So, a while back I was browsing through
Social Theory and the Politics of Identity, a collection of articles from 1994, i.e. the last time when "PC" and "identity politics" was all the rage.
I agree with you that many/most complaints on these topics from the right are merely reassertions of the "hidden baseline assumption that white christian conservative male identity is the default", but if you're looking for something like a definition and a criticism of "identity politics" that holds up somewhat better, Todd Gitlin contributed an article to that volume, a shorter version of which also appeared in
Harper's Magazine. I don't entirely agree with Gitlin but I think he provides at least an outline of a definition and a criticism that might be taken somewhat seriously:
Quote:
Instead, the left in recent years has had trouble going beyond what has come to be called “identity politics”–a politics that is rooted more in group self-assertion than in attempts to create broad alliances. Of course, oppressed groups must always struggle to overcome their second-class status; equality demands no less. But what began in the late 1960s as an assertion of dignity by various groups, a remedy for exclusion and denigration and a demand by the voiceless for representation, has developed its own habits and methods of silencing. At the extreme, in the academy but also outside it, standards and traditions are now viewed as nothing more than camouflage for particular interests.
All claims to knowledge are presumed to be addressed from and to "subject positions" which, liek the claims themselves, have been "constructed" or "invented" collectively by self-designated groups. Sooner or later, all disputes issue in propositions of the following sort: The central subject for understanding is the difference between X (e.g., women, people of color) and Y (e.g. white males). P is the case because my people, X, see it that way; if you don't agree with P, it is (or more mildly, is probably) because you are a member of Y.... [note: I took this section from the book version since I think it makes the argument more strongly --WN]
The intensification of identity politics is inseparable from a fragmentation of what I will call “commonality politics”–a frame of understanding that acknowledges “difference” but sees it against the background of what is not different, what is shared among groups....
The left’s attention is now paid to group self-assertion rather than, say, campaigns against poverty or the bankrupting of public education. As once-excluded territories have been recognized in the academy, any lingering aspiration for the universal has been largely abandoned. Whatever universalism now remains is based not so much on a common humanity as on a common enemy -- the notorious White Male. While defenses of group rights often have a powerful logic, the idea of a common America and the idea of a unified left, both great legacies of the Enlightenment, have lost their force.
So, in the Harper's version of this article he doesn't exactly define identity politics, but inasmuch as he's criticizing it, his criticism is that it involves doing politics in a way that is too focused on "group self-assertion", and not focused enough on coalition building and a pragmatic focus on policy.
He also criticizes -- in the section I took from the book instead of Harpers -- the sort of epistemology or logic of settling the truth of propositions by appeal to group membership, which I think is a common complaint. He also argues that the logic of this sort of assertion ends up re-essentializing group differences in a problematic way.
I think the most obvious rebuttal to Gitlin is the one you already made: that conservative groups are often engaged as much in "group self-assertion", especially on culture-wars topics, as liberal groups. And that was probably as true in 1994 (I'm thinking of the "moral majority") as it is now.
Craig Calhoun, in the first chapter of the book, makes the argument that collective identity is and always has been of central importance to all politics, so that the idea that there is a politics that isn't "identity politics" is already hopelessly flawed. I tend to agree with that, but it doesn't mean that there aren't more or less useful ways of thinking about group identity in relation to political and social movements.