In the context of Hume what's effectively the difference between self and soul? I don't know the full context so I'm likely off base, but to me it seems Hume by trying to perceive the experiencer rather than just experience was essentially looking for the soul.

Cool thread.

I disagree. I think there is real substance to the conversation between RLK and I that goes beyond our differing understanding of the self. For instance, I'm pretty sure RLK is claiming to have had a direct experience of the self, analogous to our experience of color. I have (a) noted that I have had no such experience (b) am doubtful that RLK has had such an experience and (c) claimed that you can't have such an experience of the self. Second, I have also claimed that we don't have direct experiences in this way even of ordinary sensory phenomena and so that even if RLK has had the experience he is claiming that it is still possible to doubt the existence of the self. These claims (except (c)) do not importantly depend on how we understand the self.

I have no idea what RLK thinks the self is (again, different from souls), only that he thinks he has had an experience of it. I've put forward my preferred "bundle" theory of the self, which comes from Hume. I personally think this is about as far as you can get from an ethereal self, but whatever. But so far I think the dispute has been more over the nature or character of our experiences than over the nature of the self.

Okay. It seems you are having a different conversation from me then--as I said, my discussion is divergent from the OP.

Obviously I have no such wish. I was making a point about the role of definitions in philosophical discussions.

To be really accurate I would have to go look over my Hume again, but I'll point out that at the time Hume was writing this distinction was live. For instance, Locke believed in a soul, but argued that this was not the same thing as the self. Instead, he claimed that the self is our consciousness of continuity with the past, especially through memory. In this sense he argued that the same person could have several souls over time (think of it as transferring a program from an older computer to a new one. Or more generally, that he identified the self as software rather than hardware).

Please continue as needed to explore the concepts as best we can. If it diverges from OP somewhat so be it. Later, we can "plug back in" whatever we can agree on into "What is the Soul?" if it comes to that. We may not agree on much but the exploration should be fruitful.

For my part, I do equate the concepts of self and soul. The soul in theology is a spiritual non-material essence of human existence and the self certainly matches that description. If the self is removed from the discussion, the soul becomes entirely a hypothetical construct as I said earlier, so without a concrete argument for separating the concepts I see no reason not to treat them as the same.

The thing that I am really pondering right now is the nature of personal experience. I have read some of Hume's writing in the past and have gone back and reread some bits again and am a little perplexed. My first reaction has always been that it is nonsense devoid of actual content. I truly cannot understand how anyone considers it worthy of note.

Of course, that opinion was formulated within the working assumption that I have always made that our experience of self was objectively the same and that it was a failure of introspection or intelligence that caused others to fail to perceive its importance. What this thread actually has me seriously considering is the possibility that we are different. In effect, I am trying to get an acknowledgement of color from a person who truly does not see a difference between the light at the top and the bottom of a traffic light. That would make Hume's comments important, but certainly not in the way he intended, if "he" existed at all.

I recall a different thread discussing self-aware machines and how mankind should treat a computer that made a claim of perception of self. There were some who felt that the machine should be treated as an equal. Somewhere in the discussion I posed the question of a person who denied a perception of self. In that context no one stepped up and took the line appearing here, which is interesting, but in any event there was not much discussion around this point, probably because it did not lead in the direction people wanted to go. But that is what is happening here, ie. a group of people denying a perception of self. What does one do with that?

From a moral point of view I would certainly feel compelled to continue to treat everyone as if they had a soul since there would be no way to know the truth, but it does call in to question the value of discussing God or morality with them. It would certainly make a discussion of the soul or self an exercise in futility.

shouldn't this sentence:

In this sense he argued that the same person could have several souls over time (think of it as transferring a program from an older computer to a new one.

be

In this sense he argued that the same person could have several selfs over time (think of it as transferring a program from an older computer to a new one.

?

I define it as the thing that experiences.

Our brains think (they go through the mechanical motions of our thought algorithms) but do not experience the thoughts. Our brains receive sensory input and react accordingly, but don't experience it. Physics governs our brains (just balls of matter with a bunch of electromagnetic interactions at work), but does not predict that the set of electromagnetic interactions should give rise to experiences, especially experiences of things that cannot be expressed/encoded in numbers (for instance, one's experience of blueness*).

*You might argue that Physics predicts that blue will be experienced roughly the same way every time since it is a range of wavelengths (and wavelengths are numbers), and that it will be experienced differently than red, but then notice that it doesn't tell you why the experiences of blue and red aren't reversed, why each is experienced the particular way it is (by a given individual). Nor do I think a more advanced body of Physics knowledge can ever predict that, because there can be no mathematical equation for my experience of blueness. "Blueness" is not in the quantitative realm.

:O one of the BOAT movies

What is the perception of self? How do you perceive it? Is it something other than a sight/sound/taste/sensation/smell?

How do you know that what you are perceiving is a self?

Are you joking? Do you think these are good questions?

I am totally colorblind (hypothetically) and have never seen or perceived color in any way.

What is red? How does it compare to taste, smell and sound? How is it different from green?

No, I am not asking what is red. I am asking how do you perceive red. Is it through sight, sound, smell, taste, touch?

If you claimed you were colourblind, I would not ask you how you perceive red. But you are claiming that you can perceive red ( the self) and so I am asking , how? Is it through one of the senses?

If I ask you "how do you know thats red" you can answer, "because I can see it", or "how do you know thats hot?" "because I can touch it". So, in what way do you perceive the self? If its not through one of the senses, then how?

That a person has at the very least a self doesn't even seem controversial.

The fact that a person can perceive at all is evidence that a (at least) self is there.

No its not.

Everyone obviously has different perceptions of things, so clearly we're not all the same conscious entity. Is this your hang up?

ye, but what does that mean?

what does it mean for a ( at least) self to be there? It doesnt make sense. I am not clear on what you are trying to say by adding the "at least"

I dont have a hang up. You claim that theres a self. I am asking you to show me. Your statement " a person perceives, therefore because we perceive, the self exists" is just begging the question. You assume that a self is needed to perceive.

If a self isn't a being that perceives, then what does self even mean?

Thats a good question.

We can define self to be "A being that perceives" . That definition doesnt mean that such a thing exists. You are still begging the question, and going on unquestioned assumptions.

beings that perceive definitely exist, I don't really see how that's arguable

then show me? Where?

Me and you aren't on the same page, can you agree with that?

Eh...I think we may be sidetracking too much here. I think most people are comfortable "assuming" selves exist.

Ask neeeel what does exist in his ontology.

I would agree

People can assume whatever they want. Doesnt make it true though. Not even if everyone in the world assumes it.

Neeeel, I just got an idea

What does exist in your ontology?

Not a lot

Now ask zumby whether he believes in a self, defined as " an entity or being that perceives"

If it doesn't exist then would you agree that what we think of as the self is really the experiences themselves? Ie, the experiences exist, period. (You and herbivorus would at least agree that it's 100% certain that experiences exist, unless you personally have no experiences.)

The above theory of 0 selves (under the quoted definition of self which was my definition of soul) is almost the same as there being only one unified self. I'm not sure which I believe. Currently leaning toward 0.