nvm, cba

But the noncognitivist rapist isn’t amoral. Presumably, from his perspective “rape is good!” Ergo, he values rape, and is likewise motivated to pursue what he values as good, like we all are. So if pace noncognitivism, moral values are merely expressions of subjective preferences, and if one values raping, then the noncognitivist is fully justified raping. Granted, I may not agree with his values, but that’s a non-sequitur in terms of preventing his actions, because by raping he’s acting in accord with his moral commitments and values—every bit as much as I would feel justified in preventing him from raping, since by doing so I’d be acting in accord with my moral commitments and values. In other words, both he and I are grounding our justification to engage in coercion of another on our respective and subjective moral values. So even though I may have good reason to reject his values, he’s under no burden to adhere to mine and has every reason to stay committed to his own, just as I'm under no burden to accept his values and have every reason to maintain my own.

When a human being sleeps at night he (Spirit/Soul) enters the realm of the spirit to which this world contains the "moral lawfulness" just as the sense bound world has what we might call the "laws of nature". The basis for the spiritual world is this very cosmic lawfulness of morality.

During this time the Man is ensconced within a "cosmic judgment" as to his deeds during the day. the entire cosmos judges his actions and the human being returns from sleep refurbished , so to speak, to continue on and perform his deeds of "rightness/wrongness" depending upon his personal development at that particular time. Of course, the experiences during sleep are not conscious but affect the individual man within his return.

The entire cosmos is within upon a "cosmic sorrows" steeped in "sacrifice". I'm trying not to use the "G" word as there are hierarchies of beings above man who are contained within and actually ARE this cosmic
lawfulness. These beings, including man, are in movement within this moral lawfulness and they also develop as does man. Selfless behavior manifested within sacrifice of self are the touchstone of spiritual activity and Mankind is a neophyte or beginner in this matters relative to the higher beings.

Brought to earth, and referenced to the individual man, if an individual man punches another while in the throes of hate then "reason" is diminished and we'll have a untoward act which might be called "evil". Instead of acting within "reason" the individual is overcome by the being of "hate" and directly responds within a "clouded consciousness", in effect being less than he could be. This is where "karma" can manifest in which the individual may not be able to make amends for this act in this life (read better himself) and will have opportunity to right the wrongs of this life and make amends in the next or further lives. this does not mean that he gets punched in the next life but more like the karmic event, buoyed in love, is accordingly acted through to the benefit of both individuals( read moral development). Also a "punch" does not necessarily mean karma will manifest as the "puncher" and the "punchee" come to an agreement as to the necessity of karmic balance as they would both need a karmic event to progress in human development.

The idea of the karmic balance of Hitler's deeds is mind boggling to me but in no way can he be considered to be acting within the rational which again is within selfless behavior. It is complicated as is the entire cosmos which is Spirit in manifest activity.

How many have had the feeling of wanting to jump out of our skins to go after a transgressor but "controls oneself" and abstains from egregious activity. this is the world of "reason" which is in our power though many might call "reason" some type of logical legerdemain to go from point A to point B. thought is certainly involved but the feeling of the individual man are considered and tellingly of primary importance.

All about "knowledge of good and evil".

^Yeah but how do you know?

Most religions speak to hierarchies of beings in some form or another and you'll have to study yourself if you want some type of confirmation.

The question and activity of "reason" can easily be seen in your life, if open and non judgmental.

Karma and its activities can be researched through Anthroposophical sources which I have referred to many times.

Also, you and I both go through these experiences during sleep and especially to a greater extent after death and hopefully what I've written can awaken a "memory" of your experiences in some form.

What I hope to present is a "platform" to which you do not have to plant your flag and say "of course" but the thinking involved is, hopefully, a logically and reasoned understanding to which you can appreciate. No need to put on your jump suit: go to sleep and mull on it, have your cup of coffee and do whatever and see whether karma or Man's destiny is sensible(have to use this word for of course we are not speaking to the senses) within what I've written.

Nothing is easy but certainly enlighteningly worthwhile.

Step one would be to see or at least consider the presence of a spiritual world as reality then all else can follow.

I am not sure this is a problem specific to morality. Someone could still believe in old scientific theories if they wanted, e.g., caloric fluid. No amount of proof may persuade them that kinetic energy seems to be a more efficient or better theory.

Where is this idea from?

Theories of morality that don't have altruism in them I would not label as theories of morality. If anything, they're theories of societal development. The reason I wouldn't label them as 'theories of morality' is because they do not accurately account for the influence of participating in an altruistic evolutionary strategy (which humans are a part of - as observed through evidence). Scientific theories of morality all consider altruism as a significant premise, among other premises. If someone's 'theory on morality' does not provide weight to the influence of altruism then it is not based in evidence and it is no theory of morality.

Secondly, deriving an ought from the evidence in physical sciences is easy. You want an ought that works pretty well? Treat others as you'd like to be treated. Please be more specific.

Refer to: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Gene-ce...w_of_evolution

What do you consider a moral theory is? If you are arguing that a moral theory explains how we act then I'll cede that it needs to account for apparently altruistic acts in nature. I don't think that's all a moral theory needs to be though and I don't see altruism having a part to play in a lot of the moral questions currently in focus.

What are these scientific theories of morality?

So how is treat others as you'd like to be treated derived easily from the physical sciences?

I'll accept that for me to act morally there will be times I am required to do what is worse for myself. But the times I have to act act altruistically is not due to a requirement for me to act altruistically it is a requirement for me to act morally. Altruism in that sense seems a means rather than an end given that it is possible to act both altruistically and immorally

Given that you think that neither objective moral values exist or that it matters I'm not sure why you seem committed to the idea of altruism as a moral premise.

VeeDDz, thanks for the link, but I'm not sure you read what I quoted carefully.

We can't make useful predictions about moral behaviours until we first explain "how we act" - as you put it. So I don't understand why you keep talking about an 'ought' or a prediction, when science is still in the process of explaining the 'is'. Science is not arrogant enough to suggest an 'ought' until it first understands the 'is'. In fact, the scientific method is built around this.
Every scientific paper on morality since the emergence of the gene-centered view of evolution. For example, some have conceptualised morality as a more holistic construct comprised of two main dimensions - empathy and perception of fairness. Refer to this summary of research on this view: http://www.ted.com/talks/frans_de_wa...ve_morals.html

There are others in neuroscience that have taken more objective measurements of morality, linking it to particular chemicals in our blood and brain, such as oxytocin and it's evolutionary requirement for building trust/enhancing the chances of group survival. Refer to this summary of research on this view: http://www.ted.com/talks/frans_de_wa...ve_morals.html

And basically, every other scientific paper on morality since gene selection theory.
Principle of reciprocity.
Regardless of how narrowly you've defined your terms here, both altruistic and moral behaviours are a means to an end.

Since when are theories of morality concerned with making "useful predictions about moral behavior"?

In order to get an 'ought' we must first understand the function of morality and immorality. It is highly presumptuous and unscientific to derive conclusions about how to behave before we first understand why we behave the way we do. What function is one particular type of behaviour serving?

To put it another way: in order to tell others to behave in way X, we must first determine why we ourselves behave in way X. Next, we must determine why way X is better than way Y. This involves predicting the future outcomes of way X vs way Y. Predictions which are best rooted in our scientific understanding of morality - in evidence - not semantic masturbation.

If it helps to clarify (and I'm not making a mistake) VeeDDzz seems to be most talking about descriptive accounts of morality, whereas most everyone else ITT is talking about normative accounts of morality (see here for details).

A descriptive account might answer questions "Why did we evolve moral intuitions?" (evolutionary psychology), "What areas of the brain are involved in moral reasoning?" (neuroscience) or "Are there universal moral norms (social anthropology) etc.

A normative account might answer (or try to answer) "Should we follow our evolved intuitions?", "What moral norms are better than others" etc.

It also seems like VeeDDzz is suggesting that we need a proper descriptive account before we can address normative accounts. Here there is potential to run into the is-ought problem. For example, even if we learn that we believe that charity is good because of evolved social interaction strategies, or because of the development of mirror neurons that allow for empathy or w/e, one can still seemingly ask Moore's open question "But is charity good?".

That said, I agree that a descriptive account is useful and possibly necessary, if only to define the parameters of morality. For example, the most plausible descriptive account of morality, imo, is that our moral intuitions are derived from evolved social interaction strategies. You might want to steal all the bananas, but if you do the other monkeys are going to kill you, so "don't steal" becomes the fittest behaviour, eventually becoming an innate moral intuition. So on this descriptive view, any normative theory should be aim towards harmonious social interactions, or it just isn't what we're talking about when we speak of morality. Incidentally, I think this view of morality as social-interaction strategies is open to theists too; e.g. it seems perfectly plausible that the rules and regulations laid down by Yahweh to the Israelites are primarily aimed at making His people more united and co-operative for their own sakes. To my mind, even if God exists, it would make more sense for a command like "Do not commit adultery" to be given because of the unpleasant social repercussions of breaking it than as, say, a command that simply flows directly from His non-adulterous nature.

This is correct, thank you for the summary. To use your terminology, what's interesting is that the evidence for the descriptive account is showing us something that we are not very good at acknowledging philosophically.

The evidence is showing that moral behaviour can not exist outside of its function. What this means is that, if there ever comes a time where the environment in which we live changes dramatically, immoral behaviour may in fact be necessary instead. This is because immoral behaviour serves the same function, but only under radically different environments. This means that morality and immorality are equals (their utility just depends on the environment) and it also contributes to the view that the universe is indifferent.

One is not superior to the other, and this is not something most of us are truly willing to acknowledge. Particularly as our evolutionary-tuned moral compass has had its apprenticeship in environments where groups thrive and individuals are too physically weak to thrive on their own. I suspect that as we discover other life forms on other planets, the folly of assuming that x is more moral than y will become increasingly clear.

There is nothing more moral than anything else. There is only that which serves the function of propagating genes most related to ours, and that which does not. You may in fact still continue to refer to this as morality or ethics as per Ayn Rand's objectivism, but in the end, it's not a question of morality - in the traditional sense - but rather a question of utility. What is most useful to us currently?

No problem

I don't think you are making your point clear because you are using the words 'moral' and 'immoral' in a bit of an odd way. It doesn't make much sense to say that immorality is 'good'. I think your point here is that moral goods are contingent on various facts about the world/environment/biology etc, and so something that is currently held to be morally good may become morally bad in the event that certain contingent facts change. For example, if world population spirals massively out of control then voluntary euthanasia may become to be seen as a moral good*. But moral=good and immoral=bad, so it's the moral status of the act that changes, not the value judgement of the term moral/immoral.

So this:
NOW -> Euthanasia = Immoral = Bad
FUTURE -> Euthanasia = Moral = Good

Not this:
NOW -> Euthanasia = Immoral = Bad
FUTURE -> Euthanasia = Immoral = Good

*I'm not making a judgement on the morality of euthanasia, just using them as an example for sake of argument.

Again, I don't think your use of the world morality is helpful here. We don't need to stick to traditional explanations of 'morality' to use the word. This is maybe a stylistic thing, but I think words/phrases like "morality" or "free will" are best taken at their minimal definition and then examine different explanations/models for them. So if you think that what we 'ought' to do is maximise utility then it is clearer to say that you define morality in terms of utility (like Utilitarians do) than to say that morality doesn't exist but we ought to maximise utility.

So the distinction between descriptive and normative accounts has been made by zumby who I'll also thank for clarifying but I retain some concerns with some of the points here.


You talked about ought when you said science tells us to treat others as we would like to be treated due to principle of reciprocity. So what you are saying is that we have some oughts which science has given us but others we've yet to learn. I don't need to know why certain people commit certain acts to "know" those acts are wrong. I can make certain predictions of the consequences of those acts and can review the intentions of the act without knowing what made the person commit it.

I'm back to not being sure how you're defining morality. These studies may show that animals show some moral intuitions, I've not read them but I'm familiar with animals grooming each other and attracting the attention of a predator to alert the herd but I don't know how you are defining a moral act.

The Golden Rule of treating others as you would be treated exists in all Abrahamic traditions and in Buddhism and Hinduism, I'm not sure how science telling me there's a principle of reciprocity in nature tells me I should have this as a moral aim. The question as pointed out earlier is why?

I'm defining Altruism as an act that I do while believing it to be worse for myself to do it. That seems a pretty standard definition, if you would prefer another feel free and we can agree on something you find more appropriate. I've not defined moral which is at the core of our disagreement.

I don't know about making predictions, but descriptions of the psychology of moral behavior have been part of the tradition of moral philosophy from its foundations in the Greeks (e.g. Aristotle and the Stoics).

Criticizing noncognitivism because it fails to "build a ladder" between real, objective moral properties and human beings just misses the point. Noncognitivism isn't even trying to do that. Rather, it is attacking your prior assumption, that "anything worth calling morality requires the existence of real, objective moral properties." If you want to engage with the theory, that is the assumption you'll have to examine.

You pretty clearly reject noncognitivism as a correct account of moral language. You say things like: "Once you deny the existence of real, objective moral properties, I think you're denying the essential concept of morality" and "if moral properties don't exist, then all that's left is ersatz morality" and "anything worth calling morality requires the existence of real, objective moral properties." These views do not commit you to the view that such moral properties exist, but it does seem to preclude the claim that moral language is not about such objective moral properties (as is claimed by noncognitivists). So, it seems pretty clear that if you rejected objective moral properties you would be an error theorist. After all, if moral language really was a way of say, expressing our approval of norms, then all the above quoted claims would be false.

Also, just out of curiosity, do you have a similar view of judgements about beauty, humor, sadness, etc--that if they do not refer to objective truths then they are only about ersatz beauty, humor, or sadness?

I think you misunderstood me. I was responding to your comment about me having 'deep intuitions' about the existence of moral truths. I replied by saying that I have deep intuitions about the necessity of the existence of objective moral properties (facts, features, whatever) for morality, and secondarily I said that it seems to me that the only way to have an intelligible interface between human beings and objective moral properties is by way of truth-apt moral language (otherwise human moral discourse is not tethered to reality). The ladder comment addresses any potential alternative to truth-apt moral language by means of which human beings can intelligibly interact with objective moral features (by way of 'sense' for example). It wasn't a criticism against views that deny the existence of such features.

The criticism against noncognitivism* is something that you have avoided to address or did not adequately address despite three or four direct questions from me and duffee about it. The criticism is that it does not provide any principled framework for normativity or for settling moral disagreements (eg noncognitivist rapists vs. noncognitivist non-rapists). If it's not supposed to, then this is my claim: I claim that any theory worth calling a theory of morality requires an account of normativity and/or a framework for settling moral disagreements; anything less than that amounts to 'merely' a descriptive theory of pseudo-moral utterances, attitudes and behaviors. If that's reality then that's reality :: Ghosts don't exist; neither does morality.

* My thought is that all non-realist non-universalist moral theories fail to provide this.

What's your point here? Error theory and noncognitivism both have it as a tenet that there are no moral features in the world. Neither yields what I want from a moral framework i.e. an account of normativity and/or a way to settle moral disagreements. Beyond that, it's not of primary importance to me whether moral language is always false or neither true or false; all I have said is that these are both plausible views. I don't believe in God, but I do not have a firm view concerning whether “God is benevolent” is false or “God is benevolent” is nonsense.

This is a deceptively complicated question, although basically my answer is no, not really. What matters about beauty and humor is that they elicit some kind of pleasure or appreciation in the beholder. If intrinsic, beholder-independent aesthetic facts existed, and if it were possible that these facts could contradict some subjective judgments of beauty and humor, then maybe there's a case to be made that subjective beauty is 'ersatz' (or maybe the other way around); but subjective experiences of beauty and humor are inherently valuable to the beholder regardless, so it doesn't really matter.

Morality is quite different, nobody holds moral precepts because they find the subjective experience of having moral precepts pleasurable. If people knew that their moral precepts did not refer to objective truths, I think they would quite quickly come around to thinking all that was left was 'ersatz' morality -- this is of course after they look up ersatz in the dictionary.

I had to look up ersatz earlier

This seems interesting but I wonder if it's correct. Maybe people don't find the experience of holding certain precepts pleasurable in the way that an ice cream cone is pleasurable, but I am fairly convinced that people derive a lot of fulfillment from having an identity and an understanding of the world and their place in it that makes sense to them, and morality plays a part in that for many people I know. Their moral framework is part of their identity and their attachment to that identity is not purely a function of evaluating truth conditions, it's more emotional than that

Someone does something wrong to me, I dont like the way it makes me feel so I dont do it to others... morality
..Vs..
Christians doing good seeking reward or the fear of reprise... not moral, but self serving?

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Actually, I think you are misunderstanding me here. What I said was that "you seem to have a deep intuition that morality is about moral truths." I didn't say that you have a deep intuition that moral statements are true or that there are objective moral properties. Rather, that your intuition is that morality must at least attempt to connect up to objective moral features of the world (a view that you repeat here). This is what is explicitly rejected by noncognitivists.

To me, the dialectic sounds like this:

Noncognitivist: Here is an account of moral language that doesn't involve objective moral properties.
smrk2: Okay. Now show me how that account of moral language connects to objective moral properties.
Noncognitivist: No, no, it is a theory of moral language that doesn't connect to objective moral properties--that is rather the point.
smrk2: Okay, in that case it is not a theory of moral language, because real moral language connects or tries to connect to objective moral properties.

Again, my point is not to say that your assumption about real moral language is wrong. It is just that you aren't engaging with the theory on its own terms if you start with this as your viewpoint. Obviously people who accept noncognitivism disagree with you about the nature of real moral language and so you using this claim as a premise to reject noncognitivism won't be convincing.

There is no problem on noncogntivist grounds with "providing principled frameworks for normativity." I can, for instance, find myself to have a deep attachment to fairness and thus approve of actions which are fair and disapprove of actions that are not fair. This attachment to fairness would thus provide me with a principled framework for normativity.

Now, I might not have an ultimate foundational reason for preferring fairness to unfairness and so in that sense I haven't ultimately justified my principled framework of normativity. But that doesn't mean I don't have such a framework.

As for settling moral disagreements, is your claim that on noncognitivist grounds we can't persuade others to change their minds? I assume not as that is clearly false. Is it that we can't provide reasons why they should change their mind? Again, I would say not. Most moral discussion is not an attempt to completely replace one system of norms with another, but to activate specific moral attitudes a person already has and show that a particular action is not consistent with that action. For instance, we try to convince people to allow homosexuals to marry by appealing to their sense of fairness ("marriage equality") or to their empathy (stories of homosexuals who want to raise a family like the rest of us) and so on.

I think the problem here is that you think that when we say that someone's moral views are wrong that we are not just disapproving of their views, but we think they are wrong. In the context of a proposition, it is clear enough what this would mean (at least, on a linguistic level). A wrong proposition is a false proposition. But what would it mean to say that, e.g. Hitler's moral views were wrong on the noncognitivist view? Here, again I will just repeat myself--it is an expression of your disapproval of his views. It would be saying that (depending on your variety of noncognitivism) you disapprove of such views, you think such views are unfair, cruel, unjust, etc.

It is true that there is no objective, third-person way of saying this on noncognitivism. The universe doesn't express a moral view towards Hitler, humans do. That is, there is no fact of the matter that Hitler's moral views are wrong. Insofar as you think this is a requirement of any adequate moral view, you will reject noncognitivism. But I would want to hear more about why you think this is a requirement.

My point here is that you are clearly a cognitivist about moral language. You acknowledge that real, objective moral properties might not exist, but you think that moral language has to be about such properties. Thus, your options are either some form of moral realism (if they exist) or error theory (if they don't). This is why you say that on noncognitivist accounts, moral language is only a phony kind of morality. You could only say this if you were assuming that real morality must be objective morality. That is, if noncognitivism were actually true, then of course moral statements wouldn't be pseudo-moral statements because real moral statements would be, by hypothesis, noncognitive.

I mean, this is textbook error theory. You think the objectivity of morality is baked into the language. You even say later that if people knew that their moral statements didn't refer to moral truths then they would think that they weren't talking about real morality (because evidently real morality requires reference to moral properties).

Again, this is not to say you are wrong. I'm just pointing out that your being open to there not being moral properties doesn't mean you are open to noncognitivism.

There is an extensive psychological literature showing that our moral attitudes and claims are intimately connected to our emotional responses of disgust, resentment, sacredness, purity, etc (e.g. here). So while it might not be the case that morality elicits some kind of pleasure or appreciation in the beholder, that doesn't mean that it doesn't elicit some other kind of emotional reaction. As to whether that is "what matters"--I'm curious what criteria you are using to decide this?

I'm not confident that this is correct.

What I said you misunderstood was the "build me the ladder" part; in that sentence I wasn't criticizing noncognitivism for failing to build a ladder to objective moral properties. I was addressing some other way that human beings might be able to interact with objective moral properties without truth-apt moral language, say via 'sense' or something. It was to emphasize that my intuition is that truth-apt moral language was the only way to tether moral discourse to (moral) reality, if such a reality exists.

Where did you catch me saying this? I have never asked the noncognitivist to provide an account of moral language that connects to objective moral properties. That would be silly. I don't even say that the noncognitivist fails to provide a plausible theory of moral language if objective moral properties don't exist; but you continue to resist me on this. What I do say is that the noncognitivist (though not uniquely) fails to provide a theory worth calling morality because anything worth calling morality contains a framework for normativity and for settling moral disagreements. I believe that objective, moral properties are necessary for such frameworks; so when I say that denying the existence of such properties entails the denial of the essential concept of morality, this is the intermediate step, perhaps I wasn't clear.

I suppose it won't surprise you that I'm not interested in someone's contingent infatuation with fairness. You 'might' -- as in you don't -- have an ultimate foundational reason for preferring fairness; I don't see how you move beyond that. Anyone lacking your contingent affinity for fairness and not raping people can go about their unfair rapey business without being in any sense wrong or immoral.

NotReady's point or duffee's point is that Hitler may express a functionally identical disapproval of your views. Neither you nor Hitler -- if you both understand what noncognitivism is -- can find any ultimate foundational reason to condemn each other, or to justify taking actions against each other. He feels one way, you feel another way. That's it; you are both equally & sublimely entitled (or not entitled) to your views about Jews.

Look, we can call it a 'moral view' or a view about the meaning of moral language. I'm simply saying that it's not worth calling these 'moral views' theories of morality because they don't provide what most of us expect from morality, which is a framework for normativity: what we ought to do, what is good or bad, who is right or wrong, etc.. Why is it a requirement that ghosts are entities from beyond the grave?

Ok well remember that I said earlier that I wasn't sure whether I should be partial to error theory since I'm already partial to realism; so I have recognized your concern [that I should be partial to error theory]. If you think that I'm committed to error theory then it's only relevant now if noncognitivism gives me something that error theory doesn't; and I suggest that it doesn't. Noncognitivism does not give me normativity or a framework for settling moral disagreements. It does not give me 'ultimate foundational reasons'. To this extent, it's not worth calling a theory of morality.

Of course moral attitudes are intimately connected to emotions, but my point is it doesn't matter if they are; the salient feature of moral attitudes is not the emotions they are intimately connected to but whether the 'attitudes' are sufficient to justify future actions. I'm sure that victims of rape have an emotional reaction to their experience that is far stronger than me gazing at the sunset or watching the Jeselnik Offensive, but it's not the emotional reaction of the victim that justifies throwing the rapist in jail.

Ok, ask 100 people whether "rape is wrong" is objectively true; then tell them "rape is wrong" is not objectively true, tell them that it's simply an utterance that expresses an emotion and that all such utterances express only emotions, tell them that there are no ultimate foundational reasons to prefer one emotion over another, and so on, and then ask if they think what you're talking about is worth calling morality.

I'm going to break off this part of the conversation and address the rest in a separate post later. You have repeatedly said that the account of moral statements posited by noncognitivists is "not worth calling morality." Presumably this is because you have already some idea about what is worth calling morality and you think noncognitivism doesn't provide that. On its face, this is a claim about the conceptual nature of morality, such that in order to talk about morality you have to be talking about that thing.

This means that since noncognitivist accounts are (according to you) missing this conceptual part of morality, they aren't talking about moral statements, but only something that seems like moral statements. But this is just another way of saying that noncognitivism is false. Noncognitivists are not saying that there is "real" moral talk, which is all that cognitive stuff, then ersatz moral talk, which is all the noncognitive stuff. No, they are saying that real moral talk is the noncognitive stuff. In other words, they are disagreeing with your underlying view about the conceptual nature of morality.

Basically, if you want me to stop resisting your claim about viewing noncognitivism as plausible, then you'll have to give up the claim that if noncognitivism is true that it is only an ersatz morality.