What do you think it is?

Well let's talk about perception, to see where it goes.

Using 2, I would argue that morality is something that we perceive.

Also:

It seems from these definitions, and many more that I haven't quoted, that perception is more than just what we can learn about our environment through our 5 senses, that there's a cognitive aspect to it, that you can perceptions can be thoughts, and be something that isn't necessarily true.

If we've evolved to have perceptions that aren't true, then the idea that there is morality could be one.

I am not getting into this discussion, the paper you linked to is clear the perceptual experience to which it applies is the evidence of our senses not our reason, if you want to use a definition different to the one employed by the authors of the paper you linked to you may but I am not.

I don't think it's as clear as you do that the author's definition is as limited as that, even though he focused on physical perception in his examples, there are elements of the paper, especially in the conclusion and in his references, that suggest a purely cognitive 'mind' aspect to ITP.

However, I'm not going to present that evidence because whilst I'm interested in defining 'perception', what it is and how it plays a role in how we think, and how that might extend to our concept of 'morality', I'm not particularly interested in a pedantic argument over whether I was right to link a particular source or not, especially one I'm not even relying on, it was the idea that was important. I hadn't realised that this was your sole reason for participating in the conversation.

Yeah this is the same type of snide passive aggressive response that was discussed earlier with regard to reading a book.

Huh? I've provided you with a definition. I've told you exactly how what you said fit that definition. I've told you I don't even know what else there is to go read about, it is all spelled out for you. It should be very clear what I think. So what, exactly, are you asking here?

I'm still trying to figure out why this matters. Suppose I agree that I'm discussing an idea that could be labelled as 'descriptive' (I'm not making a claim), what next?

I don't see how 'metaethics' is relevant at all since I'm examining the idea that there are no morals.

why is every post an evasion? You tell me you need to do more reading so I explain the concept. Then you ask me what I think and I say I just explained it. Then you ask me why it is relevant. We've been at this "descriptive claim" for a dozen posts and you haven't engaged the idea once, just a series of differnet punts. This is exactly what happened with objective/subjective which was a series of differing comments that went anywhere but actually engaging with the idea.

Of course you are making a claim. You told us that we evolved this business with morality. That is a claim. And it still functions and is analyzed as a claim even if you surround it with qualifiers like that you aren't certain and that you expect we will tell you to read a book before posting (which no one has yet done!). In particular, at the core of understanding morality is whether your claims are descriptive or normative. As in, whether you are saying what is, or what ought to be. It is likely true we evolved a sense of right and wrong for various evolutionary reasons like that social behavioural norms provide survival advantages. But that is a separate question as to whether one should kill, and so forth. If you are going to get off the ground in any discussion of morality you need to understand the distinction between descriptive and normative.

As I have explained to you, moral nihilism is a meta ethical theory. If nothing else, that should be enough to motivate you to learn what meta ethics is.

You aren't the only one to have explained that moral nihilism is a meta-ethical theory I don't think MB cares. He wants to make his argument without actually understanding the terms he's using, hence the back and forth on subjective/objective/normative etc etc.

Good luck getting this resolved as I suspect you are going to need it.

I'm going to clarify, try to address certain points, and try to bring this back into focus.

It seems irrelevant that Moral Nihilism is a metaethical theory because I haven't said that I subscribe to it. If you read back you'll see that I said that a Presupposition Failure form of Moral Nihilism was the closest thing I found to what I'm thinking. If I'm not offering a moral theory, I don't think I should be discussing it as if it were one. If I'm wrong and it is metaethics anyway, ok, where does that take us?

The 'objective/subjective' nature of moral beliefs seems irrelevant in a discussion about whether or not there really is right or wrong to be objective or subjective about. It feels like arguing about which shade of red the emperor's new clothes are made of. I engaged with that, made my view clear, and moved on.

If I have to choose between 'descriptive' or 'normative' I'll chose descriptive because what I'm suggesting clearly isn't normative. I'm not saying that anything 'should be'. Now, is there a point to that line of questioning that you're going to get to?

I've backed away from language such as 'making a claim', I think that I'm saying 'what if'. If you want to label it a 'claim' you can, but I'm unwilling to commit to that mainly because I'm not sure what I'd be exposing myself to that would be unnecessary if what I'm saying isn't as strong as a 'claim'. However, if it helps you to formulate a view, go ahead and call it a claim, I'll see what that brings.

That is a lot of arguing as to why basically every word I have asked you to define is totally irrelevant and you don't have to learn what that word means. Even when in the very defence you make basic errors like confusing ethics and meta ethics. remember, you confidently told me you were not proposing a meta ethical theory....when I have informed you that you are indeed doing this you have now asked why it is irrelevant. And I don't care about moral nihilism, your own statements have been meta ethical claims!

Your basic exposition consisted of a mixture of descriptive and metaethical claims. The first step is to recognize that this is going on, that you are jumping between the two and that the descriptive claims don't get you to the metaethical ones. Considering whether, say, some types of subjective morality might be consistent with your descriptive claims would be useful, but you have insisted this is irrelevant despite showing you no indication you know what any of these words means.

And ffs, you shouldn't say your claims are descriptive because they are "not normative" and that is the best you can do, they are descriptive because they DESCRIBE a feature of the universe!

I had to learn what they meant (the terms I didn't already know) to be able to decide if they were relevant. I'm now much more clear on what descriptive and normative mean so that's been useful.

? I'm not sure where I confused ethics with metaethics, perhaps you could quote that? I've only used the word 'ethics' once (in this post) and that was in a definition that I quoted for you to confirm that I was understanding 'descriptive claim' correctly. But I've explained why I thought the term wasn't relevant, accepted that I might be wrong anyway, and asked you where we go from there?

I've made clear indications, including quoting definitions, that I understand what they mean. You've yet to explain why we still need to be using these terms. For example, I don't understand how ideas about subjective morality could be at all useful in a discussion about whether or nor morals are actually real. Can you give me an example?

I'm trying to accommodate your insistence that we label my 'what if' one or the other. I've done that, even though it seems particularly not useful other than to rule out that it's a Normative idea, now where does that take us?

Perhaps somewhere along the line you got confused and thought that I was subscribing to moral Nihilism. I haven't done that, I said it was the closest thing I'd found to what I'm thinking.

So, even if it turns out that what I'm wondering about is a metaethical issue, it's irrelevant at this point that Moral Nihilism is. (Unless of course it turns out that I am simply describing Moral Nihilism, but I'm not sure about that yet)

I understand the terms 'objective' and 'subjective', and have for some time (it would have been tricky to get through Rachels without understanding that...), I'm still waiting to understand why they're relevant to this discussion. What does it matter that someone thinks moral X is subjective, and someone else thinks moral X is objective, if I think moral X doesn't even exist?

For our purposes, and because "metamorality" isn't standard, I'm using ethics and morality interchangeably. Regardless, your error was to say that because you were not proposing a moral system, meta ethics was irrelevant. Ethics/morality and meta ethics occur at different levels. What you are doing is meta ethics when you claim that morals don't exist. That is a metaethical position...it isn't just relevant it is exactly what you are doing!


Reading your post to deregs I have to ask yet again that you define these terms you claim you understand. I think it is ridiculous that you have spent so much effort refusing to do so because I have to argue why they are relevant first...we should see that AFTER we know what they mean. But since you insist, do you think it possible that the person who thinks moral X is subjective ALSO thinks that morals don't "exist", whatever that might mean?

But the big problem is the mix of descriptive and metaethical claims. Do you understand that these are on different levels, that you can't jump back and forth, and that you don't magically get moral nihilism from saying we evolved?

Possibly. They might think that what other people think about moral X is subjective, because morals don't actually exist.

No to the first question, 'I'm not arguing moral nihilism', to the second.

Amazing. Twenty posts of trying to get you to define basic terms so you can see that nope, you can't just use the concepts interchangeably, and you still don't see any difference, still seem to believe they are irrelevant. And then even though you have espoused a poorly formed version of moral nihilism and endorsed moral nihilism as a position that seems close to yours, instead of answering a question that gets at the the difference you just stamp your feet and say nope nope nope I'm not talking about moral nihilism I refuse to answer. Call your theory whatever name you wish if you object so strongly to the standard name for it, and repeat the (single) question. Or don't, for I don't think I can possibly get through to you at this point.

Maybe you really should go read a book.

I'm surprised the Rachels that MB has read doesn't distinguish meta-ethics from normative moral philosophy.

In any case I get that MB wants substantive discussion but unfortunately it's incredibly difficult to have one without the relevant terms being agreed and understood. If you are going to deny something exists it is necessary to understand what you are denying.

I don't think that this is true. I don't need to understand the complexities of the Greek gods, or fairies, or Reiki and all the terms used in discussions about them to deny that they exist. All related theories and concepts become redundant, irrelevant. My point all along has been that there may not be right and wrong. If that's a metaethical position, if that's how it's categorized then fine, but so what? Does that have some kind of impact on what I'm saying? That's what I want to know but people seem more interested in getting me to admit that than what relevance it actually has, or in actually discussing the subject.

Whilst I have no problem with defining terms, in fact I actually enjoy that part of any conversation and consider it to be entirely necessary, I feel that this conversation simply got filibustered by the issue of terms.

If what you're saying here is 'MB, what you're describing is basically a Presupposition failure form of Moral Nihilism, so you have to have this discussion using terms relevant to discussions about moral theories' then ok, but it's not clear that that's what you're saying. Otherwise, morals have nothing to do with this, because they don't exist, they're just something we invented because we're thinking, rational beings that like to classify and categorize and explain, but actually life is completely indifferent to what we think is right and wrong, there is no right and wrong and something else entirely is going on.

Hmm, sounds almost as if you get where I was coming from with my remark about reading a book

Honestly, I have no problem with someone not interested in matching their theories with common terminology. I think that in philosophy, much like math, getting your hands dirty and trying some things out on your own, without just doing a literature search, is a very variable pursuit. It is the unwillingness to engage with the concepts behind the words that has made this conversation so unproductive. The basic errors - confusing descriptive claims and metaethical ones - are there regardless of whether one uses the words descriptive or metaethical. But you can't engage the concepts if for literally half this thread one spends the time evading reaching common agreements on the terms that have been brought up.

I'd go further and say even if you are getting your hands dirty with a literature search philosophy can be a variable activity. One of the reasons for me going back to college was that I was finding philosophical questions tough on my own. I think once you want to discuss or argue those theories with others common agreement on the terms is essential. At least at the point that inaccuracies in applying those terms becomes apparent. And yes defining descriptive and normative is fundamental.

Btw I meant valuable but yes variable is also true here

Haha. I think my own work was variable rather than valuable but yes it can be very valuable if you put the appropriate effort in.

How can it not be meaningful if it is a verdict? That doesn't make sense to me. A verdict must be its very nature be meaningful, must it not?

Anyway, your argumentation is now beginning to sound like something ala "a rock doesn't exist, because a rock only describes something". And again, that's a very unfair argument. Obviously people use terminology to describe something that exists, they are not discussing what it means to exist. If you feel that they should, you should obviously also discuss that yourself. This all smacks of absolutism and "gods of the gap" to be honest.

Lastly, I'm unsure of how or why you think differing moral verdicts matter at all to the case you are making.

As I said previously, I understand why it's so important to define terms. The first problem here is that I have no clue why it is I don't seem to understand these terms, they seem basic. The second problem is that whilst I'm being repeatedly told that I don't understand them, no one is actually explaining what I'm doing wrong.

Descriptive.

I'm saying 'What if there is no right and wrong', that would be describing something about our universe. So it's Descriptive. It's not Normative.

Metaethics

Metaethics is a branch of Analytical Philosophy that deals with questions like 'Are there moral facts?'.

How are these in conflict when I'm proceeding from the supposition that there are no moral facts, I don't even grasp the nature of the mistake I'm making. I'm not asking 'are there, or aren't there?', I'm starting at 'there aren't' and asking what else could be going on. I want to have this discussion, I'm not being evasive (although I've been cautious about what language I've applied to what I'm saying because I understand enough to know that it matters) I'm trying to get past this issue of terms.