More Craig vs. Krauss
Okay, well frame it however you want then. Granted I didn't read mrmr's discussion so maybe it is in there, but it still isn't clear to me whether you even think the universe is or is not fine tuned, or why you think this. On multiple times I've queried you to define (err...describe?) things however you like, so it isn't like I am forcing you into a specific framing. Just explain your view with whatever framing you like, because it is far from clear to me what it is you think.
All I got was that patterns are inherently interesting, with the implication that our universe has patterns but if the universe were different than it is, it would not have patterns and/or would not be interesting, so therefore something, so therefore fine tuning.
Demonstrate that our universe is more "inherently interesting" than other conceivable universes? Not attempted.
The two concepts are substantially different. Design as you suggest is indeed difficult to describe, let alone to quantify. With the exception of specifying what exactly is meant by "small" (less than 5%, say), the fine tunedness of the universe is relatively objective according to that descriptive definition. We can put different values into equations and determine that it predicts physics completely different than our own and prevents life as we know it. Granted it isn't completely objective (what is "fundamental" is probably fairly subjective) but I'd say it is an order of magnitude easier to work with than design.
If you still think these are substantially different, then there's probably very little more you can say about fine-tuning that I'm going to find meaningful.
Perhaps it is better to delineate between the two related concepts (the property of the universe, and the argument for a deity). A universe has the property UM if small variations in fundamental constants result in life not being possible. The universe has the property AW if it is not the result of chance. Then the FTA (fine-tunedness argument) is the argument that UM implies AW is likely. So, do you agree that my toy universe has the property UM?
It is interesting that you had to create your own example and not use mine to try and find a problem. I didn't suggest we should try models for the universe with internal contradictions. In this modified newtonian world, you haven't shown any contradiction of having a one over distance cubed dependency.
Suppose you change your formula from being an inverse square to an inverse cube. You now need to change the units on G in order to get units of force. But when you do this, you then need to look at the Einstein Field Equations (general relativity) because those depend on G as well. So those units now need to be adjusted. Except that it's not one equation, but really 10 equations that need adjustment (fortunately, they're all of a similar form). And now you've changed the energy-momentum tensor, which means you've got to now look at Maxwell's equations in GR and then also check the impact of changing these equations with the other Maxwell's equations, and continue to make adjustments from there.
And none of this even looks at whether the changes that were made make anything a proper generalization or special case of anything else. It's far from obvious that changing Newton's equation for gravity will be a proper special case of Einstein's equation.
Naive physics is simply insufficient to have this conversation. You can't make an arbitrary change the type you suggest without needing to completely rewrite a huge amount of physics. It's not nearly as simple as you think it is.
I cannot find a reference now, but I once saw on PBS something about a tribe of people who venerate the color red. They would undoubtedly find an Old Cat to be more "intrinsically interesting" than a royal flush in spades.
What, if anything, privileges your view that the royal flush is more interesting (or indeed, the only one of the two that is intrinsically interesting at all)?
What, if anything, privileges your view that the royal flush is more interesting (or indeed, the only one of the two that is intrinsically interesting at all)?
What are the attributes of 5 playing cards? Suit and rank only? Maybe also standard size or large print. What else? They could be mini-sized, or jumbo magic-trick sized cards. Manufacturer. Plastic coated paper or plastic through and through. That is about it, right? What about density? What about size and shape as measured by something more exacting than a human eye? What if a smudge of pheromone imperceptible to the human nose on one card makes it more "intrinsically interesting" to an insect of some kind? Is the insect wrong? Or does its interest not count because it isn't as intellectually developed as a human?
In fact, there is a very long list of facts we could denote about two piles of cards, facts which differ wildly on some scale. Even a single card probably has many gradations of color on it.
In fact, there is a very long list of facts we could denote about two piles of cards, facts which differ wildly on some scale. Even a single card probably has many gradations of color on it.
When you say that a royal flush is inherently interesting, if you mean it is more interesting to you and I because of reasons relating to biology and culture, then I agree.
But if you claim that a royal flush is truly inherently interesting and an Old Cat is not, and you mean that on the long list of attributes that actually define the cards, the characteristics that speak loudest to human beings, i.e. the ones that present themselves in the narrow range of our senses, determine that the royal IS inherently interesting, and all those other attributes be damned, the Old Cat is not, then I think you would need to prove it, because it is not obvious to me.
But if you claim that a royal flush is truly inherently interesting and an Old Cat is not, and you mean that on the long list of attributes that actually define the cards, the characteristics that speak loudest to human beings, i.e. the ones that present themselves in the narrow range of our senses, determine that the royal IS inherently interesting, and all those other attributes be damned, the Old Cat is not, then I think you would need to prove it, because it is not obvious to me.
And indeed, this is exactly what I think the fine tuning argument does. It holds up a picture of the universe, and sees a picture of human beings and says "this demands explanation." Granted, you also think atoms are amazing, but that does not change the thrust of the argument. You think the things that are interesting to you make the universe inherently in need of a special explanation (or rather, that it suggests we should suspect a special explanation, etc.), and implicitly, other hypothetical universes do not have this property of being interesting and requiring special explanation. This, despite the fact that they would hypothetically have all kinds of attributes of their own which could hypothetically produce patterns that someone could marvel at, but which you declare are simply not interesting.
But this still doesn't argue anything in particular against the fine-tuning argument. You're still holding the NUH-UH position that says that no matter what, you can't conclude anything about the universe. That's ultimately going to be an unsuccessful argument no matter how you slice it. It's like arguing with a skeptic. They will continue to grasp at anything at all that they think supports their argument in order to maintain that they're relevant in the conversation.
Maybe at this point it is worth going into the math and physics of the fine tuning argument, because they are suspect, and actual physicists have been known to speak out against the veracity of the claims.
Every stop the debate until you read this book.
http://www.amazon.com/Our-Mathematic.../dp/0307599809
That's an order.
http://www.amazon.com/Our-Mathematic.../dp/0307599809
That's an order.
our physical reality is a mathematical structure
PairTheBoard
Every stop the debate until you read this book.
http://www.amazon.com/Our-Mathematic.../dp/0307599809
That's an order.
http://www.amazon.com/Our-Mathematic.../dp/0307599809
That's an order.
Also might be valuable to read this debate on the anthropic arguments:
http://edge.org/3rd_culture/smolin_s..._susskind.html
..especially the final Letter by Susskind. ( feel free to skip all of Smolins side of the debate as it is summarized well by opponent. IMO ). It is not specifically about fine-tuning in fact I am sure both sides agree that fine-tuning is on. Interestingly, Susskind has stated elsewhere that the only explanations for fine-tuning are multiverse or theism ( He is not a theist ).
The alternative idea that the many constants of the standard model and cosmology will all be derived theoretically looks hopeless at this point ( see Weinberg, Dreams of a Final Theory).
One other thing, Sklansky's idea that fine-tuning is like winning a lottery with 12 number picks instead of 6, or whatever, illustrates the actual situation much better that some other examples. Some sort of explanation is required other than someone had to win.
Dave
naive reality look more like the metaphor and Platonists will argue
that mathematical structures necessarily exist as part of reality.
Just asking for clarification.
We have this for the fine-tuning argument or heuristic:
Notice that nowhere in the argument do you see the term "fine tuned". In particular, the argument does not assert that the Universe is "fine-tuned".
The argument looks a little awkward to me in this form. Trying to see exactly how the argument is working I suggest this rewording of it. I believe the rewording is logically equivalent. If it's not I'd like to know why.
"It's unlikely that the parameters of our universe were the result of chance *Because* they must have fallen within a narrow range for life as we know it to have formed."
Call that the "narrow parameter range for life" argument rather than "fine tuned argument" if you prefer.
PairTheBoard
*IF* the parameters of the universe were changed, life (as we understand it) could not form. Since the parameters must fall within a narrow collection of ranges, then it's unlikely to be the result of chance.
The argument looks a little awkward to me in this form. Trying to see exactly how the argument is working I suggest this rewording of it. I believe the rewording is logically equivalent. If it's not I'd like to know why.
"It's unlikely that the parameters of our universe were the result of chance *Because* they must have fallen within a narrow range for life as we know it to have formed."
Call that the "narrow parameter range for life" argument rather than "fine tuned argument" if you prefer.
PairTheBoard
I don't think I like the words interesting and meaningful, because they require context. It's difficult to know whether we are using the same or different context when we use these words. In a universe devoid of life and consciousness, would you feel that the pattern of a snowflake is meaningful or interesting? If so, to whom? To what? And in what context?
It seems to me, that a better word to describe what you're really talking about (or what you mean?), is coincidence. It would be a remarkable coincidence if every hand were dealt all one suit. But a coincidence necessitates at least a 2nd event. It requires a comparison. If you stopped for gas this morning and saw that pump #3 was out of order, so you pulled up to pump #5 and put 14.3 gallons in your car totaling $32.61, this would not be remarkable. However, if I told you that the EXACT same thing happened to me, including pump #3 being out of order, and the exact total, etc., we could certainly call it a coincidence.
We can call an all suited hand meaningful (as you put it), only because we know how mathematically improbable it is. Would your hypothetical gas station stop be mathematically improbable? Of course not. It only becomes interesting upon learning of my 2nd and identical event. Before that, each of our fueling stops were nothing out of the ordinary.
So am I wrong to apply this same logic to the universe? It may very well be remarkable that the universe is tuned exactly as it is. But I do not find this overly impressive, because one thing is for sure.. If it weren't tuned this way, we wouldn't exist to have this conversation.
I guess what I'm saying is that there is no other context with which to view things. Yes, patterns are interesting to us, but they require comparison and conscious minds to recognize them. Are they meaningful? Well, faces in the clouds are interesting too. But how can they be meaningful if no one is around to assign meaning? Ditto for all suited hands (I think)..
It seems to me, that a better word to describe what you're really talking about (or what you mean?), is coincidence. It would be a remarkable coincidence if every hand were dealt all one suit. But a coincidence necessitates at least a 2nd event. It requires a comparison. If you stopped for gas this morning and saw that pump #3 was out of order, so you pulled up to pump #5 and put 14.3 gallons in your car totaling $32.61, this would not be remarkable. However, if I told you that the EXACT same thing happened to me, including pump #3 being out of order, and the exact total, etc., we could certainly call it a coincidence.
We can call an all suited hand meaningful (as you put it), only because we know how mathematically improbable it is. Would your hypothetical gas station stop be mathematically improbable? Of course not. It only becomes interesting upon learning of my 2nd and identical event. Before that, each of our fueling stops were nothing out of the ordinary.
So am I wrong to apply this same logic to the universe? It may very well be remarkable that the universe is tuned exactly as it is. But I do not find this overly impressive, because one thing is for sure.. If it weren't tuned this way, we wouldn't exist to have this conversation.
I guess what I'm saying is that there is no other context with which to view things. Yes, patterns are interesting to us, but they require comparison and conscious minds to recognize them. Are they meaningful? Well, faces in the clouds are interesting too. But how can they be meaningful if no one is around to assign meaning? Ditto for all suited hands (I think)..
Let me first note that I after you got mad that I wasn't using your "framing", I asked you to give whatever framing you want, and to make it clear to us (since mrmr doesn't know either) whether you even think the universe is or is not fine tuned, and why. You completely ignore this. Vintage Aaron.
You seem to be getting quite confused about the different parts of the argument. I carefully delineated these in the part you quoted (but seemingly ignored). There is a descriptive claim about the universe that I labeled UM. And there is a causal claim about the universe that I labeled AW. Together the argument is that if UM, then AW is likely.
What you are doing here is using "fine-tuned" anonymously with "result of intention". Now I'm going to quote you here and see if the word "intention" comes up anywhere:
While I agree with PairTheBoard that this is very poorly worded, you started with an observation about the universe, that changing the parameters a bit means life can't form. I don't know what you want to call universes that have this property. Often they are just called fine-tuned. I called them having UM.
So when I asked whether my toy universe was fine-tuned I - as I asked in the previous post and you ignored - was asking if it had the property UM. Do you think this is the case?
Again, I'm working from your "description". The observation of the universe YOU gave is a fairly objective one: small changes in parameters prevent life as we know it. We can speak far more objectively that the universe has this property than that it has the property of design which - unlike the description you gave for fine tuning - I suspect you won't be able to provide even a good description.
At the end of the day, I am still unsure what the disagreement is. It seems like you want to try and nitpick everything I say (and are doing a pretty bad job at this). But I am not sure what if any actual difference there is on our conceptions of the concept of fine tuning.
Just lol. I explicitly stated I was making a modification in the "newtonian world" and changed newton's equation and your response is to be "LOLOLOL but GR would change too!" Well no **** sherlock, but I wasn't talking about the GR model of the universe, now was I?
You seem to have missed the point entirely, though. The point was that in the fine tuning argument we are changing our models of the universe a bit. I see no a priori reason why the only allowable change is to vary certain empirical constants but are going to complete disallow changing the structure of the equations themselves. It is saying we allow one type of change to our models, but not another type of change. Of course I don't suggest proposing models with internal contradictions (as your laughable made up example did). And it is perfectly fine to illustrate this point in the simpler Netwonian model of the universe without you coming in with but but but but GR. My goodness.
What you are doing here is using "fine-tuned" anonymously with "result of intention". Now I'm going to quote you here and see if the word "intention" comes up anywhere:
*IF* the parameters of the universe were changed, life (as we understand it) could not form. Since the parameters must fall within a narrow collection of ranges, then it's unlikely to be the result of chance.
So when I asked whether my toy universe was fine-tuned I - as I asked in the previous post and you ignored - was asking if it had the property UM. Do you think this is the case?
At the end of the day, I am still unsure what the disagreement is. It seems like you want to try and nitpick everything I say (and are doing a pretty bad job at this). But I am not sure what if any actual difference there is on our conceptions of the concept of fine tuning.
Suppose you change your formula from being an inverse square to an inverse cube. You now need to change the units on G in order to get units of force. But when you do this, you then need to look at the Einstein Field Equations (general relativity) because those depend on G as well. So those units now need to be adjusted. Except that it's not one equation, but really 10 equations that need adjustment (fortunately, they're all of a similar form). And now you've changed the energy-momentum tensor, which means you've got to now look at Maxwell's equations in GR and then also check the impact of changing these equations with the other Maxwell's equations, and continue to make adjustments from there.
You seem to have missed the point entirely, though. The point was that in the fine tuning argument we are changing our models of the universe a bit. I see no a priori reason why the only allowable change is to vary certain empirical constants but are going to complete disallow changing the structure of the equations themselves. It is saying we allow one type of change to our models, but not another type of change. Of course I don't suggest proposing models with internal contradictions (as your laughable made up example did). And it is perfectly fine to illustrate this point in the simpler Netwonian model of the universe without you coming in with but but but but GR. My goodness.
By the way, one person's rambling is another person's good faith effort to have a conversation. Wouldn't this be less interesting, less accessible, and less informative, if I answered questions as you do, i.e. "you think that's what I said? yawn" rather than explaining, and attempting to use different analogies when you are apparently unable to understand. Why don't you try rambling a little bit and carefully explain (again) what exactly it is you are defending.
This reminds me of the Sleeping Beauty Paradox we debated on SMP. Beauty is put to sleep Sunday night for a week, except for one or two brief awakenings. A coin is flipped after she goes to sleep Sunday night. If heads she is awoken briefly on Monday only. If Tails she is awoken briefly on Monday and again on Tuesday. In that case she is given amnesia when put back to sleep on Monday so when she is awoken again on Tuesday she has no memory of the Monday awakening. She is informed of all this before being put to sleep Sunday night. But she receives no additional information when she is awoken on Monday or possibly Tuesday.
The problem is, what probability should Beauty rationally maintain when awakened for the proposition, "The coin landed heads"?
Our debate as well as that across the internet was fairly closely divided between those who think she should say, 1/2 and 1/3. Even the great Kurzweil of recent Singularity and "We're likely living in a Simulation" fame wrote a paper on the paradox suggesting a kind of mixed solution. I'm not inviting a rehash of that debate though.
What I do think is interesting is the solution (imo The Solution) our own jason1990 came up with. Under an Information Theory model for probability theory he said that in the spirit of "no new information" Beauty should maintain the same probability for heads as she had when told about the upcoming coin flip Sunday night, 1/2. However, and this is where it gets interesting, If upon an awakening Beauty is allowed to roll a million sided die and when she does so it comes up say, 752,233, then she can make a Bayesian calculation based on the prior probabilities of that happening under heads and tails. That calculation produces approximately the probability of 1/3 for heads.
Now for the part I think is relevant to this discussion. Objecting to jason1990, I argued that Beauty doesn't really need to roll the die. All she needs is to know that IF she rolled such a die it would be bound to come up SOME unlikely number and she could use that number - whatever it might be - to make the same Bayesian calculation. So she ought to say 1/3 whether she rolls such a die or not.
jason1990 emphatically rejected that argument and showed me the mathematics proving it fallacious. Something about Total Probability I think. It should be in the archives somewhere.
Anyway, I think this illustrates that stuff like this can be tricky.
PairTheBoard
The problem is, what probability should Beauty rationally maintain when awakened for the proposition, "The coin landed heads"?
Our debate as well as that across the internet was fairly closely divided between those who think she should say, 1/2 and 1/3. Even the great Kurzweil of recent Singularity and "We're likely living in a Simulation" fame wrote a paper on the paradox suggesting a kind of mixed solution. I'm not inviting a rehash of that debate though.
What I do think is interesting is the solution (imo The Solution) our own jason1990 came up with. Under an Information Theory model for probability theory he said that in the spirit of "no new information" Beauty should maintain the same probability for heads as she had when told about the upcoming coin flip Sunday night, 1/2. However, and this is where it gets interesting, If upon an awakening Beauty is allowed to roll a million sided die and when she does so it comes up say, 752,233, then she can make a Bayesian calculation based on the prior probabilities of that happening under heads and tails. That calculation produces approximately the probability of 1/3 for heads.
Now for the part I think is relevant to this discussion. Objecting to jason1990, I argued that Beauty doesn't really need to roll the die. All she needs is to know that IF she rolled such a die it would be bound to come up SOME unlikely number and she could use that number - whatever it might be - to make the same Bayesian calculation. So she ought to say 1/3 whether she rolls such a die or not.
jason1990 emphatically rejected that argument and showed me the mathematics proving it fallacious. Something about Total Probability I think. It should be in the archives somewhere.
Anyway, I think this illustrates that stuff like this can be tricky.
PairTheBoard
Notice that in this Sleeping Beauty Paradox, Beauty can make the Bayesian probability calculation based on the result of 752,233 for her roll of the million sided die because She knows something about the prior probability of heads to begin with.
PairTheBoard
I don't think I like the words interesting and meaningful, because they require context. It's difficult to know whether we are using the same or different context when we use these words. In a universe devoid of life and consciousness, would you feel that the pattern of a snowflake is meaningful or interesting? If so, to whom? To what? And in what context?
It seems to me, that a better word to describe what you're really talking about (or what you mean?), is coincidence. It would be a remarkable coincidence if every hand were dealt all one suit. But a coincidence necessitates at least a 2nd event. It requires a comparison. If you stopped for gas this morning and saw that pump #3 was out of order, so you pulled up to pump #5 and put 14.3 gallons in your car totaling $32.61, this would not be remarkable. However, if I told you that the EXACT same thing happened to me, including pump #3 being out of order, and the exact total, etc., we could certainly call it a coincidence.
We can call an all suited hand meaningful (as you put it), only because we know how mathematically improbable it is. Would your hypothetical gas station stop be mathematically improbable? Of course not. It only becomes interesting upon learning of my 2nd and identical event. Before that, each of our fueling stops were nothing out of the ordinary.
So am I wrong to apply this same logic to the universe? It may very well be remarkable that the universe is tuned exactly as it is. But I do not find this overly impressive, because one thing is for sure.. If it weren't tuned this way, we wouldn't exist to have this conversation.
I guess what I'm saying is that there is no other context with which to view things. Yes, patterns are interesting to us, but they require comparison and conscious minds to recognize them. Are they meaningful? Well, faces in the clouds are interesting too. But how can they be meaningful if no one is around to assign meaning? Ditto for all suited hands (I think)..
Not too far away from your question is the question of whether primes would exist if the human mind did not conceive of them. We view math as attaining certain types of transcendent properties to the point that we would expect intelligent life from other parts of the universe to comprehend it. Are prime numbers interesting only because they're interesting to us? Does the universe contain interesting patterns as part of its fabric, regardless of human (or other intelligent) interaction with them?
We have this for the fine-tuning argument or heuristic:
Notice that nowhere in the argument do you see the term "fine tuned". In particular, the argument does not assert that the Universe is "fine-tuned".
The argument looks a little awkward to me in this form. Trying to see exactly how the argument is working I suggest this rewording of it. I believe the rewording is logically equivalent. If it's not I'd like to know why.
"It's unlikely that the parameters of our universe were the result of chance *Because* they must have fallen within a narrow range for life as we know it to have formed."
Call that the "narrow parameter range for life" argument rather than "fine tuned argument" if you prefer.
PairTheBoard
Notice that nowhere in the argument do you see the term "fine tuned". In particular, the argument does not assert that the Universe is "fine-tuned".
The argument looks a little awkward to me in this form. Trying to see exactly how the argument is working I suggest this rewording of it. I believe the rewording is logically equivalent. If it's not I'd like to know why.
"It's unlikely that the parameters of our universe were the result of chance *Because* they must have fallen within a narrow range for life as we know it to have formed."
Call that the "narrow parameter range for life" argument rather than "fine tuned argument" if you prefer.
PairTheBoard
Let me first note that I after you got mad that I wasn't using your "framing", I asked you to give whatever framing you want, and to make it clear to us (since mrmr doesn't know either) whether you even think the universe is or is not fine tuned, and why. You completely ignore this. Vintage Aaron.
I'm sympathetic to the viewpoint that the universe is "fine-tuned" in some sense. But I don't believe that the fine-tuning argument proves this. I've been very clear about what I believe the fine-tuning argument does and does not do.
You seem to be getting quite confused about the different parts of the argument. I carefully delineated these in the part you quoted (but seemingly ignored). There is a descriptive claim about the universe that I labeled UM. And there is a causal claim about the universe that I labeled AW. Together the argument is that if UM, then AW is likely.
What you are doing here is using "fine-tuned" anonymously with "result of intention". Now I'm going to quote you here and see if the word "intention" comes up anywhere:
What you are doing here is using "fine-tuned" anonymously with "result of intention". Now I'm going to quote you here and see if the word "intention" comes up anywhere:
You're doing much harm to the fine-tuning argument by trying to force it to overstate its position. Fine-tuning is a heuristic. It doesn't draw a formal conclusion based on a deductive pattern of thought.
While I agree with PairTheBoard that this is very poorly worded, you started with an observation about the universe, that changing the parameters a bit means life can't form. I don't know what you want to call universes that have this property. Often they are just called fine-tuned. I called them having UM.
So when I asked whether my toy universe was fine-tuned I - as I asked in the previous post and you ignored - was asking if it had the property UM. Do you think this is the case?
So when I asked whether my toy universe was fine-tuned I - as I asked in the previous post and you ignored - was asking if it had the property UM. Do you think this is the case?
Again, I'm working from your "description". The observation of the universe YOU gave is a fairly objective one: small changes in parameters prevent life as we know it. We can speak far more objectively that the universe has this property than that it has the property of design which - unlike the description you gave for fine tuning - I suspect you won't be able to provide even a good description.
At the end of the day, I am still unsure what the disagreement is. It seems like you want to try and nitpick everything I say (and are doing a pretty bad job at this). But I am not sure what if any actual difference there is on our conceptions of the concept of fine tuning.
At the end of the day, I am still unsure what the disagreement is. It seems like you want to try and nitpick everything I say (and are doing a pretty bad job at this). But I am not sure what if any actual difference there is on our conceptions of the concept of fine tuning.
Just lol. I explicitly stated I was making a modification in the "newtonian world" and changed newton's equation and your response is to be "LOLOLOL but GR would change too!" Well no **** sherlock, but I wasn't talking about the GR model of the universe, now was I?
You seem to have missed the point entirely, though. The point was that in the fine tuning argument we are changing our models of the universe a bit. I see no a priori reason why the only allowable change is to vary certain empirical constants but are going to complete disallow changing the structure of the equations themselves. It is saying we allow one type of change to our models, but not another type of change. Of course I don't suggest proposing models with internal contradictions (as your laughable made up example did). And it is perfectly fine to illustrate this point in the simpler Netwonian model of the universe without you coming in with but but but but GR. My goodness.
I'm not arguing whether I believe the universe is fine-tuned. You would note that if you were actually paying attention, I'm arguing that mrmr's presentation doesn't accurately reflect the fine-tuning argument. There's a big and obvious distinction between the two.
I'm sympathetic to the viewpoint that the universe is "fine-tuned" in some sense. But I don't believe that the fine-tuning argument proves this. I've been very clear about what I believe the fine-tuning argument does and does not do.
I'm sympathetic to the viewpoint that the universe is "fine-tuned" in some sense. But I don't believe that the fine-tuning argument proves this. I've been very clear about what I believe the fine-tuning argument does and does not do.
Given a complete lack of any actual content in your entire post, let me try this: Recall how I carefully delineated between the two ideas going on, the descriptive property UM and the causal property AW. Do you believe our universe has the descriptive property UM, namely that small changes in fundamental parameters eliminate life as we know it?
From the beginning, I have suspected that we don't actually have any disagreement, and your unending tendency to try and create silly objections to other people without offering any substantive position of your own is the only reason why it isn't obvious we agree. I suspect we both agree that the universe has the property UM. And I suspect (given how you don't think the fine-tuning argument proves the universe is fine-tuned) that, like me, you don't find persuasive the argument that the property UM means AW is likely. And that this is also true for my toy universe. If I am not wrong, it is amazing to me that you have done everything in your power to hold onto the pretense of having a conversation while avoiding actually saying so.
Who cares about a priori reasons? I'm giving you an a posteori reason why random alterations to the equations isn't a good way to try to adjust the parameters. The naive thing of treating physics equations as if there are no units involved doesn't reflect how physics is done in reality. So if you want to play with toy models that don't generalize and become incoherent with each other, I don't see why I should care.
This has already been answered. Matching symbols is intrinsically interesting. Sequences of objects are intrinsically interesting, regardless of which symbols you're matching. Even if you want to deny the meaning of the rank of cards, flushes are still more interesting than random assortments of suits.
Why is your opinion of what is interesting privileged over anyone else's?
You have completely ended any pretense of rational discourse when you write off everything I wrote on this topic with your "patterns are intrinsically interesting" reply.
Are your favorite jokes intrinsically funnier than the ones you don't like?
The real question is "What is your model?" When we use a mathematical model of cards with which we do probabilities, we don't care about all of those other things. So this is all nonsense that's irrelevant to the concept of modeling cards from a mathematical perspective. And since we're talking about mathematical models, this is all pointless gibberish.
Please find the physicists who speak out about the claims and look at their specific objections. Their objections have little to do with the calculations behind the fine-tuning arguments. They do not reject those parts of the claim. Rather, they reject on various "philosophical" grounds. For example, they try to explain it away using a multiple universe hypothesis. Or they posit (similar to Sklansky) that there are unknown logical connections between the parameters so that they aren't to be seen as independent values.
I'd suggest this joke is intrinsically funny.
This is the type of argument that doesn't allow us to say anything meaningful besides "it's just the way it is." Again, that's a perfectly valid way to view things. But many people find that explanation to fall short because it can kind of be used whenever you want to use it and it denies the application of the mind to consider connections. It functions kind of like a god-of-the-gaps argument in that it says that there's no further meaningful inquiry into the question because of a fiat claim.
If a tree falls in a forest... ?
Not too far away from your question is the question of whether primes would exist if the human mind did not conceive of them. We view math as attaining certain types of transcendent properties to the point that we would expect intelligent life from other parts of the universe to comprehend it. Are prime numbers interesting only because they're interesting to us? Does the universe contain interesting patterns as part of its fabric, regardless of human (or other intelligent) interaction with them?
Originally Posted by PairTheBoard
The argument looks a little awkward to me in this form. Trying to see exactly how the argument is working I suggest this rewording of it.
"It's unlikely that the parameters of our universe were the result of chance *Because* they must have fallen within a narrow range for life as we know it to have formed."
"It's unlikely that the parameters of our universe were the result of chance *Because* they must have fallen within a narrow range for life as we know it to have formed."
Suppose it had instead been found that there was no wiggle room at all for the parameters. i.e. The parameters needed to be exactly what they are. That would amount to the narrowest of ranges. Do you think the argument still sounds reasonable. Consider how it would look.
"It's unlikely that the parameters of our universe were the result of chance because they needed to be exactly as they are for life as we know it to have formed."
Before I'd ever heard of the fine-tuning argument this is what I thought the situation was. The universe being as it is allows for the formation of life. Does that imply it was unlikely for the Universe to be as it is? I don't see that at all. How could it be otherwise than what it is?
PairTheBoard
Well, if you didn't read it, I've completely summarized my position in this thread in that. So you don't really have any excuses.
The "some sense" is primarily an intuitive reading of data. I understand the intuition behind the claim, so that while I admit that the argument is incomplete, I tend to lean in the direction of the conclusion. For anyone who has analyzed their beliefs carefully, this type of move should be familiar. It's not hard to recognize arguments that are weak where you nonetheless tend to accept the conclusion.
Yes.
Why do you think it's also true in your toy universe? You've gone from an actual universe with lots of data and lots of areas in which that connection could be made (not to mention a lot of first-hand experiences which would be impossible to quantify) to this hypothetical universe in which you give just a singular data point. And you expect that the same type of inductive reasoning could be applied in the same way? You surely aren't that bad at logic.
See above. If you treat the argument as if it is a formal implication (that the conclusion follows from the hypothesis in the same way all the time), then you're basically treating the argument syllogistically, just like a deductive argument.
I did. You just don't like the answer because it doesn't fit your preconceived notions. It could not be the case that gravity has 1/r^3 dependency at Newtonian scales because it isn't consistent with the rest of physics. If you don't think that's actually a problem, that's not really my concern.
It's really ironic because you're saying "nobody is suggesting making Newtonian physics incompatible with GR" yet you're making a move that makes that happen. So what am I to say to you?
You can propose any type of physics you want. I don't really care what physics you propose. But what you pose is a fundamentally different type of change. Why not just propose a hypothetical universe that doesn't conform to any mathematical laws at all? Why limit yourself to mathematical laws?
As I said, you can propose any type of changes you want. They just won't be meaningful in a productive way. There's such a thing as being too arbitrary. One should consider things that we know nothing about to demonstrate that we can't discover anything about something we know something about.
Right... it doesn't touch your point even though it addressed precisely the types of problems that arise by making completely arbitrary changes to the existing set of physical laws. Oh, I was only talking about *NEWTONIAN* physics, as if that's completely independent of GR and the two don't need to connect to each other. Why not just throw out all of physics entirely?
Right. We should also propose that instead of positive and negative charges, that there are five directions of charges. Maybe life will still be possible in that situation?
Naive assumptions lead to naive conclusions. If you want to play the game of naive argumentation, be my guest.
If there is something critical there, you can quote it, because at this point I have almost no idea what it is you think the fine-tuning argument does or does not do, or what the "some sense" you find yourself sympathetic to. Amazing to me that when asked your view you say you agree in "some sense" without any attempt to elaborate on what that sense actually is.
Given a complete lack of any actual content in your entire post, let me try this: Recall how I carefully delineated between the two ideas going on, the descriptive property UM and the causal property AW. Do you believe our universe has the descriptive property UM, namely that small changes in fundamental parameters eliminate life as we know it?
From the beginning, I have suspected that we don't actually have any disagreement, and your unending tendency to try and create silly objections to other people without offering any substantive position of your own is the only reason why it isn't obvious we agree. I suspect we both agree that the universe has the property UM. And I suspect (given how you don't think the fine-tuning argument proves the universe is fine-tuned) that, like me, you don't find persuasive the argument that the property UM means AW is likely. And that this is also true for my toy universe. If I am not wrong, it is amazing to me that you have done everything in your power to hold onto the pretense of having a conversation while avoiding actually saying so.
Sure. Borrowing your phrasing with my abreviations, the argument only was that AW is likely given UM. I don't think I ever suggested it was deductive. Very strange that you felt the need to say this.
I'm curious if you will ever actually be able to give a reason why it could not be the case that gravity has 1/r^3 dependency at newtonian scales. Yes of course GR is going to be different if gravity is different, but can you actually answer the question? Your only objection right now is "well ya it would change EFEs!". Duh. Nobody is suggesting making Newtonian physics incompatible with GR.
It's really ironic because you're saying "nobody is suggesting making Newtonian physics incompatible with GR" yet you're making a move that makes that happen. So what am I to say to you?
I was just illustrating a point with the much simpler to understand and express ITT Newtonian model (and where there is no contradictions named by you). If you can prefer, you can consider any other consistent model slightly different from our own.
Unless your position is that it is impossible to propose any other physical model of the universe than our current one, you are still missing the forest for the trees here. My point is that considering other models should not be constrained to the identical model we have with simple changing empirical constants.
Arguing that a particular change causes contradictions (see your made up example because you couldn't do it for mine) or that one might need to do other work if we are going to consider the expanded GR model too (when i was clearly talking about a newtonian model of the universe) just doesn't touch this point.
Yes we need to avoid contradictions and yes complete models of the universe might take time to right down in entirety. But the point about alternate models of the universe nonetheless stands entirely untouched by you.
Laughably untouched, I would add. Vintage Aaron making something up to (poorly) nit up about while ignoring the point entirely, untouched, even.
I just meant that each of us encountering an out of order pump #3 and putting in the exact amount of gas as we did in our example at stations with the exact price per gallon would NOT be considered meaningful for either of us. It is only after we learn of the other's exact occurrence that it becomes interesting.
Perhaps people's brains just work differently like how some are creative, some not so creative, etc. For me, I'm not really interested in meaning. Again to parrot some scientists, 'why' questions are kind of dumb. Usually when someone asks 'why', what they really mean 'how'. For example, are you concerned with why the universe is the way it is? Or do you really want to know how it is the way it is?
Well I know we're on the same page, because I almost said the same thing -lol.
I used to be of the opinion that math/numbers wouldn't exist if we hadn't invented the language. Bunny had very strong arguments to the contrary. I'm still not sure I agree, but I think it's fascinating to think about!
I used to be of the opinion that math/numbers wouldn't exist if we hadn't invented the language. Bunny had very strong arguments to the contrary. I'm still not sure I agree, but I think it's fascinating to think about!
o.k.
Suppose it had instead been found that there was no wiggle room at all for the parameters. i.e. The parameters needed to be exactly what they are. That would amount to the narrowest of ranges. Do you think the argument still sounds reasonable. Consider how it would look.
"It's unlikely that the parameters of our universe were the result of chance because they needed to be exactly as they are for life as we know it to have formed."
Suppose it had instead been found that there was no wiggle room at all for the parameters. i.e. The parameters needed to be exactly what they are. That would amount to the narrowest of ranges. Do you think the argument still sounds reasonable. Consider how it would look.
"It's unlikely that the parameters of our universe were the result of chance because they needed to be exactly as they are for life as we know it to have formed."
Before I'd ever heard of the fine-tuning argument this is what I thought the situation was. The universe being as it is allows for the formation of life. Does that imply it was unlikely for the Universe to be as it is? I don't see that at all. How could it be otherwise than what it is?
The "some sense" is primarily an intuitive reading of data. I understand the intuition behind the claim, so that while I admit that the argument is incomplete, I tend to lean in the direction of the conclusion. For anyone who has analyzed their beliefs carefully, this type of move should be familiar. It's not hard to recognize arguments that are weak where you nonetheless tend to accept the conclusion.
Yes.
Why do you think it's also true in your toy universe? You've gone from an actual universe with lots of data and lots of areas in which that connection could be made (not to mention a lot of first-hand experiences which would be impossible to quantify) to this hypothetical universe in which you give just a singular data point. And you expect that the same type of inductive reasoning could be applied in the same way?
See above. If you treat the argument as if it is a formal implication (that the conclusion follows from the hypothesis in the same way all the time), then you're basically treating the argument syllogistically, just like a deductive argument.
I did. You just don't like the answer because it doesn't fit your preconceived notions. It could not be the case that gravity has 1/r^3 dependency at Newtonian scales because it isn't consistent with the rest of physics. If you don't think that's actually a problem, that's not really my concern.
It's really ironic because you're saying "nobody is suggesting making Newtonian physics incompatible with GR" yet you're making a move that makes that happen. So what am I to say to you?
It's really ironic because you're saying "nobody is suggesting making Newtonian physics incompatible with GR" yet you're making a move that makes that happen. So what am I to say to you?
Your objection is just entirely empty. Just lol that you think you can win this point. Your stubborn need to try and win when you have entirely and irrevocably lost is beyond hilarious.
You can propose any type of physics you want. I don't really care what physics you propose. But what you pose is a fundamentally different type of change. Why not just propose a hypothetical universe that doesn't conform to any mathematical laws at all? Why limit yourself to mathematical laws?
As I said, you can propose any type of changes you want. They just won't be meaningful in a productive way. There's such a thing as being too arbitrary. One should consider things that we know nothing about to demonstrate that we can't discover anything about something we know something about.
At the end of the day, the fine tuning argument for God is just one more weak, incomplete and if I may add, just bad argument. It seems you agree. Maybe one day a theist will come up with a compelling reason to believe that God made man, not the other way around. But I'm not holding my breath.
Every universe has life.
Every universe has life that develops consciousness.
Every universe has life that develops consciousness to the point of seeking and questioning about its own origins.
Every universe has life that develops consciousness.
Every universe has life that develops consciousness to the point of seeking and questioning about its own origins.
Originally Posted by me, responding to you
I'm not arguing whether I believe the universe is fine-tuned. You would note that if you were actually paying attention, I'm arguing that mrmr's presentation doesn't accurately reflect the fine-tuning argument. There's a big and obvious distinction between the two.
Originally Posted by me
Your objection here seems to not address the fine-tuning argument at all. It is true that any specific random sequence is as probable as any other. But the feature is not that a specific random event occurred, but that the random event in the space of random events also happened to lie in a much smaller subspace which has a particular feature.
Originally Posted by me
Briefly, you're still making errors in characterizing the argument.
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Originally Posted by me
This has already been explained to you. It's not merely that "some" outcome occurred, but that an outcome that exhibits a type of pattern. That is, unless you're going to argue that dealing a bridge hand in which every player receives cards from only one suit is a normal type of event.
Originally Posted by me
It's almost as if you can't decide what your philosophical basis is. You complain about a lack of empirical support, yet I've told you exactly where the empirical support comes from. So rather than addressing that, you deny all empirical observations and just speculate that maybe something totally unlike anything we observe is the way to go.
Again, this comes back to your consistent failure to advance a conversation.
Sure. If you believe that God created the universe you are probably going to accept the conclusion that God did indeed create - fine tune, even - the universe. GASP.
My suspicion seems to be correct. We both agree that the universe has the descriptive property, and we both agree continuing to the argument for the causal property is "weak" and "incomplete". You insist that I am framing this differently from you (despite me effectively quoting your position) but I don't actually see where this disagreement is. It seems we are left merely with this little quibble:
Why? It is by construction. The toy universe is defined to be one where a small change in the parameter leads to life not being possible. So it unquestionably satisfies UM. And since you don't agree that UM provides enough information to conclude that AW - the conclusion that the universe was formed by chance - likely for our universe, it certainly won't make it sufficient to conclude it is likely in this universe where we have even less information. This example was supposed to take like 5 seconds of thought to flush out the definition; amazing that you are still struggling with it.
Why? It is by construction. The toy universe is defined to be one where a small change in the parameter leads to life not being possible. So it unquestionably satisfies UM. And since you don't agree that UM provides enough information to conclude that AW - the conclusion that the universe was formed by chance - likely for our universe, it certainly won't make it sufficient to conclude it is likely in this universe where we have even less information. This example was supposed to take like 5 seconds of thought to flush out the definition; amazing that you are still struggling with it.
Originally Posted by me
Possibly.
Lol, except I haven't done this. I mean heck, we haven't even talked about the types of ways people argue from UM towards AW. So I have no idea how you are concluding that I am saying it is deductive. Keep trying to find something - anything - to disagree with, even if you have to make it up.
Lol, man you suck at reading. I'll quote myself: "Yes of course GR is going to be different if gravity is different...Your only objection right now is "well ya it would change EFEs!". Duh.". At no point have I ever suggested proposing a model of the universe that has internal contradictions. You made that up. Just like you made up your E=Mc^3 = 1/2mv^2.
I have always agreed that at minimum we should propose models that are consistent. Sure, to make my point I used the Newtonian model of the universe because it is simpler to express and understand ITT, and guess what, in that model my suggested change is consistent.
You could ask the same question in the GR model of the universe, of course, where changing how gravity works would change GR, but at no point have I ever suggested anything remotely close to changing just Newtonian physics and not GR.
Your objection is just entirely empty. Just lol that you think you can win this point. Your stubborn need to try and win when you have entirely and irrevocably lost is beyond hilarious.
As I said, naive physics isn't sufficient. If you can't even get past the basic concept of energy equations (note: plural) then I don't know how to help you.
Sure, sounds great. I don't think such hypotheticals are amenable to the fine tuning argument the way slight changes in the structure of the models is, but sure it is an interesting question why it is indeed the case that our universe can be describe so well by mathematical laws.
There is a middle ground between "absolutely no changes allowed except varying empirical constants" and "just guessing anything willy nilly".
I'm not sure you are aware, but theoretical physicists for centuries have proposed ranges of models and then gone on and seen what predictions they make that we can verify, and so forth. The undergraduate exercise of playing around and seeing what orbits different powers for r in newtonian gravitation result in is precisely such an example.
Heck, even in the EFE, Einstein originally added the cosmological constant was an added term that was effectively a fudge factor to make static universes. You are basically trying to shut down this entire endeavour because omg arbitrary help help!
But you're losing the plot. You're trying to say that we can make these arbitrary changes to the equations and get "consistent" equations (whatever that means when you only have one equation and pretending that everything else works out), but then you're also noting that we use predictions that those equations make to guide how we do physics. And then you also want to take these rejected universes and say "But this shows that universes can be arbitrary in lots of different ways."
You would be much better off arguing to reject physics as giving us any insight into how other universes could work.
At the end of the day, the fine tuning argument for God is just one more weak, incomplete and if I may add, just bad argument. It seems you agree. Maybe one day a theist will come up with a compelling reason to believe that God made man, not the other way around. But I'm not holding my breath.
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