838. The dangers of over-thinking have more to do with destruction than construction. It is simpler to call something into question than it is to prove it. It’s not disproving, since that is a simple reciprocal, and therefore the relative equivalent of, proving that thing (or its opposite). The innate construction of our minds does not permit us the luxury of being certain of our perceptions. By endowing us with a set of senses which apprehend reality in an attenuated and possibly errant fashion, nature has relegated the human species to a void of uncertainty. Propositions cannot be proved or disproved if they relate to this “reality” we encounter through the five olfactory senses.
This is the essence and central ideology of over-thinking, valid abstractions taken to an equally valid but still certainly depressing and distressing extreme. On the one hand, to extrapolate on the solipsistic idea that “I think, therefore I am” represents the only truth, does indeed lead to perfectly logical and completely depressing conclusions, not about reality, but about humans’ place in it. Here’s the difficulty. The inescapable answer that “we don’t know” only destroys our systems of belief. In the same way that Irony cannot construct a world view, but can rather only undercut one, over-thinking can only present contradictions which never seem to afflict the unscrupulous.
A somewhat related example: By over-thinking the question of religion, one can easily come to the conclusion that it is a bunch of kaka, and by inconceivably numerous methods. One can debase the metaphysical foundation of religion, or the central tenant of an omnipotent God or Pantheon. The difficulty here is that the God concept still cannot be disproved. He or She (God that is) could have, in its infinite “wisdom,” devised to set up some idiotic and sadistic system by which astronomically large numbers of insubstantial inhabitants of a likewise contrived planet interact in the most inexcusable ways imaginable while nearly in-total rejecting that self-same creator. There is the question of reality after all, that is hardly serviced by any theory, especially when compared with something as attractive as Christianity. It services every single part of every single question by presenting an omnipotent/omniscient, possibly anthropomorphic rationality that maintains some modicum of control. Those who over-think just declare God dead, not giving a **** about Pascal and his sage warnings about wagers. God could have set this system up, so that it requires faith; Fideism. What if intelligence is of no use? What if there is some insipid sort of ******s’ paradise with 7,000 virgins or endless prayer and all this strife and apparent reality has no purpose beyond testing our predilections toward faith? To disprove God in an acceptable way, that is, beyond doubt, would be nice, but is as beyond us, and for the same reason, as proving the same.

The original train of thought lead to the question of how over-thinking was more about destruction than construction, and about whether one was more significant than the other. Christianity and many other forms of idiocy preceded me by far, and will far outlive me, and even if that were otherwise the result would be more a matter of opinion than victory. That existence itself preceded my awareness is the difficulty, it means that my state must be a derivative of that which existed before it. This then means that my criticism is an act of rebellion. Not the pop-culture driven, pseudo-sexual type of rebellion, but actual rebellion, against that which is known to be true; the unquestionable. How could that be justified?
Is it that Humanity is perverse at its actual core; that my iteration is just another of humans going fully against that which is advisable?

Who has the better right to be angry even, God at Man or Man at God?
Only one of them actually choose. Our creator made confusion the absorbing state of consciousness.

Are you certain of this perception? (Call it perception 'X'.) If you are, then aren't you claiming two different types of 'certainty' and 'perceptions'? One pair of types to describe X; and one pair of types which X describes.

What is the difference between the two types of 'certainty'? Between the two types of 'perception'?

Really, the problem is not over-thinking; it's over-saying. Even the cogito ergo suum is saying far too much, without thinking to ask what has actually been said. (If anything!)

I think what you have said is that the validity of a perception is unimportant. The fact that it exists is enough, unless one wants to do what you have challenged me to do.

Without the possibility of certainty why even mention it. It would be ridiculous to refer to your belief as certain, were it certain it would not be a belief.

Your last sentence reminds me of Witt. "Reality is what we can say about it"

Good reply even though it may sound like answering someone else