Hey Will,
there seems to be a mistake in example 4 (p. 305-306) that still has not been fixed. Or I am just not understanding it correctly.

The solution says that BB will bet 3/4p with 253 of 447 combos, which comes out to 59%. Then, in the next paragraph you say that BB's 3bb bet is the most common bet. You only listed a few combos (such as bottom pairs) that would bet 3bb. The paragraph finishes off by saying that BB leads 3bb with over half his range.
So what's the correct solution and what are the correct ranges for the BB?

Hi Will

I am hoping you are still willing to answer questions on the book since i have only gotten to reading it now.

I think it is page 250 or 251, structuring the indifference equations:

"at Hc:
EvBB(fold hc) = EVBB(call hc)

S=(S-B) + (2B+P) ( hb/(hb+1-hv)
"

I just cant grasp how this came about:
I understand "S" since BB left with S when he folds;
I understand "(S-B)" when BB calls and loses the pot.
I dont understand where the rest comes from --- why is it not (for the last part):
"(2B+P)(% SB bluffs)"
Where %SB bluffs would be ??

Thanks in advance

I'm not Will, but maybe I can help anyway.

The % of SB's betting range that are bluffs is hb/(hb + 1 - hv). Here's a line of SB's hands varying in strength from 0 to 1:



The length of the first segment (his bluffs) is (hb - 0) = hb. The length of the second segment (his value bets) is (1 - hv). So the total length of hands he's betting is hb + (1 - hv) and the proportion of his bets that are bluffs is hb/(hb + (1 - hv)).

CREV for the game trees and Poker Ranger for equity distribution graphs works well for me.

Thanks alot Bmart91, i understand now!!


(in the same section @ hb)
EVsb(bet hb) = EVsb (check hb)

1."(S-B)" - this is for when the SB checks back with his hand hb (but it does win some of the time... So why is it not (S-B)(EQsb(hb)) ??
and why is "hc(B+P)" Not "hc(B+S+P)" his stack plus his bet plus what is in the pot ?

I think you have it backwards. The (S-B) term is for betting, not checking.



It's hc(B + P) rather than hc(B + S + P) because out stack is already accounted for in the (S - B) term. After betting, we have (S - B) in our stack and there's (B + P) in the pot. Then when the BB folds - which happens hc of the time - we add (B + P) to our (S - B) stack.

i would consider myself decent at math but i always struggled with equations would i have difficulty digesting information without maybe learning the equations correctly?

im tempted to go through the whole review pages to maybe see your breakdown of some equations.

Hi all,

For my first post here, I'd like to ask Will to clarify for me one or two points I have when reading Expert HUNL Volume 1.
My first questions are on balance (page 59, §2.3.1), a subject on which I'm struggling a bit.
You say that balance refers to 2 related properties of strategies:

• they imply playing multiple different hands the same way. For example (my sentence), in my range of, say, check-call, I will have some made hands (top air or second pair) and also air. Right ?

• they also imply playing a single hand multiple different ways. For example (my sentence), AK will be 30% of the time played in a check-call line, and the other remaining 70% played in a check-raise line.
  That is to say that, in the same situation with the same opponent on the same flop, when repeated one hundred time, 30 will be played check-call and 70 check-raise. Right ?

I have also some comments on the Equilibration exercice of § 2.2.3 (page 46). First of all, hero's range on page 48 is 42 combos (not 45), just a detail. But my main point is on page 51.
I've run some simulations with "cardrunnersEV" latest beta software and also with "simple postflop" free software and both of them tell me that, on iteration 4 and at equilibrium , Villain calls with 65 combos:
and not 98 ones.
Strangely enough, neither cardrunnersEV nor simple postflop does not give the resulting value of the game, but I doubt it will be 90.8 BB for Hero. Am I right for the calling range or did I entered wrong numbers in those software ?

Thanks for your attention

Man, totally enjoyed the first 3/4 of this book. Now that I'm at section 7...something is really off. The graphs have become almost impossible to really make sense of and ideas stated are completely without examples and everything just seems rushed. Hoping some things start coming together but leading up to river situations was quite understandable. Not sure if I just missed something or if author had to speedily finish the book. *I'm a bit rusty with equations and graphs but have completed college level calculus and have previous knowledge of gto practices etc.

What I love about this book is the "You should now"-section in every chapter. If you check these again, then you will find out that you basically learned nothing, at least nothing of actual value. There is not a single rule of what to do or not to do, that you could incorporate into your own game. 336p of straight air. Nice hand!

"You should now" know how you can lose $25 to a guy without having ever played a single hand against him.

After rereading the first half of this chapter and really concentrating on the examples and corresponding eq distributions, I believe I got a better handle on it all. This latter half of the book def requires a bit more concentration from the reader.

Hi,

I just bought this book, but there's something I don't understand regarding the optimal betsizing B*formula : which Equity should be used in the formula?

a/ Equity of Hero's betting range (value+bluffs) versus Villain's whole range?
b/ Equity of Hero's Value betting range versus Villain's whole range?
c/ Equity of Hero's betting range (value+bluffs) versus Villain's calling range?
d/ Equity of Hero's Value betting range versus Villain's calling range?

thanks for your help Will

Hi there, would this serie be useful for a plo player?

Would it worth it to read it if we are playing just plo?

Thanks in advanced

Hi

Is there an audiobook available for this and/or volume 2?

Don't think so, mate. There are many images in the book, so merely listening to the audio of the written part alone wouldn't make much sense.

Cheers for the answer.

I had bought the book previously but gave it away as find sitting down to read quite hard. Thought listening might work out better

Kindle version from Amazon not available anymore?

Hi,

sorry for my english, but english isnt my native language.

I´ve tried to do the equilibrium exercise. I ´ve understood the concept, but when i ´ve tried it out with pokerranger, something interesting happened, and i don´t understand it.

On page 51 in the book it shows, that if Hero starts to add bluffs in his range, because Villain folds a lot, Hero´s EV increases. When i start to add bluffs in my range, my EV decreases (and i give Villain also a foldingrange). Where could be my mistake? I dont understand it

On page 51 at itiration 4 it sais, that Hero gains 90.8 bb with his shove.On page 53 on the top they explain, that Hero wins on average in 55% of the time 101.5bb with his bluffs, and on on the other 45% of the time he wins on average 0.55x101.5 =55.8bb. How add this up to 90.8bb???

Sorry for asking this, but i am a noob yet

Might somebody please help me? Thanks in Advance!

Zoty

Calculus is needed to understand this book?

Nope

Equilibration Exercise

Hero’s Range on page 48 contains 42 combos and not 45.
When getting to Iteration 4 which is also the optimal solution for Villain Tipton arrives at a range which contains 98 combos total. This is incorrect, the range you arrive at contains 65 combos.

It was shown on page 53 that villain needs a hand with at least 32.3% equity to justify a call. On page 51 we see KsKc in the small blind calling range. KsKc only has 28.9% equity vs Big Blinds range on page 48. None of the KK or QQ hands should be in the optimal calling range.

The correct 65 combo optimal calling range is:

KJs, QJs, JJ, JTo, J9o, J8o, J7o, J6o, J5o, J4o, JTs, J9s, J8s, J7s, J6s, J5s, J4s, J3s, J2s, 66, 33

excluding the combos which conflict with the board.

The expectation for Hero at the equilibrium is approximately 92.68 BB

I figured it out. The way the range is written is QsTs - Qs6s , both myself and 3 other posters in this forum read it as QsTs , Qs6s giving us 42 combos. but when you add the other 3 you get 45 combos. This gives 45 combos and all the rest of the results correct.

If the other two users see this, that is why we are all arriving at the correct incorrect result. It was the way we read it.

I just did so many iterations all correct but incorrect. I am good on the iteration stuff now....

hi guys, I don't know if this thread is still active, I hope so. Reading this amazing book I got stuck at one point in chapter 7.3.2 (p248), where it deals with the River bet-or-check decision for the SB.
No problems at all concerning the symmetric distribution (i.e. when EQSB(hv)=hv), but when it goes to the asymmetric distribution all appears very clear but in applying those concepts I find meaningless solutions. Precisely, I am referring to the part where the author says that the relative strenght of the ranges changes a lot the frequencies. So I ask myself why, if it's the relative strenght what matters, in the formula (7.3) appears EQSB(hv) as a relevant variable while hv doesn't appear at all. From this (surely wrong) point of view something strange is going on there, and the situations gets even stranger when I try to find the cutoff calling hand (hc) from that same equation (7.3), procedure appearently suggested from the author itself in the next page ("The weakest value-betting hand in a spot is something many players seem to have good intuition about. Once we know this, we can immediately find Villain's calling cutoff through Equation 7.3."). What happens trying to solve the equation (7.3) for the variable hc, is that the result (given by a calculator, no human mistakes involved ) is hc = 2(EQSB(hv)) - 1 ; and after experiencing the joy of seeing a very simple solution, i realized it was perhaps too much simple (!), lacking at least two obvious important variables : P (the pot size) and B (the Bet size). How can Villain's calling frequency be indipendent of the Bet and Pot size ? Clearly something was wrong in this previous reasoning.
Something else that further makes me believe I didn't get at all that passage is that for what I understood hc should be to solution of two indifference equations ; that's to say hc has to make both Hero's best bluffing hand (hb) and Hero's worst value hand (hv) indifferent between checking and betting, and so I expected a system of equations to be used to find hc, but if do there's no warranty I get consistend results from the individual equations.
In short, and to anyone so kind to try to help me I really apologize for the lenght of this post, I'm not able to find Villain's calling frequency (1-hc) and neither Hero's GTO valuebetting frequency (1-hv) when Hero is IP.
Let me know how did you get right that passage

I found this issue some time ago but never found a satisfactory answer. There is definitely something weird with this section. Unless the author shows up I think we will probably never know.

https://forumserver.twoplustwo.com/1...k-game-1584194

I'm kind of (selfishly) pleasant to see that someone has found the same issue . Listen I'm trying other routes to the solution and decided to deal first with the problem of the single optimal bet size in that spot --who knows maybe solving that would help us find the solution for Villain's calling frequency. I'm referring to pag.261 in the same chapter (7.3.2), when the author tells us that the single optimal bet size in this bet-or-check game from SB is a PSB (for symmetric distributions). I was trying to formulate an equation that would give that result, in order to find the optimal bet size in different spots.
The plan is to (1) find the EV of the game for SB ad a function of the Bet Size (better the fraction of the pot bet) ; (2) find the absolute maximum of that function.
I'm getting started with point (1), and after having found the EV for each of the three parts of SB's range (value-betting, bluffing and checking) I should now weigh these factors for the frequency each of the three choises is made. I don't know if you have found any problem in doing this, but I'm stuck at this point because I don't find a way to get the value-betting frequency (1-hv) as a function of the bet size (the other two frequencies would be easily calculated once hv is known). We agree I believe that the EV of (value-)betting in that spot is :
EVbet= (hc)(S+P)+(1-hc)((S+P+B)EQ+(S-B)(1-EQ))
where EQ is the equity of the valuebetting range when called
But what about this variable (i.e. EQ)? How do we know its value without knowing the exact betting and calling range (that are exactly what we are trying to find)? For we have to put some numerical value because we don't know its relation with the Bet Size (to return to the main problem of formulating the EV of the game as a function of B).
One attempt I've made is to set the inequality EVbet>EVcheck and solving that for EQ :
EVbet> EVcheck
(S+P)hc+(1-hc)((S+P+B)EQb+(S-B)(1-EQb))>(S+P)EQc+S(1-EQc)
where EQb is the previous EQ and and EQc is SB's Equity when he checks back. According to wolframalpha the result is :
EQb > (B (hc - 1) + P (hc - EQc))/((hc - 1) (2 B + P))
but this solution still leaves us with a variable we are not likely to know (EQc). Any idea ? Or should we wait for the Lord's coming (Will Tipton) ?