Pretty much. If a person is enough of an expert to understand what a proposition is, and insists that she intends to express a proposition when she says, "murder is wrong", then how can one possibly challenge that she means what she says she means?

A new moral language that's exactly the same as the old one?

Maybe this is supposed to be a rhetorical question, but seriously, this challenge is exactly what is made by much of the substantive work of analytic philosophy. For instance, we see an analogous claim in the Frege/Russell account of existence.

Obviously the claim is that it is not exactly the same as the old one (even if they use the same words, these words would have the stipulated meanings of the philosophers moral theory rather than the meaning/usage of ordinary moral discourse).

No, hold on, a realist might say, "When I say 'murder is wrong', I categorically don't mean <Boo Murder> or <Murder, thumbs down!> as the noncognitivist thinks. If I wanted to communicate <Boo Murder> I would literally boo murder. No, when I say 'murder is wrong' I specifically mean that 'murder is wrong' is a true proposition, and it's true because it corresponds to a mind-independent moral reality." How can a noncognitivist possibly insist that the realist cognitivst here means something other than what she says she means?

Is that how it works? Can I have a theory that people who say "cats" really mean dogs, call it robust noncatsivism, and then if you really want "cats" to mean cats you have to ask me for a special stipulation?

"Murder is wrong". According to subjectivists, this translates to "In my opinion, murder is wrong". According to cultural relativists, this translates to "In my culture, murder is wrong". According to emotivists, this translates to "Boo murder". According to prescriptivists, this translates to "Thou shalt not murder". How about we take the grammar at face value? "Murder is wrong" means murder is wrong, and "In my opinion, murder is wrong" means in smrk2's opinion, murder is wrong, etc..

What you say you mean may not reflect the psychological basis underlying your statement.

Can you explain this a bit more, what psychological basis could underlie a moral philosopher failing to mean by a statement what her meta-ethical position is?

Sure, a realist might say this, but I think very few ever have. Instead, I think they are making a claim about the meaning of moral language in general. I think very few philosophers are really interested in just specifying what they in particular mean by moral propositions rather than what is generally meant by them.

Sure, although you wouldn't have to ask for a special stipulation.

First, you are mixing up theories about moral language and theories about the grounding of morality here, so this isn't very helpful. Second, okay? I'm not seeing an argument here. Is it just that so much disagreement about morality makes you want to throw up your hands and give up on philosophizing about it?

If you say so, but this seems a bit strange to me. Sure, it is not uninteresting to theorize about what most people mean by their moral statements, as it is not uninteresting to theorize about what most people mean by justice or free will. But the more interesting thing (to me anyway) is what philosophers mean, because they are the gatekeepers to any rigorous conceptual investigation of moral questions; there's obviously more to morality than just semantics.

What exactly did I mix up here? Is it not the case that for each of these views there is a respective account of what moral statements translate to?

It seems to me, especially given the last few posts, that the debate about the general semantics of moral discourse is underwhelming, what more fundamental ideas about the grounding of morality are forwarded with the emphasis on general semantics?

My primary argument is that the principal feature of a moral belief, in direct distinction to one's subjective tastes and preferences, is that it's supposed to apply to everybody if it's true. My intuition is that this has to be underwritten by some robust realism. If that kind of realism is false, that's fine with me, but then I think it's incoherent to invoke moral principles to condemn people as if we have any reason for thinking our principles apply to them.

Gatekeepers? What gate? (or gates). Any locks? Who has the key(s). St Thomas Aquinas? Sun Tzu?


You appear to be serious.

The gate between the people who think philosophy is the love of knowledge and the people who think philosophy is a skincare line. One Locke.

I'm only serious in that I think there is no middle ground between morality existing as some spooky mind-independent reality and morality not existing.

Well said. I agree with this guy. Yes they can exist but God is the foundation of what to consider as a "value" so...there you go.

An X does exist and we label it morality. A starting hypothesis is that the germ is DNA and biological evolution.

Linked below is an article by E. O. Wilson that is certainly worth reading, whether you agree with it or not is irrelevant.

The Biological Bases for Morality

This is also worth reading

In response to OP: objective moral values do not exist with or without God, and it does not matter. Put more accurately: it does not matter, therefore they do not exist. All that matters is that which facilitates survival and reproduction, and that which facilitates survival and reproduction can not be constant/unchanging/objective, but must be dynamic and emergent - to adapt to the changing environment. The only thing that can be objective/constant is that which does not need to adapt to anything - i.e., the laws of the universe (insofar as we know).

When scientists finally find evidence that the laws of the universe must also adapt to some higher environment, then we'll know for certain that there's no such thing as 'objective/constant' and that physics is really just a sub-set of biology, which is the overarching science (insofar as I predict). The distinction between living things and non-living things is illusory, borne out of our inability to comprehend long time-frames and distances.

If you want me to take evolutionary biology and label it morality, I will, I've got spare time.

Will it have a guarantee?

I don't want or require you to do anything. Use your own discretion, you should be wise enough.

I use my spare time to read James Thurber, Tu Fu, Sun Tzu, Mark Twain, and P. G. Wodehouse and drink good beer. Sometimes I pull Basic Writings of Nietzsche off the bookshelf and fondle the dense tome, but then silently slip it back in place.

Have I been Understood? - Nietzsche

I fail to see and understand why it matters. Can you show why it matters for survival/reproduction?

Because of mechanisms explained by game theory. Interpersonal trust and cooperation (which is all borne out of empathy - mirror neurons and oxytocin) form more effective evolutionary strategies in environments with access to large varieties of resources.

Trust: being the key word up above. Individuals who display trustworthy behaviour (moral behaviour) are more likely to be trusted. Individuals more likely to be trusted are more likely to survive and reproduce - over the long-term. Those who lie, cheat and steal can not be trusted by others, so they become ostracized or imprisoned or simply labelled "anti-social" or "mentally ill" (albeit, the 'mentally ill' comment is a tad controversial).

in what sense are there evolutionary strategies in nature? Doesn't a strategy imply teleology?

I don't think the second paragraph holds to be honest I don't think cheating lying and stealing has much if any bearing on an individuals chance of reproducing outside of the being locked up and only while someone is locked up.

I should use more correct terms like evolutionary trajectory. One particular evolutionary trajectory (empathy, trust, cooperation) is more likely to be successful than another (cheating, stealing, lying and killing each other) in environments where there is easy access to varieties of resources. The highlighted part above is important because in environments where access to resources is limited (e.g., lots of predators in the area or lack of resources around due to geographic reasons) the more successful evolutionary trajectory in this circumstance is one that involves less cooperation and more interpersonal competition.

In this sense, the environment selects the successful evolutionary trajectory. Please note, this does not imply that the environment is consciously selecting for one particular evolutionary trajectory or another.

Imprisoning, ostracizing, labeling and discriminating against behaviour that is not trustworthy (moral) may not have much of an effect on genes with propensity toward such behaviour. At least not in the short-term. However, over a long enough time-frame (think hundreds of generations), there would be an effect. Human brains have not yet fully evolved the ability to comprehend subtle and intricate changes in long time-frames or big numbers (the evolutionary environment has not yet selected for such abilities). As a result, evolutionary biology claims are often met with extreme skepticism.

You fail to show why it matters to reproduce and survive. For some people like me who have no interest in reproducing (meaning it is not hardwired in my DNA).

What you do show is that if someone has that drive to reproduce and to survive for as long as possible then it is important to be trustworthy and cooperate, that I do agree with. But that is not what I'm asking at all.

You never asked: "why does reproduction and survival matter?" you asked "why does it matter for survival/reproduction?"

As such, how do I "fail to show"?

Why survival and reproduction matters is a meaningless question.

It's like asking "why do rocks just sit there?". Rocks are not living, thereby they have no intention and asking why a rock does anything is meaningless. Asking "how" instead, adds meaning to the question.


As such, there is no intention behind the reasons for survival and reproduction. It just so happens (selected for by the laws of the universe) that the only way for anything to stay alive is for it to be able to replicate/copy/reproduce itself. Consequently, it must (a) survive long enough, until it can (b) replicate/copy/reproduce. There is no intention behind this (so far as we know), nor is intention necessary.

I think a relevant question to ask yourself is: Why does the universe need to have intention in order for you to find meaning in it?

If you have no interest in reproducing, your DNA lineage (genes) will not continue on into the future and your specific set of traits/abilities will be absent in future generations. In a way, your DNA and environmental influences (that have lead to your decision not to reproduce) have already selected for your genes to be culled from the gene pool. Your contribution however, in an information-age, can be more significant in terms of the way you change the world or the ideas you invent, than somebody who simply has 20 children. Accordingly, there is equal meaning to your pursuits, as there is to those who only pursue basic biological imperatives.

WEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEE!!!!!!


WEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEE!!!!!!

I'm not going to go into details but I will simply say you are wrong.

You talk some **** VeeDDzz i will give you that I mean you got it all going for you with those big words but that don't add up to much. I'm going to use this line as my opening gambit next time I tell a joke its 100% guarantee to get a laugh. I'm going to drop into one of those sales rep phone calls at work, just add it in there "yeah nice product and your contribution in this information age is significant because you are changing the world with your ideas....but I don't want any toner today, ring again next week Captain Planet"

Okay I'm cool with evolutionary trajectory but I'm less confident that we can ascribe behaviours to genetics and even less than we can be confident evolutionary pressures will select for them in long time frames.

I don't know we need to present greater co-operation when resources aren't scarce and greater competition where they are in evolutionary terms.

If there are any papers worth taking a look at I'd appreciate it.

Refer to the bottom of this wiki link for a whole lot of papers worth looking at.

For example:

West, Stuart A.; El Mouden, Claire; Gardner, Andy (2011). "Sixteen common misconceptions about the evolution of cooperation in humans". Evolution and Human Behavior 32 (4): 231–62