I did not say that the more personal version of the argument was comprehensive, so I'm not sure I follow your point here. With regard to your last point, I just don't agree that two spouses who have sex and are open to procreation are "using" each other in anything like the way in which they would be if they wanted to have sex for pleasure but not to accept each other's fertility as something good.

All I've set out to do is to defend the claim that the Catholic view on sex and contraception is coherent and principled. Like asdfasdf32, I think it's more that you are disagreeing with the principles of Catholic moral teaching without successfully showing that it's incoherent.

As for your use of the language of the state of nature, before I respond it would be helpful to know how much Hobbes, Rousseau, and Locke you've read and what is informing your understanding of the notion of a state of nature. You mention Hobbes, but I'm curious whether you really hold to Hobbesian views about the character of moral principles.

Are you not willing to grant that the Aristotelian conception of nature--even if you think it is false--is at least reasonably coherent as a basis for something like Catholic moral teaching? That is, if I affirm that there is such a thing as human nature that is ordered towards happiness such that various human activities (such as political activity, sexual activity, domestic life, study, recreation, etc.) have natural purposes, then the sorts of conclusions drawn by Catholic moral thinkers would in fact follow?

You talked about divorce previously, not about separation. If a woman's husband has HIV and he is not willing to refrain from having sex, then she would have sufficient reason to separate herself from him; but not to divorce him, because marriage is a lifelong commitment, "in sickness and in health." Advocating condom use in such a case, given the in-practice failure rate of condoms, is no guarantee that the woman would not contract HIV eventually.

I want to focus in on two things you said.

This suggests you don't understand what's even meant by calling something natural for a human being or saying that what is morally good for a human being has to do with what's natural. It's true that arsenic itself is something natural, but it is decidedly not something that is naturally good for a human being. This is no different from saying that it's naturally good for a sheep to live and naturally good for a wolf to kill and eat the sheep. Arsenic is a naturally occurring element, but it's not naturally good for human beings to be exposed to arsenic. Do you see the distinction being drawn here?

The claim I'm defending as at least coherent is that what is morally right or wrong for human beings has something to do with what's natural for (or naturally good for) them.

Are you saying you can't even imagine that the claim "the natural purpose of sex is reproduction" is anything other than than purely arbitrary imposition of some sexist celibates? It's not just that you disagree with me, but you think there's absolutely no good will or reasonableness on my part in defending such a view?

BT:

What you are calling an "Aristotelean" view of human nature has been disproven by Darwin. Our nature is to survive long enough to reproduce. There is no natural morality in that.

Now I can defend Aristotle by saying that we have secondary drives towards happiness that are part of our nature, but if you want to take that view, the Catholic approach to sexuality is HORRIBLE for the pursuit of happiness. Gays and bis are completely unhappy, and heteros are dogged by the constant threat that their lives will be ruined by an unwanted child.

Further, if you are in a bad marriage, you have to stay in it. If you want to leave your husband because he repeatedly beats you, you can't have sex with another man until your husband dies. If you can't find a marriage partner, you have to be celibate.

The Catholic system ruins lives. It can't be defended under any definition of human nature that survives Darwin.

I'm not Catholic but I'll take a stab at this one. The Catholic Church has been around for a long time. As a result it has had a lot of practice saying one thing and doing another. In fact there is no single human organization that has so consistently said one thing, and then completely ignored the fact that it's followers were completely ignoring its teachings. In fact the church has the worlds greatest escape valve for people to continue doing things that are against the teachings of the church: confession. People can confess to using BC and then go on their merry way basically.

Examples: The vast majority of Catholic women in the US are on BC. Being a pedophile is bad but the church will play a massive shell game to avoid acknowledging that the catholic church, like virtually all large human organizations, has predators inside it.

It is not bad information as far as the Catholics are concerned. And again you are missing the point. These are not two sets of individual instructions. Using contraception outside of marriage is a mute point to the Catholics as you not supposed to be having sex outside of marriage.

Here's what I don't understand about the Catholic view. I can understand a view that says we shouldn't use any birth control at all, whether it be the rhythm method, condoms, or contraceptives. Seems wrong to me, but whatever. What I don't get is that the Catholic Church is okay with people using "natural" family planning, but not with birth control drugs. Seems to me like your goal is the same in both cases, so why not use the better technology (i.e. contraception)?

Although I don't agree with his reasoning (at all) he already addressed your objection:

I think what I am saying is that there is no principled distinction between extending postpartum infertility by breastfeeding longer and say, not breastfeeding at all, but taking a taking a drug that mimics postpartum infertility. The goal is the same in both cases. Taking the drug is actually more effective in achieving that goal. So what is the principled difference?

After all, supposedly the reason we shouldn't use birth control drugs is because it interferes with the natural end of sex, which is procreation. But if it is okay to interfere with the natural end of sex by say, extending postpartum infertility or using natural family planning, then it is not inherently wrong to interfere with the natural end of sex. So what is it about birth control drugs such that interfering with the natural end of sex using them is wrong. After all, Catholics don't believe that just because something is artificial that it is wrong. This is not just hippie nonsense about naturopathic medicine or something

I agree completely, and look forward to BTirish's response.

with regard to Original Position

I often wonder the same things, I find it very strange that as Catholics we draw the line at NFP (natural family planning) as being acceptable and condom usage as not. This is a funny issue because both of my parents are die hard Catholics and even they question this theology (it is essentially the only social issue that they really have question with, so it's certainly worth discussing).

I actually attended the NFP basics class as part of marriage preparation in the last few months (getting married next week) but we didn't discuss theological reasoning as much as it was an information class on the logistics of using that system.

The very very basic premise as I understand it is that God created sexuality as an expression of love between a husband and wife and there should be as little artificial interference as possible and you should be open to new life if it so happens to occur.

I'm not saying this explanation makes sense logically and more importantly I have admittedly not studied extensively on it so take what I am saying with a grain of salt but I'd be willing to ask and find out why Catholics feel this way since there seems to be some interest.

You implicitly suggest here that the only principled distinction possible would be on the basis of a difference in goal or purpose. Catholic moral theology (particularly as articulated by St. Thomas Aquinas) contends that the goodness or badness of a human act arises from the conjunction of that act's 1) object, 2) intention, and 3) circumstances. By "object" here is just meant the type or species of the act, considered as it were in the abstract. For example, "to take a life," "to steal a purse," "to praise someone," "to contracept," "to breastfeed." By "intention" is basically meant the goal or purpose sought by the act, the motive for which the person acts. The meaning of "circumstance" should be evident, and it's not really relevant in this case to get into the role that circumstances can play in evaluating the morality of a human act. An act can be evil if it fails to be good with respect to any of these three components--one cannot do what is intrinsically evil (object) to achieve good (intention), and one can do something evil even by doing something that is in itself morally acceptable (object) for an evil purpose (intention).

It is central to Catholic moral doctrine that some moral objects are intrinsically evil, without exception, so that it isn't even necessary to take intention or circumstance into account in evaluating an instance of that act.

The difference, then, between breastfeeding with the intention of prolonging the natural period of infertility and using a hormonal contraceptive is that in the former case, breastfeeding is not an intrinsically evil moral object; whereas using a hormonal contraceptive is an intrinsically evil moral object. (I've given some indication already as to why, with respect to the moral object, using contraception is intrinsically evil: it directly obstructs the natural purpose of the sexual act.)

It's also simply false that hormonal contraceptives "mimic postpartum infertility" in anything except the absence of ovulation. Hormonal contraceptives force anovulatory cycles, whereas the natural period of postpartum infertility involves no cycles at all (the woman just doesn't menstruate).

Whenever a married couple has sex, they must be open to and accepting of the possibility of conception. A wife who is timing her breastfeeding in a way to prolong the natural period of infertility can still be open to conception occurring, because it's always possible that the woman will ovulate despite breastfeeding (and ovulation can occur before the woman has a first postpartum period). Using a hormonal contraceptive to suppress ovulation is inconsistent with being similarly open to procreation. The precise reason that so-called ecological breastfeeding is less effective (ovulation can return at any time) is also the reason that it is consistent with being open to conception.

With respect to the distinction I drew above, you're here confusing object and intention. The fact that it can be acceptable to pursue a goal using one means (intention by object) does not imply that every possible means for attaining the same goal is licit. The reason that using contraception is intrinsically evil (as a matter of the object) is, again, because it directly frustrates the natural purpose of the human sexual act.

I disagree that timing breastfeeding in a way that prolongs the natural period of infertility "interferes with the natural end of sex." One isn't doing anything to force the woman's body to act contrary to what is natural for it; instead, one is acting so as to extend to its natural limit the period of postpartum infertility. One is cooperating with nature rather than acting contrary to it.

The issue is not just whether something is artificial, but whether what is done (whether artificial or not) cooperates with or interferes with what is natural.

You have the most important idea down: there needs to be openness to new life whenever a married couple is intimate. Natural family planning is consistent with such openness, but the use of condoms, hormonal contraceptives, or intrauterine devices is not.

I should add something I haven't indicated above, which is that the Church's teaching is that the use of natural family planning to space births is acceptable only under certain circumstances (financial, etc.), and there does have to be a legitimate reason for using it.

Congratulations on your upcoming wedding! You and your wife-to-be will be in my prayers.

One other point I can add in response to Original Position's question is to note that what is normally meant by natural family planning--abstaining from sex when the woman is near ovulation--does not involve having sex while doing something to directly obstruct conception. Using any form of contraception (which is called contraception for a reason) does involve having sex while doing something to directly obstruct conception. Does that help to clarify the principled difference (again, with respect to the moral object, not with respect to the intention)?

Well, I didn't mean to suggest this, so I'll grant you this point.

This seems to be the crucial claim. You say that the wrongness of contraception lies in the act itself--that the act of contraception is inherently evil. Now, relating this to contraceptive drugs is a bit tricky. Earlier you said that artifacts (such as, I assume, contraceptive drugs) do not have essences and so their final causes are supplied by human intention. Thus, on your account we shouldn't say that the contraceptive drugs themselves are inherently evil, but the rather that the act of contraception that uses those drugs is inherently evil.

Now, this immediately raises an important issue. What about women who take these drugs for purposes other than contraception (e.g. health reasons, easing cramps, etc.)? This is even starker with condoms, which often have as a primary goal the prevention of STDs. It would seem that if you used contraceptive drugs or condoms for these other (I'll assume) acceptable purposes then the act of taking those drugs is not inherently evil.

But wait, using "contraceptive" drugs for these other purposes will have a side-effect of significantly decreasing fertility. Thus, even if the act of taking a birth-control pill for health reasons is not immoral, the fact that doing so has the side effect of effectively acting as a contraceptive would be enough to make it immoral. But if we accept the Thomistic doctrine of double effect, then at least under some conditions and with all of your assumptions, then using these birth control drugs or condoms would be morally justified. That is, as long as we don't intend the bad effects, but only the good ones, then even if we know that the bad effects will follow our action is still justified.

I take it that this should be enough to show that even on your own grounds, it should be regarded as justifiable to use condoms or contraceptive drugs in some circumstances. However, I've been making a larger claim, which is that I don't see a viable moral difference between using the methods of NFP and artificial contraceptives.

So what exactly is your claim? Where is the evil of contraceptives supposed to lie? Based on your earlier comment about artifacts, it can't lie in the nature of artificial contraceptives themselves. This might lead us to think it has to do with the intention we have in using those drugs. But here you seem to say that the evil of contraceptive drugs is not our intention in using them, but rather the act of using them itself. Now, as I pointed out above, since the act (what you refer to as the "object") is individuated in part by our intentions, we have to be very precise in what exactly it is about which kind of act of using contraceptive drugs (i.e. which "object") is the inherently evil one.

It can't just be any act with the intention of increasing infertility as that would rule out NFP. I think this is the really crucial point of contention here. I don't think you've identified any such act (or "object" if you prefer) such that it excludes NFP but includes artificial contraceptives.

This is meant as more of a thought experiment, so unless you think that a birth control pill that did mimic postpartum infertility would be morally acceptable, let's just go with it.

Here I would say that the bolded claim is incorrect. If "being open to procreation" meant trying to have a baby at the earliest possible time, then your claim would be correct. However, it clearly doesn't mean that or it would also condemn natural family planning. It might mean, wants to have children. But of course, using a condom or birth control pills by no means implies that you don't want to have children. It might mean, if the woman gets pregnant she will happily carry the child to term. Again, using birth control pills or condoms doesn't imply the opposite. It might mean, leaves a chance of conceiving. Again, this is the case for both condoms and birth control drugs (at least oral contraceptives) as neither of these are perfect contraceptive technologies. It might mean, won't act in a way such that your chances of getting pregnant are affected. Again, this is clearly inconsistent with natural family planning, so that can't be it.

So basically, this seems like an incorrect criticism of the usage of contraceptive technologies. Either it applies equally to NFP or it is false as a description of those who use birth control pills.

Here I think we get at what you think is the important difference. You want to say that extending postpartum infertility is okay as long as we do so using methods that "cooperate with nature" rather than act contrary to nature.

I don't think this is a meaningful distinction. The body is not acting contrary to its nature when it responds to contraceptive drugs by becoming infertile. That is the natural state of a human female body + contraceptive drugs. This is exactly the same as increased fertility is the natural state of a human female body + postpartum infertility brought on by breastfeeding. The difference here, if there is one, is that contraceptive drugs are not natural and postpartum infertility is.

Now it is true that contraceptive drugs are not natural objects, but artifacts. Maybe this is the root of your claim. But if it is, then your view really does devolve into the kind of hippie view that says that drugs are evil and we should just use naturopathic medicine. Presumably you don't want to say that. But what else is there? And what if we used non-artifactual birth control (naturally-occurring plants that decrease fertility)? I can't see how this goes anywhere.

Anyway, I've gone on too long already, so I'll stop here.

Fair enough. However, I think you slip back into implicitly assuming that intention is all that matters below, but as I think you see, the issue is complicated.

To be terminologically precise, an act is constituted by object and intention in particular circumstances, and these three together are the matter for moral evaluation.

This is great--you're right to push for this point of precision. This is a point that is difficult, which is that the moral object in a given act is not absolutely independent of intention, and this is where identifying the moral object can become difficult.

In general, identifying the relevant moral object is itself something that requires an informed conscience. For example, it would be a gross mistake to characterize the moral object in shooting someone innocent and in operating a weed wacker as "pulling a trigger." In the former case, the real moral object is "murder," and in the latter it is "cutting weeds." So this difficulty about identifying the real moral object in "taking a hormone pill" (the analogue to "pulling a trigger") is not unique to this case, even if it may seem more difficult.

You are correct that one can "take a hormone pill" and have the moral object be something other than "to contracept," at least in principle, because what one is doing is in fact "promoting health." This is a case where I will concede that the moral object is not absolutely independent of intention, in part because, as you said, the artificial derives its very character from human intention. (This is an insightful point.)

This being said, and I know this will be a contentious point, I am convinced that there are no cases where the birth control pill--which forces an anovulatory cycle by the timing of hormone pills and placebo pills--achieves any genuine medical purpose better than an appropriately tailored hormonal therapy that usually won't suppress ovulation. If you're curious about this, look at http://www.naprotechnology.com/ and http://www.creightonmodel.com/ The only exception that I know of is the use of progesterone therapy to treat postpartum depression, which presumably would delay a woman's first ovulation and menses. But menstrual cramps, PMS, etc. are successfully treated by the doctors employing the model outlined at these websites without suppressing ovulation. In any event, the point is that taking the birth control pill isn't even the best means available for treating such conditions.

This is a rather different case from the "birth control pill for health reasons" case. In principle, double effect could apply in the case of taking the birth control pill, if that pill were the best means available for promoting health (I don't think it ever is, but I'll grant for the sake of argument that there is such a case), because the moral object is "taking hormonal pills for a medical problem" and the suppression of fertility is a foreseen but unintended consequence (this is how double effect works). In this case there is an end or effect sought--health--which is of itself independent of the sexual act. That is, the promotion of health (in this hypothetical case) would obtain whether the couple has sex or not.

But in the case of condom usage, there is no such end or effect sought that is of itself independent of the sexual act. There is a risk to health precisely because one of the spouses has an STD that could be transmitted through the sexual fluids.

The main reason that this case is different, however, is that prophylactic sex--not just "the avoidance of conception"--is intrinsically evil. Insemination--the mixture of sexual fluids in the woman's body--is essential to what the sexual act is, as ordered to procreation. To engage in prophylactic sex is not even to really engage in the sex act completely, because the sexual act is completed by insemination. To engage in prophylactic sex is therefore akin to onanism, masturbation, or sodomy as acts that involve sexual pleasure and climax without insemination. Here is where you're focusing only on the intended effects without giving any consideration to the relevant moral object: you focus on "avoiding conception" as an effect independent of "sexual pleasure that doesn't result in insemination."

Specifically with regard to double effect, to abstain from sex achieves the purpose of protecting the health of the uninfected spouse, and so double effect couldn't apply to the use of a condom in this case, because double effect requires that there not be a means available without the unintended evil effect. That is, you can't shoot someone in self-defense if it isn't the necessary (in the sense of only available) means for defending one's life. Another reason that double effect doesn't apply here is that prophylactic sex is an incomplete or imperfect sexual act (like masturbation) that is being used as the means for avoiding exposure to an illness; but double effect requires that no evil effect of one's action be the actual means for achieving the intended good effect.

There are aspects of the case of condom usage for disease prevention that are quite complicated according to Catholic moral thought, and there is room for some legitimate disagreement. I'd suggest taking a look at this interview with Fr. Martin Rhonheimer for a balanced perspective from someone with whom I disagree on a few details: http://www.osv.com/tabid/7621/itemid...om-remark.aspx

There are other requirements for double effect as indicated in that article; in particular, the means in question must be the only one available for achieving the good effect.

With qualification as indicated above, this is fine, but irrelevant to the other question as to whether there is a relevant moral difference between NFP and contraception. I'll reply to the rest of your post later.

Late edit: one other point about double effect that's important. Many people assume that double effect governs only the sorts of exceptional cases where an otherwise illicit act (this is phrased without the terminological rigor involved in distinguishing object, intention, and circumstance) becomes licit because it is the only means for achieving some intended good effect. It is true that such cases fall under double effect; but there are also cases where an otherwise licit act becomes illicit by the doctrine of double effect. That is, sometimes it is the doctrine of double effect that is LESS permissive even than an analysis of an act in terms of object, intention, and circumstance. So, if for the sake of argument I grant that you've established that the relevant moral object in some case of taking a hormonal pill is "taking hormones for a medical problem" with health as one's intention, still, if the suppression of fertility is a foreseen evil consequence of this act, then the act will be illicit if there is some other means--some other object--available for achieving that intention.