neeeel is there a definition of the self that you consider useful? Is it specifically a dualistic kind of self that you deny or is it any idea of self. What about me defining myself as my body mind desires etc?

No, Islam didn't 'copy' Christianity, I agree. When put like that, you turn my point into an entirely different argument. If I've created a situation where my use of the word copy has confused the issue, I retract it and apologise for my lack of specificity. Also, I'm only running with Doggg's assertion here and not contesting it.

If however, elements are shared by both religions (and bearing in mind that they are mutually exclusive in their versions of events) then the certainty of both is undermined since we now have two versions of the same story and no way to know which is correct. Also, since we're now not sure which is correct, we also have to entertain the possibility that neither are correct and that a third and undiscovered (not yet inspired?) version may be the correct version.

So, how does these two distinct religions 'sharing' elements and yet differing so greatly become something that you pass off as unimportant?

How can they be the same until they diverge? One didn't exist until the split. Would you argue that one or the other were more likely to be correct if asked?

What you call differing 'traditions' within a religion, I consider 'inconsistencies' in their version of events. To borrow a legal term, it introduces Reasonable Doubt. What you consider 'shared foundations' between two religions, I consider a suggestion of stories being manipulated, forgotten, reinvented, added to and contrived in times when we were little more than primitives still gasping in wonder at the sun and imagining ourselves the centre of the universe.

I dont know, depends what you mean by useful, I guess. I mean, santa claus is a useful concept in helping make christmas more mysterious and exciting. I would guess that the self is a useful concept in planning and decision making. It doesnt mean either exists.

I dont really get how you can redefine it , though. Because there is no actual thing there. If we see an object lying on the ground, we can then define it as "an apple, a sweet fruit", and that label refers to the actual object. Defining the self seems pointless though, since there is no referent for the label.
So when you say "I am my body, mind and desires" what is referred to by the word I? It seems that, unless the I refers to something specific, you are just saying "The body/mind/desires is the body/mind/desires" which doesnt seem very useful?

I still use the word I , and so I guess I still use the concept, and use it to distinguish between different objects. But as to what the "I" actually is, it seems like a meaningless question.

At this point, I get bogged down in language and definition.

I'm not contending reasonable doubt.

They can be the same before they diverge because they are the same. As for the inconsistencies I think you are in danger of conflating a couple of arguments. I generally think that when a church splits there will be inconsistencies between the branches. From a logical perspective I don't think that's entirely important because I don't know a church needs to be consistent with the church it split from, hence the split, it only needs to be internally consistent.

Cheers and I'm not wanting to bog you down I'm just curious.

It seems like it can be shorthand for the mind body desires because it's easier to talk of the self in those terms. If I'm talking about a car it helps me to talk of a car rather than the wheels engine computer etc.

Do you recall the thread that resulted in your understanding as it may be less work for you if I can get answers from there.

Thanks again

In addition to what dereds said, you'll have to explain/justify the bolded parts

1) You'll have to show that the inconsistencies in events told in bible/quran are actually mutually exlusive versions of events.
2) Again - that a later version plagiarizes/changes/incorporates an earlier version in itself does not cast doubt on the earlier version at all. You need an additional argument to cast doubt on the earlier version - which you try to do by pointing to their unverifiability. This, however, is a distinct argument than literary dependence.
3) You'll have to show that differences are indeed inconsistent.

If two theories are internally consistent but mutually exclusive, surely that isn't something that can be ignored? You wouldn't ignore it in a non-religious context would you? You wouldn't pass off differing theories for gravity as equally valid 'traditions' within science? How is it acceptable in a religious context.

I have no problem with a newer religion being a 'progressive' version of a previous religion because I have no problem with scientific theories behaving that way, it's part of what makes them scientific isn't it. Except that it's not one theory being corrective and progressive because that's not possible in religion. It's an entirely new hypothesis that happens to share a 'foundation' but is incompatible with other religious theories.

1) How about that Christians believe Jesus to be the son of god, or god himself incarnate, and Islam believes Jesus simply to be a prophet and not even the most important of the prophets. That's a non trivial distinction.

2) Ok, agreed, for the reasons in my reply to Dereds above although I think my point about the resulting reasonable doubt is sound even if it doesn't really achieve anything.

3) Aren't differences inconsistent by definition? Otherwise, they'd be the same religion, but they're not.

True. But here you're not talking about an event but a theological qualification. And a distinction is not necessarily an inconsistency or mutual exclusivity (is that even a word?). I.e. if christians believe jesus to be the son of god, they also believe that he acts as a prophet (since prophets are, basically, messengers of god).

Of course not, especially if you talk about traditions (rather than, say, doctrine). If one tradition uses prayers from the 3rd century throughout their religious practices and another tradition uses prayers by contemporary doctrine, they differ but certainly aren't inconsistent.

It's not even true on a theoretical level: Being green is different from being curvy but it's not inconsistent for something to be both green and curvy.

I think internal consistency has to come first, outside of that then we can start to compare some of the truth claims of various organisations against each other.

I'm not sure about the comparison with science, firstly we use science we know to be incorrect in domains where it is accurate and secondly the epistemology of science seems much clearer to me. I can get how we know science, I'm not sure how we can know religion.

I think politics may be a better example. Leninism would be a tradition within Marxism, Trotskyism similarly, both develop and claim traditions posited by Marx and Engels, many differences exist between the groups that would identify as Trotskyist and Leninist and within the sub groups.

I think Jesus is also an event since Christians believe that god sent us his son, Muslims don't. Muslims don't believe that Jesus was crucified, just killed. In the Sunni version, Jesus was replaced by a volunteer who was made to look him.

I'd say that those versions were mutually exclusive with Christian versions and qualify as inconsistencies. This supports Reasonable Doubt.

Unless the premise is that all green things are square. So if Jesus was the son of god, then Jesus couldn't have not been the son of god which is what Islam claims. That's inconsistent.

And what are the implications of this? If there are two internally consistent schools of thought (if it's even possible not to be internally consistent when it could be completely fabricated), each appearing equally valid, how is it possible to subscribe to one over the other?

True, not a great comparison. For me this makes religion even less credible. Where science meets well defined and rigorous criteria designed to expose fault or weakness, religious criteria seem arbitrarily awarded as suits each version put forward.

Are we heading for the word 'faith'?

I thought of politics but I think it's weak for the same reasons. Who can say which political system is 'correct' in the way that people can say that their interpretation of god is correct?

I think that's why it's a better example. I tend to think that when discussing things that are inherently uncertain that we need to make allowances for that uncertainty.

I think this is why we start at a particular juncture and work from there, it seems to me that internal consistency has to be the first challenge addressed. If a theory isn't consistent then it seems it's self defeating, if it's defeated on it's own terms I'mm not sure we need anything else.

We may be headed towards faith though I think it's more complex and we have to place the competing theories within a particular context.

You're conceptualizing a physical body as an event; that throws together different ontological categories. Usually, one needs good reason to do that, in particular if the upshot is limited. But no matter:
We've had this discussion before. Differing accounts of the same events are to be expected, given the long and complex process of passing them on through time. Their differing doesn't mean they're mutually exclusive. For example, from a christian PoV, the muslim teachings about Christ are consistent with the biblical story. Wrong, but consistent. I.e. being cruxified vs. being killed is not inconsistent and certainly not mutually exclusive. Being crucified and a doppelganger being crucified is again a difference, the emergence of which a christian can make sense of.
Happily throwing stuff together. We were talking about traditions. The example of Dereds regarding this point is very spot on: Differing political traditions within Leninism are different, but not necessarily (certainly not automatically) inconsistent. Asking how the fact that they differ relates to the "truth" of the underlying political conviction is besides the point, as these traditions are differing exemplifications of the same political belief. If Leninism is "metaphysically true", there is no reason to assume that there can't be multiple practical ways in which it can manifest itself within differing societies.

Political systems can be tested, evidence gathered, results made meaningful. That can't happen with religion so I'm not sure that there is a comparison that really works.

Ok. It seems to me then that religion is not internally consistent because Islam and Christianity have contradictory beliefs (sticking with those two for now but could use many other examples). Even within specific religions there is a lack of consistency, think how many version of Christianity there are. Some believe in Original sin, some believe in many wives, some believe god hates **** etc etc

I'd prefer not to get to a point where faith enters the discussion but I'm not sure it can be avoided.

I think this may be some semantic wriggling. Christians insist that Jesus was crucified, it's a fairly vital part of their belief system (the cross is their primary symbol) mostly because the bible records it that way and believing the four gospels is a fundamental aspect of their faith and the gospels say that Christ was crucified. For Muslims to say 'christ was not crucified' is not a trivial difference that can be ignored because he ends up dead either way. It's a significant divergence and a major inconsistency.

You could pass it off as errors made in the long process of passing them on, in fact I rely on that argument myself in this discussion but that doesn't change that it's an inconsistency.

I was just trying a little categorical logic

Really my answer boils down to 'you say traditions', 'I say inconsistencies' (based on my understanding that an inconsistency requires a contradiction and I see plenty of those even in the religions that are very similar to each other). Are we going in circles now?

One of the problems with political philosophies is that they can't be. Marxism struggles because of it's Big Idea and it's subsequent malleability to subsequent events. It may not be the perfect comparison but I think it's easier to compare religion to political philosophy than it is to science.

I think we're in danger of talking across ourselves and I'm not even making the claim that religious movements are internally consistent, only that they need to be as a starting point, if they aren't they may be considered self defeating. I don't think you can talk a bout internal consistency with external entities even those that retain a similarity such as religious and political groups.

Seems reasonable.

Frankly, this is quite complicated stuff in philosophy of language that you are dealing with here, and I don't really have much more time than to say that you are leaving out a lot of very relevant stuff here. For instance, let's say we understand "self" to refer to the body/mind/desires. You ask what the use of this would be. One usage would be as an indexical, where you identify something as my body/mind/desires rather than someone elses (interpret the "my" here however you want). Anyway, I would say that even if you think there is no such thing as the self (understood as a separate substance), I would still claim that inherent in our language are these ideas of the self.

Yes.

I never said "borrowed" or claimed that they were merely "similar." The Koran *recognizes* the Bible as "the book" and as being inspired. Muslims now simply believe that any part of the Bible that doesn't align with their revised and rewritten version are the "corrupt" parts.

Islam is an offshoot of Judaism/Christianity. If you take away the Hebrew scriptures, you don't have much of anything left in the Koran.

If I write a commentary on the Bible, does that mean that the Bible itself must be a commentary on some other religious book? I assume that is where you want to go.

My point is that the three largest monotheistic religions in the world are sourced from the same foundational texts. This is hardly a proof against the credibility of those "source" scriptures, and in fact, are just the opposite.

Furthermore, if I decided to rewrite the Bible stories 500 years or so after the fact, and give the main characters new names and add a bit here and take away a bit there, how does that affect the historical credibility of the original stories themselves, which, imo, are not being determined on my much-later rewrite (which was inspired by "hallucinations and revelation"), but instead on historical methods, no?

I don't know what you mean by 'the self in reality', though. Certainly there is no one thing I can point to, separate from my big toe or my earlobes or my hippocampus and say, There, that's my 'self'.

But given that 'everything is happening on its own' as you say, isn't it also true that there's nothing I can point to that is those things? And wouldn't that then lead us to conclude that those things, too, don't exist? So my thoughts, desires, etc, are not simply happening on their own (thus negating the self's existence), but they in themselves don't exist, since there is no locus I can point to which they occupy.

And again, I would say that you seem to dressing up a rejection of free will (or perhaps more properly, a reaction to the non-existence of free will) as a rejection of the 'self', which is confusing to me.

To be honest, it's pretty standard to accept definitions without question. Find me a dictionary or other appropriate source that offers a definition of 'thought' which doesn't imply a thinker and I'll probably have to concede that point.

I'd say the rain is doing the raining. 'Rain' is water falling from the sky. And I'd also say that the 'self' as a confluence of several phenomena, however automated, is both a useful and meaningful concept.

Yes. This is good for my case, not yours, no? You seemed to be saying that 'just happens' = 'actor doesn't exist'. Yet now you're cheerfully saying that digestion requires a digester, even though digestion just happens. So how come thoughts don't require a thinker even though they likewise just happen?

possibly, yes. It depends what you mean by "exist". I would say that thoughts exist, but the content of thought doesnt always refer to something in reality.
I dont think that any concepts exist, except in our thoughts.

Yes, free will and self are related to each other. If theres no self, theres no free will.

1) thoughts imply a thinker
2) therefore there must be a thinker.

You are implicitly accepting 2 because of 1. As most people do, which is fine. Its unquestioned from birth.


I agree that self is a useful concept.
How can rain be doing the raining? That doesnt make sense.



You misunderstood. It was an example of "X requires an X'er". I dont think that digestion requires a digester, it was an example to show that although we say "I digested" there was no control, input, or decisions over the digestion process.

Sure.

Sure, no self means no free will, as no arm means no hand. But no hand doesn't mean no arm, so does no free will mean no self? Rejection of free will doesn't entail rejection of will, only of the will's freedom.

You're leaving out a premise:

3) Thoughts imply a thinker
4) Thoughts exist
5) Therefore there must be a thinker

And seemingly you reject 3), right? I just don't understand why.

The same way that it's fire that does the burning.

Well, strictly speaking there was a degree both of control and (quite literally) input - I don't digest things I don't eat. And also the full process of 'digestion' begins with the act of chewing. But to address the substance of your point, I haven't asserted the existence of free will. I've questioned whether its absence negates the self.

because there is no evidence of one. A thinker, as in , one who thinks, who chooses the thought, who actively controls and affects thoughts. If you want to assert that the body, or brain, is doing the thinking, fine, but thats misleading too. The brain and thoughts are part of the same process.

and my answer is the same. Fire doesnt do the burning. the fire and the burning are the same thing.


Who or what was the controller ? Who or what decided what to eat?

The absence of free will doesnt negate the self. Looking for a self and not finding one negates the self.

I'd ask if Ice and freezing would be the same thing too. On top of that, your answer implies that the sentence "This fire is burning" has no significant synthetical meaning as it would be equivalent to "This A is an A", which is a tautology.

This, however, is clearly not the case for the sentence "This fire is burning" as it clearly tells us something non-tautologic, for example, that the fire is burning, rather than blazing, dying, smoldering, smoking or w/e.