I recently wrote this paper (for a graduate course) on the historical situations that have impacted gambling culture in America. I thought some on you in the community would enjoy. I'm relatively new to the forums so if there is a better place or format to post this, please let me know.
After discussing how gambling spread throughout America in the 1800s, I talk about how the ambiguity of the Wire Act left most gambling legislation in limbo, until the banhammer (UIGEA) was brought down in 2006. I lost steam by the end of the paper and don't go into too much analysis of the recent Frank/Menendez bills, but there are other threads dedicated to that. Consider this more a history lesson about the gambler and America's love/hate relationship to professional gamers.
Gambling in America: A Legislative History
Internet gambling revenue for offshore companies was estimated to be $5.9 billion in 2008 from players in the United States and $21.0 billion from players worldwide (American Gaming Association, 2009). These numbers highlight the growing phenomena of online gambling. With so much being invested in this industry how has the American public and its government responded? What is the best course of action to manage this burgeoning enterprise? What are the future implications of prohibiting versus regulating Internet gambling? Before we can answer these questions, we must first look at the historical events that have shaped gambling in America and its current online incarnation. The aim of this paper is to examine the historical elements that have influenced past U.S. gambling legislation in an attempt to gain insights into the effectiveness of current and future gambling laws with a specific focus on games played online.
By reviewing the past cultural record that surrounds gambling, one can see how public opinion often battles politics in an attempt to regulate social behavior. This paper also discusses how technology can, at times, disrupt cultural notions and force legislative bodies to rethink strategies aimed at managing public interest. Additional themes include the effects of political corruption, prohibition versus regulation, and the significance of historically unique moments in time.
Although the primary focus of this paper is to analyze the current legislative environment surrounding gambling over the Internet, an introduction to the history of gambling in the United States is necessary in creating a foundation for analyzing the cultural expectations that gambling policies should exhibit. Building upon the work of Nelson Rose (1991) who describes that gambling regulation in the United States’ history has undergone three waves, I argue that due to the advent of the Internet, we should consider a fourth wave that encompasses the mid-nineties to the modern day.
The notion of gambling is older than any historical record to date. Plenty of archaeological evidence supports the claim that almost every ancient culture practiced some form of betting or wagering. It’s not a difficult notion to accept that the competitive spirit within human nature can be enacted via games of chance and skill. Evidence also suggests that problematic gambling (i.e. pathological and addictive forms) has also accompanied gamblers throughout the historical record. By the 1600s, gambling as a professional trade was socially tolerable in most parts of Europe and these cultural habits emigrated to America with the early colonists.
According to Rose (1991), the First Wave of gambling in the U.S. spans from the 1600s to the mid-1800s. The earlier settlers represented two distinct camps: the Puritans and those who adhered to English traditions and beliefs. Although the Puritans came from England, they came to the new world to create a better society and discard the values of their mother country (Dunstan, 1997). The Puritan-led colonies initially adopted a prohibitive stance towards gambling and outlawed even the possession of gambling paraphernalia. Eventually “this stance was relaxed slightly … as to allow gaming as long as it was for innocent and moderate recreation and not as a trade or calling” (Dunstan, 1997). As we will see, this hostility towards professional gambling represents one side of the shifting public opinion in regards to American gamblers.
In contrast to the religious anti-gambling perspective, non-Puritan colonists “brought with them the view that gambling was … considered proper gentlemen's diversions” (Dunstan, 1997). This division in public opinion has shrouded the legislative history of gambling ever since. Conservatives who want to protect family values view gambling as a threat. Liberals contend that government intervention is unnecessary. Of course there are many other objections and supporting statements as to why the government should or shouldn’t get involved with someone’s choice to gamble, but as we will see, the prevailing sentiment is significantly influenced by historical situations.
In the case of the early colonies, the necessity for funding spawned a host of lotteries. English venture capitalists held lotteries to bring in investments, colonies established lotteries to raise revenue for public works, and Congress attempted to finance their war for independence. Not only did the increased presence of lotteries add an air of legitimacy to gambling, but according to some scholars, “playing the lottery became a civic responsibility” (Clotfelter and Cook, 1989) In addition to lotteries during this time period, informal wagers on horse racing became popular; but in the case of fledgling casino culture, “the relatively sparse population was a barrier to establishing gaming houses” (Dunstan, 1997).
As frontiersmen pushed west and south, they brought with them their spirit of adventure, opportunity, risk-taking, and of course gambling. This culture meshed well with those inhabitants among the Mississippi Valley. According to John Findlay (1986), “The south tended to have a more open attitude towards gaming, reflecting the Spanish, French, and early Virginian traditions.” Additionally, the technological achievements of mastering the Mississippi river invigorated gambling among the farmers, merchants, and passengers among riverboats as the waterway represented a major avenue of trade, commerce, and surplus cash.
Since the developing nation didn’t have any gambling statutes by the 1830s, the public enacted their own mob law just as gambling began to become viewed as negatively impacting local communities. In the South during this time, “the professional gamblers were blamed for limiting economic growth, interfering with business, endangering the streets, committing numerous crimes, and debasing the morality of the society. Vigilantism was one method by which the anti-professional gambler sentiment manifested itself” (Dunstan, 1997).
Anti-gambling sentiment was also growing nationally during the 1830s. There was always a group opposing gambling on moral grounds. This opposition was largely based on religious beliefs (Gabrielle and Brenner, 1991). Although there was strong sentiment to avoid interference with market forces, there was a countervailing view that people should behave in a virtuous way and that meant no gambling (Findlay, 1986). However, increasing evidence of fraud and dishonesty in the operations of lotteries added to the opposition (Clotfelter and Cook, 1989). In 1833 Pennsylvania, New York, and Massachusetts put an end to state authorized lotteries. By 1840, most states had banned lotteries (Dunstan, 1997).
In addition to the prohibition of lotteries, the Civil War and extension of railroads spelt the demise of the riverboat culture, which jeopardized the livelihood of American gambling. However, Rose’s (1991) so-called Second Wave was just beginning as the California gold rush set off a gambling boom in the mid-1800s. Similar to the frontier spirit of early America, western expansion into this area was symbolized by the risk-taking nature of its pioneers. Mining was a gamble but it represented an opportunity for great wealth. San Francisco soon replaced New Orleans as the center for gambling; and by 1850, California and its cities were licensing gambling establishments to raise money (Dunstan, 1997).
However, with more money came more problems. As with the rest of the United States, the desire for respectability and a recognition of the social ills tied to gaming led to limits on gambling (Dunstan, 1997). Most of the legislation that arose targeted the professional gambler. These initial laws were weak since they outlawed specific games, which made it difficult to enforce when new and unnamed variants were used. This important lesson was passed down to today’s lawmakers as more recent legislation attempts to categorize gambling by its type – ‘games of chance,’ ‘games of skill,’ or ‘sports contest’ – rather than by specific names. The initial prohibitive laws targeted those who ran the games, but eventually expanded to include the players as well. But it wasn’t until 1891, when “the statutes made the penalty for playing equal to the penalty for running the game” (Dunstan, 1997).
By 1910, virtually all forms of gambling were prohibited in the U.S. The feelings against gambling ran so strong that Arizona and New Mexico were forced to outlaw casinos to gain statehood (Rose, 1991). However, this era of prohibition would not last for long. Rose’s (1991) Third Wave reveals how transient public interest is during national calamity and how legislation will adapt to historical situations. This lesson is particularly pertinent in light of America’s current financial recession. The Third Wave began when the antigambling mood changed as tremendous financial distress gripped the country, especially after the stock market crash of 1929 (Dunstan, 1997).
Legalized gambling was looked upon as a way to stimulate the economy. Decriminalizing bingo was one of the first relief efforts to help organizations raise money. A resurgence of horse racing and pari-mutuel wagering began and with new laws and automated systems these games became more honest than their 1800s’ counterparts. Since prohibition drove gambling underground in the previous few decades, illegal gambling had remained prevalent up to this time. However, the backlash of these illegal operations swept reform candidates into New York and Chicago bent of cracking down illegal gambling (Dunstan, 1997). East coast mobsters fled west. While California continued to clear out gambling interests, Nevada moved to legalize most forms of gambling, ultimately creating a haven for crime syndicates who invested heavily in casinos. Las Vegas eventually emerged as the gambling headquarters of America.
During the 1950s, the Senate Committee to Investigate Organized Crime in Interstate Commerce held a number of hearings on criminal influence in the casino industry. The committee found widespread evidence of skimming, which sheltered gambling profits from taxes. The prevalence of crime left gaming once again on the verge of a national prohibition (Harris, 1994). Due to the committee’s findings and resulting criminal crackdown, the mob sold their casino interests to lawful individuals and publicly-traded companies (Dunstan, 1997). The government continued to be concerned with organized crime activities and a series of hearings throughout the 1950s-60s lead to the Organized Crime Control Act, the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act, and the Illegal Gambling Business Act among others. It was in 1961, however, that Congress enacts the Federal Wire Act to which we now turn our attention.
The intent of the Wire Act was to help law enforcement agencies, especially at the state level, fight organized crime. Its text states:
Whoever being engaged in the business of betting or wagering knowingly uses a wire communication facility for the transmission in interstate or foreign commerce of bets or wagers or information assisting in the placing of bets or wagers on any sporting event or contest, or for the transmission of a wire communication which entitles the recipient to receive money or credit as a result of bets or wagers, or for information assisting in the placing of bets or wagers, shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than two years, or both (Wire Act, 1961).
Several phrases from the above clause have caused confusion among the courts due to their ambiguities. The first confusion was who can fall under this violation. Currently, the phrase ‘engaged in the business of betting or wagering’ is most often interpreted to exclude casual bettors. It has been argued, even by congressmen during the debate on this bill, that “[t]his bill only gets after the bookmaker, the gambler who makes it his business to take bets or to lay off bets … It does not go after the causal gambler who bets $2 on a race. That type of transaction is not within the purvue of the statute” [United States v. Baborian, 528 F. Supp. 324, 328 (D.R.I. 1981) (quoting 107 Cong.Rec. 16,534 (1961)).]
A particularly debated phrase that added to the confusion over the clause is the interpretation of the wording ‘any sporting event or contest.’ Specifically at question is whether ‘sporting’ is intended to modify both ‘event’ and ‘contest.’ Since nowhere in the text is a ‘sporting event or contest’ defined, most courts have taken a narrow construction approach and limited the phrase to sports-related activities [See United States v. Bergland, 209 F. Supp. 547, 549-550 (E.D. Wis. 1962), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 861 (1963)]
When it comes to Internet gambling, the most important aspect within the Wire Act centers on the phrase, ‘a wire communication facility.’ The text defines it as, “[A]ny and all instrumentalities, personnel, and services (among other things, the receipt, forwarding, or delivery of communications) used or useful in the transmission of writings, signs, pictures, and sounds of all kinds by aid of wire, cable, or other like connection between the points of origin and reception of such transmission” (Wire Act, 1961). Debate swirls around the authors’ intentions of this bill, which was written decades prior to the Internet’s advent. Did they want to include any future communication technologies or just the telephony as they currently understood it? Some have pointed to section 1084(d) and its reference to ‘common carriers’ within the jurisdiction of the Federal Communications Commission to support the argument that ‘wire communication facility’ is limited to telephone companies (Rodefer, 2009).
Since the first online gambling site wasn’t launched until August 1995 (American Gaming Association, 2009), the debate over how the Wire Act pertains to Internet gambling is relatively a recent one. The time frame from the mid-1990s to the current day is what I introduce as the Fourth Wave. In 1996 the National Gambling Impact Study Commission Act was signed into law which established the National Gambling Impact Study Commission (Commission hereafter), “charged by Congress with a ‘very broad and very difficult task – to conduct a comprehensive legal and factual study of the social and economic implications of gambling in the United States’” (Commission, 1999). The process took two years, and the final report was published in 1999.
The Commission included a specific section devoted to Internet gambling in which they came to no clear conclusion, but rather harped on the uncertainty that the technology brought to the legal field. Mainly they asserted that the most likely law to invoke is the Wire Act, but simultaneously admitted that ‘wire communications’ may not apply to the World Wide Web that can employ satellite technology and other wireless technology. They also raised the issue that the statute does not clearly define gambling “contests” and if it should apply to non-sports betting such as Internet bingo, lotteries, or casino-style games. More poignantly, the Commission asked relevant but unanswered questions such as, “What are the legal jurisdictions when it comes to Internet gambling? Where are the bets and wagers actually taking place?” (Commission, 1999). Such questions were already covered for brick-and-mortar establishments but the new technology of the Internet had ushered in an unfamiliar domain.
Ultimately, the Commission decided to make sweeping conclusions about how to govern online gambling. In their words, “Thus, with only a few exceptions in areas such as the Internet, we agree that gambling is not a subject to be settled at the national level, but is more appropriately addressed at the state, tribal and local levels” (Commission, 1999). The Commission made four recommendations regarding Internet gambling: 1) the federal government should prohibit…Internet gambling not already authorized, 2) prohibit wire transfers to known Internet gambling sites or the banks who represent them, 3) prohibit states from permitting the expansion of gambling into homes…, and 4) the federal government should take steps to encourage foreign government not to harbor Internet gambling organizations that prey on U.S. citizens (Commission, 1999).
It seems that the authors’ limited understanding of cyberspace permitted them to treat the Internet as a unified jurisdiction capable to being encompassed by a national law, since any state would be hard pressed to enforce a law governing the de-centralized Internet’s transmissions across state lines. In addition to this lack of understanding of technology, the Commission failed to look to the past on how prohibition may affect society. Significant revenue streams would be missed and the activity would be driven underground, making it more susceptible to corruption and enticing for organized crime. The Commission defended their decision for three main reasons. First, in order to protect children from falling prey to online gambling there must be a national prohibition since there was no known acceptable way to ensure age verification online. Second, pathological gamblers would use the ease of accessible Internet sites to further their addiction. Third, criminal syndicates could employ money laundering operations through the gaming sites. Apparently the need to protect a few outweighed the rights of the many responsible users.
While the report focused on addressing both the social and economic situation regarding gambling, the only technological solutions in regards to Internet gambling they came up with were recommending enforcement strategies that targeted ISPs, credit card providers, money transfer agencies, and makers of wireless communication systems. In order to police the nebulous Internet, they planned on holding the financial facilitators responsible. This tactic of targeting intermediaries has become a common application of enforcing Internet laws since it takes the burden off federal resources.
Thanks in part to the Commission’s report, antigambling sentiment was reinvigorated on Capitol Hill. In 1999, Senator Bob Goodlatte introduced the Internet Gambling Prohibition Act (IGPA), which had strong support from Christian conservative groups and southern representatives. The Puritan ethic was rearing its head once again. The bill essentially outlawed any form of gambling online, with the exception of state authorized lotteries and horse or dog racing. However, the IGPA was not mean to be.
Even though the bill cleared the Senate and "appeared on its way to passage by an overwhelming margin in the House of Representatives," (Schmidt and Grimaldi, 2005) a small Internet lottery company from Connecticut decided to fund a campaign to intervene in the legislative process. Powerful lobbying efforts orchestrated by Jack Abramoff eventually scuttled the passage. These efforts employed a “win-at-any-cost strategy that went so far as to launch direct-mail attacks on vulnerable House conservatives” and included at one point, “circulat[ing] a forged letter of support from Florida Gov. Jeb Bush” (Schmidt and Grimaldi, 2005) After the $2 million pro-gambling campaign defeated the bill, several charities tied to Abramoff and his accomplices helped launder the money.
The defeat of the IGPA allowed online gambling companies to grow in the ensuing years. Poker popularity increased with the televised coverage of the World Series of Poker on ESPN and gaming companies were raking in significant profits. However, due to the ambiguity of the Wire Act many companies remained off-shore as a safer bet. Additionally, "Despite the divergent views … the official position as expressed by the Justice Department [during the Clinton Administration] and several state attorneys general is to treat the Wire Act as applying broadly and covering all forms of Internet gaming" (Goss, 2001).
Finally, in 2001, a court was pressed to make a decision on how to apply the Wire Act to online gambling. In re MasterCard Int'l, et al., 132 F. Supp. 2d 468, 472 (E.D. La. 2001), several banks and credit card companies were accused of unlawful interaction with Internet casinos per the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations (RICO) Act. However, the defendants were able to successfully move to dismiss the case. During the appeal hearing in 2002, the judge affirmed the previous decision.
The judge wrote the following in his decision, “Because the Wire Act does not prohibit non-sports internet gambling, any debts incurred in connection with such gambling are not illegal” (MasterCard Int'l, et al, 2002). Trumpeted by poker players unanimously, this case law set a precedent that although sports betting conducted over the Internet may be illegal, casino games are legal and out of reach of the Wire Act. The judge’s opinion was indeed influenced by previous attempts to expand the ambiguous Wire Act, as seen by his comments, “[T]he recent legislative history of internet gambling legislation reinforces the Court's determination that internet gambling on a game of chance is not prohibited conduct under 18 U.S.C. § 1084. Recent legislative attempts have sought to amend the Wire Act to encompass ‘contest[s] of chance…’ the ‘Internet Gambling Prohibition Act of 1999’ …sought to amend Title 18 to prohibit the use of the internet to place a bet or wager upon a ‘contest of others, a sporting event, or a game of chance…’” (MasterCard Int'l, et al, 2002).
Even though a precedent had been set, uncertainty still surrounded the fate of online gambling. The number of online gaming sites had grown tremendously as well as the number of players. However, there was little public outcry as to the detrimental effects of gambling online. Then suddenly in 2006, the Security and Accountability For Every Port Act was passed at midnight on the day Congress adjourned for elections. Although the SAFE Port Act was mainly an anti-terrorism bill, the Unlawful Internet Gambling Enforcement Act (UIGEA) was tacked on at the last moment.
Very few of the representatives had a chance to review the full bill and the UIGEA portion was not even included in the original SAFE Port Act passed by the Senate. The UIGEA was indeed a resurrection of the IGPA that failed in 1999 but several portions had been scrapped, namely any text relating to the Wire Act. With the stroke of his pen, George Bush had sounded the death knell to Internet gambling, or so his supporters had thought. Even though the UIGEA was signed into law in 2006, its provisions were marked for ‘notice of proposed rulemaking’ that delayed any real legitimacy to the act until final regulations were released November 12, 2008 to become effective January 19, 2009. Additionally, due to the complicated enforcement issue the UIGEA placed on payment processors, compliance is not required until December 1, 2009.
Due to the rushed process to include the UIGEA in the SAFE Port Act, the language that pertained to the Wire Act was dropped, which subsequently created confusion. While this bill does not expand the Wire Act provisions, it does add language to cover “interactive computer services” which obviously refers to the Internet. The real problem with the UIGEA is that it declares “unlawful Internet gambling” is illegal, but never defines Internet gambling. In an attempt to target poker and casino-style games specifically, the language expands on what is considered a bet or wager to include “games subject to chance.” However, poker enthusiasts and advocates claim that poker is a game of skill and not chance.
The main purpose of the bill is to force the financial institutions to become watchdogs over transactions, similar to the recommendations from the 1999 Gambling Commission Final Report. This reason alone is why banks heavily lobbied against the bill. While the long-term consequences are yet to be seen, the immediate effects resulted in Neteller and several other prominent payment processors to unilaterally stop serving the gambling community. Of course, other processors gladly stepped up in this vacuum alongside poker sites utilizing workarounds through phone cards and other innovative approaches. Just as history has shown us, prohibitive stances only force behaviors behind the scenes. All the while, professional online gamblers have to live with the stigma that their livelihood may be considered criminal as the U.S. misses out on lucrative opportunities to license a popular activity.
The passage of the UIGEA not only effected domestic interests, but received international attention as well. On June 10, 2009, the European Commission released a report as the result of a formal examination procedure filed in 2008 following the complaint lodged by the Remote Gambling Association. The report “concludes that U.S. laws deny access and discriminate against foreign suppliers of gambling and betting services inconsistently with U.S. WTO obligations” (European Commission, 2009). In response, the U.S. is trying to withdraw from WTO trade obligations, but has been unable to formally do so. However, as the report notes, “a withdrawal only affects future access to the market, but does not allow the U.S. to disregard its obligations in respect of past activities” (European Commission, 2009). These past activities affect “revenue and stock market value lost by affected companies” (European Commission, 2009). One of the fundamental reasons as to why this dispute is taking place, is indeed the fault of the U.S. government for not clearly defining the laws, namely in the ambiguous Wire Act and UIGEA. As outlined by the Commission, “E.U. companies thought that it was legally possible to supply Internet gambling services in the U.S., given the lack of clarity of the domestic legal framework” (European Commission, 2009). As a result, even though the European companies began withdrawing in 2006 as a response to UIGEA, the U.S. pursued these companies for their pre-2006 activities in a discriminatory fashion.
The “lack of clarity” that surrounds the UIGEA most likely resulted from its hastened adoption as part of the SAFE Port Act and now the U.S. is attempting to back pedal from trade obligations. The E.U. Commission also pointed out how the UIGEA was discriminatory in that it allows horse racing as a sanctioned gambling activity online. The recent pressure from the E.U. has made some legislators rethink the purpose and necessity of the UIGEA. Additionally, the new composition of members on Capitol Hill embodies a different outlook than its previous administration. With new legislation in the works, the possibility of repealing the UIGEA has greater potential.
The new legislation currently on the table takes the form of four proposed bills. Three bills have been introduced in the House and one in the Senate. In May 2009, Rep. Barney Frank (D-Mass) resurrected a bill similar to one he was unable to pass in the previous congress. H.R. 2267, or the Internet Gambling Regulation Consumer Protection and Enforcement Act, “would establish a federal regulatory and enforcement framework under which Internet gambling operators could obtain licenses authorizing them to accept bets and wagers from individuals in the United States” (Frank, 2009a). One of the other two bills that join H.R. 2267 is H.R. 2266, Internet Gambling Regulation and Tax Enforcement Act, with the purpose of framing the regulation and taxation of this new enterprise; namely, “a 2 percent fee (i.e. federal tax) on all deposits” (Frank, 2009b). The third counterpart, the Reasonable Prudence in Regulation Act, is a last ditch effort to stall the UIGEA in case the first two bills fail. This third bill calls for a one-year delay for UIGEA compliance.
In Frank’s own words, “The government should not interfere with people's liberty unless there is a good reason. This is, I believe, the single biggest example of an intrusion into the principle that people should be free to do things on the Internet. It's clearly the case that gambling is an activity that can be done offline but not online” (Audi and Schatz, 2009). Most advocates point to the revenue stream this bill would create, while opponents argue “legalized online gambling is a ‘clear danger to our youth’ and encourages gambling addiction at a young age” (Oinounou, 2009). However, Frank’s response to this claim is, “The notion that a society should prohibit something entirely because of the possibility that children will abuse it is a terrible blow to liberty” (Audi and Schatz, 2009). The bill’s authors have stressed that it includes safeguards to prevent underage or compulsive gambling and protect consumers who gamble online.
Until the bill comes to session, lobbying efforts have been promised by the Poker Players Alliance that include a $3 million campaign. H.R. 2267 moves contrary to the traditional prohibitive stance the government has taken towards online gambling. In an economic downturn, it’s no surprise that novel revenue streams become more appealing, which makes passing the Internet Gambling Regulation Consumer Protection and Enforcement Act very sensible. In the Fourth Wave we saw how legislation shifted away from the decriminalization of gambling spurred by the Great Depression and towards prohibition as a result of the 1999 Impact Study and the 2006 UIGEA. However, H.R. 2267 and its counterparts would usher in a new Fifth Wave of licensed and regulated gambling online.
According to Harrah's Entertainment's senior vice president of communications and government relations Jan Jones, "We really believe this industry already exists. It just exists in a Wild West setting. If you say you care about protecting children and fraud and money laundering, then the only way you can put those protections in place is to put in a strong regulatory frame" (Knightly, 2009). The Internet Gambling Regulation, Consumer Protection, and Enforcement Act is slated for September 2009 but already has 54 cosponsors. Since Barney Frank has democratic support and is chair of House Financial Services Committee where some of the bills are referred, their passage in the House is very likely. The accompanying Senate version of the bill was introduced by Robert Menendez (D-NJ) but includes some key differences.
Menendez introduced a similar bill to the previous Congress but just like Frank’s attempt, it was stalled during review. The new bill from Menendez does represent a kind of rethink, insofar as it presents a much more detailed outline of how licensing and regulation of online poker (and other “games of skill”) would go (Shortstacked, 2009). Like Frank’s H.R. 2267, Menendez’ bill sets up a federal licensing and regulatory system, to be run by the U.S. Treasury, but also allows for individual states (and tribes) to ask to be allowed to take over the business of issuing licenses and do the regulating (Shortstacked, 2009). The critical concern with state licensing is that some states will opt out and take away the ‘freedom’ this bill is purported to support. While some issues need to be resolved between the bills, having both under discussion allows for a smooth transition during the resolution and adoption process.
As we have seen, the United States has had a long history of allowing some forms of legal gambling and a certain degree of tolerance of illegal gambling. Prohibition of gambling forced the activity underground and made the criminal activity susceptible to black-market forces. Societal tolerance and acceptance of legal gambling can change rapidly. “Scandals and political control by gaming interests have led to backlashes, which result in regulation and/or prohibition” (Dunstan, 1997). Legislatives authors were forced to rethink how technological advances affect social environments. Legitimate gaming operations can add credibility to the professional aspect of gambling. Lobbyists can ultimately pay enough to ensure a particular legislative result. Additionally, in a global economy the U.S. must maintain a balanced approach to trade agreements and public interest.
As I have described the ebb and flow of gambling legislation, it is important to remember how historical events affected the election and enforcement of these laws. In colonial times, culture and religious ethic dominated the discussion. Trade and expansion moved gambling along the waterways to the south until scandal and illegitimacy thwarted its adoption. The gold rush and need for financing reinvigorated gambling’s acceptance, until corruption once again plagued the gaming industry. Then the Great Depression opened the possibility that decriminalization of gambling could stimulate the economy. Once the Internet became widespread in the mid-1990s, legislators were hard-pressed to understand how to effectively control cyberspace and unfortunately adopted a prohibitive stance towards online gambling with the passage of the UIGEA. Now the cycle of history seems to be turning over once more with the introduction of new pro-gambling bills to repeal the UIGEA.
We will see soon if America’s government is ready for the task of regulating and licensing online gambling. We will also see how public opinion will react to new legislation if it’s passed. In light of America’s current economic crisis, decriminalizing gambling is seen as a viable option to stimulate the economy. It’s happened before and it can happen again.
Works Cited
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Oinounou, Mosheh. "Lawmakers Bet on Internet Gambling Legislation." FoxNews. May 6, 2009. <http://www.foxnews.com/politics/2009/05/06/lawmakers-bet-internet-gambling-legislation/>.
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Schmidt, Susan, and James V. Grimaldi. "How a Lobbyist Stacked the Deck—Abramoff Used DeLay Aide, Attacks On Allies to Defeat Anti-Gambling Bill." Washington Post. October 16, 2005 2005. <http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2005/10/15/AR2005101501539_3.html>.
Shamus, Short Stacked. "On the Menendez Bill (S. 1597); or, Be Careful What You Ask For." Hard-Boiled Poker. August 12, 2009. 8/17/2009 <http://hardboiledpoker.blogspot.com/2009/08/on-menendez-bill-s-1597-or-be-careful.html>.
Two Plus Two
Linear Mode
