I have no problem with him seeing morality in this way. But if hes going to state it as a given, I would like to see justification for his position.

In my particular example - individual autonomy is more important because it is more useful to the collective good of the human species. If you take women's ability to choose away from them - in this particular example - how do you think women would respond to this? That sort of infringement on a woman's rights will cause more problems than solutions. Why? people are not happy when their basic rights are restricted.
It's not something you should care about. You should care about whatever you want to care about. It's just something I care about. A moral statement is not true or false, but simply useful and less useful.

Ok, a simple question

A woman believes she will cope with a new child, therefore she is morally right to have the child. Is this correct?

A woman believes that she wont be able to cope with a new child, therefore she is morally right to abort the child. Is this correct?

I didn't say "morally right". Neither is morally "right or wrong", but both are morally justifiable due to the appeal to freedom of choice.

In which case I think you should abandon the claim that

because this means, in the context of your later replies, that her individual choice outweighs most other moral values only by your definition and only if you care about moral statements that can be neither true or false.

So, whatever she believes at the time, leads her to the morally justified action?

Also, seems a bit of a nitpick, in what way is morally justified not the same as morally right

what is it to be morally unjustified if moral statements can't be true or false?

Whatever she believes or thinks has nothing to do with it - should we stick the thought-police on her maybe?

Her action, whether abortion or not, is morally justified, as freedom of choice outweighs the other moral values in this particular example.

but you just agreed that

substitute morally justified for right if you like.

If you agree with my above statements, then you are saying that what she believes leads to the morally justified action.

Are you now saying that the above statements arent correct after all?
In which case, how does she choose the morally justified action?

Haha, so whatever she chooses, is morally justified, for whatever reason she chooses, or for no reason at all. Well, at least it gives a lot of leeway.

If something is justifiable that means you can give reasons for it being true. If you give reasons for it being true, then you have just justified it.

Morally 'right' implies that there is an existence of a morally 'wrong' action. Morally justifiable implies that there is an existence of a morally 'unjustifiable' action. Wrong and unjustifiable are two different concepts.

Just because something may be morally unjustifiable doesn't make it wrong but simply unjustifiable - under the morality framework of 'useful behaviour to the collective good of the species'. It may be justifiable under other morality frameworks, hence why I prefer to avoid the use of the word 'wrong'.

Once again however, I don't understand why you're so interested in the semantics. My point remains.

Under the morality framework of 'usefulness to the collective good of the human species' morally unjustified simply means that it can not be justified under that framework: in other words, it is not very useful to the collective good of the human species.

So basically what you are saying is

If you insist. Maybe if you asked me some questions about my views on morality, as opposed to arguing semantics within 1 particular example, your conclusion would be different. Just maybe.

I have asked you questions about your views on morality.

Maybe you could outline your views on morality so that I can get an idea of where you are coming from?

Roughly speaking, my theoretical framework of morality is a culmination of concepts from; (1) Ayn Rand; (2) Utilitarianism and; (3) Evolutionary Biology implications. Combining notions of personal liberty with utilitarianism, as further backed by evidence in emerging sciences such as evolutionary biology and evolutionary psychology.

(1) and (2) appear contradictory at first but it is possible to reconcile them and reach a middle-ground that meets both types of criteria. (3) is simply the hard-science evidence for adopting (2).

Whether people choose to value certain moral values higher than others is largely not for me to judge. Only a few serious infringements on others rights and freedoms (i.e., murder, theft etc.) I believe should be treated firmly. Most other moral issues I believe should be free to the individual to decide, and the dynamics of power, influence, determination etc. will naturally determine which moral values hold consensus and which don't.

I define morality as doing whatever you want at any given moment. The catch is if one can convince others in the same of way of thinking either by force, coercion or consent (by supplying reasonable justification to which others will agree).

I'm basing it on the fact that there are some underlying cross-cultural values that have arisen independently at multiple points in time. Just as there's an underlying mathematical reality in which people keep discovering the same mathematical conclusions across cultures and across time.

This is interesting, because when I asked you about morality, you said it was what is "the best measure of a moral truth is its usefulness [to the species]." Then when I ask "Useful *how*?" you said:

None of your concepts of individual freedoms actually plays into this concept of usefulness. At all. People are free to do all sorts of things that are not useful to the species. And so while you're saying you don't judge them, you've clearly set up parameters by which moral decisions are to be judged, namely whether they are "useful to the species" or not.

I find this to be a confused mess wherein you just kind of grab at things you agree with and use the inherent flexibility provided to you by a utilitarian framework to defend it, but at the same time declare explicit measures of usefulness that you choose to ignore because you want to place a higher value on individual freedoms than the things your utilitarian framework is built around (individual freedoms that you don't particularly justify).

When do you believe that individual freedoms should apply to an individual? A 10 day old baby clearly doesn't much freedom to choose, yet you would (presumably) require that a parent engage in behaviors to preserve the future freedoms of the baby. But that baby is infringing on the parents' freedom to do things other than care for the baby. So who wins and why?

It comes across that VeeDDzz has no idea what he is talking about. He is clutching at straws IMO.

I disagree that with this. The depravity of man is the fact that people choose to do things against their moral intuitions.

Ok, I disagree with the conclusions you draw, but fair enough

Then you end up in a position where you are simultaneously claiming that moral facts can be true, we know them via our intuitions but that we have this inherent property of evil.

If we are all, either individually or collectively as a human race, imbibed with this property of evil how can we rely on our intuitions to identify moral facts?

It works in the same way that our illogical brains can still manage to be logical.