You do like your arguments from the halo effect, don't you?

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Academic_elitism

quote: Anti-intellectuals often perceive themselves as champions of ordinary people and as defenders of populism against elitism, especially academic elitism—e.g., some of economist Thomas Sowell's writings (Intellectuals and Society) suggest that while academics and intellectuals have done much valuable work, they also have an undeserved "halo effect" and face fewer disincentives than other professions against speaking outside their expertise. These critics argue that highly educated people form an isolated social group whose views tend to be overrepresented amongst journalists, professors, and other members of the intelligentsia who often draw their salary and funding from taxpayers. Economist Dan Klein shows that the worldwide top-35 economics departments pull 76 percent of their faculty from their own graduates. He argues that the academic culture is pyramidal, not polycentric, and resembles a closed and genteel social circle. Meanwhile it draws on resources from taxpayers, foundations, endowments, and tuition payers, and it judges the social service delivered. The result is a self-organizing and self-validating circle.

But the ontology of QM is among the areas of expertise of theoretical physicists...

Carry on then...just sayin'

If (3) is true by definition, then you should be able to show from a mere examination of the meaning of "contingent being" that it must be caused to exist by something external to itself. You have not so far done this, and I very much doubt you can. Instead, the claim that (3) is true requires that you also assent to other metaphysical theses, such as

(a) everything has a cause.

In fact, I suspect that since you are using a non-standard understanding of "cause" here that your claim will end up depending on some Aristotelian/Platonic assumptions about the nature of predicates (that true statements about predicates must refer to something real, etc.) and a rejection of the Frege/Russell thesis about the meaning of existence that underlies modern logic.

I have no idea where (4) is coming from. I have certainly not claimed it. It also seems to contradict your entire line of argument (if the universe exists necessarily then there is no need to posit something external to it as an explanation of its existence), so I am assuming that I'm misreading you here or you went temporarily astray.

Yeah, this is a more general philosophical disagreement. I reject the Platonic/Aristotelian theory of predicates that underlies this account of causation. Basically, Plato argued that in order for something to have a attribute (or property or predicate) such as "redness," "wetness," "chairness" that there must be some basic abstract Idea of these properties in which it somehow "participates." Here you seem to be applying this idea to the attribute/property of existence--claiming that in order for something to have the property of existence it must somehow participate in or be caused by the abstract Idea or Form of existence (which you then identify with God).

I reject this for at least three reasons.

First, I don't think that "existence" is a property in the sense that these other things (i.e. "redness," etc.) are properties. Rather, I think that a correct analysis of the logic of our language would show that existence is better thought of as a quantifier term.

Second, I reject the Platonic idea that in order for a being to have these properties they must somehow be caused by an external Form or Idea that underlies such properties. There are many arguments against this view, but I unoriginally think that the Third Man objection is just devastating.

Third, I reject the identification of God with the Platonic Idea of existence. I think the attempt by mystical thinkers like yourself to identify the object of their experience with the highly rationalized Idea of existence to be unwarranted, an illicit attempt to rationalize your experience of oneness or union by combining it with a speculative metaphysical theory meant to explain our understanding of the logic of predicates.

Finally, I just want to point out how far this is from the ordinary sense of "everything has a cause." I don't think the kind of formal causation you are relying on here is what most non-philosophers have in mind when they nod along to this claim.

What I meant is that I don’t think you can label a thing contingent without knowing it was caused to exist, at least I can’t think of any examples. Can you provide an example of a contingent thing that’s not caused to exist?

b. (Pos. ~p) possibly, the universe doesn’t exist.

Weren’t you arguing that modern (end-state) theories are leaning towards b being false?

Seems so. The problem is I lack the philosophical breadth to really get into all the whys and wherefores. I don’t know if you’ve run across Edward Feser’s blog, but he’s a modern Thomist (in the Aristotle-Aquinas tradition) who is far more up on this issue than I. In a recent post, here, he mentions a new book Contemporary Aristotelian Metaphysics* and there’s an open com box if you want to take the issue up with him.

*amazon book description:
Aristotelian (or neo-Aristotelian) metaphysics is currently undergoing something of a renaissance. This volume brings together fourteen new essays from leading philosophers who are sympathetic to this conception of metaphysics, which takes its cue from the idea that metaphysics is the first philosophy. The primary input from Aristotle is methodological, but many themes familiar from his metaphysics will be discussed, including ontological categories, the role and interpretation of the existential quantifier, essence, substance, natural kinds, powers, potential, and the development of life. The volume mounts a strong challenge to the type of ontological deflationism which has recently gained a strong foothold in analytic metaphysics. It will be a useful resource for scholars and advanced students who are interested in the foundations and development of philosophy.

You claimed that it was analytically true that contingent beings must be caused to exist. I pointed out that your claim was not based on the meaning of "contingent being," but rather on your acceptance of other metaphysical principles. Thus, while it might be true, it is not analytically true. You've provided no defense for your claim. So, do you agree with me that it is not based on the meaning of "contingent being"?

As for examples--in the sense that you have specified for "cause to exist," I don't think that rocks have been caused to exist, but yet they are contingent. But this is not relevant to the above point.

No. I argued that the heat-death of the universe is not the kind of "nothing" that Leibniz and other Christians mean by ex nihilo. I have not claimed that modern cosmology claims that the universe exists necessarily. I have no idea where you got that idea.

I've read a few blog posts of Feser before--mostly ridiculous stuff on homosexuality--but not much of his work on Aquinas. I think you should start a thread explaining why you are a Thomist.

No, I don’t agree. By definition a contingent thing’s existence is contingent precisely because it is contingent on or depends on some metaphysical fact F that may or may not obtain. The point being: we can’t rightly say that X is a contingent thing without the implication that X’s existence is dependent on or is contingent on some F, whereby sans F obtaining, X would not exist.

So if it’s true of a contingent thing X that X is contingent on some F, then F obtaining is the cause of X existing. And since it is true by definition that every contingent thing’s existence is contingent on some F (otherwise we couldn’t say it is a contingent thing), and F’s obtaining is the cause of X’s existing, then it is analytically true that every contingent thing must be caused to exist.

I probably read too much into:
Thinking you were using the ensuing mentions of cosmologist’s end-state theories to support the bolded.

Early on in this thread I stated the definition of contingency that I am using: "[T]rue in our world, but not true in all possible worlds." By this definition of contingency, a contingent thing would be a thing that exists in the actual world, but not in all possible worlds. Now, using this definition, it is not the case that by definition a contingent things existence depends on some metaphysical fact that doesn't refer to its own existence.

Second, your argument above implicitly assumes that all dependency relations are inherently causal. I've rejected that view of causation in this thread.

Third, assume that you are right it is analytically true that all contingent things must be caused to exist. In that case I will claim that we don't know whether the universe is a contingent thing and not just by claiming that it is a necessary thing. Rather, there will be alternative modal possibilities. It might be a non-necessary and non-caused thing, whatever you want to call that.

I think of contingency and possibility as inter-definable by contrast to the non-contingency and necessary. That is one is what the other is not. So, since a non-contingent necessary thing is something whose possible existence entails its actual existence, a contingent thing is something whose possible existence doesn’t entail its actuality.

So if a contingent thing’s actuality doesn’t depend on some metaphysical fact and if its possibility doesn’t entail its actuality, then how do you account for its actuality? I mean, I’m not denying such things could exist, it’s just that we can’t term them a contingent thing without implying some metaphysical fact caused its actuality, anymore than we can call a necessary being necessary without the implication that something inherent to it is the cause of its actuality.
I just can’t understand how one can say, “something x is contingent,” without the logical implication that, “x is contingent ‘on’ something.” My impression is you’re arguing that even if there is a correlation we can’t ascertain causation. I agree with you there, but I don’t think we can call something contingent simply because its existence is correlated with some metaphysical fact.

For example, it’s not disputed that there’s a correlation between brain states and mental states. However, to say that mental states are contingent things, we have to go further and assert that there’s not simply a correlation but a casual relation whereby brain states cause mental states. If we don’t do so, then following your definition of contingency, if you agree that mental states are contingent things, then it seems you’d be compelled to maintain that mental states are not necessarily dependent on brain states.


That’s precisely why I think Adler’s argument fares better then the Kalam argument. That is, Adler isn’t asserting that the universe is contingent and/or began to exist, but simply that there are contingent things.

This is a different definition than the one I'm using, but whatever.

I don't. As I've said numerous times, your claim is not analytic, but rather is based on your acceptance of the PSR as well. The bolded is another example of this. It is only if we assume that some metaphysical fact must cause anything that is actual to be actual (i.e. we accept the PSR) will we agree with your claim about contingent beings. However, the definition of "contingent being" doesn't imply the truth of the PSR.

Are you clear on what I mean by "analytic" or "true by definition"? I feel like you are arguing about something other than the point I'm addressing.

This is because you are equivocating over the meaning of "contingent." Here is the first definition given by dictionary.com:

Here is the fourth:

When you provided an explicit definition, you use the fourth meaning, but you rely on the first meaning to get this dependency relation to some metaphysical fact. Basic equivocation.

There are many problems here. First, it is disputed whether there is a correlation between brain states and mental states because some people (eliminative materialists) are skeptical about the real existence of mental states. Second, according to the majority view, which identifies mental states as brain states, the connection between the two is a necessary, not contingent connection. I don't really know how to make sense of your example in that case. Third, it seems pretty common for those who accept some more dualist account to agree that mental states are not necessarily dependent on brain states. For instance, many dualists believe in immaterial beings (such as angels or gods) that have mental states but no brain states. So I'm not sure what your example is going to prove here....


Obviously he isn't asserting only that. Most people are willing to agree with the claim that some things that exist only exist possibly. It is the other claims that are more controversial.

1. Every effect has a cause.
2. Existence is an effect.
3. Therefore, existence has a cause.

Do you agree that if 1 & 2 are true then Adler’s third antecedent…

“everything contingent must be caused to exist”

… is true?

If yes, and assuming you accept 1 as true then 2 is the pivotal premise. Now my metaphysics defines existence as an effect, so for me 2 is analytically true. You adhere to a different metaphysics than I, so for you 2 is not true. Anyway, that’s how I’m seeing the issue.

I said it's not disputed that there is a correlation between brain and mental states. That some believe mental states are epiphenomenona doesn’t contradict what I’m claiming.

I think the “majority view” is something like:

Necessarily, if there are mental states then they are convertible to brain states.

My point is that if one rejects the PSR then one has no reason to accept the majority view as true. In other words, if one rejects the notion that a state of affairs cannot obtain unless there is sufficient reason why it should not be otherwise, then one should reject the majority view. That is, taking into account the current status of the debate, there is reason to doubt that the majority view is true, or at least doubt that the connection is necessary.


You said:
I was just pointing out that Adler isn't claiming the universe is a contingent thing, so your claim wouldn't rebut what Adler is arguing.

I suspect the claim that "existence is an effect" is nonsense, so it is hard for me to tell if "everything contingent must be caused to exist" follows. However, I will agree that from "Everything that exists is caused to exist" it follows that "Everything that contingently exists is caused to exist." Is that enough for you to make your point?

Now, as for your claim that your acceptance of (2) makes this an analytic truth--it has become apparent to me that you are confused on this issue. You claim that (2) is analytically true for you, but not for me, because I accept a different metaphysical theory. But an analytic claim is a claim whose truth depends solely on the meaning of the words involved. Thus, the metaphysical theory I accept shouldn't affect the truth of the claim (if it is truly analytic), since regardless, the meaning of the words should still be the same and so whether or not the claim is true would be unchanged.

Eliminative materialists do not believe that mental states are epiphenomena. They are skeptical that they exist at all.

Yeah, I don't know what you mean by "convertible" here, so this doesn't really help me much. Honestly, maybe I'm being slow here, but I'm not understanding your argument here.

My point was that if you accept a dependency definition of "contingency," then you can no longer define a contingent being purely in terms of necessity, i.e there are more possibilities than just necessary and contingent beings. To this point it doesn't matter whether we are talking about the universe as a whole or my neighbor's dog.