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Originally Posted by Original Position
Maybe this is supposed to be a rhetorical question, but seriously, this challenge is exactly what is made by much of the substantive work of analytic philosophy. For instance, we see an analogous claim in the Frege/Russell account of existence.
No, hold on, a realist might say, "When I say 'murder is wrong', I categorically don't mean <Boo Murder> or <Murder, thumbs down!> as the noncognitivist thinks. If I wanted to communicate <Boo Murder> I would literally boo murder. No, when I say 'murder is wrong' I specifically mean that 'murder is wrong' is a true proposition, and it's true because it corresponds to a mind-independent moral reality." How can a noncognitivist possibly insist that the realist cognitivst here means something other than what she says she means?
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Obviously the claim is that it is not exactly the same as the old one (even if they use the same words, these words would have the stipulated meanings of the philosophers moral theory rather than the meaning/usage of ordinary moral discourse).
Is that how it works? Can I have a theory that people who say "cats" really mean dogs, call it robust noncatsivism, and then if you really want "cats" to mean cats you have to ask me for a special stipulation?
"Murder is wrong". According to subjectivists, this translates to "In my opinion, murder is wrong". According to cultural relativists, this translates to "In my culture, murder is wrong". According to emotivists, this translates to "Boo murder". According to prescriptivists, this translates to "Thou shalt not murder". How about we take the grammar at face value? "Murder is wrong" means murder is wrong, and "In my opinion, murder is wrong" means in smrk2's opinion, murder is wrong, etc..