Quote:
Originally Posted by SplawnDarts
This explanation fails to grasp the nature of the situation, The CDS index position was a market long (ie. it increased in value when the default risk (and thus yields) fell and bond prices rose).
The bond position it was supposedly hedging (which almost certainly doesn't exist)...The situation would have been very different if JPM was buying insurance as you imply instead of selling it.
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You have no idea what you are talking about. At all.
They had a very long position in CDS of HY firms and the HY index [and assorted tranches]. This position was profitable last year and made them ~$500m in 2011. {Notice how the p/l always looks worse if you discount all the profits on a trade}
They then decided to hedge [for some reason] their protective position in the CDX.NA.HY by selling protection in the IG.9 index. The rationale [seemingly] being that if overall corp credit got worse, they would make more on HY continuing to file BK as when they won on Kodak and AA and Dynegy.
And if junk credits improved, and the value of their CDS fell, that would be mitigated by gains on the IG.9, after all, it's fairly unlikely for junk bonds to rally while I-grade falls.
It's the only thing that makes sense of the facts, AND fits with their previous commentary on their portfolio in London. It was not a bullish bet on the markets. If that was their view,
they wouldn't have needed to buy all that protection on the HY series.
Of course, none of this is to excuse either the oversized loss,
poor risk modeling, foolish sizing, messing with VaR inputs, possibly hiding of bad news from upper mgmt in london, or cavalier response by CEO to earlier questions last month. And they didn't consider their lack of options when it came time to rebalance their hedges [as noted in the FT] which may have been the real problem that caused the losses - [at some point you have to roll these trades or you get both tenor and single-name mismatches as certain names fall out of the Index.]
But it was not 'prop trading.' Their $360Bn asset/liability mismatch on the loan book
has to be hedged synthetically somehow - the IR, the convexity, the basis risks, et al.
Otherwise, OMG!!! Dimon is long & super-levered credit-risk and macro-risk hed asplode call the NYT he's...he's...spec-u-lating with gubmint mobnies! Or something.
Esp given that both Dimon & CFO categorically and publicly stated otherwise, [and I'm fairly certain lying about this stuff is punishable by jail time even before D-F or Volcker rules go into effect.]
The goal is
always to hedge your risks with the cheapest, effective insurance possible. JPM got it badly wrong, but that doesn't make it 'prop.' The odds that Drew and Iksil were doing a 1-way directional bet are probably < 1%.
Finally, given that 99% of all CDS/Index trades are reported to DTC-C, regulators could have seen what was going on any time they wished, esp since everyone knew that Iksil - The Whale - was the one moving the markets.
That's one reason the idiot politicos are making so much noise over this - they already *HAD* all the info they needed about what JPM was doing, but, just like Madoff, failed to provide any actual oversight.