If you start by assuming that morality must be objective, it is easy enough to show that a theory of moral language that doesn't account for the objectivity of morality is inadequate. However, that isn't a very satisfying criticism of the theory.

The point of a noncognitivist theory of moral language is its claim that the basis for saying that Hitler's moral views are wrong will not be that they are false or somehow do not correctly describe the moral order of the universe. Rather, noncognitivists might say something like, they are wrong because they encourage actions which are immoral (e.g. rape, torture, stealing, etc.). But they will not attempt to describe how an action is moral by reducing it to non-moral descriptive terms.

Another way of putting it is that a noncognitivist will not step outside the realm of moral discourse (which is on her view not propositional) to evaluate the correctness or wrongness of a moral claim. Appealing to some fact about the universe, whether it be a natural fact or a supernatural fact will not imply any kind of moral claim because moral claims are not propositions.

I'm confused again. If the noncognitivist considers moral statements not truth apt how do they qualify something as wrong. Doesn't wrong require a truth statement?

I can't imagine a better example of question begging.

God is the absolute and therefore the source of all meaning. He is absolute goodness and so the source of all that is good. He prescribes what is right and wrong for his creatures and does so in accordance with his nature, which is inherently good. So morality for us is (objectively)grounded in God and his commandments to us.

This book by the Dalai Lama does a fantastic job discussing how morals can and do exist independently of any religious belief or lack thereof.

Nope. On noncognitivist grounds the claim that something is immoral is not a proposition and so cannot function as either a premise or a conclusion in an argument. Hence it is quite impossible to beg the question here.

Before going on the attack I would advise you to try a bit harder to understand the noncognitivist viewpoint. Your criticisms in this thread have mostly assumed that moral language is cognitively meaningful and so haven't really touched the core issues.

Edit: Looking at the bolded statement again I see that even on a standard cognitive interpretation it doesn't beg the question. I was answering the question of why someone's moral views are wrong and said because they lead to immoral actions. What is question - begging about that?

An immoral action is something that is wrong so you are defining a moral view as wrong by saying it is immoral - can't get more circular.

I admit I don't know what is meant by noncognitivist. I have a suspicion that what you are basically trying to do is deny there is objective morality. If the statement "That is wrong" isn't a proposition but the description of an emotion, that seems to be a denial of morality itself. Give me a good, SHORT, link, maybe I'll take a look eventually.

Silly

Morality tends to adapt fairly quickly to cultural and ecological structures. The simplest example is merely to see what happens to a society when water and food become scarce resources.

Why? Because people almost universally put themselves first, simple because we are biologically primed to avoid fear and pain. It isn't more difficult than that. Not even the pop-myth that mothers "would do anything to save their child" is true in anything but the absolutely rarest of cases. Acts of extreme bravery certainly seem to exist, and so does self-sacrifice. Don't underestimate the amount of times those are merely the result of bad judgment however.

Are there morals so common we can could them close to universal? Sure... the simplest is "do not kill". But don't let that fool you. Most humans will kill in a heartbeat if you arrange the scenario right.

Sigh. Look again at what I wrote. I said that the noncognitivist might say that the moral views were wrong because they lead to immoral actions. This is not circular--I am giving an account of the wrongness of a moral statement in terms not of its being false, but of it leading to actions that I think are immoral.

If you can't see how that is not circular, then I don't know what more to say to you about that. It's true that I didn't give an account of what an immoral action was there, but as long as I'm adding new information it wouldn't be circular.
You just aren't following the conversation at all. Dereds said that he didn't know how people could honestly make claims that didn't presuppose the objectivity of morality. I am explaining to him a popular theory of moral language that explicitly rejects the objectivity of morality. Denying the objectivity of morality is where the conversation started.

Just as a note, saying "that is wrong" is not on emotivist grounds a description of an emotion (as that would be a proposition), but an expression of an emotion (like how saying, "ouch" doesn't describe that you are feeling pain, but expresses your pain).

As for a short summary, I provided that above. Or you can try wiki or the short intro to the article I already cited.

There are more ways of being wrong than just being false. This is because language does more things than simply state propositions. So noncognitivists will often explain moral language by saying what it's function is. If we have some theory of the function of moral language, then we can also say that some moral statement is wrong in that it poorly performs that function without it thereby being false.

Thanks, that makes sense.

The part I bolded would not be circular on noncognitivism if what is meant isn't really a comment on morality. It would just be disingenuous.

I read the wiki. I just wasn't familiar with the terminology. All they're really doing is claiming morality doesn't exist, kind of a spin off of logical positivism. We've had many threads on this topic - if someone denies the existence of morality, of course, there's little left to discuss. Not unlike when someone who says they believe something can come from nothing.

Whatever dude.
This is incorrect as a description of noncognitivism or about whether there's anything left to discuss. However maybe you don't have any interest in this topic, in which case I'll let you bow out of the thread.

Your condescension is rather irritating.

You have shown a remarkable unwillingness to understand. Frustration warranted IMO. It seems as if you are more interested in condemning it than in understanding what it is.

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Non-cognitivism


http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/moral-cognitivism/
When someone says moral knowledge is impossible and someone else says ethics is "irreal" I conclude they mean morality doesn't exist. You have a different interpretation?

If I believe that knowledge regarding the existence of aliens is impossible to ascertain, do I believe necessarily that aliens do not exist?

Man, the noncognitivist angle is clearly that morality does exist but that its nature differs from your notion of it.

You keep importing the idea "Moral statements are propositions" into your reading of the noncognitivist line. So NO DUH when the noncognitivist says moral statements aren't propositions, you hear "Morality doesn't exist."

I mean, it's almost as though there's some fundamental axiomatic disagreement between you and a moral noncognitivist... crazy, right?

Again, you're better than this.

To have a better world for everyone without anyone giving up anything is objectively good. It's actually a moral value, because it encompasses duty both to yourself and others. It's a myth that moral values are only to refer to dealing with others. It's not easy to dispute the claim that you have a moral duty to yourself to make your life as good as possible. Whether and when you have moral duties to interfere in the lifes in others is complicated, but there is no doubt to me that on some levels objective moral values do exist. It's just that game theory complications ruin the unprepared dabbler when he tries to think of what objective moral values would be and focuses on social interactions.

Read the last sentence in my quote from sep.

Edit:

Or this:

http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/moral-anti-realism/

Another thing which just occurred to me and which I haven't researched so my terminology may cause me to be ejected from my next attempt at a Ph.D. thesis, is:

Logical positivism bit the dust (technical term) because it is self-refuting.

So, when a NC says "Moral statements have no truth value", is that not intended to be a statement about morality containing truth value?

On noncognitivism moral statements have no truth value. That doesn't mean that statements about moral statements have no truth value. For example, if I laugh at a joke, there is no propositional content connected to my laughter and hence it has no truth value. However I can make true statements about my laughter, such as "I am laughing" or "I am laughing because I find that joke funny."

To go back further, this seems to be a discussion of Platonic Forms. Is there a Form of "Morality" of which all other moralities are a corruption to a greater or lesser extent?

To answer that, you have to decide if Forms even exist if you aren't going to bring a deity into the discussion. If the answer is there aren't Forms and there is no deity that is stating such a value, then the answer is there is no objective moral value.

For those who need to disagree, please inform us of what moral value you personally disagree with, but accept as a moral value which you are working to achieve despite your disagreement.

As for the other question if you don't accept a moral value, it doesn't have to matter to you. It matters to others.

Look at the language in the bolded. Does that sound to you like the standard Non- cog view? You also never answered my question, I think my example demonstrates clearly that because you have no knowledge of a thing, does not necessarily imply you believe that thing is non existant.

I have to return to my criticism that you are bending over backward to paint this view the way you want to.