A bias and ignorant view of China from an American citizen. The Chinese did invent gunpowder, ice cream, and printing. China was the pinnacle of civilization through out human history, it was only after around the Opium war did we start to fall, the last 200 years was probably China's toughest, we went through the Opium War, Colonial Agression, Japanese Invasion x2, WWII, Cultural Revolution.

When you think of children in general, the West raise dominant children that are friecely compeitive especially in sports, but in Asia, especially China, it is quite opposite. Docile children are rewarded while dominant disobedients are punished. European society and economy is based on innovation and military agression. Not really gonna happen in China or Asia because we are quite confined by family values, political system, etc etc.

China is a terrific history and culture. I think at the viewpoint we are at now looking back the difference is that there has never been a peak point of China's world dominance. Rome was the most dominant force in the world for centuries, but for the last 1600 years game over.

Many European states like France, England had there day in the sun after the Roman Empire fell but have not stood the 1000 year plus test like China.

When it comes to an advanced culture that has stood the test of time and continuing to advance as a power, it is difficult to not include China as one of the greatest civilizations period. Not for it's peak world dominance, but it's consistency as an advanced culture over thousands of years.

Sure China was not a dominant power in the 20th century, but like many periods in the past it has a vast history the has stood the test of time.

America's run as a power is a blip on the radar screen compared to China.

If you got in to a time machine and went to China 400 years ago most people would probably be impressed by the advanced culture. North America? Not so much, even giving all do respect to native American's.

"In the world" may also be overstated. Certainly Rome was the most formidable force anywhere West of Mesopotamia (the Romans were never able to get the drop on the Parthians or Sasanids), but remember that the height of Rome overlapped with the more populous, more urbanized, and wealthier Qin/Han Empire of China until the early 3rd century, when both empires entered a protracted decline/gradual breakup (for reasons that may be similar).

It would be an interesting historical "what if" had these empires been closer together what a diplomatic relationship or military conflict would have looked like. They of course did still have economic dealings, as Roman glassware and silver was exchanged for Chinese silk and porcelain, mostly through Persian intermediaries (the Persians reportedly even deceptively forestalled a Chinese mission to Rome for fear that they might try to set up a direct trade route bypassing Persia).

Population clearly would be the wild card factor in this historical "what if" you suggest. Like the Russian's in WWII who had more man power to throw against the German's, across a vast continent. You could say the same for Napoleon against the Russian's as well. This is the one factor that would make this potential matchup close.

That said I think in a direct conflict against a Roman Council like Pompeii, Sulla or Cesar I would take the Roman's hands down. It took until the early 13th century with Genghis Khan and the Mongols before there is significant historical evidence the there was a force in the east strong enough since the Alexander the Great era, to dominate any area they basically would be willing to spend the resources to defeat. It's one thing to have the potential but another to have the willingness, technology and capability.

Genghis Khan and the Mongols may have been the greatest dominant power in history. But the Mongols advance happened several hundred years after the Fall of Rome. It would be easy to argue Europe basically stood still or hardly advanced at all militarily in that period. While at the same time eastern culture and military capability continued to steadily evolve. The east fell behind the west after Alexander, caught up and past the west at some point in the dark ages. Before falling behind again in more recent times.

But at it's peak power I think Rome had the will, technology and military capability to defeat any potential opponent they set there sites on.

Sun Tzu's wisdom would not have been enough to overcome the tactics discipline and will to dominate of the Roman legions. The biggest weakness of the Roman's was it's willingness to fight amongst itself but focused on a external target I would not bet against the Roman's at there peak.

Fast forward several hundred years and I would say the same about the Mongols. The knock on the Mongols is the same on the Greeks with Alexander, once great the leader died the decline was immediate. Although Alexander's father may have been a even better military leader then his son.

LOL I was bored terribly by The Ascent of Money: A Financial History of the World. Another Ferguson gem. A topic I was very interested in but the presentation was so dry.

Unlike Against the Gods: The Remarkable Story of Risk by Peter Bernstein which was phenomenal.

I love your posting around here. Being a history buff I can't believe it took me this long to stumble on the board.

Well, I'm hardly an expert on China (my specialization was largely on Tudor/Stuart England and Early Modern to Modern Intellectual History), but I imagine there are a few Sinologists who might dispute this premise. As you point out, China had produced a number of military geniuses like Sun Tzu and Qin Shihuang, and certainly the Han army was no slouch (nor were their clients and sometime rivals, the Xiongnu), but whether they had military generals on footing with Caesar is hard to speculate on. One advantage the West has in the study of history is a wider library of sources from this era to draw on, at least ones widely accessible. I'm withholding judgment on this one.

Now this I would dispute. Though there would not be a united Mongol Empire after Genghis Khan's death, there was still a functioning system of allied/sometimes rival Mongol States that brought an immense stability to Central Asia for the better part of the 13th and 14th centuries. This was the era of the "Golden Horde," that set the stage for a strong Russian State emerging during the Renaissance, the Il-Khanate that partly gave rise to the later Ottoman, Safavid, and Mughal Empires, and of course the Yuan Dynasty of China under Kubilai Khan and his successors. These Mongol States created an enormous flow of goods (and critical technologies) from East to West, and brought Europe into direct contact with East Asia for the first time in history. This system of states did not collapse until the rise of the Black Death in the 1340s, and the victory of the Ming over the weakened Yuan Dynasty in 1368.

Indeed. Though had Ferguson stuck to his area of expertise (economic history), I think he would have been far better served. The major problem with his stab at Civilization is that it more of less recycles Max Weber's "Protestant work ethic" claptrap and ex post facto rationalizations of the last century. This is not new, as conservative historians have been seeking for the better part of the last three decades to "take back" history from the "multiculturalists" (which, near as I can tell, encompasses anyone who doesn't think Europe and America have a monopoly on successful ideas an inventions), though certainly Ferguson tries to do it in pop, tech-savvy language by talking about "killer apps" and the like, but it's really not very original. He gives only superficial treatment to the "operating systems" (to extend his metaphor), and his analysis is almost entirely devoid of examinations of the "hardware" (ie geography, climate, ecology, etc).

His idea around "killer apps" is interesting, and yes it's important to acknowledge that cultural differences sometimes do cause societies to succeed or fail, but they are rarely the sole source of success or failure, and it's dangerous to make sweeping generalizations about "cultural values" over geographic blocs that encompass millions of individuals. Speaking of the language of "killer apps," he spends a lot of time talking about the success of the apps, with relatively little discussion of the "killer" part. Europeans certainly didn't rise to prominence primarily on the merit of their ideas. They did it by subduing, coercing, conquering, and exterminating anyone who got in their way. This is not to say there is anything particularly cruel about Europeans (the sack of Baghdad by the Mongols and the culling of local tribes by the Aztecs were certainly not picnics, just to give two examples). Rather, it's to point out that European conquest at a key phase in history, from 1500-1700, provided it (especially Britain and the Dutch) with the goods needed to create these "killer apps," and most of these goods came at the expense of peoples in the Americas (dead Natives, especially via diseases that no individual European had control over) and Africa (via the devastating and titanic effects of the Atlantic slave trade). Is it any wonder the rest of the world tried to adopt these "killer apps"? What alternative models of modernity were there. It just seems a way of working backward from the conclusion.

To top it off, much of his work seems to contain a sniping, sarcastic, derisive tone when concerning non-European peoples, particularly Arabs. He also very oddly pairs (or hints at) the success of industry to the adoption of Christianity in foreign countries, but it comes off as a good old-fashioned British knock on Catholicism and Islam. One wonders how much of this tone was influenced by his wife, Ayaan Hirsi Ali, who has made her contempt for Arab and Islamic culture extremely clear (though in her life experiences, one can't entirely fault her for this). At base, it's not simply "non-PC" to suggest that Europe succeeded for primarily cultural reasons (the extent to which so-called "PC" attitudes exist in academic history, or higher education in general, is vastly exaggerated IMO), it's dangerous: it leads to the conclusion that Europeans must have simply been smarter, and that if other cultures fell behind, it's at base their fault, along with their "backward" cultural values. This is far too simplistic a view, and frankly irresponsible for an Ivy League historian.

On the other hand, you have much more straightforward geographic determinists like Ian Morris (maybe determinist is too harsh a word, but certainly he lends more credence to geography than cultural idiosyncracies). I think his account is better (I'm starting to dig into Why the West Rules... For Now in more detail), but there are some pretty serious problems, most notably his massive expansion in what he counts as the "Western core," that shifts around from the Near East, to the Mediterranean, back to the near East, to Northwestern Europe, to the Atlantic basin. While I agree that the Islamic World is more properly placed in "the West" (due to its adoption, like Europe, of Judaic monotheism and Greek philosophy) than "the East," I dispute the premise that these are particularly useful categories of analysis, particularly since he keeps the "Eastern core" primarily focused on China... the short treatment of India is a fairly major oversight, at least in my initial reading.

TL;DR, but my overall point is that history is full of paradoxes, none stranger than the balance between geographic determinism and cultural innovation. A truly groundbreaking work will have to create a thesis attempting to unite these disparate threads. I've yet to see it done convincingly in a single work; perhaps it can't be done.

I agree with your post above. But after Genghis Khan died it appears to me that the seeds to destruction of the empire were already sown unlike the Roman republic or other autocratic systems.

Genghis Khan died in 1227 - just sixteen years after he began his world conquest. With the exception of India and China, he had conquered everything he set his sites on. This made the Mongols a dominant power hard to find anything in the west to compare except the Roman Empire.

It would now be up to Genghis's sons and their children to finish what in the shortness of time Khan could not. The empire seems to have expanded more by the momentum of its founder's achievements, even after his death, than by the skill of his heirs.

Genghis Khan had always been careful not to give his children too much power, as he sought to break away from the traditional kin-based ties of the steppe in order to more smoothly run his empire. In mediating disputes involving his sons, he at times took the side of non-family members against them. Until late in his life, he appears to have neglected their training as leaders. The consequences of this became immediately apparent in the actions of his son, Ogodei.

But, even with sub par and occasionally strife-ridden leadership, the empire continued to expand. Some of the Mongol leaders to follow Genghis Khan were exceptional leaders, while others were not, but the combination of unbeatable virtues in the empire was fixed in a way that it hardly mattered in the first few decades after his death.

Nothing outside of the empire could stop it, only enduring struggles from within similar to the Roman's centuries before. Even as the empire began to split into four quadrants, trade and other imperial activities continued. Two Mongol rulers from separate quadrants could be at war with each other and still allow trade and investments between the sides to continue unmolested very rare. But eventually this relationship would break down, and when it did, it would spell the end of the empire.

True... although I've suggested to some people a somewhat controversial thesis that there never really was such a thing as a "Mongol Empire," simply Mongol dynasties in a number of other cultures. By and large, Mongol rulers adopted the styles and customs of the empires they conquered (though the Khans did smash previous systems of aristocratic privilege and sometimes institute reforms we'd consider downright progressive) rather than imposing their nomadic structure on new societies, preferring to leave that on the steppes. These dynasties were backed by the overwhelming force of that cavalry just over the horizon, and it could hold as long as they kept the commerce flowing, but when the Black Death destroyed the old networks, the conquered foes rose up and deposed their Mongol overlords, who returned to the steppe and resumed life much as it had been before the rise of the Great Khans. It's quite the intriguing tale.

Jack Weatherford wrote an interesting account of it fairly recently: Genghis Khan and the Making of the Modern World. He's an anthropologist, not a historian (and it sometimes shows in his treatment of the sources), but it's still a fairly in-depth and fascinating account from someone who's "lived life in the saddle" and is trying to "rehabilitate" Genghis Khan's legacy.

I have Weatherford's book in my Audible wish list. I do want listen to that book as it looks very interesting. Your post clearly compels me to move it up to the top of the list.

Ferguson's book will never make my wish list after your review and my experience with The Ascent of Money: A Financial History of the World.

Not this.

There were a bunch of factors that led to Europe's dominance; but it's important to remember that for most of history Europe wasn't dominant, at all.

The first factor is that trade across Europe is generally much easier than trade across Asia and the Middle East simply because of Europe's river systems.

The second factor was the Mongol invasions of the Muslim world. The Mongols destroyed a number of ancient Muslim centres of learning, but, more importantly, they connected Europe directly to the technological advances that were occurring in East Asia.

The third factor was the introduction of West Africa to Islam. West Africa has metric ****tons of gold. When West African kings/emperors would travel to Mecca for Hajj they brought with them a metric ****ton of gold. The most famous of these is Mansa Musa. Mansa Musa brought so much gold with him for Hajj that he inflated prices all throughout the Muslim world. This led to European merchants being able to bring large amounts of gold from the Muslim world back to Europe relatively cheaply, increasing their power and status over the nobles.

The fourth factor was a douchebag named Al-Ghazali, whose idiocy led to secular science being declared heretical.

The fifth was the discovery of the Americas, before which it could still be said that the Muslim world was more powerful than the Christian one.

And the final factor was the industrial revolution, which, it must be said, probably wouldn't even have occurred but for the Ottomans.

I don't know if I would be to quick to dismiss capitalism as a significant factor. From Rome to the USA the profit motive for individuals has been a large driver in "dominant" groups of people being successful.

China is a perfect example, until it embraced some qualities of capitalism in it's system it never hit it's stride again as world power. Capitalism is not the only way to become a dominant power, but it sure looks like a great system to try to foster the environment.

Partly, but I think ascribing the success to capitalism is sort of a confusion of cause and effect. Capitalism works because industry provides such a significant surplus, not the other way around. Clearly capitalism is (thus far) a superior means of industrial distribution to other kinds of economic organization, but capitalism came about as a result of industry, which is where the credit ultimately lies. Even before the adoption of Deng's reforms, China went through the most dramatic rise in standard of living in human history... as long as you weren't one of the unlucky ones to get caught up in Mao's purges/famines/genocide.

I would. Europe was clearly dominant well before capitalism was even a thought process. For most of Europes 'domination', mercantilism was the driving economic theory.

Conditions of relative political anarchy in Europe following the dark ages led to the development of capitalism and the rest was history. When I say relative political anarchy, of course i do not mean that Europe did not have a state (save Iceland, for a while) but rather it was divided into many local fiefdoms. This meant it was relatively easy to vote with your feet and things improved rapidly.

Capitalism had very little to do with Europe becoming dominant because for most of Europes history it wasn't capitalist. Trade was more commonplace amongst Muslim India than it was in Europe during the early years of the Renaissance. Europe became dominant because of numerous social, political and economic factors that happened to occur at the same time as when the Midde East was undergoing runaway inflation.

I think we ought to define our terms here. "Capitalism" when used in the historical sense, does not simply refer to the existence of a market or presence of an international trade network. Those have more or less always existed. Capitalism refers to a particular form of industrial organization, since it is capital, what Marx might have called "the means of production," that is the center of economic activity.

In that sense capitalism has never been unique to European society.

Excellent point. As we move closer to present times the term has taken a more narrow meaning.

I think there is general agreement a capitalism is an economic system that includes private ownership by more than a few, creation of goods or services for profit the accumulation of resources by more than an elite few, and competitive or semi completive markets, with voluntary exchange of goods.

Heard a new argument tonight on European supremacy. Went to a talk by Charles Mann, author of 1491 and the sequel 1493. We already know that when the potato reaches Europe from the Americas, it allows a large population increase. Mann takes it a step further, and says that due to food security, the governments are able to become strong enough to be imperialists. Periodic famines are hard on governmental authority, so the potato allows institutions to be more stable. Don't know how well he develops or proves this in the book 1493, but it's an interesting thought.

He makes a similar argument about the decline of China. The introduction of corn from the Americas allows fast new areas of China to be settled. Very hilly regions are heavily terraced and planted with corn, also sweet potato from Americas. This leads to vast amounts of erosion which change the nature of major rivers like the Yellow river. The way the sediment builds up, it makes whole river valleys very prone to catastrophic floods. He said to think a Katrina flood per month for 100 years, somewhere in China. And that helped destabilize the dynasty and allows a walk over by European imperialists. Don't know how significant the corn really was in governmental collapse, but very interesting.

Other crucial points: labor becomes a commodity. You sell your labor, rather than the food you grew or the baskets you wove.

Capital itself: the systematic creation of surplus wealth that must be reinvested or it vanishes. So capitalism is in constant crisis as it desperately searches for new outlets for all the capital it accumulates.

Very interesting thread, guys. I initially jumped to the Jared Diamond answer when I read the first post, then I saw it was the first answer to the thread. So, thinking about it a little bit more, there is a little incident that explains why Islam and the East weren't able to develop their huge knowledge edge in the middle ages into world hegemony.

The Mongols.

The Mongols didn't get around to conquering Europe, but they totally decimated two entire civilizations. Genghis Khan hated cities and liked to burn them to the ground and slaughter everyone who lived there. This set Islam and China back centuries, literally. So, that left Europe essentially unchecked to expand globally.

No, not really. The Khans liked cities just fine, and were happy to collect the income that they drew. They usually offered cities the choice to surrender, and were *relatively* merciful to those who submitted (relative since we're still talking about fairly brutal conquest here), but utterly merciless to those who resisted (like Baghdad). The Mongols never tore down Chinese cities in this way, and the Yuan Dynasty mostly conducted business as usual in China. The extent to which the Mongols "set back" China is almost certainly exaggerated, since it was they who opened up China to trade to a much larger extent than the preceding and succeeding dynasties. This was the highly-advanced court that Marco Polo visited, after all. I'd recommend looking at Jack Weatherford's Genghis Khan and the Making of the Modern World and/or Janet Abu-Lughod's Before European Hegemony for a couple fresh take on Genghis Khan and the Mongols, who probably take a little more heat than they deserve relative to their contemporaries.

The fate of the Islamic world is more complicated, and frankly tragic. Baghdad was brutally sacked (by Hulagu Khan, not Genghis Khan), destroying the cultural and intellectual center of the entire Near East. Though the city was rebuilt, the great libraries were burned, creating an incalculable loss for generations of Islamic scholars. Subsequent Islamic regimes south of Turkey became increasingly paranoid, skeptical, and reactionary toward outsiders, leading to a general decline of the Islamic world, especially during the key years of European ascendancy.

I would, however, agree that the collapse of the Eastern Mongol Empires helped set the stage for a rise in the West, partly because European merchants began searching for cheaper ways to acquire the goods they'd become accustomed to in the heyday of the Mongol trading system.

Interesting, but I'd have to dissent from this. Afaik, the Yellow River was known even in ancient times to be violent or unpredictable, hence its alternative name, "the river of sorrows." I think Mann does have a good point on a link between food production and the centralization of government (since a food surplus means less reliance on feudal lords), but there is also a corresponding change in military technology (ie gunpowder) that had the advantage of nullifying the traditional military advantages of the feudal aristocracy (this is what happened in the Middle East, allowing the creation of three strong, centralized states in the Ottomans, Safavids, and Mughals). So I'd argue it's a dual process. But in any case, the advantage conferred on Europe through the domination of the New World should not be underestimated. Two continents essentially emptied of their people (via conquest and especially disease), ripe for mineral extraction and the raising of cash crops is a huge advantage in both the short and long term.