The more specific the definition of a particular god, the more comfortable an atheist might be in being gnostic about the existence of that god - for instance, re: a literal Biblical definition of God, someone could use things like errors in the Bible, immoral acts of a supposedly benevolent being etc to build a case for them being gnostic atheist.

I don't think taking a .0001% possibility and treating it as a a 0% possibility is a ridiculous position, nor do I think it's 1/100th as ridiculous as asserting that you're 100% certain that the most implausible of conclusions about the beginning of the universe is correct.

I can for instance say that the greek gods do not and have not ever existed outside of the imagination. Likewise, I can say that about any god. I may be ignoring an infantismally small unprovable chance, but as stated we do the same with faeries, unicorns, the boogy man, etc. I think allowing people the kindness of pretending that there's a reasonable chance that a god exists is harmful to society and human growth. It also gives them an out logically "Well, at least they think it's possible, rather they believe it or not."

We might as well be 99.9999% gnostic atheists, with .0001% agnostic.

I lost my faith, regained it, and lost my faith again. This forum was the catalyst for my first deconversion but ultimately wasn't why I deconverted. I wanted to prove the evolutionists wrong on this forum so I studied evolution. After studying it, I was convinced of the soundness of the theory. I quickly lost my faith for various reasons after that.

I had a brief reconversion and this forum was instrumental in my subsequent deconversion. I submitted my beliefs to the fire of this forum with an open mind and was convinced by the (IMO) better arguments.

hey joker, just in case you still have a little fear of hell fire from time to time, you might like this video!

That was very good. Thanks augie.

I'm not totally averse to this conclusion. I don't think you have a clear conception of the nature of God because of your incorrect views about the meaning of "existence." For instance, you claim that it is part of the nature of God to exist. Here you seem to think that it doesn't make sense to deny the existence of God because when we unpack what theists mean by "God" it ends up that the atheist is claiming that the actually existing God doesn't exist (which is a obvious contradiction).

But of course we can't understand "existence" in this way (as part of the concept of some object) or we could prove the existence of anything. For instance, we could say that Santa Claus exists because the definition of "Santa Claus" accepted by children is the actually existing Santa Claus.

Now, no doubt you are aware of this problem, so you might say that there is a difference here--it is not an inherent part of the idea of Santa Claus that he exists because we don't think that Santa Claus exists necessarily, whereas it is an inherent part of the idea of God, that God exists necessarily. That is, you conceive of God as a being whose very essence is to exist.

Now, as should be clear by now, I reject the Thomistic framework that underlies your talk of "essences" here. I don't think that concepts or beings have essences that are more than nominal. So objects exist, but there is not something (some Platonic Form or abstract object) that exists independently of those objects that IS existence.

Thus, I don't regard your claim here as a definition, but rather as a substantive claim about the metaphysical nature of the universe. When you say that you understand God as a being whose nature is to exist, then I will say that you are wrong, not just because of your definition, but because there is no being whose nature is to exist.

And here is a final question for you. Suppose we think that there is some being whose essence is to exist. How do we know that this being is God? It seems just as likely (much more actually because of the problem of evil) to me that it would be Aristotle's Unmoved Mover or a Platonic Form than the God of Christianity.

A couple points here.

First, it is possible to prove a negative.

Second, why are you assuming that in order to know that p, you must be completely certain that p?

For example, I don't consider myself an agnostic atheist--I think I know that God doesn't exist--but I am not completely certainly that God doesn't exist. This seems to conflict with your understanding of "gnostic" atheism.

I’m not sure of your point. The O.P. asked what good arguments theists have for the existence of God. Since I do adhere to Thomism and define God in a like manner, then the argument works for me. Obviously, if I held to your theory of intelligibility then I’d probably conclude as you, but since I don’t, I don’t. So while I suppose you could claim my way of looking at things defines God into existence, I could likewise claim your way of looking at things defines God out of existence.

The short answer is that theists believe God revealed his essence to Moses with “I am that I am,” which some take to mean, “I am the pure Act of Being.” That’s the bridge, so to speak, from the philosophical to the theological.

Here is what the best argument would contain, imo:

An explanation of why money doesn't work. What is it based on? Why is it valuable, and explain why that value is so easily manipulated.

An examination of God's economic theory and compare it to all other models.

Point out who the Israelites are. That there were 13 tribes, and Judah was only one (Gen ch. 49). God promises he would never cut off David's line of kings, even if the king sins. (2 Samuel 7:13-16, and repeated in a few other spots as well) Point out the separation of the House of Judah and the House of Israel.

If you can understand all of the above, you can understand the world, and how much sense the bible actually makes. It's like pulling Excalibur from the stone.

Your description sounds like an agnostic atheist imo - in what way do you not consider yourself this? You might have seen this before:

Maybe it is the part where I said, "I think I know that God doesn't exist."

But isn't the difference between "I think I know" and "I know" the dividing line here?

My point is pretty clear. I think you haven't provided a good argument for the existence of God. Rather, you have pointed out that there are metaphysical systems which imply that God exists.* Fine. I don't think anyone was denying that. The issue is whether we should accept those metaphysical systems.

Also, your attempt to claim equivalence between our two positions is incorrect. I am not defining God out of existence. Rather I am saying that it is an open question whether such a being exists. I am rejecting the entire project of defining a being into or out of existence and instead relying on empirical evidence and rational argumentation to justify the belief that God exists. It is not the case that because I reject the definition of Santa Claus as the "actually existing Santa Claus" that I am defining Santa Claus out of existence. No, rather I am acknowledging the possibility that Santa Claus exists, but claiming that as a matter of fact he does not.

*Just as a sideline, I think it should be pointed out that Aquinas actually rejected the ontological argument, so I'm inclined to think that it doesn't works on those grounds either.

Yeah, this is definitely where I get off the train. My entire epistemological approach to the world would have to change in order for this to seem even close to rational. Basing a belief as foundational as this on the ancient legends of a relatively minor people written by who knows whom? It is the belief you describe above that leads me to think that for many theists, their religion does conflict with science. It is hard to reconcile someone who accepts the scientific canons of evidence and who also uses these old stories as evidence for the metaphysical nature of the world.

Nope. Look at the chart. It says that an "gnostic" atheist is someone who claims to know that god doesn't exist. I claim this all the time. For intance, "I know that God doesn't exist."

Of course, I acknowledge that I could be wrong, but I could be wrong about all sorts of things that that I claim to know. If our standard for claiming, "I know that p" is that we couldn't be wrong, then we could almost never truthfully say, "I know that p."

When I say "I think I know that p" I am saying that yes, I think it is true that I know that p. I'm certainly not saying, I don't really know that p.

Fair enough. I suppose I am/was confusing gnostism with having absolute knowledge.