Quote:
Originally Posted by Bladesman87
Whether it matters that I can be certain of something is different to whether I can be certain at all.
I agree that it doesn't matter because the world I experience may require me to act as though I have certainty. In this regard, I consider it similar to free will discussions (I act and feel as though I have free will regardless of whether I do).
I would define certainty as something like "A proposition which is both true and for which I can have no doubt". As I said before, as long as we face the problem of hard solipsism, we can't reach this standard for propositions about an external world. No, this doesn't trouble me in daily life.
I don't think the world you experience does require you to have certainty, but I think it's important to differentiate certain in its psychological form from its epistemic one. Consider the relationship between a subject S and a proposition P
S is certain that P refers to S's psychological state
It is certain that P refers to the epistemic status of P
When you define certainty in terms of
"A proposition which is both
true and for which
I can have no doubt"
If we can't be certain how can we know it is true? The first clause looks circular. If we look at the second clause the I it is a reflection of your psychology. So you need to depersonalise it and drop the first clause so something like.
"Something is certain if it is beyond doubt."
But then it's not clear that this only applies to analytic propositions, if we can legitimately doubt there is any external world then we can doubt whether or not the laws of logic are in fact indubitable. This may be controversial but then we have examples when philosophers have denied that logical propositions hold. Consider that the law of transitivity and the principle of closure for knowledge have both come under attack from philosophers.