I would say I'm an original human and that the duplicate is a duplicate human, and that these are different types.

If they are physically identical then they would be different types only in timeline. I think that's fair and might have a lot to do with how I would define "self" because I cannot yet articulate a reasonable materialistic definition.

How do people STILL believe in a soul? i think the thread title is wrong, should it not be why do people STILL believe in a soul?

I think this is where the concept of a soul really begins. Even though there's no reasonable materialistic concept of a "self" there's a experiential (maybe even a functional?) sense in which the "self" really exists.

What is your concept of a soul?

I agree but think its tangential to the issue at hand. (And there may be a reasonable materialistic concept of "self", I just don't know what it would be. At some point in the future I'll start a thread on this topic. Pretty interesting IMO)

The most concise way of saying it is that the soul is that which experiences reality.

I have additional theological conceptions which extend this basic definition, but are unnecessary for the concept of the soul. Also, these ideas are not grounded in the actual "experience" of the soul, but are cognitively developed additions.

I'm not sure I'm understanding you, consciousness is the soul?

What is consciousness? (For you to answer, even though I give my answer below.)

Consciousness is a state of experiencing the universe, but that which is doing the experiencing is the soul.

I think the standard definition would be fine. Consciousness is the quality or state of being aware of an external object or something within oneself.

I'm not understanding why you're separating the soul from consciousness? Why the extra step?

EDIT: Perhaps to avoid a potential conflict I might change 'state' for 'act' (so that you don't need the soul to 'act' on the state).

I don't see why they would be the same.

You seem to recognize here that a "quality" or "state" is somehow distinct from an "act" (which is still not the same as the thing that acts, or experiences, or the thing that is in a state, or that which has the quality).

Because being in a 'state' of awareness necessitates 'acting' aware. Both 'state' and 'act' are describing qualities of the same term.

Maybe. I'm still not sure why they couldn't all be encompassed under the heading of 'consciousness'. Regardless, I'm unsure why you would feel the need to attach an immaterial mechanism (the soul) into the already obfuscated arena of consciousness.

While the two are linked, they aren't the same thing. A "state" sounds like something that would be true in a fixed moment of time (the gate is in an open state), but an act requires the movement of time (the opening of a gate requires time to advance -- because a gate that is opening and a gate that is closing look the same in a single instant of time).

You *could* do such a thing, but I would posit that it would be an incomplete description. A computer can be in a particular state, but it doesn't function as a computer except through the passage from one state to another.

The immaterialness follows from the immaterialness of experiencing.

I don't think the analogy quite holds because the gate doesn't require continuous action to keep its state, while consciousness *does* require a continuous 'act' to qualify. Maybe running would be a better analogy since as with consciousness the 'act' necessitates the 'state'. It would seem the 'act' of running and the 'state' of running are somewhat synonymous (or at least close enough to qualify).

The above analogy I gave should (hopefully) clear up why I feel this isn't a valid objection to the act/state duality of consciousness.

We obviously have very detailed material explanations for how our brain experiences, so why are you declaring it an immaterial process?

The state "open" may not, but the state of "opening" does. Running works, too.

I don't think you've honed in completely on what a state of being aware would be from a purely physical perspective. You would have (perhaps) a particular neuron or collection of neurons in a specific state, which would be that awareness. In an extremely oversimplified picture, when neuron X is in a particular state, it corresponds to "I'm aware of myself."

Who said the soul is a process?

Also, you're begging the question by stating that we know how the brain "experiences." We know how the brain responds to stimuli, but that's not the same as saying that we know how the brain experiences. We can go back to the computer analogy. We know how computers respond to stimuli (input from the keyboard or whatever), but we don't say that the computer is "experiencing" input (with the same meaning as when applied to human experience).

I would disagree with the example only because when neuron X is in a particular state (or more accurately all the necessary neurons are in a particular state), but not 'acting' you couldn't really say someone was conscious. For example, if you froze (in time) all the neurons in their 'aware' state they would no longer be aware because they're no longer acting.

In any event I think the state/act discussion is largely irrelevant to the main point and think we should move past it.

That's fair, but you didn't really answer the question. Why are you positing an immaterial *something* rather than saying "I don't know how we experience?" It seems an awful lot like an argument from incredulity.