Suppose HUNL but variant doesn't really matter that much for this question. Suppose the opponent is playing Nash equilibrium ("GTO") and is not deviating to exploit us. Suppose we are playing a crazy aggro strategy that way overbluffs.

Suppose we are BB and opponent raises preflop and we call, and we decide we are going to take a crazy strategy this hand of check-raise flop, bet pot on turn, jam pot on river with our entire range.

On the river he should theoretically be calling with around 1/2 his range vs. PSB, and if he calls with this range we are of course break even on all our bluffs.

I'm not understanding where exactly our "crazy" strategy is leaking money here, assuming a GTO opponent. I guess if he reraises us on flop or raises us on turn we lose. But if he just calls/folds, we are just basically breaking even assuming he doesn't change his strategy to exploit us.

GTO is not to station down, he has enough value and rebluffs to fight back, and position also.


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Just do the individual math on how much gto villain loses when you bluff him out of the pot and how much gto villain wins when he calls vs your bluff

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Our crazy stretegy put money pre flop on the flop and on the turn to make brake even bluff on the river + he is going to re raise you some % of the time.He probably calls and raise flop enough to make our low equity hands -EV bluffs.I dont think we break even even if he just calls/folds.
Lets say you start with 100BB stack and you decade to go crazy with 0 equity hand and he just calling MDF on every street,your strategy wins same as c/f otf,so on the end of the hand you have 2-3BB less whatever raise was.Obv he is not going to have this super simple strategy and your hands with low equity will lose money when you raise them on the flop and weak made hands will lose value when you do this with them that is why this strategy will lose money.

I got a couple of questions, what stakes are you playing?
how do you know he is playing "GTO" vs you? what about if he is
applying exploitative play and have reads about your crazy tendencies.

I'm just intending the initial question to be purely theoretical, though you can interpret it however you'd like.

We are losing money in a variety of ways here. I am not sure if your crazy strategy of "x/r full range, pot, jam pot riv" includes middling hands as well, or just pure bluffs. If you only meant pure bluffs you are probably losing value on all hands that strictly fold or call because those hands

Flop -> don't have enough combination of equity + blockers + blockers on future streets that make semibluffing profitable.
Turn -> same as flop
River -> probably strictly blocker effects here, but getting here with no equity and opponent possibly overcalling previous streets due to blocker effects is probably quite expensive.

If you are talking about x/ring your entire range including your calling hands that never raise, that is a bit different but somewhat similar principles...imo.

I still don't see how we aren't at least breaking even with all of our zero-equity pure bluffs, assuming we forbid the opponent from raising. For (nearly) every runout he is calling a range on the river that makes our bluff extremely close to 0EV. And also he is folding often before the river.

I dont think I can explain it really any better than I did above. I think the river will prob be the street that loses the least here for reasons you said. However, its possible its not since blocker effects get larger as ranges get tighter and also the pot is quite large at this point so smaller mistakes are relatively larger (3x as large as on the turn)

To put it from another perspective, there are tons of GTO solutions that have hands that strictly fold on the flop (EV=0) Therefore EV(raise) of those hands is <= 0...but very likely to be less since they NEVER mix and its almost always the same general hands across different runouts or situations. I think the solvers can show EV of different actions for hands even if those actions arent taken at equilibrium...so you could also see it that way.

Yeah... so like you said you're going to get torched on the flop and turn. You're also going to get torched on the river because of blocker effects. Back to the drawing board.

It seems that the OP has simultaneously solved GTO and determined how to exploit it. Amazing.

The strategy seems somewhat analogous to just shoving pre with 100% of hands. You'll win a lot of small pots (when villain folds on an early street), but lose a lot of big ones (when he doesn't).

Your strategy is leaking money because your range is constructed in such a way that your value range isn't being compensated as much as your bluffing range is leaking.

That's not even accounting for the opponent's bluffs that might make you fold some of your own value hands as well as your excessive bluffs.

I think you seem to believe that your later bluffs will compensate previous money lost because the pot is bigger but that also holds true for your opponent's strategic options because he gets go win or bluff the bigger pot as well.

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This strategy is leaking for every hand which a player at equilibrium would never play this way.

Don't look at the entire strategy, just look at individual hands to see why they may be unprofitable. On the river if the opponent's range is constructed so that your bluffs ignoring blockers are neutral, if you make a bluff which blocks villain's folding range and doesn't block his continuing range you are making a -EV bluff.

I you bet a +EV checking hand with showdown value on the river which beats no part of villain's calling range, your hand is reduced to a ~0EV bluff.

If you use bluffs on earlier streets which have worse equity than they are supposed to, you will improve to a hand with value less often and lose money.

Not all bluffs are equal.