-matter of metaphysics is ‘being as such’”; “The subject-matter of metaphysics is the first causes of things”; “The subject-matter of metaphysics is that which does not change.” Any of these three theses might have been regarded as a defensible statement of the subject-matter of what was currently called “metaphysics” till the seventeenth century, when, rather suddenly, many topics and problems that Aristotle and the Medievals would have classified as belonging to physics (the relation of mind and body, for example, or the freedom of the will, or personal identity across time) began to be “reassigned” to metaphysics. One might almost say that in the seventeenth century “metaphysics” began to be a catch-all category, a repository of philosophical problems that could not be otherwise classified: “not epistemology, not logic, not ethics … ”. (It was at about that time that the word “ontology” was invented—to be a name for the science of being as such, an office that the word ‘metaphysics’ could no longer fill.) The academic rationalists of the post-Leibnizian school were aware that the word ‘metaphysics’ had come to be used in a more inclusive sense than it had once been. Christian Wolff attempted to justify this more inclusive sense of the word by this device: while the subject-matter of metaphysics is being, being can be investigated either in general or in relation to objects in particular categories. He distinguished between “general metaphysics,” (or ontology) the study of being as such, and the various branches of “special metaphysics,” which study the being of objects of various special sorts, such as souls and material bodies. (He does not assign “first causes” to general metaphysics, however: the study of first causes belongs to natural theology, a branch of special metaphysics.) It is doubtful whether this maneuver is anything more than a verbal ploy. In what sense, for example, is the practitioner of rational psychology (the branch of special metaphysics devoted to the soul) engaged in a study of “being”? Has a soul a different sort of being from that of other objects?—so that in studying the soul one learns not only about its nature (that is, its properties: rationality, immateriality, immortality, its capacity or lack thereof to affect the body …), but about its “mode of being,” and hence learns something about being? It is certainly not true that all, or even very many, rational psychologists said anything, qua rational psychologists, that could plausibly be construed as a contribution to our understanding of being.
Perhaps this development, this wider application of the word ‘metaphysics’, was due to the fact that the word ‘physics’ was coming to be a name for a new, quantitative science, the science that bears that name today, and was becoming increasingly inapplicable to the investigation of many traditional philosophical problems about changing things (and of some newly discovered problems about changing things). Whatever the reason for the change may have been, it would be flying in the face of current usage (and indeed of the usage of the last three or four hundred years) to stipulate that the subject-matter of metaphysics was to be the subject-matter of Aristotle's Metaphysics (or that it was to be “that which is above matter” or “divine things”). It would, moreover, fly in the face of the fact that, in the current sense of the word, there are and have been paradigmatic metaphysicians who deny that there are first causes—this denial is certainly a metaphysical thesis in the current sense—, others who insist that everything changes (Heraclitus and any modern philosopher who is both a materialist and a nominalist), and others still (Parmenides and Zeno) who deny that there is a special class of objects that do not change.
And doing a hell of a job. I was completely fooled and actually believed it was a word.
That's a reasonable model for what happened that my mind can create.
Your definition is specious. I'm making a peep about it. We can tell that it's specious because you think you can prove that everything is metaphysical according to your definition. Everything is obviously not metaphysical if the encyclopedias you cite bother to enumerate the constitutive questions of metaphysics, instead of letting your definition stand without further comment.
Wikipedia defines physics as
"study of matter[6] and its motion through space and time, along with related concepts such as energy and force.[7] More broadly, it is the general analysis of nature, conducted in order to understand how the universe behaves."
Physicists don't typically study frogs. But frogs certainly have a physical existence, are comprised of matter, are subject to forces and constraints of energy, and they are certainly part of nature. As such, they certainly could become the subject questions to be answered by a consideration of physics.
And according to that reasonable model, it's not reasonable that your mind created scotch and codified the laws of property ownership, at last we agree.
That would depend on your definition of trolling. This is a subject of serious academic debate.
Trolling in asynchronous computer-mediated communication: From user discussions to academic definitions
(From the Journal of Politeness Research)
Some of it even impacts the personal identity debate:
"In the physical world there is an inherent unity to the self, for the body provides a compelling and convenient definition of identity. The norm is: one body, one identity ... The virtual world is different. It is composed of information rather than matter."
-Donath, Judith S. (1999). "Identity and deception in the virtual community", Communities in Cyberspace
Trolling in asynchronous computer-mediated communication: From user discussions to academic definitions
(From the Journal of Politeness Research)
Some of it even impacts the personal identity debate:
"In the physical world there is an inherent unity to the self, for the body provides a compelling and convenient definition of identity. The norm is: one body, one identity ... The virtual world is different. It is composed of information rather than matter."
-Donath, Judith S. (1999). "Identity and deception in the virtual community", Communities in Cyberspace
Wikipedia defines physics as
"study of matter[6] and its motion through space and time, along with related concepts such as energy and force.[7] More broadly, it is the general analysis of nature, conducted in order to understand how the universe behaves."
Physicists don't typically study frogs. But frogs certainly have a physical existence, are comprised of matter, are subject to forces and constraints of energy, and they are certainly part of nature. As such, they certainly could become the subject questions to be answered by a consideration of physics.
"study of matter[6] and its motion through space and time, along with related concepts such as energy and force.[7] More broadly, it is the general analysis of nature, conducted in order to understand how the universe behaves."
Physicists don't typically study frogs. But frogs certainly have a physical existence, are comprised of matter, are subject to forces and constraints of energy, and they are certainly part of nature. As such, they certainly could become the subject questions to be answered by a consideration of physics.
My mind created the illusion of scotch, the laws of property ownership, and the notion that these laws had codifiers.
That would depend on your definition of trolling. This is a subject of serious academic debate.
Trolling in asynchronous computer-mediated communication: From user discussions to academic definitions
(From the Journal of Politeness Research)
Some of it even impacts the personal identity debate:
"In the physical world there is an inherent unity to the self, for the body provides a compelling and convenient definition of identity. The norm is: one body, one identity ... The virtual world is different. It is composed of information rather than matter."
-Donath, Judith S. (1999). "Identity and deception in the virtual community", Communities in Cyberspace
Trolling in asynchronous computer-mediated communication: From user discussions to academic definitions
(From the Journal of Politeness Research)
Some of it even impacts the personal identity debate:
"In the physical world there is an inherent unity to the self, for the body provides a compelling and convenient definition of identity. The norm is: one body, one identity ... The virtual world is different. It is composed of information rather than matter."
-Donath, Judith S. (1999). "Identity and deception in the virtual community", Communities in Cyberspace
I consider it an honor to be trolled by Bruce, so troll away. BTM on the other hand is close to getting slapped around with a giant trout *
*Seriously Brian, prepare for holy hell the next time there's a genetics/IQ thread
*Seriously Brian, prepare for holy hell the next time there's a genetics/IQ thread
Biologists study matter (frogs are made of matter), its motion through space and time (frogs move through space and time), along with related concepts such as energy (frogs need energy to live) and force (they need force to flick their tongues out and eat flies or whatever). Biologists are therefore physicists. Is this specious or not specious?
That's one model, but it's not the model that I stated in the previous remark which you said was reasonable. According to that model, the notion that laws having had codifier is an illusion is not reasonable.
Wrong. All notions are illusions, and all perceptions are illusions. They aren't the real thing.
That's not in the definition, that's some further wobbly commentary that doesn't appear in the definition. The definition of physics is "the study of matter[6] and its motion through space and time, along with related concepts such as energy and force." People who study frogs study all these things, they are not only physicists, the study of frogs is physics, case closed.
There are physicists who will say that chemistry is just a branch of physics, and biology is just a branch of chemistry, therefore biology is just a branch of physics.
Notions are illusions of what? Is the notion of an illusion an illusion?
A notion is an illusion of whatever thing out in the world you have a notion about. It may or may not exist, but regardless, we don't experience the thing, we experience the notion of the thing which is an illusion. Illusion of an illusion doesn't really compute since the initial illusion isn't a thing i the real world.
Well we can go back and forth on this again, but we will not get anywhere. The person on the forum who knows this topic best is Philo, although I don't remember what his own view is. The most palatable solution is to say personal identity is an illusion, that there's really no sense in which you are the same person over time (what chezlaw argued for in that thread), so there's really nothing at stake if you get cloned/copied/gradually replaced, and so on. But it's a hard illusion to shake.
...
...
While the claim there is NO SENSE in which you are the same person over time might turn out to be false (it certainly feels wrong), that we are the same person in a legal sense is pointless to this discussion. It is simply a practical way to keep things straight today and would be useless in the event our perfect clone were created. So can we get back on track and try and think of a different sense in which we are the same person over time, trying to keep it relevant to the topic? How about in a concious/self-aware sense?
The notion that an object is an illusion is either true or false, it is not itself an illusion. The notion that laws have codifiers is not an illusion, it is either true or false. You said it's reasonable to have a model that laws have codifiers, and you were right.
If you think that numbers are non-physical, you can say that cashiers deal in non-physical aspects. But that numbers are non-physical is not in itself a metaphysical aspect. We can see that because the thesis 'numbers are non-physical' and the thesis 'numbers are not non-physical' are both metaphysical theses; and we don't say dealing in paper slips is a metaphysical aspect. The cashier would have to be dealing with metaphysical theses to be dealing with metaphysical aspects.
You can say that ghostbusters deal with metaphysical aspects, if you think that ghostbusters bust real ghosts, which are taken to be supernatural; that would be consistent with the non-philosophical sense of 'metaphysical'. But you can't say that ghostbusters deal with metaphysical aspects in the philosophical sense, because ghostbusters don't deal with the study of a specific set of philosophical questions.
That an object exists is true or false (leaving aside the objections of constructivists for now). That laws have codifiers is true or false. But the notion or model of an object existing or codifiers existing is always an illusion because we don't experience those objects and codifiers directly, but only the illusion of those things that exist in our minds. Illusion may not be the best word as it isn't meant to imply a falsehood.
ROLF, okay so this is where the disagreement began way back on page one, and it has been rolling down a mountain of **** since.... so much so, nobody is chipping in anymore but you guys. We were getting pretty interesting comments from the likes of Masque and others, but now even the OP has abandoned this thread.
While the claim there is NO SENSE in which you are the same person over time might turn out to be false (it certainly feels wrong), that we are the same person in a legal sense is pointless to this discussion. It is simply a practical way to keep things straight today and would be useless in the event our perfect clone were created. So can we get back on track and try and think of a different sense in which we are the same person over time, trying to keep it relevant to the topic? How about in a concious/self-aware sense?
While the claim there is NO SENSE in which you are the same person over time might turn out to be false (it certainly feels wrong), that we are the same person in a legal sense is pointless to this discussion. It is simply a practical way to keep things straight today and would be useless in the event our perfect clone were created. So can we get back on track and try and think of a different sense in which we are the same person over time, trying to keep it relevant to the topic? How about in a concious/self-aware sense?
* He started it
ROLF, okay so this is where the disagreement began way back on page one, and it has been rolling down a mountain of **** since.... so much so, nobody is chipping in anymore but you guys. We were getting pretty interesting comments from the likes of Masque and others, but now even the OP has abandoned this thread.
While the claim there is NO SENSE in which you are the same person over time might turn out to be false (it certainly feels wrong), that we are the same person in a legal sense is pointless to this discussion. It is simply a practical way to keep things straight today and would be useless in the event our perfect clone were created. So can we get back on track and try and think of a different sense in which we are the same person over time, trying to keep it relevant to the topic? How about in a concious/self-aware sense?
While the claim there is NO SENSE in which you are the same person over time might turn out to be false (it certainly feels wrong), that we are the same person in a legal sense is pointless to this discussion. It is simply a practical way to keep things straight today and would be useless in the event our perfect clone were created. So can we get back on track and try and think of a different sense in which we are the same person over time, trying to keep it relevant to the topic? How about in a concious/self-aware sense?
As to what happens when you create a clone, I really don't see the problem. If you believe that we are nothing but an arrangement of atoms, and you duplicate that arrangement of atoms, then you have 2 people with identical arrangements of atoms who both think they have the same identity until informed differently. If you destroy the original as in teleportation, then there should be no important difference between the new copy you create and the old copy any more than if all of those atoms had been replaced as they are anyway in about 7 years, save for the changes that would have occurred naturally. If you think we're more than just an arrangement of atoms, i.e., we have a soul, and you don't copy that soul, then you'll just end up killing someone and creating a lifeless pile of atoms. If you won't get into that machine, then you're not an atheist. Next topic.
A few things.* 1) He started it, 2) I hope he comes around because he may have an interesting and sophisticated conceptual approach to identity because he's smarter than all of us 3) He started it 4) Nobody else really has much else to say, this is an intractable problem 5) He started it.
* He started it
* He started it
If 2) is true, it would be great to see this approach. While I agree the problem appears intractable, I think there are many approaches we have yet to explore. For example, I've pointed out a couple times now we wouldn't have this problem at all if we could successfully make this clone while simultaneously keeping a connection between the two. Then they would/could/should? be considered one person, and terminating the original would not kill you.
So, if that is true, then is this connection really necessary or not? The more I think about your original statement that there is no (relevant) sense in which we are the same person over time, I'm not able to find one and am starting to think that might be an accurate statement... not that I'm willing to find out personally.
As to what happens when you create a clone, I really don't see the problem. If you believe that we are nothing but an arrangement of atoms, and you duplicate that arrangement of atoms, then you have 2 people with identical arrangements of atoms who both think they have the same identity until informed differently. If you destroy the original as in teleportation, then there should be no important difference between the new copy you create and the old copy any more than if all of those atoms had been replaced as they are anyway in about 7 years, save for the changes that would have occurred naturally. If you think we're more than just an arrangement of atoms, i.e., we have a soul, and you don't copy that soul, then you'll just end up killing someone and creating a lifeless pile of atoms*. If you won't get into that machine, then you're not an atheist. Next topic.
That's interesting. So, if we let both you and your clone live, you are initially the same person, but due to separate experiences quickly become separate identities, you and someone very much like you. If we destroy you a few minutes later, I suppose we have killed you.
You (original) would be okay with being destroyed immediately, but how about a few minutes later?
Edit: * missed the bolded. I think we are all assuming a living clone is created, just questioning if it is really you.
What if the MWI (many-worlds interpretation) is true?
No. I am pretty sure it is a descriptive ratio thingy.
The components aren't you. A raindrop is not a hurricane.
The only sensible way of thinking about a smrk2 is as a whole thing.
Yasser doesn't exist as a properly working person.
That we place a hard line between his rotting body and what a properly functioning Yasser is does not create
a really difficult differentiation. It is a useful falsehood to say "he is dead" for funeral purposes. It keeps us from burying the wrong body.
After the components are done being me, there will be no me.
The only sensible way of thinking about a smrk2 is as a whole thing.
Yasser Arafat is dead. Yasser Arafat is not alive. It is not the case that Yasser Arafat lives. Are any of these statements true? Are they false, are they neither true nor false? What's your best effort to capture the mortal status of Yasser Arafat?
That we place a hard line between his rotting body and what a properly functioning Yasser is does not create
a really difficult differentiation. It is a useful falsehood to say "he is dead" for funeral purposes. It keeps us from burying the wrong body.
That's interesting. So, if we let both you and your clone live, you are initially the same person, but due to separate experiences quickly become separate identities, you and someone very much like you. If we destroy you a few minutes later, I suppose we have killed you.
You (original) would be okay with being destroyed immediately, but how about a few minutes later?
Edit: * missed the bolded. I think we are all assuming a living clone is created, just questioning if it is really you.
You (original) would be okay with being destroyed immediately, but how about a few minutes later?
Edit: * missed the bolded. I think we are all assuming a living clone is created, just questioning if it is really you.
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